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ALONE IN CHINA: PATRICK J .  HURLEY'S ATTEMPT
TO UNIFY CHINA, 1944-1945
CHAPTER I 
MINER TO STATESMAN
The c a re e r  of P a tr ic k  J .  H urley was a c u rio u s  one. He
tra v e le d  a p a th  to  n a tio n a l  prom inence f u l l  of s h o r tc u ts .  He
s ta r te d  out poor and, no t f o r g e t t in g  t h i s ,  fough t h i s  way to  
th e  to p . H urley , u n fo r tu n a te ly , never r e a l iz e d  th e  d if fe re n c e  
between success in  f a c t  and success in  name. He became a 
g e n e ra l; bu t he never commanded tro o p s . He re c e iv e d  h is  law 
degree from a one y e a r  n ig h t law sch o o l. He was a d ip lom at by 
appointm ent r a th e r  than  t r a in in g ,  and a p o l i t i c i a n  v^o never 
served  in  e le c t iv e  o f f ic e .  These t i t l e s ;  g e n e ra l, law yer, d ip ­
lom at, p o l i t i c i a n ,  re p re se n te d  success to  H urley. He fough t 
fo r  s o c ia l  p o s i t io n  l ik e  a man p o ssessed . He knew p o v e rty , 
d is l ik e d  i t  in te n s e ly ,  and sought by every means to  r a i s e  him­
s e l f  from th e  lowly s t a t io n  to  which he was born. Hurley 
ty p if ie d  in  many ways th e  men who made fo rtu n e s  in  th e  o i l  
f i e ld s  of Oklahoma and Texas.
H urley was a man of many f a c e t s .  He was sc ru p u lo u sly  
h o n e s t. He was b ig , laugh ing , f r ie n d ly .  He b e liev ed  th a t  by 
accum ulating g re a t  w ealth  he could  buy th e  s o c ia l  p o s i t io n  he
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craved  so bad ly . An a n t i - i n t e l l e c t u a l ,  he m is tru s te d  th in k e rs  
w herever he found them, w hether i t  be in  th e  army, th e  govern­
m ent, th e  d ip lo m atic  s e rv ic e , or as le a d e rs  of fo re ig n  
c o u n tr ie s .  H urley had no th ing  in  common w ith  them. Y et, he 
found much in  common w ith  th e  se lf-m ade men l ik e  h im se lf  who 
fre q u e n tly  h e ld  h igh  p o s i t io n s  around th e  w orld . He was a t  
home w ith  Chiang K ai-shek , Joseph S ta l in ,  and even F ran k lin  
R o o sev e lt, fo r  th e se  men emphasized a c tio n  more than  though t. 
H urley re sp e c te d  and found communion w ith  th e se  p roud , s t r a ig h t ­
forw ard men who valued  p o s i t io n  as much as he d id .
H u rle y 's  ro o ts  went back to  th e  l a s t  f r o n t i e r  of th e  
American W est, and i t  was from th e  red  d i r t  h i l l s  of f r o n t ie r  
Oklahoma th a t  P a tr ic k  H urley began h is  journey  to  n a tio n a l  
prom inence. He stopped  a t  many s ta t io n s  along th e  way and 
each one helped  shape th e  man whom R oosevelt e n tru s te d  w ith  
A m erica 's fu tu re  in  th e  Far E as t.
Hurley was an Irishm an through and th rough . H is f a th e r .  
P ie rc e  C N e il  H urley, was an I r i s h  re b e l  who found h is  way to  
Texas in  th e  l a t e  1 8 6 0 's , a f t e r  a  brush w ith  B r i t i s h  troops 
in  I r e la n d . P ie rc e  H urley was a la rg e ,  braw ling  man w ith  a 
qu ick  temper and ready  f i s t s .  He tra v e le d  about Texas and 
Oklahoma, and in  th e  l a t e  1 8 7 0 's m arried  Mary K elly  in  San 
M arcos, Texas. Mary K elly  H urley was as I r i s h  as P ie rc e ; but 
where P ie rc e  was a f i e r y  I r i s h  r e b e l ,  Mary K elly  ep itom ized  
a n o th e r a sp ec t of I r i s h  c u l tu r e .  She had a h ig h  r e s p e c t  fo r  
e d u ca tio n , and passed  th is  on to  h e r  young son P a tr ic k  b e fo re
1 3h e r  un tim ely  d e a th . In 1882, th e  H urley fam ily  moved in to  
Ind ian  T e r r i to ry  and e s ta b l is h e d  a farm in  Coal County, Okla­
homa, on land  owned by Ben Smallwood, an i n f lu e n t i a l  Choctaw 
who l a t e r  became c h ie f  o f th e  Choctaw N ation . L ife  in  Okla­
homa was hard  on th e  H urleys, and P ie rc e  went to  work as a
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day la b o re r  in  th e  c o a l mines a t  Lehigh, Oklahoma.
Born January  8 , 1883, in  In d ian  T e r r i to r y ,  P a t r ic k  J ,  
H urley sp en t h is  e a r ly  ch ildhood  in  P h i l l ip s ,  Lehigh, and on 
th e  farm  re n te d  from Ben Smallwood. The i n f lu e n t i a l  In d ian  
took a l ik in g  to  th e  w h ite  boy l iv in g  on h i s  lan d . Young P a t 
sp en t a g re a t  d e a l of tim e a t  th e  Smallwood m ansion, where he 
saw how th e  i n f lu e n t i a l  peop le  o f Ind ian  T e r r i to ry  occupied 
them se lves. He heard  them t a lk  o f im portan t m a tte rs  and be­
came acq u a in ted  w ith  many of th e  most pow erful peop le  in  th e  
Choctaw N ation . When H urley was not a t  th e  Smallwood home, 
he could  be found runn ing  w ild  in  th e  empty lands of Ind ian  
T e r r i to ry .
L ike h is  f a th e r ,  t h i s  young Irishm an p o ssessed  a v io ­
l e n t  tem per. Even in  h is  you th , young H u rle y 's  temper tended 
to  g e t him in to  t ro u b le .  Once H urley b ea t a man w ith  a  mace 
fash io n ed  from a s t i c k  and a s t e e l  n u t,  and n e a r ly  k i l l e d  him .^ 
In th e  rough co a l m ining t e r r i t o r y ,  t h i s  v io le n t  tem per was an 
a s s e t .
In 1894, a t  th e  age of e lev en , young H urley began work-
^Don Lohbeck, P a t r ic k  J .  H urley (Chicago: Henry Reg-
nery  C o., 1956), l7 - l3 1
^I b id . . 19. ^ I b id . ,  22-25. ^ I b id . . 26.
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ing  in  th e  m ines. His f i r s t  job  was as a t ra p p e r  in  th e  Number 
S ix  Mine of th e  Atoka Coal Mining Company in  P h il l ip . ' , Okla­
homa, Pay was poor and th e  hours lo n g , but he had no 
a l t e r n a t iv e  bu t to  work. His m other had d ied  in  F eb ruary ,
1896, and P ie rc e  H urley in ju re d  h im se lf  in  a f a l l  from a h o rse  
a t  about th e  same tim e . When P a t r i c k 's  e ld e r  b ro th e r  l e f t  th e  
fa m ily , he found h im se lf  th e  s o le  p ro v id e r  f o r  th e  H urley 
brood. Work in  th e  mines h e ld  no a t t r a c t i o n  fo r  young H urley , 
and he s to l e  every  moment he cou ld  to  v i s i t  h i s  f r i e n d s ,  th e  
Choctaws. ^ O pportun ity  soon knocked f o r  H urley when Tom 
G o lig h tly , an i t i n e r a n t  te a c h e r , wandered in to  P h i l l i p s ,  Okla­
homa,
G o lig h tly  made a c a re e r  on th e  f r o n t i e r  e s ta b l is h in g  
n ig h t  schoo ls to  tea ch  uneducated fro n tie rsm en  th e  elem ents 
o f re a d in g , w r i t in g ,  and a r i th m e tic .  When G o lig h tly  opened 
h is  school in  P h i l l i p s ,  H urley was among th e  f i r s t  to  a t te n d . 
When H urley moved to  th e  head of th e  c la s s ,  i t  was ap p aren t 
th a t  th e  young Irishm an p o ssessed  a keen mind, G o lig h tly  
took  a l ik in g  to  th e  young man and encouraged him in  h is  
p u r s u i t s .  At G o l ig h t ly 's  sch o o l, H urley f i r s t  r e a l iz e d  th e
A
p o te n t i a l  of h is  m ind .'' But, though ts of schoo l and m ining 
l e f t  him w ith  th e  o u tb reak  of th e  Spanish-A m erican War,
The Spanish-Am erican War gave H urley th e  chance he 
sought to  leav e  th e  d rea ry  mines of P h i l l i p s ,  Oklahoma.
Theodore R o o sev e lt, th en  A s s is ta n t  S e c re ta ry  of Navy, was r e -
^Ib id , . 27-28. ^Ib id , .  30.
5
c ru i t in g  cowboys to  form a v o lu n te e r  cav a lry  reg im en t. Al­
though he was only f i f t e e n  y e a rs  o ld , H urley v o lu n te e re d  and 
go t as f a r  as Tampa, F lo r id a , b e fo re  th e  a u th o r i t i e s  r e a l iz e d  
th a t  he  was under age. H urley never made i t  to  Cuba, bu t he 
re tu rn e d  to  Oklahoma determ ined never again  to  work in  th e  
m i n e s H u r l e y  d r i f t e d  around working as a cowboy, but knew 
th a t  a u n iv e r s i ty  ed u ca tio n  h e ld  th e  key to  th e  success he 
so d e sp e ra te ly  w anted.
He became determ ined  to  ga in  adm ittance  to  th e  Ind ian  
U n iv e rs ity , l a t e r  Bacone C o llege , lo c a te d  j u s t  o u ts id e  Mus­
kogee, Oklahoma, H urley lacked  th e  p r e r e q u is i te s  to  a tte n d  
th e  U n iv e rs ity , bu t h i s  p e r s is te n c e  won him accep tance  to  th e  
p rep  school d iv is io n  of th e  Ind ian  U n iv e rs ity , He com pleted 
h is  work th e re  in  one y e a r  and then  he e n ro lle d  in  r e g u la r  
c o lle g e  co u rse s . He soon became one of th e  most a c t iv e  s tu ­
d en ts a t  th e  U n iv e rs ity , He p layed  a French horn in  th e  
o rc h e s tra ,  was a f i r s t  baseman on th e  b a se b a ll team, sang in  
th e  U n iv e rs ity  c h o ir ,  cap ta in ed  th e  f o o tb a l l  team, le d  a de­
b a te  squad, and e d ite d  th e  school newspaper. In f a c t ,  young 
H urley a c ted  as a s s i s t a n t  p ro fe s so r  on th e  f a c u l ty  of h is to r y  
w h ile  a sophomore. In  1905, H urley rec e iv e d  h is  degree  from 
th e  Ind ian  U n iv e rs ity  and became a docket c le rk  in  th e  in -
Q
t r u d e r  d iv is io n  of th e  Ind ian  S e rv ice  O ffice  in  Muskogee, 
W hile working fo r  th e  In d ian  S e rv ice , H urley tu rn ed  
h is  a t te n t io n  to  law . He read  fo r  th e  S ta te  Bar Exam ination
^Ibid,. 30. Qlbid,. 32-37,
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in  th e  o f f ic e  of Soaper, H uckleberry , and Owen, one of th e  
le a d in g  law firm s in  Muskogee. He wanted to  ta k e  th e  exami­
n a tio n  w ith o u t g e t t in g  a law d eg ree , but f r ie n d s  convinced him 
th a t  to  succeed in  law he needed a deg ree . They arranged  fo r  
H urley to  be adm itted  to  Y ale. He re s ig n e d  from th e  Ind ian  
S e rv ice  in  1907 and headed E a s t,^  On h is  way to  Y ale , he 
stopped  to  v i s i t  W ashington, D. C.
From th e  moment of h is  a r r i v a l ,  H urley was hypno tized  
by th e  n a tio n a l  c a p i t a l .  He knew th a t  he must seek  h is  f o r ­
tune  in  W ashington, D. C. The drama and th e  excitem en t of 
government g ripped  th e  young fro n tie rsm an  l ik e  a s p e l l .  A ll 
though ts of Y ale l e f t  him, and he sought adm ission to  a u n i­
v e r s i ty  near th e  c a p i ta l  c i t y .  U n fo rtu n a te ly , he found 
h im se lf  u n q u a lif ie d  to  e n te r  any of th e  u su a l law schoo ls be­
cause of h is  in s u f f i c i e n t  academic background. He f i n a l ly  
w rangled adm ittance  in to  th e  N a tio n a l U n iv e rs ity  Law School 
where he a tte n d e d  n ig h t c la s s e s ,  A y e a r  l a t e r ,  1908, he 
re c e iv e d  h is  Bachelor of Laws degree a t  th e  age of tw enty- 
f iv e .^ ^  H urley was ready  to  move on to  h ig h e r th in g s .
He re tu rn e d  to  T ulsa and, in  1908, became a p a r tn e r  in  
th e  law firm  of Gregg, Gormley, and H urley. In 1909 th e  firm  
d is so lv e d  and H urley took over the  b u s in e ss . He soon had a 
f lo u r is h in g  law p r a c t ic e ,  p e r ta in in g  m ostly  to  o i l ,  m ining 
r ig h t s  and land t i t l e s .  F req u en tly , H urley would accep t p a r ­
c e ls  of land  in  payment f o r  h is  s e rv ic e s ,  and in  only a very
^Ibid. . 38. ^^Ibid,, 38-39.
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few y e a rs  th e  booming economy in  and around T ulsa  sky rocketed  
th e  v a lu e  of H u rle y 's  r e a l  e s t a t e .  In  th i s  way, H urley s t a r te d  
what was to  become a r a th e r  c o n s id e ra b le  fo r tu n e . He became 
one o f th e  le a d in g  c i t i z e n s  in  T u lsa  and was e le c te d  as th e  
f i r s t  p re s id e n t  o f th e  T ulsa County Bar A sso c ia tio n  in  1910, 
That same y e a r , H urley was d ra f te d  as th e  R epublican c a n d i­
d a te  f o r  th e  S ta te  Senate from th e  d i s t r i c t  made up of T ulsa  
and W ashington C o u n tie s , He ran  an e n th u s ia s t ic  campaign and 
lo s t  by only  n in e  v o t e s , T h e  n ex t y e a r , H u rle y 's  p a th  to  
success sh o rten ed  m easurably .
In 1911, V ic to r  Locke, J r , ,  a boyhood f r ie n d  of Hur­
l e y 's ,  became p r in c ip a l  c h ie f  of th e  Choctaw N ation , Locke 
soon g o t r i d  of th e  o ld  t r i b a l  law yer, Ormsby McHarg, th e  
A s s is ta n t  S e c re ta ry  of th e  Departm ent of Commerce and Labor in  
th e  R oosevelt a d m in is tr a t io n , and tu rn ed  to  h is  o ld  f r ie n d ,
P a t H urley , H urley was appo in ted  a tto rn e y  f o r  th e  Choctaws on 
November 27, 1 9 1 1 , With th e  appointm ent in  h is  p o c k e t, Hur­
ley  re tu rn e d  to  W ashington and resumed h is  study  of law a t  
George W ashington U n iv e rs ity  and, in  1912, he was ad m itted  to  
p r a c t ic e  b e fo re  th e  U nited S ta te s  Supreme C ourt, As th e  Choc­
taw law yer. H urley fough t two n o ta b le  c a se s , one to  p rev e n t 
th e  reopen ing  of Choctaw r o l l s  to  adm it M is s is s ip p i  Choctaws, 
and th e  o th e r  to  f o r e s t a l l  an a ttem p t by J ,  Frank McMurray,
^^I b id , , 40-41 , T ulsa  D aily  W orld. November 16, 1910,
12U, S , , Departm ent of th e  I n t e r i o r ,  R eport of th e  
Commissioner to  th e  F ive  C iv il iz e d  T rib es  to  th e  È e c r e ta ^  
o f th e  I n t e r io r  f o r  th e  F is c a l  Year Ending. June 50, 1912 
(W ashington: U, S, Government P r in t in g  O ff ic e , 1912), 34-35,
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an Oklahoma p o l i t i c i a n ,  to  r a id  th e  In d ian  c o f f e r s .  *' Both 
Locke and H urley , however, l e f t  t h e i r  p o s i t io n s  w ith  th e  Choc­
taws when war broke o u t in  1917,
H urley had v is io n s  o f h e ro ic a l ly  le a d in g  tro o p s  in to  
b a t t l e .  P r io r  to  1914, however, h i s  only m i l i t a r y  ex p erien ce  
had been h is  b r i e f  so jo u rn  to  Tampa, F lo r id a ,  h i s  membership 
in  th e  In d ian  T e r r i to ry  v o lu n te e r  m i l i t i a ,  and as a C aptain  
in  th e  N a tio n a l Guard d a tin g  from March 17, 1 9 1 4 . On th e  
b a s is  of th i s  e x p e rie n c e , H urley f e l t  he was f u l ly  q u a l i f ie d  
to  se rv e  as a commissioned o f f i c e r  in  th e  r e g u la r  array of th e  
U nited  S ta te s ,  When th e  Oklahoma N a tio n a l Guard was a c t iv a te d  
fo llo w in g  th e  U nited  S ta te s  e n try  in to  war in  Europe, th e  
D em ocratic-dom inated Guard had no command p o s i t io n  open f o r  
R epublican  P a t H urley , H urley was f e a r f u l  t h a t  th e  war would 
pass him by, n o t g iv in g  him a chance to  se rv e  h i s  co u n try .
He a p p lie d  f o r  a r e g u la r  army commission and on August 18,
1917, he  was a p p o in ted  to  th e  ran k  o f Major in  th e  Judge Ad­
v o ca te  G e n e ra l 's  D e p a r t m e n t , H e  was a ss ig n ed  to  duty in  
W ashington a d m in is te r in g  th e  N a tio n a l D ra f t A ct, bu t he  was
13Lohbeck, P a t r ic k  J ,  H u rley . 46-69,
S tatem ent of N a tio n a l Guard R ecord ," C harles F, 
B a r r e t t ,  Adj, Gen. of th e  S ta te  o f Oklahoma to  H urley , Ju ly  17, 
1928; in  U n iv e rs ity  o f Oklahoma, B iz z e l l  L ib ra ry , D iv is io n  of 
M anuscrip ts , P a t r ic k  J ,  H urley C o lle c t io n . C ite d  h e r e a f te r  as 
H urley P apers ,
‘ 'L ohbeck, P a t r ic k  J ,  H u rley . 70.
S tatem ent o f World War S e rv ice  of L t ,  Col. P a tr ic k  
J ,  H urley , Judge Advocate G en era l' s D epartm ent," C harles H, 
B ridges to  H urley , December 18, 1928; H urley P ap e rs .
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r e s t l e s s  and never ceased  h is  e f f o r t s  to  g e t t r a n s f e r r e d  over­
se a s , He f i n a l ly  succeeded in  g e t t in g  new o rd e rs  and, in  
A p r i l ,  1918, H urley c ro ssed  th e  A tla n t ic  w ith  th e  f i r s t  de­
tachm ent of American a r t i l l e r y  to  go to  F rance. A ssigned to  
th e  s t a f f  of G eneral E rn es t H ines, H urley found h im se lf  again  
a law yer in  un ifo rm . Time and a g a in , he a p p lie d  fo r  a t r a n s ­
f e r  to  th e  l in e ,  bu t s in c e  he lacked  q u a l i f ic a t io n s ,  h is  
re q u e s ts  were den ied . The war drew to  a c lo s e , and H urley had
s t i l l  no t ta s te d  a c t io n . On th e  l a s t  day of th e  war. H urley ,
18in  d e sp e ra tio n , made a f i n a l  b id  fo r  g lo ry .
Although ass ig n ed  to  a s t a f f  p o s i t io n ,  f a r  behind th e  
l in e s .  H urley was determ ined  to  be d eco ra ted  fo r  v a lo r .  He 
a rran g ed  to  c a r ry  a message from one a r t i l l e r y  command p o s t 
to  a n o th e r , and, as a r e s u l t ,  th e  Army awarded H urley th e  
S i lv e r  S t a r , I n  th e  occupation  which fo llow ed . H urley won
th e  D is tin g u ish e d  S e rv ice  medal fo r  n e g o tia t io n  fo r  th e  occu-
20p a tio n  of th e  Duchy of Luxembourg, He re tu rn e d  to  th e  
U nited  S ta te s  on May 30, 1919, a d eco ra ted  war h e ro .
Before H urley l e f t  th e  U nited S ta te s  in  1917, he met 
W ashington d eb u tan te  Ruth W ilson, th e  daugh ter of Admiral 
Henry W ilson, th e  commander o f th e  A tla n t ic  F le e t ,  On f i r s t
^^Lohbeck, P a tr ic k  J ,  H u rley . 70-71,
^^Ib id , .  71,
19The most c r i t i c a l  account o f how Hurley q u a l i f ie d  fo r  
t h i s  award i s  in  Drew Pearson and R obert Sharon A llen , More 
Merry-Go-Rotind (Nev; York; L iv e r ig h t ,  I n c . , P u b lis h e rs , 1932),
^ ^ I b id , , 163-164.
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s ig h t ,  H urley knew th a t  he wanted Ruth W ilson to  be h is  w ife . 
She was th e  most b e a u t i f u l  and c e r ta in ly  one of th e  most in ­
f l u e n t i a l  d eb u tan te s  in  W ashington, On t h e i r  second d a te , 
H urley asked th e  A d m ira l's  daugh ter to  m arry him. On Decem­
ber 5 , 1919, a f t e r  a c o u rtsh ip  c a r r ie d  on p a r t i a l l y  by
21correspondence from F rance , th e  p a i r  wed. H urley re tu rn e d  
to  T ulsa  w ith  h is  b r id e  and s e t t l e d  down to  in c re a se  h is  
fo r tu n e .
He soon became a lead in g  f ig u re  in  Oklahoma p o l i t i c s .
In  1921, he  p lay ed  a key r o le  in  s e t t l i n g  th e  ra c e  r i o t s  in
T u lsa , head ing  a c i t i z e n s ' com m ittee to  m a in ta in  o rd e r . He
re fu s e d  to  run  f o r  o f f ic e  b u t, in  1924, was a d e le g a te  to
th e  R epublican N a tio n a l Convention in  C leveland , In  1926,
he le d  th e  Oklahoma S ta te  Convention of th e  R epublican p a r ty ,
where he tu rn ed  down th e  g u b e rn a to r ia l  nom ination . H u rle y 's
p o l i t i c a l  r e t ic e n c e  was s h o r t - l iv e d ,  f o r  e a r ly  in  1928 he
22came ou t in  suppo rt of H erbert Hoover,
H urley accep ted  th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  of managing th e  
s t a t e  p re -co n v en tio n  campaign f o r  Hoover, The o ld  guard  Re­
p u b lican s  in  Oklahoma favored  S enato r C harles C u r tis  of K ansas, 
w ith  secondary suppo rt fo r  Frank 0, Lowden, H urley met w ith  
d e fe a t  a t  th e  s t a t e  convention  when th e  o ld  guard u n ite d  to  
c lo s e  th e  door on Hoover, But a t  Kansas C ity  th e  nom ination 
o f H erbert Hoover p u t H urley in  v i r t u a l  c o n tro l  of th e  Repub-
^^Lohbeck, P a tr ic k  H urley . 75,
^^I b id , . 76-79,
23l ic a n  p a r ty  in  Oklahoma.
H urley a v id ly  campaigned fo r  Hoover in  th e  p r e s id e n t ia l  
e le c t io n .  He stumped Oklahoma in  h is  p r iv a te  a i r p la n e ,  f l y ­
ing  to  sm all towns where he made over s ix ty  sp eech es . Due 
p a r t l y  to  th e se  e f f o r t s ,  Hoover c a r r ie d  Oklahoma. As a r e ­
w ard, Hoover o f fe re d  th e  Oklahoman s e v e ra l  jo b s in  W ashington.
and H urley accep ted  th e  p o s t o f A s s is ta n t  S e c re ta ry  o f W ar,^^
? ROn March 15, 1929, he assumed h is  new d u t ie s .  S ev e ra l 
months l a t e r ,  th e  S e c re ta ry  of War, James W. Good, d ied  and 
th e  Oklahoma law yer became th e  f i f t y - f i f t h  S e c re ta ry  of War 
on December 9, 1929, a t  th e  age of f o r ty - s ix .
H urley  s a i le d  th e  War Departm ent th rough  storm y se a s .
In  one of h i s  f i r s t  o f f i c i a l  a c t s ,  he b locked th e  t r a n s f e r  o f 
th e  A r t i l l e r y  School a t  F o rt S i l l ,  Oklahoma, to  Gamp Bragg, 
N orth  C a ro lin a . In  th e  summer of 1931, H urley v i s i t e d  th e  
P h i l ip p in e  Is la n d s  and came ou t a g a in s t  independence, s t a t in g  
t h a t  most of th e  p o p u la tio n  th e re  were n o t ready  to  be f re e d . 
When he appeared  b e fo re  a  Senate  com m ittee h o ld in g  h e a rin g s  
on th e  H aw es-C utting B u ll, a m easuie which would g iv e  inde­
pendence to  th e  I s la n d s , H urley exploded \dien th e  com m ittee 
d isa g re e d  w ith  him. He c a l le d  th e  com m ittee a  s ta r-cham ber 
h e a r in g s  and s ta lk e d  o u t. This was th e  f i r s t  of H u rle y 's  many
^^I b id . .  80-81.
^^Pearson and A llen , More Merry=Go=Round. 16^  ^
^^New York Times. March 13, 1929, 1.
^^I b id . .  A p ril 13, 1929, 3.
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d ram atic  appearances b e fo re  Senate  com m ittees. During Hur­
l e y 's  te n u re  as S e c re ta ry  of War, he e s ta b l is h e d  th e  War 
P o l ic ie s  Commission and ap p o in ted  G eneral Douglas MacArthur
as C hief of S ta f f ,  in  o p p o s itio n  to  th e  w ishes of John J ,
28P e rsh in g , But th e  g r e a te s t  t e s t  f o r  H urley as S e c re ta ry  of 
War came in  1932.
H u rley ' s su p p re ss io n  of th e  Bonus R io ts  in  1932 brought 
him a la n d s l id e  o f n a t io n a l  p u b l ic i ty .  An array of unemployed 
v e te ra n s  had assem bled in  and around W ashington, D. C ., de­
manding th a t  Congress a p p ro p r ia te  funds to  pay th e  bonus vo ted  
in  1924. Tension ro s e  and, on J u ly  26, 1932, r i o t s  broke ou t 
which th e  W ashington p o l ic e  subdued w ith  g u n f ire . On Ju ly  28,
1932, H urley is su e d  an o rd e r  fo r  f e d e r a l  tro o p s  to  c le a r  th e
29a re a . The bonus m archers d isp e rse d , bu t t h i s  a c t  became a
p o l i t i c a l  i s s u e  which c o n tr ib u te d  no sm all p a r t  to  th e  d e fe a t
30of th e  R epublicans and H u r le y 's  r e tu r n  to  p r iv a te  l i f e .
A lthough H urley l e f t  th e  governm ent, he  rem ained on th e  
n a tio n a l  scen e . He was a vocal c r i t i c  of th e  new a d m in is tra ­
t io n  bu t p u b lic ly  endorsed  some R o o sev e lt m easures, such as
31
th e  N a tio n a l Recovery A ct. P r iv a te  c i t i z e n  H urley devoted
^^I b id . . February  12, 1932, 6 .
^^Lohbeck, P a t r ic k  J .  H u rley . 98-101.
^ % u rle y  to  Douglas M acArthur, Ju ly  28, 1932; H urley
P ap ers .
30
See c o l le c t io n  of c lip p in g s  in  H urley C lip p ing  Book, 
1932; H urley P ap e rs .
^-Lohbeck, P a t r ic k  J .  H u rley . 138-139.
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h im se lf  to  h is  la rg e  law p ra c t ic e  and to  v a rio u s  b u sin ess
e n te r p r is e s .  In  1935, H urley h e lp ed  o rg an ize  th e  I n t e r s t a t e
09
O il Commission, a fu n c tio n a ry , re g u la to ry  o rg a n iz a tio n .
H urley reo rg a n ize d  th e  R ic h f ie ld  O il Company, b r in g in g  i t  
back from bankruptcy , and scon had reg a in ed  much o f th e  f o r ­
tune  he l o s t  in  th e  c ra sh  of 1929,^^ On March 18, 1938, th e  
e x p ro p r ia tio n  of o i l  p ro p e r t ie s  in  Mexico brought H urley in to  
an in te r n a t io n a l  d isp u te  fo r  th e  f i r s t  tim e s in c e  he had a r ­
ranged f o r  American tro o p s  to  e n te r  Luxembourg a t  th e  end of 
World War I .^ ^
H urley , a c tin g  as le g a l  counsel f o r  th e  S in c la i r  O il 
i n t e r e s t s  in  Mexico, took  a d i r e c t  i n t e r e s t  in  th e  se ttle m e n t 
o f th e  e x p ro p ria tio n  c o n tro v e rsy . The U nited S ta te s  govern­
ment was h e s i ta n t  to  ta k e  a s tro n g  s tan d  on th e  m a tte r ,  knowing
th a t  in te rv e n tio n  of any s o r t  by th e  U nited S ta te s  government
35could  p r e c ip i t a t e  a r e v o lu tio n  in  Mexico, With government 
su p p o rt, however, th e  m ajor American o i l  companies w ith  h o ld ­
ings in  Mexico s e le c te d  a n e g o tia to r  to  d e a l w ith  th e  Mexican 
governm ent, Donald R ichberg , a New Deal f a v o r i t e ,  was s e le c te d  
to  d e a l w ith  th e  Mexican governm ent. H urley , f e a r f u l  th a t  th e  
in t e r e s t s  of Harry F, S in c la i r  had been n e g le c te d  by R ichberg , 
went to  Mexico and a rranged  a s e p a ra te  s e ttle m e n t on b e h a lf  of
^^Ib id , .  146, ^^I b id ,
^'^ew  York Times. March 19, 1938, 1,
35The b e s t g en e ra l trea tm e n t of th e  o i l  e x p ro p r ia tio n  
co n tro v e rsy  i s  in  Howard F. C lin e , The U nited  S ta te s  Mex­
ico  (Cambridge, M ass .: H arvard U n iv e rs ity  P re s s , l9 6 5 ) , x i i ,  
x l i i .
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S in c la i r  w ith  th e  Mexican governm ent. Josephus D a n ie ls , th e  
American Ambassador to  Mexico, du ring  th e  n e g o tia t io n s  a sc r ib e d  
H u rle y 's  success to  h is  a b i l i t y  to  communicate w ith  th e  Mexi­
can P re s id e n t,  Lazaro C ardenas, on th e  b a s is  of a warm p e rso n a l
36f r ie n d s h ip . In  th e  y e a rs  Hurley was occupied w ith  th e  Mexi­
can e x p ro p r ia tio n s  c a se , th e  American n a tio n  moved c lo s e r  to  
w ar, both  in  Europe and th e  P a c i f ic .
H urley was n o t o b liv io u s  to  th e se  developm ents. As 
war approached, h is  s ta tem en ts  on th e  in te r n a t io n a l  s i t u a ­
t io n  undersco red  th e  f a c t  t h a t ,  w h ile  he d id  n o t su p p o rt 
F ra n k lin  R ooseve lt on most o f h i s  dom estic p o l ic i e s ,  he  d id  
approve of th e  P r e s id e n t 's  growing involvem ent in  Europe and 
th e  Far E a s t. On November 7 , 1939, a f t e r  war broke ou t in  
Europe, in  a speech to  th e  overseas Masonic Lodge a t  P ro v i­
dence, Rhode I s la n d , H u r l ^  s tro n g ly  a tta c k e d  A m erica 's 
n e u t r a l i t y  as embodied in  th e  N e u tra l i ty  A cts,^^  On May 19, 
1940, he exp ressed  h is  approval o f  th e  d e fen se  program  out= 
l in e d  by P re s id e n t R oosevelt and added th a t  th e re  was a need 
fo r  in c re a s in g  n o n -p a r tis a n  suppo rt of R o o se v e lt 's  emer­
gency n a tio n a l  d e fen se  p r o g r a m . T h r e e  weeks l a t e r ,  on 
June 7, H u r l^  c a l le d  on P re s id e n t R ooseve lt and ag a in  r e i t e r -
36Josephus D a n ie ls , S h ir t-S le e v e s  Diplomat (Chapel 
H i l l :  The U n iv e rs ity  of N orth C a ro lin a  P re s s , 1947), 265.
37T y p esc rip t copy o f A rm istice  Day Address d e liv e re d  
by H urley to  th e  Overseas Masonic Lodge, P rov idence , Rhode 
I s la n d , November 11, 1939; H urley P apers .
^®Chtcago H erald  American. May 19, 1940, H urley C lip ­
p ing  Book, 1940; H urley P ap ers .
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a te d  h is  suppo rt of R o o se v e lt 's  n a tio n a l  de fense  program .
T his m eeting a ls o  sparked  rumors th a t  H urley was being con­
s id e re d  as a p o s s ib le  S e c re ta ry  of War under R oosevelt in  th e  
even t th e  P re s id e n t re o rg a n iz e d  h i s  c a b i n e t , H u r l e y  con­
t in u e d  to  p re s s  fo r  b ip a r t is a n s h ip  on th e  q u e s tio n  of n a tio n a l  
d e fen se  and on September 9, 1940, came ou t s tro n g ly  fo r  th e  
r e p e a l  of th e  N e u tra l i ty  Act in  support f o r  P re s id e n t 
R o o s e v e l t , H u r l e y  co n tin u ed  to  fav o r th e  P r e s id e n t 's  de­
fe n se  program  in  p u b lic  s ta tem en ts  and by p a r t i c ip a t io n  in  
r e s e rv e  t r a in in g  d u rin g  th e  y e a r 1941,
Although H urley had h e ld  a re s e rv e  o f f i c e r 's  commission 
and th e  rank  of C olonel f o r  many y e a r s ,  he had taken  p a r t  in  
le s s  th an  fo u r weeks of t r a in in g  between th e  tim e of h i s  d i s ­
charge  in  1919 and O ctober 31, 1941,^^ E arly  in  1940, 
however. H urley was inform ed th a t  he  was e l i g i b le  f o r  promo­
t io n  to  th e  rank  of B r ig a d ie r  General in  th e  even t o f n a tio n a l  
emergency; he was r e ta in e d  on th e  e l i g i b i l i t y  l i s t  f o r  th e  c a l ­
endar y e a r  1941,^^ In  November, 1941, H urley p a r t i c ip a te d  in
44tw e n ty -e ig h t days of t r a in in g  in  North C a ro lin a , On Decem-
qg
T ulsa  D aily  W orld. June 8 , 1940, H urley C lipp ing  
Book, 1940; H urley P ap ers ,
‘^ ^New York H erald  T ribune , June 8, 1940, H urley C lip ­
p ing  ^ook, 1940; H urley P apers ,
^^T ulsa  D aily  W orld. June 15, 1940, and New York Tim es.
June 16, 1940, H urley C lipp ing  Book, 1940; H urley P apers ,
^^"S tatem ent of S e rv ice  fo r  L ongevity P ay ,"  November 1, 
1941; H urley P ap ers ,
^^A dju tan t G eneral to  H urley , January  15, 1940, and 
A d ju tan t G eneral to  H urley , A p ril 2 , 1941; H urley P apers ,
^ U ,  S. Army S p e c ia l Order No, 251, O ctober 25, 1941,
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ber 4 , 1941, H urley in  an in te rv ie w  w ith  G eneral George C, 
M arsha ll inform ed th e  C hief of S ta f f  t h a t  he d id  n o t want a 
s t a f f  p o s i t io n  in  W ashington and did. n o t want to  se rv e  u n le ss  
war a c tu a l ly  broke ou t and u n le s s  he had an o p p o rtu n ity  to  go 
o v e r s e a s . 45 Three days l a t e r  th e  U nited  S ta te s  was in  war.
H urley was on a b u sin ess  t r i p  to  V enezuela when th e  
Japanese  bombed P e a rl  H arbor, When he re tu rn e d  to  th e  U nited 
S ta te s ,  he  w ro te  a l e t t e r  to  P re s id e n t R oosevelt which changed 
th e  p o s i t io n  he  had tak en  in  h i s  t a l k  w ith  G eneral M arsha ll 
a few weeks e a r l i e r .  H urley inform ed th e  P re s id e n t on Decem­
ber 24, th a t  he  would se rv e  in  any c a p a c ity  and a t  any p la c e ,
46bu t added th a t  he p re fe r r e d  to  se rv e  on th e  l i n e .  R oosevelt 
soon found a p la c e  fo r  th e  ram bunctious H urley ,
The Japanese  in v a s io n  o f th e  P h il ip p in e  Is la n d s  caught 
American fo rc e s  in  a weak p o s i t io n .  In  le s s  than  a month, Amer­
ic a n  and P h il ip p in e  tro o p s  under th e  command of G eneral Douglas 
MacArthur had been fo rc e d  in to  th e  m ountainous Bataan pen in ­
s u la  where they  co n tin u ed  to  f ig h t  a bloody, h o ld in g  a c t io n .
I t  became c le a r  in  W ashington th a t  G eneral MacArthur would 
have to  be re - s u p p lie d  w ith  ammunition in  o rd e r  to  co n tin u e  
h is  r e s i s ta n c e  a g a in s t  th e  Japanese  in v a d e rs . Supply of 
MacArthur was made d i f f i c u l t  because th e  Japanese  had e s ta b ­
l is h e d  a  b lockade around th e  P h i l ip p in e  I s la n d s . I t  was
Hq. 3rd Army A rea; H urley P ap ers ,
^ % u rle y  O ffice  D iary , 1941, December 4 , 1941; H urley
P ap ers .
^^H urley to  R o o sev e lt, December 24, 1941; H urley P ap e rs ,
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obvious th a t  unusual means would have to  be adopted to  save 
th e  be leagured  Americans on th e  Bataan p e n in su la .
The War Departm ent soon evolved a p lan  to  a id  MacArthur. 
A h ig h -ran k in g  o f f i c e r  w ith  th e  proven a b i l i t y  to  o p e ra te  o u t­
s id e  e x is t in g  m i l i ta r y  channels would be se n t to  A u s tr a l ia  
w ith  a la rg e  sum o f American cu rren cy . When in  A u s tr a l ia ,  
t h i s  o f f i c e r  would commission sh ip s  to  run  th e  blockade to  
B ataan. Q uite  n a tu r a l ly ,  t h i s  would be no easy ta s k .  I t  r e ­
q u ire d  th e  s e rv ic e s  of an o f f i c e r  who had p r e s t ig e ,  energy , 
and n e rv e ,
P a tr ic k  J .  H u r l^  was a n a tu ra l  ch o ice  f o r  t h i s  m iss io n . 
His s t a tu r e  as a form er S e c re ta ry  o f War and as a lea d in g  f i g ­
u re  in  th e  R epublican p a r ty  gave him f a r  more a u th o r i ty  than  
an o rd in a iy  Colonel in  th e  U nited S ta te s  Army would c a r ry . 
H u rle y 's  v igorous p u r s u i t  o f th e  n e g o tia t io n s  concern ing  th e  
Mexican o i l  e x p ro p r ia tio n  co n tro v ersy  c le a r ly  dem onstra ted  h is  
a b i l i t y  to  a cc o n ^ lish  a  d i f f i c u l t  ta s k  a g a in s t  s iz a b le  opposi­
t io n .  M oreover, H urley , considered  too  o ld  to  command tro o p s ,
could  be spared  fo r  t h i s  m ission  w h ile  younger r e g u la r  army
49o f f ic e r s  were needed in  tro o p  ccmunand p o s i t io n s .
Two o th e r  f a c to r s  made H urley emminently s u i ta b le  fo r  
th e  m issio n . H urley and MacArthur had been f r ie n d s  s in c e  
MacArthur ro se  to  th e  p o s i t io n  of C hief o f S ta f f  under H urley
^^Dwight D. Eisenhow er, Crusade in  Europe (Garden C ity , 
New York: Doubleday and Company, 195J), 25.
^ ^ I b id . . 25.
^^Lohbeck, P a tr ic k  J .  H urley . 158.
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as S e c re ta ry  of War, Secondly, H urley had been a staunch  ad­
v o ca te  of a b ip a r t is a n  n a tio n a l  d e fense  program in  th e  y ears  
p reced in g  th e  w ar. By g iv in g  H urley th i s  im portan t ta s k  
R oosevelt would un d ersco re  h is  in te n t io n  of making th e  war e f ­
f o r t  t m l y  b ip a r t is a n .
H urley had a sc a n t two days to  p rep a re  fo r  h is  b lock ­
ade runn ing  m iss io n . On F rid a y , January  16, 1942, he 
c o n fe rre d  w ith  G eneral George C, M arsh a ll, th e  C hief of S ta f f ,  
who inform ed him th a t  he had been s e le c te d  to  c a rry  out th e  
re -su p p ly  of G eneral M a c A r t h u r , T h e  nex t day. H urley r e ­
tu rn ed  to  th e  War Department where he met w ith  M arsha ll again  
and was b r ie fe d  in  d e t a i l  on th e  assignm ent by G eneral Dwight 
D, E isenhow er, then  th e  c h ie f  of th e  O perations D iv is io n  of 
th e  G eneral S ta f f ,  M arsha ll d e s ig n a ted  H urley as a p e rso n a l 
r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  of th e  C hief of S ta f f  to  co o p era te  w ith  th e  
commanding g e n e ra l. U nited  S ta te s  fo rc e s  in  A u s tr a l ia ,  fo r  
o rg an iz in g  and d isp a tc h in g  su p p lie s  to  G eneral Douglas 
M acArthur' s command in  th e  P h il ip p in e s ,^ ^  When H urley asked 
when he was to  le a v e , Eisenhower inform ed him to  r e tu rn  to  th e
War Department by m idn igh t, and to  be ready f o r  extended
S2du ty . H u rle y 's  day was no t y e t over.
That same day. H urley met w ith  P re s id e n t R oosevelt who
^^Hurley O ffice  D iary , 1942, January  16, 1942; H urley 
P ap ers , Eisenhow er, Crusade in  Europe. 25,
'^% urley  O ffice  D iary , 1942, January  17, 1942; George C. 
M arsha ll to  H urley , January  17, 1942; H urley P apers ,
Eisenhow er, Crusade in  Europe, 25, M arshall to_________ bur
Dwight D, Eisenhow er, January  l7 ,  1% 2; H urley P ap ers ,
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spoke w ith  him b r i e f ly  and inform ed him th a t  h is  name had been
forw arded to  th e  Congress w ith  th e  recommendation th a t  he be
prom oted to  th e  tem porary rank  of B rig a d ie r  G enera l, By one
o 'c lo c k  in  th e  m orning, January  18, 1942, H urley had l e f t
53W ashington by a i r  on h is  s e c r e t  m issio n .
H urley d id  no t reach  A u s tr a l ia  on th e  f i r s t  t r y .  Be 
cause  of bad w eath er, h i s  p lan e  was grounded a t  Ham ilton F ie ld  
in  C a li fo rn ia  f o r  more than  two weeks. During th a t  tim e Hur­
le y  re c e iv e d  news th a t  h i s  prom otion to  B r ig a d ie r  G eneral had 
been approved and a ls o ,  to  h is  s u r p r i s e ,  t h a t  he had been ap­
p o in te d  th e  f i r s t  American m in is te r  to  New Z ealand , He was to
assume th e  d u t ie s  of m in is te r  upon com pletion  of h i s  m il i ta r y
-  54 assignm en t.
In  e a r ly  February  H urley a r r iv e d  in  A u s tr a l ia .  He im­
m ed ia te ly  began to  round up sh ip s  f o r  h is  m issio n  and by 
February  8 , he  had c o l le c te d  s ix  sh ip s  w ith  crew s. He cab led  
G eneral M arsha ll th a t  he  was p rep a red  to  begin  th e  re -su p p ly  
of M acArthur on B ataan, Two days l a t e r  H urley re c e iv e d  a 
m essage from M ajor G eneral George B re t t ,  th e  American r e p r e ­
s e n ta t iv e  on th e  A m eric an -B ritish -D u tc h -A u s tra lia n  command 
a t  S u rab a ja , This message s a id  th a t  naval a u th o r i t i e s  r e ­
fu sed  to  g ra n t p e rm iss io n  fo r  H u r le y 's  sh ip s  to  s a i l  f o r  
B ataan , H urley im m ediately flew  to  S u rab a ja , In  d isc u ss io n s
53H urley O ffice  D iary , 1942, January  17, 1942; H urley
P a p e rs ,
54Lohbeck, P a t r ic k  J .  H u rley . 160. A d ju tan t G eneral 
to  H urley , January  1 / ,  1942; Ë urley  P ap e rs .
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w ith  G eneral A rch iba ld  P , W avell, H urley secu red  p e rm iss io n  
to  d is p a tc h  th e  sh ip s  to  B ataan.
H urley a r r iv e d  back in  A u s tr a l ia  on February  19, 1942,
He had checked in to  a h o te l  in  P o r t  Darwin where th e  sh ip s  he 
had assem bled w ere w a itin g  in  th e  h a rb o r . That same day th e  
Japanese  launched an a i r  a t ta c k  on th e  c i t y  and crowded p o r t  
f a c i l i t i e s .  H urley was s l i g h t l y  wounded in  th e  head by a f l y ­
ing  bomb fragm ent and as a r e s u l t  re c e iv e d  th e  P u rp le  H eart.
S ix  o f th e  sh ip s  vdiich he had assem bled were sunk d u rin g  th e  
a t ta c k  and of th e  rem ain ing  s i x ,  only  th re e  reach ed  th e  P h i l ip ­
p in e s .  MacArthur was o rdered  to  A u s tr a l ia  and th e  de fen d ers  
o f th e  Bataan p e n in su la  were overpowered by th e  Jap an ese . With 
th e  P h il ip p in e s  l o s t .  H u r le y 's  m i l i t a r y  m issio n  ended and i t  
was tim e f o r  him to  assume h is  d u t ie s  as American M in is te r  to  
New Z ealand . H urley , however, was r e lu c ta n t  to  le a v e  th e  scene 
o f a c t io n ,  b u t a f t e r  re p e a te d  u rg in g s  by G eneral M a rsh a ll, he 
went to  New Z ealand .
H urley d is l ik e d  h is  new assignm en t. A lthough he p e r ­
formed h i s  d u t ie s  th e re  w e ll ,  he chafed  a t  be ing  so rem ote 
from th e  m i l i ta r y  a c t io n .  He began to  f e e l  t h a t  he had been 
p la c e d  in  a  backwash a re a  of th e  w ar. H urley wanted to  see
^^The b e s t  g e n e ra l account o f th e  e f f o r t s  to  re -s u p p ly  
MacArthur in  th e  P h il ip p in e s  i s  in  Louis M orton, The F a l l  o f 
The P h i l ip p in e s . Vol. I I ,  P a r t  1 , o f The War in  tiie  P a c i f i c , 
in  U nited  S ta te s  Army in  World War I I . ed. Kent R oberts 
G re e n fie ld  {53 v o i s . ; W ashington: Ü7 S. Governmait P r in t in g
O ff ic e , 1947-1960), 390-404. The b e s t  g e n e ra l account of 
th e  ev acu a tio n  o f MacArthur i s  I b i d . . 353-360. H u rle y 's  
r o l e  in  th e  re -s u p p ly  e f f o r t  and th e  evacuation  of MacArthur 
i s  in  Lohbeck, P a tr ic k  J .  H u rley . 155-168.
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a c tio n  o r a t  l e a s t  be where th e  a c tio n  was ta k in g  p la c e . He 
looked fo r  every o p p o rtu n ity  to  leav e  New Zealand and when 
th e  New Zealand Prime M in is te r , P e te r  F ra z e r , flew  to  Wash­
in g to n  in  Ju ly , 1942, to  d isc u ss  m i l i ta r y  m a tte rs . H urley 
accompanied him."^^
While in  W ashington, H urley was given a new m ission  
by F ra n k lin  R o o sev e lt. The P re s id e n t se n t H urley back to  
New Zealand by way of th e  S ov ie t Union, where he was to  d i s ­
cuss th e  problems of th e  P a c if ic  war w ith  M arshal Joseph 
S ta l in ,  Before H urley l e f t ,  he managed to  e n la rg e  th e  t r i p  to  
in c lu d e  a ju n k e t th rough  th e  M iddle E a s t, Much to  H u rle y 's  
p le a su re  he was allow ed to  make th e  t r i p  no t as a d ip lom at 
but as a G eneral in  th e  army,^^ H urley a r r iv e d  in  Moscow on 
November 4 , 1942, and rem ained th e re  two weeks b e fo re  he met 
w ith  th e  S ov ie t P r e m i e r , H i s  d isc u ss io n s  w ith  S ta l in  had 
l i t t l e  su b s tan ce . They spoke in  g e n e ra l term s of democracy, 
of th e  n e c e s s i ty  of d e fe a tin g  th e  A xis, and of th e  h e ro ic  e f ­
f o r t s  by tro o p s of both s id e s  in  th a t  s t r u g g l e , T h e  
sp h y n x -lik e  S o v ie t le a d e r  found th e  c o lo r f u l ,  ram bunctious 
H urley amusing and so , when H urley asked perm ission  to  
v i s i t  th e  f ro n t  a t  S ta lin g ra d , S ta l in  r e a d i ly  g ran ted  th e
^^Lohbeck, P a tr ic k  J ,  H u rley . 170-171, H urley to  
M arsh a ll, October 21, 1942; H urley P a p e rs ,
^^M arshall to  H urley , O ctober 5, 1942; R oosevelt to  
Joseph S ta l in ,  October 5 , 1942; H urley P apers ,
58Lohbeck, P a t r ic k  J ,  H urley , 174.
59Hurley to  R o o sev e lt, November 15, 1942; H urley P apers ,
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r e q u e s t .  H urley barnstorm ed through R u ssia  fo r  th e  b e t te r
p a r t  o f two m onths, a r r iv in g  a t  Teheran, I r a n , on New Y e a r 's
Day, 1943, Thus, he ended th e  f i r s t  of many v ^ ir lw in d  v i s i t s
to  th e  S o v ie t Union.
H urley w ro te  voluminous r e p o r ts  about h is  v i s i t  to  th e  
R ussian  c a p i ta l  and h is  o b se rv a tio n s  on th e  v a rio u s  m il i ta r y  
f r o n t s .  He re p o r te d  in  glowing term s th e  u n i ty  o f purpose  vrtxich 
e x is te d  between th e  U nited  S ta te s  and th e  S o v ie t Union. Regard­
in g  th e s e  r e p o r t s ,  George F. Kennan, a  n o ted  d ip lo m at, s ta te d :
I  d o n 't  th in k  . . • he H urley 7  knew what he was t a lk ­
ing  about idien he re p o r te d  on th e  view s o f th e  S o v ie t 
le a d e r s .  On th e  o th e r  hand, th e re  was a s ^ le  adv ice  
a v a i la b le  to  him \d iich  he showed no d e s i r e  to  ta p  on 
th e se  s u b je c ts .  I  mean, i t  was n o t s u rp r is in g  to  me 
th a t  H u r l^  d i d n 't  know th a t  he was being g iven th e  
u su a l run -around  and th e  u su a l p a t t e r  by S ta l in  and 
M olotov, bu t I  th in k  th a t  i f  he had been a w ise r  and 
more th o u g h tfu l man, he would have asked some peop le  
who would be f a m i l ia r  w ith  th o se  c o n d itio n s  fo r  some 
y e a rs  to  comment on th o se .
In any ev en t. H urley , now in  Teheran, tu rn ed  h i s  a t t e n t io n
from R ussia  to  th e  M iddle E as t.
The P r e s id e n t 's  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  sp en t two weeks in  
I ra q  and I ra n . A lthough H u rle y 's  o rd e rs  s p e c if ie d  th a t  he 
was to  co n tin u e  on to  New Z eàland, he was r e lu c ta n t  to  r e ­
tu rn  to  th e  South P a c if ic  i s la n d  because he b e lie v e d  i t  to
^ ^ S ta lin  to  R o o sev e lt, November 15, 1942; H urley Pa­
p e rs ,
^ ^D esc rip tio n  o f S ta lin g ra d  f ro n t  in  H urley to  Roose­
v e l t ,  December 11, 1942; D e sc rip tio n  o f t r i p  to  Caucasus in  
H urley to  R ooseve lt, December 29, 1942; H urley P ap ers . U. S. 
S ena te , Committee on Fore ign  R e la tio n s , S ta te  Departm ent 
L oyalty  I n v e s t ig a t io n . Senate R eport 2108, 8 1 s t Cong., 2nd 
S e s s , , 1^50, P a r t  i ,  2124. C ited  h e r e a f te r  as L oyalty  In ­
v e s t ig a t io n .
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be a p o s i t io n  which would keep him i s o la te d  from th e  main­
stream  of th e  w ar. At l e a s t  p a r t i a l l y  to  avo id  re tu rn in g  to  
New Z ealand , he w ired  R oosevelt t h a t  th e  s i tu a t io n  he had un­
covered  in  th e  M iddle E ast was so c r i t i c a l  th a t  i t  w arran ted
62h is  v e rb a l r e p o r t .  The P re s id e n t y ie ld e d  to  H u rley ’s de­
mands and H urley flew  back to  W ashington,
A fte r  a m eeting w ith  R o o sev e lt, H urley emerged as a 
s p e c ia l  p r e s id e n t ia l  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  in  th e  M iddle E a s t, Hur­
le y  was to  r e p o r t  p e rs o n a lly  and d i r e c t l y  to  R oosevelt on th e  
g e n e ra l c o n d itio n s  in  Egypt, S y r ia , Lebanon, I r a q ,  I r a n ,  
P a le s t in e ,  and th e  Arab s t a te s  in  th e  Near E a s t, in c lu d in g
r  O
th e  kingdom of Saudi A rab ia , H urley a r r iv e d  in  N orth A fr ic a  
on March 13, 1943, and d id  n o t r e tu rn  to  th e  U nited  S ta te s  un­
t i l  e a r ly  June , R esponsib le  only to  R o o sev e lt, H urley c re a te d  
g re a t  excitem en t as he  swept m a je s t ic a l ly  through N orth A f r i ­
ca and th e  M iddle E a s t,  He l a t e r  d e sc rib e d  how he developed 
a form ula f o r  becoming acq u a in ted  w ith  th e  problem s of every 
n a tio n  he v i s i t e d .  H urley ta lk e d  w ith  p o l i t i c a l  and m il i ta r y  
le a d e r s ,  re a d  a few books, l i s te n e d  to  o f f i c i a l  g u id es , and 
v i s i t e d  th e  t o u r i s t  s ig h t s .  In o th e r  words, he took a V ,I ,P , 
to u r  of each coun try  through which he p assed . He met v i r t u a l ­
ly  every le a d e r  in  th e  M iddle E ast from King Saud to  David 
Ben-Gurion, The t r a in e d  fo re ig n  s e rv ic e  o f f ic e r s  a t  th e  v a r­
io u s p o s ts  H urley v i s i t e d  re s e n te d  th i s  bumptious am ateur
62H urley to  R o o sev e lt, December 29, 1942; H urley P apers ,
63R oosevelt to  H urley , March 3, 1943; H urley P ap ers ,
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d ip lo m at. H urley on h i s  p a r t  tended  to  r e s e n t  th e  condescend­
ing  a t t i t u d e  which he sensed  was p re s e n t  among th e  more
64ex p erien ced  fo re ig n  s e rv ic e  o f f i c e r s .  By th e  tim e H urley 
re tu rn e d  to  W ashington, much of th e  S ta te  Department and a 
good p o r t io n  of th e  War Departm ent were up in  arms about h is  
a c t i v i t i e s . ^ ^
H u rle y 's  r e p o r ts  from th e  M iddle E ast had charged  th a t  
e lem ents in  th e  S ta te  Departm ent were e i t h e r  p ro -B r i t i s h  o r 
pro-Communist in  t h e i r  se n tim e n ts . He sa id  th a t  some members 
o f th e  S ta te  D epartm ent were in te n t  upon u sin g  th e  war a g a in s t  
Germany and Japan as a means f o r  s tre n g th e n in g  th e  B r i t i s h  
E n t i r e 's  ho ld  over weaker n a tio n s  of Europe, th e  M iddle E a s t, 
and A sia . O th e rs , he co n tin u ed , were determ ined  to  a s s i s t  
th e  Communist c o n sp iracy  f o r  w orld dom ination by th e  S ov ie t 
Union, There was no means of d e fen se  a g a in s t  H u r le y 's  c h a r­
ges, As a prom inent R epub lican , H urley was immune from a t ta c k  
by R o o se v e lt 's  n a tu r a l  o p p o s itio n . Working fo r  p robab ly  th e  
most pow erfu l D em ocratic p re s id e n t  in  th e  h is to ry  of th e  
U nited  S ta te s ,  H urley had th e  su p p o rt of most Democrats as 
w e ll .  Denied th e s e  n a tu r a l  channels of p r o t e s t ,  d i s s a t i s f i e d  
in d iv id u a ls  in  th e  S ta te  Departm ent gave t h e i r  v e rs io n  of 
H u r le y 's  a c t i v i t i e s  to  Drew P earson , th e  no ted  W ashington c o l­
u m n is t. On August 17, 1943, Pearson w ro te  th a t  H urley had 
ag reed  w ith  Ibu S aud 's  vow to  d r iv e  th e  Jews from
. _ __^%og of M iddle E ast t r i p ,  March 13, 1943, to  June 15,1943; H urley P a p e rs . ’
^^Lohbeck, P a t r ic k  J .  H u rley . 198-199.
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P a le s t in e ,  A few re b e ls  in  Congress tu rn ed  t h e i r  a t te n t io n
on H urley , charg ing  him w ith  a n ti-S em itism  among o th e r  th in g s , 
bu t t h e i r  a t t a c k s ,  to o , proved in e f f e c tu a l ,^ ^  R o o sev e lt, r a t h ­
e r  than  d ism iss in g  H urley , s e le c te d  him fo r  an o th e r s p e c ia l  
m issio n .
On October 14, 1943, H urley l e f t  W ashington fo r  Chung­
k in g , on a new and im portan t m ission  fo r  th e  P re s id e n t,  On 
h is  way to  Chungking, H urley had s e v e ra l  s p e c i f ic  ta s k s .  He 
was to  check on th e  s i tu a t io n  in  th e  M iddle E ast and a ls o  
co n fe r w ith  American and A llie d  m i l i ta r y  le a d e rs  in  In d ia , In 
o rd e r to  accom plish th e s e  secondary assignm ents H urley was r e ­
q u ired  to  make se v e ra l s id e  t r i p s  in  th e  M iddle E ast and co n fe r 
f o r  more than  a week in  New D e lh i. In  h is  m eetings a t  New 
D elh i, H urley lea rn ed  of th e  te n s io n s  and c o n f l ic t s  which 
were d is ru p tin g  th e  a c t i v i t i e s  in  th e  China-Burm a-India
th e a te r .  I t  was n o t u n t i l  November 7 , t h a t  H urley a r r iv e d  in
68China to  pursue  th e  main purpose of h i s  t r i p ,
R oosevelt se n t H urley to  China to  sound ou t Chiang 
K ai-shek  on th e  arrangem ents and v a rio u s  problems \d iich  would 
be d isc u sse d  a t  th e  forthcom ing C airo  and Teheran co n fe ren ces , 
R oosevelt had en v is io n ed  two co n fe ren ces . The f i r s t ,  in v o lv -
^ % u rle y  C lipp ing  Book, 1943, August 17; H urley P apers , 
Emanuel C e lle r  to  R ooseve lt, August 18, 1943; H urley
P apers ,
° % u rle y  to  R o o sev e lt, November 7 , 1943; R oosevelt 
to  H urley, October 12, 1943; H urley to  R o o sev e lt, November 18, 
1943; D ra ft of H u r l^  Memoirs, v i i ,  2; H urley P ap ers ,
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ing  th e  U nited S ta te s ,  C hina, and G reat B r i ta in ,  in  vdnich th e  
problem s of th e  P a c if ic  a lone  would be d isc u sse d . At a sec ­
ond conference  th e  S o v ie t Union, re p re se n te d  by M arshal 
S ta l in ,  would be p re s e n t  and, in  a d d it io n  to  q u e s tio n s  broad­
ly  a f f e c t in g  th e  w orld-w ide war e f f o r t ,  th e  q u e s tio n  of S ov ie t 
e n try  in to  th e  Far E as te rn  war would be r a i s e d ,  Chiang to ld  
H urley he would n o t meet w ith  S ta l in  a t  th e  second con ference  
s in c e  R ussia  was n o t then  invo lved  in  th e  war w ith  th e  Japa­
n e se , but he would co o p era te  w ith  th e  S o v ie ts  i f  they  e n te re d  
th a t  war on th e  A ll ie d  s id c ,^ ^  In  a d d itio n  to  th e  s p e c i f ic  
arrangem ents f o r  th e  con ferences t e n ta t iv e ly  scheduled  f o r  
l a t e  November, H urley was in s t ru c te d  to  sound out th e  
G enera lissim o  on American s t r a te g y  in  th e  P a c if ic ,
Hurley gave th e  C hinese le a d e r  a b r ie f in g  on th e  
American is lan d -h o p p in g  s t r a te g y ,  Chiang K ai-shek  expressed  
h i s  approval bu t s t i l l  en v is io n ed  a lan d in g  on th e  m ainland 
of China by American fo rc e s  as a p re lu d e  to  an a l l - o u t  a t ta c k  
on J a p a n , H u r l e y  c u t  sh o r t  h i s  con ferences w ith  th e
G enera lissim o a f t e r  th r e e  days when he lea rn ed  th a t  R oosevelt
72d e s ire d  h is  p resen ce  in  C a iro ,
The P r e s id e n t 's  s p e c ia l  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  a r r iv e d  in
C airo  on November 16, and, a f t e r  m eeting w ith  P re s id e n t
71R o o sev e lt, flew  on to  Teheran on November 22, H urley p e r-
^^Hurley to  R o o sev e lt, November 20, 1943: H urley P ap e rs , 
^^ Ibid, ^hbid ,
^^M arshall to  H urley , November 10, 1943; H urley P apers , 
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Lohbeck, P a t r ic k  J ,  H urley , 207-209,
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formed only one fu n c tio n  a t  th e  Teheran co n fe ren ce . He 
d ra f te d  th e  I ra n  D e c la ra tio n , e s s e n t ia l ly  a r e â f f irm a tio n  of 
th e  A t la n t ic  C h a r te r , and a t  th e  end of th e  m ee tin g s, Roose­
v e l t ,  S t a l i n ,  and C h u rc h ill  s ig n ed  th e  declara tion^  which 
gu a ran teed  th e  po st-w ar independence of I ra n .^ ^  When th e  
heads of s t a t e  l e f t  th e  I ra n ia n  c a p i t a l ,  H urley rem ained. The 
P re s id e n t had asked H urley to  s ta y  in  I ra n  to  c o o rd in a te  th e  
a c t i v i t i e s  of American ag en c ies  th e r e .  H urley rem ained in  th e  
M iddle E ast u n t i l  March, 1944, vrtien th e  P re s id e n t c a l le d  him 
to  W ashington f o r  c o n s u l ta t io n s ,75
H u rley ' s f u r th e r  a c t i v i t i e s  in  th e  M iddle E ast had 
succeeded in  a l ie n a t in g  c a re e r  o f f i c e r s  in  th e  S ta te  D epart­
ment even more. At th e  same tim e . H urley had become angered 
by what he b e lie v e d  to  be d e l ib e r a te  a ttem p ts  to  sabo tage  h is  
m ission  to  th e  M iddle E a s t ,76 He became more h o s t i l e  when, on 
a v i s i t  to  th e  S ta te  D epartm ent, he saw a memorandum w r i t te n  
by Eugene R ostov, d e sc r ib in g  one of H u rley 's  r e p o r ts  from 
Ira n  as " h y s te r i c a l ,  m essian ic  g lo b a lo n y ,"  The memorandum 
bore Dean A cheson 's approving i n i t i a l s , 77 A pparently  th e  
o p p o s itio n  to  H u rle y 's  p ro p o sa ls  in  th e  S ta te  Departm ent d id  
n o t shake R o o se v e lt 's  con fidence  in  him. Indeed , R oosevelt
7^ D e c la ra tio n  of th e  Three Powers R egarding I ra n , 
December 1, 1943; H urley P ap e rs ,
^^Edward R, S te t t i n iu s  to  H urley , November 5, 1943; 
H urley to  R o o sev e lt, February  8, 1944; H urley P ap e rs ,
7^Lohbeck, P a tr ic k  J ,  H u rley . 228-230,
^^Ibid.
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h im se lf  though t th a t  th e  p lan  was an e x c e lle n t  one, and sa id
78so when he forw arded i t  to  th e  S ta te  D epartm ent,
H urley rem ained in  W ashington f o r  th e  rem ainder of the  
s p r in g  and summer of 1944. He was u n w illin g  to  accep t any 
p o s i t io n  which would fo rc e  him to  se rv e  w ith in  th e  S ta te  De­
p a r tm e n t 's  ch a in  of command. In  J u ly ,  H urley began to  h e a r  
rum ors about th e  develop ing  c r i s i s  in  C h i n a , I n  A ugust, 
R o o sev e lt would g iv e  H urley  th e  ta s k  of so lv in g  th e  C hinese 
p u z z le . On th e  eve o f th e  China m iss io n , H u rle y 's  p a s t  h i s ­
to ry  re v e a le d  l i t t l e  which would q u a l i fy  him fo r  such a ta s k . 
A lthough he d e lig h te d  in  w earing h i s  G e n e ra l 's  un ifo rm , he 
was r e l a t i v e ly  in ex p e rie n ce d  as a s o ld ie r .  He had no t r a i n ­
ing  which q u a l i f ie d  him to  u n d e rs tan d  th e  p e c u l ia r  problem s 
he would fa c e  in  C hina, N e v e rth e le ss , H urley h e ld  th e  con­
f id e n c e  of P re s id e n t R oosevelt and th a t  q u a l i f ic a t io n  
overrode  any of H u rle y 's  d e f ic ie n c ie s ,
^^R oosevelt to  C o rd e ll H u ll, January  12, 1944: Roose­
v e l t  to  H urley , March 25, 1944; H urley P ap e rs ,
^^Lohbeck, P a t r ic k  J .  H u rley . 232,
CHAPTER I I
THE CHINESE PUZZLE
The s i tu a t io n  which developed in  China in  th e  summer 
of 1944 had deep ro o ts  in  th e  p a s t .  S ince th e  Open Door no tes 
of John Hay, America had been committed to  m a in ta in in g  th e  in ­
dependence and th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  and a d m in is tra t iv e  i n t e g r i t y  
of C hina, The U nited S ta te s  re a ff irm e d  i t s  devo tion  to  th e se  
p r in c ip le s  and had secu red  t h e i r  accep tance  by e ig h t  o th e r  
powers in  th e  Nine Power T rea ty  signed  in  W ashington in  1922, 
Among th e  n a tio n s  p a r ty  to  th i s  agreem ent was Japan , When 
Japan undertook  th e  m i l i ta r y  occupation  of M anchuria and e s ­
ta b l is h e d  th e  Japanese-sponso red  puppet regim e of Manchukuo 
in  1932. th e  U nited S ta te s  f e l t  t h a t  th e  Open Door p r in c ip le s  
had been v io la te d .  Furtherm ore, th e  U nited S ta te s ,  under th e  
p ro v is io n s  of th e  K ellogg P act of 1928, had committed i t s e l f  
to  th e  se ttle m e n t of d isp u te s  by p e ac e fu l and o rd e r ly  p ro ­
c e s s e s , J a p a n 's  p o lic y  in  M anchuria had a ls o  igno red  th e  
s p i r i t  of th i s  agreem ent.
The U nited S ta te s  response  to  th e  a g g re ss iv e  a c t i v i t i e s  
of Japan was fo u r fo ld . I t  made an e f f o r t  to  persuade  Japan 
to  abandon h e r course  of conquest, b u t, a t  th e  same tim e, 
c a r e f u l ly  avoided war w ith  Japan , N e v e rth e le ss , American
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e f f o r t s  to  a s s i s t  China in  m a in ta in in g  h e r independence and 
in te g r i t y  in  th e  fac e  of Japanese ag g re ss io n  drew th e  U nited 
S ta te s  f u r th e r  in to  th e  Asian c o n f l i c t .  America adopted a 
p o lic y  of n o n -re c o g n itio n  toward t e r r i t o r i e s  which th e  S ta te  
Department f e l t  were u n law fu lly  se iz e d  from China by th e  Jap a­
n e se . Furtherm ore, c r e d i t s  were ex tended to  China to  a id  h e r 
in  so lv in g  d i f f i c u l t  cu rren cy  problem s. In 1937, when Japan 
invaded n o r th e a s t  C hina, th e  U nited  S ta te s  government r e ­
f ra in e d  from app ly ing  n e u t r a l i ty  l e g i s l a t i o n  ^ i c h ,  i f  
en fo rced , would have worked to  th e  d isad v an tag e  of China.
When Japan jo in e d  Germany and I t a l y  to  form a t r i ­
p a r t i t e  m il i ta r y  a l l i a n c e ,  however, th e  methods and emphasis 
of American fo re ig n  p o lic y  in  th e  Far E ast changed. The U nited  
S ta te s  endeavored to  broaden i t s  r o le  in  C hina. To co u n te r 
th e  Japanese a ttem p t to  e s ta b l is h  a puppet C hinese government 
under Wang C h 'ing-w ei e a r ly  in  1940, th e  U nited S ta te s  govern­
ment d e c la re d  i t s  co n tin u ed  re c o g n itio n  of th e  Chungking 
government as " th e  government of C h ina."  T his meant th a t  a l l  
a id  to  China would go to  th e  Chungking government of G eneral­
issim o Chiang K ai-shek .
Chiang, in  d e sp e ra te  s t r a i t s ,  needed any th ing  th e  Uni­
te d  S ta te s  could  su p p ly . Loans were g ran ted  and o th e r  m easures 
adopted  to  s ta b a l iz e  C hinese cu rren cy . L en d -lease  a id  was ap­
proved, in c lu d in g  te c h n ic a l  a s s is ta n c e  which g re a t ly  in c re a se d  
tonnage c a r r ie d  over th e  Burma Road, th e  main land  ro u te  to
China u n t i l  i t  was c lo se d  by Japanese  m i l i ta r y  o p e ra tio n s  in  
May of 1942. The U nited S ta te s  began a program to  equip and
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t r a i n  C hinese fo rc e s  and h e lp ed  to  o rg an ize  and o u t f i t  th e  
"F ly ing  T ig e rs ,"  a v o lu n te e r  group of American c iv i l i a n  f i g h t ­
e r  p i l o t s  under th e  command o f C la ire  L. C hennault, l a t e r  
Commanding G eneral o f th e  F o u rteen th  A ir F orce, American a id  
to  China, however, f a i l e d  to  h a l t  Japanese  a g g re ss io n .
From Septem ber, 1939, to  e a r ly  December, 1941, th e  
U nited  S ta te s  co n tin u ed  a b a rra g e  o f n o te s  to  th e  Japanese  
le a d e rs  in  an a ttem p t to  p o in t  o u t th e  f o l ly  o f th e  p a th  t h ^  
had a p p a re n tly  chosen . In  1940 and 1941 P re s id e n t R oosevelt 
i n i t i a t e d  more r i g i d  m easures to  d issu ad e  th e  Japanese  from 
t h e i r  h o s t i l e  c o u rse . Economic s a n c tio n s , in c lu d in g  embargos 
on o i l  and s t e e l  and th e  f re e z in g  o f Japanese c r e d i t s  in  th e  
U nited  S ta te s ,  were designed  to  show th e  Japanese  th e  e r r o r  
o f t h e i r  ways, American p o lic y  in  China was s ig n i f ic a n t ly  a l ­
te re d  by th e  Japanese  a t ta c k  on P e a rl  H arbor, December 7 , 1941,
The n a t io n a l  o b je c tiv e s  o f th e  U nited S ta te s  c r y s t a l -  
iz e d  when i t  became invo lved  in  a  tw o -fro n t war w ith  th e  Axis 
pow ers. The im m ediate o b je c tiv e  was d e fe a t  o f th e  A xis. Sec­
ondly , l e s s  im m ediate bu t e q u a lly  v i t a l ,  was th e  c re a t io n  of a 
peace w ith  a ssu ran ces  of perm anent s t a b i l i t y .  To f u r th e r  th e se  
g o a ls , American p o lic y  in  China by 1944 was d ir e c te d  toward th e  
e f f e c t iv e  j o i n t  p ro se c u tio n  of th e  war and f u l l  c o lla b o ra t io n  
w ith  China as a m ajor power. I t  was expected  th a t  China would 
sh a re  prim ary  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  in  th e  o rg a n iz a tio n  o f w orld peace 
and he lp  to  b rin g  s t a b i l i t y  and p ro s p e r i ty  in  th e  P a c if ic  a r e a ,1
I g ta t e  Departm ent P o licy  P aper, "P o licy  toward China 
March 1933-August 1939, R evised as o f December 1, 1944;"
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U n fo rtu n a te ly , t h i s  p o lic y  was based on s e v e ra l  f a l s e  assump­
t io n s .
D eterm ined to  r e s i s t  th e  Japanese  program of e s t a b l i s h ­
in g  puppet governm ents in  C hina, th e  U nited  S ta te s  chose th e  
K uom in tang -con tro lled  N a t io n a l i s t  government of Chiang K ai-shek  
as th e  "government o f C h ina,"  By reco g n iz in g  on ly  th i s  govern­
m ent, th e  U nited  S ta te s  sa n c tio n ed  a government r e p re s e n tin g  
n o t th e  p eo p le  of C hina, but r a th e r  s e v e ra l  pow erfu l p o l i t i c a l  
f a c t io n s .  The la n d lo rd  c la s s ,  th e  W este rn -o rie n te d  b ig  b u s i­
nessmen of th e  c o a s ta l  c i t i e s ,  and a lo o se  c o a l i t io n  of 
w arlo rd s  c o n tro l le d  th e  Kuomintang, These th re e  groups were 
h e ld  to g e th e r  by th e  p e rso n a l le a d e rs h ip  of Chiang K ai-shek , 
who m ain ta in ed  h i s  p o s i t io n  by c a te r in g  to  th e  s p e c ia l  i n t e r ­
e s t s  of each , and by b a lan c in g  th e  power of one a g a in s t  th e  
o th e r .
In r e a l i t y ,  th e  Kuomintang sh a red  p o l i t i c a l  power in  
China w ith  se v e ra l  o th e r  g roups, th e  most pow erfu l of which 
was th e  Communist p a r ty .  At th e  beg inn ing  of h o s t i l i t i e s  w ith  
Japan , th e  Communist p a r ty  was sm all and t i g h t l y  o rg an ized .
I t  d id ,  however, p o sse ss  a base of o p e ra tio n s  in  N orth China. 
A f te r  1937, th e  Communists had extended t h e i r  c o n tro l  over 
la rg e  p o r tio n s  of r u r a l  N orth China th rough  g u e r r i l l a  w a rfa re . 
The Japanese  were c o n te n t to  ho ld  th e  la rg e  c i t i e s  and com-
H urley P ap e rs , The S tandard  O f f ic ia l  summary of American Re­
la t io n s  w ith  China i s  U, S, Department o f S ta te ,  U nited S ta te s  
R e la tio n s  w ith  China w ith  S p e c ia l R eference  to  th e  P eriod  
l4 4 4 -l9 4 $ . Based on th e  F i le s  of th e  Departm ent of S ta te , 
Departm ent of S ta te  P u b lic a tio n  5573, C ited  h e r e a f t e r  as 
China W hite P ap e r.
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m unication  l in e s .  By th e  l a t e  summer of 1944, th e  Communist 
p a r ty  was a s tro n g , dynamic fo rc e  ch a llen g in g  th e  Kuomintang
9
fo r  le a d e rsh ip  in  th e  coun try .
The U nited S ta te s  e n try  in to  th e  war in  th e  Far E ast 
a ssu red  Ja p an ’s d e fe a t .  With th e  Japanese th r e a t  removed, th e  
Kuomintang tu rn ed  more and more of i t s  a t te n t io n  to  th e  Commu­
n i s t s .  The N a t io n a l is t s  hoped th a t  by n o t w asting  t h e i r  
s t re n g th  a g a in s t  th e  Japanese they  would, because of American 
a id ,  be a b le  to  tu rn  t h e i r  arm ies on th e  Communists a t  th e  end 
of th e  war. The Japanese d id  n o t c a p i ta l iz e  on th e  s i t u a t io n ,  
fo r  they  were more than  busy r e s i s t i n g  th e  American is la n d -  
hopping in  th e  South P a c if ic ,
On th e  o th e r  hand, Mao T se-tung took advantage of th e  
Kuom intang's i n a c t iv i ty  by a tta c k in g  th e  Jap an ese , th u s  expand­
ing  th e  in f lu e n c e  of th e  Communist p a r ty  among th e  p e asa n ts  in  
Japanese-occup ied  China. Mao won a d d it io n a l  su p p o rt from th e  
p e asa n ts  by i n i t i a t i n g  s o c ia l  and economic reform s in  th e  a reas  
where Communist in f lu e n c e  was supreme. Through such programs 
he a ls o  in flu e n c e d  l i b e r a l  elem ents in  K uom in tang-con tro lled  
China. To co u n te r th e  growing s tre n g th  of th e  Communists, 
Chiang K ai-shek  adopted  only stopgap m easures, f o r  he p lanned  
to  e lim in a te  th e  Communists by fo rc e  of arms fo llo w in g  th e
2
R eport of John S tew art S e rv ice , "The Need of an Ameri­
can P o licy  Toward th e  Problems C reated  by th e  R ise  of th e  
C hinese Communist P a r ty ,"  September 3, 1944; R eport by John 
S tew art S e rv ic e , "The Need fo r  G rea te r Realism  in  Our R ela­
t io n s  w ith  Chiang K a i-sh ek ,"  October 10, 1944; R eport by John 
P. D avies, J r . ,  "How Red a re  th e  Chinese Communists?" Novem­
ber 7, 1944; H urley P ap e rs . A good summary of Communist 
expansion in  th e  war y ears  i s  in  China W hite P a p e r. 52-58.
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war w ith  Japan .
The U nited S ta te s  found i t s e l f  su p p o rtin g  a government 
which d id  no t r e p re s e n t  a l l  of China and which by 1944 had 
l i t t l e  hope of ever doing so . M oreover, t h i s  governm ent, 
r a th e r  than  f ig h t in g  Japan , devoted most of i t s  a t t e n t io n  to  
p re p a rin g  fo r  a c i v i l  war which would c e r ta in ly  fo llo w  th e  de­
f e a t  of Japan by th e  U nited  S ta te s ,  U nited  S ta te s  a id ,  which 
went e x c lu s iv e ly  to  th e  Chungking government and \d iich  was in ­
tended to  h a s ten  th e  d e fe a t  of Japan , was s to c k p ile d  f o r  th e  
expected  c i v i l  w ar. In  s p i t e  of t h i s  a id ,  i t  became c le a r  th a t  
because of i t s  o rg an ic  w eakness, th e  government of Chiang K ai- 
shek would be on th e  lo s in g  s id e  in  th a t  c i v i l  w ar,^
U n fo rtu n a te ly , c o n d itio n s  in  th e  U nited  S ta te s  made i t  
a lm ost im possib le  to  re a p p ra is e  A m erica 's China p o lic y , Amer­
ica n s  found i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  analyze  th e  s i tu a t io n  in  China 
a c c u ra te ly  because, w ith  th e  excep tion  of in fo rm a tio n  o r ig in a t ­
in g  from o f f i c i a l  American so u rces , news from China was 
extrem ely  u n r e l ia b le ,"  Communications were f u r th e r  muddled
H urley to  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te ,  June 7, 1945; H urley 
P ap ers , China W hite P a p e r. 570-572,
^A good summary of U, S, problem s in  China was p re ­
pa red  f o r  H urley by th e  I n te l l ig e n c e  S ec tio n  of G eneral 
Joseph W, S t i l w e l l 's  S ta f f  and i s  t i t l e d ,  "Notes on Problems 
Connected w ith  our M ission in  C h ina,"  H urley P ap ers , See a l ­
so China W hite Paper and C harles F, Romanus and R iley  
Sunderland . S t i l w e l l 's  Command Problem s, 7 o l ,  IX, P a r t  2, of 
C hina-B urm a-lndia t h e a t e r , in  U nited  S ta te s  Army in  World War 
I I ,  ed, Kent R oberts G re en fie ld  (53 v o i s , ;  W ashington: U,S, 
Government P r in t in g  O ffic e , 1947-1960), C ited  h e r e a f te r  as 
Romanus and Sunderland, Command Problem s,
S , , S ena te , Committee on Foreign  R e la tio n s  and Com­
m itte e  on Armed S e rv ic e s , M il i ta ry  S i tu a t io n  in  th e  Far E a s t.
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because the Chungking government carried on its relations with 
the United States in a most irregular manner. Rather than go­
ing through the Department of State, representatives of the 
Chungking government, official, unofficial, and familial, 
would go directly to the various departments of the United 
States government, and even the President, circumventing the 
State Department and the American Ambassador in China, Fre­
quently the State Department found itself totally uninformed 
on matters pertaining to China, Furthermore, President 
Roosevelt made no effort to rectify the irregular procedures 
of the Chungking representatives,^
The United States found itself alone in the position 
it had adopted toward China, The British did not view China 
as a great power and expected it to be divided after the war 
into spheres of influence. Moreover, the British made it 
clear that they did not intend to relinquish without a strug­
gle any of their former possessions or spheres of influence in 
the Pacific, including Hong K o n g , ?  American policy in China 
was further challenged by the Russian specter to the north. 
There was little doubt that the Soviet Union would come into 
the Far Eastern war, but it appeared likely that it would wait
H earing to  Conduct an In q u iry  in to  th e  M il i ta ry  S i tu a t io n  in  
th e  F ar E ast and th e  E*acts Surrounding th e  b e l i e f  of G eneral 
Douglas MacArthur from h is  Assignm ents in  t h a t  A rea . 82nd Cong,, 
1 s t  S e s s . . 195i . P a r t  4 . 2882. C ited  h e r e a f te r  as MacArthur
H earin g s ,
^Cordell Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull (2 vols,; New 
York: MacMillan Company, 1948J, tl, 1586-158/,
?R obert E, Sherwood, R oosevelt and Hopkins; an I n t i ­
mate H is to ry  (New York: H arper and B ro th e rs , l^q-o;, / l b .
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u n t i l  th e  f ig h t in g  was over and then  a c t  to  r e e s t a b l i s h  th e
Q
sphere  of in f lu e n c e  which R ussia  once enjoyed in  M anchuria.
P re s id e n t R oosevelt viewed th e  problem s in  China in  
term s of p e r s o n a l i t i e s .  He lacked  confidence  in  G eneral 
Joseph W, S t i lw e l l  in  p a r t i c u l a r  and th e  S ta te  Department 
r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  in  g e n e ra l .  For h is  in fo rm a tio n  on China he 
tended  to  r e ly  on p e rso n a l r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  such as W endell 
W ilk ie , P a tr ic k  H urley , and Henry W allace, who were u s u a l ly ,  as 
Henry L. Stim son s a id ,  "easy  dupes of th e  w onderfu lly  charming
Q
c i r c l e  around Chiang K ai-shek  in  Chungking." The Chinese 
le a d e rs  w ith  whom th e s e  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  met blamed a l l  th e  
problem s in  China on th e  American Ambassador, C larence  E.
Gauss, and G eneral S t i l w e l l . R o o s e v e l t ' s  a ttem p t to  so lv e  
th e  China problem  a t  th e  C airo  co n fe rence  by m eeting w ith  th e  
G eneralissim o ended in  f a i l u r e .  His d is i l lu s io n m e n t w ith  
Chiang K ai-sh ek , growing ou t of th a t  m eeting , caused him to  
l i s t e n  c lo s e r  to  th e  counsel of S t i lw e l l ,  even though he had 
l i t t l e  co n fidence  in  th e  G e n e ra l.H
G eneral Joseph W. S t i l w e l l 's  m ission  to  China began on 
Ju ly  2, 1942, when he re c e iv e d  a message from G eneral George
% acA rthu r H e a rin g s . P a r t  3, 1845.
^Henry L. Stim son and McGeorge Bun(fy, On A ctive  S e rv ice  
in  Peace and War (New York: H arper and B ro th e rs , 1947), 535-536,
^^Sherwood, R ooseve lt and H opkins. 634.
Romanus and S underland , Command Problem s. 82. The 
b e s t  account of S t i l w e l l 's  f i r s t  m eeting w ith  P re s id e n t Roose­
v e l t  which was i n f l u e n t i a l  in  form ing th e  u n fav o rab le  op in ion  
R ooseve lt h e ld  of S t i lw e l l  i s  in  Stimson and Buncfy, On A ctive 
S e rv ic e . 535,
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C, M arshal o rd e rin g  him to  China, He was d i r e c te d  to  in c re a se  
th e  combat e f f ic ie n c y  of th e  C hinese army and f u r th e r  th e  war 
e f f o r t  a g a in s t  J a p a n , T h e  o b s ta c le s  G eneral S t i lw e l l  en­
coun te red  in  h is  a ttem p t to  accom plish h is  m ission  caused him 
to  tak e  a very  p e s s im is t ic  a t t i t u d e  toward th e  Kuomintang by 
1944, In  comparing th e  Kuomintang w ith  th e  Communist p a r ty ,  
S t i lw e l l  saw th e  Kuomintang exem plified  by c o rru p tio n , ne­
g le c t ,  chaos, ta x e s , t r a d in g  w ith  th e  enemy, and o th e r  eq u a lly  
unpraisew orthy  a t t r i b u t e s .  He saw in  th e  Communist program 
reduced tax es and r e n t s ,  g r e a te r  p ro d u c tio n , a h ig h e r  s tan d a rd  
o f l iv in g ,  and a c t iv e  p a r t i c ip a t io n  in  governm ent. He saw 
them p ra c t ic in g  \d ia t they  p reached . This c o n tr a s t  caused 
S t i lw e l l  to  view th e  Communists more fav o ra b ly  than  th e  Kuo­
m intang, The shortcom ings he a sc r ib e d  to  th e  Kuomintang 
were r e f le c te d  in  th e  a d m in is tra tio n  o f i t s  army \rtiich was un­
a b le  to  launch any m eaningful a t ta c k  a g a in s t  th e  Jap an ese ,
From th i s  v iew p o in t. G eneral S t i lw e l l  and a  m a jo r ity  of 
th e  American m il i ta ry  p e rso n n e l in  China began to  see  only one 
so lu tio n  to  th e  China muddle* They knew t h a t ,  w ith o u t prss=  
su re , Chiang K ai-shek  would n o t launch an o f fe n s iv e  a g a in s t  
th e  Japanese , As many Americans se rv in g  in  China c a u s t ic a l ly  
p u t i t ,  "P ea rl Harbor was C h in a 's  a rm is t ic e  d ay ,"^^  The
^^Joseph W, S t i lw e l l ,  The S t i lw e l l  P a p e rs , ed , Theodore 
H, White (New York: W illiam  S loane A sso c ia te s , 1948), 306,
I S lb id . .  316, l ^ I b i d . , 316-317,
1^Samuel L u b e ll, "V inegar Joe  and th e  R e lu c ta n t Dragon," 
Saturday Evening P o s t . CCXVII (February  24, 1945), 11,
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American s o ld ie r s  in  China thought th a t  i f  th e  U nited  S ta te s  
gave arms to  th e  Communist fo rc e s ,  i t  would h a s te n  th e  d e fe a t 
of th e  Japanese  both  by in c re a s in g  th e  combat e f fe c t iv e n e s s  
of th e  Communists and by fo rc in g  Chiang K ai-shek  in to  a c tio n  
which would win back American s u p p o r t , T h i s  s o lu t io n  had 
th e  approval of th e  fo re ig n  s e rv ic e  o f f ic e r s  and th e  American 
Ambassador in  China.
The S ta te  Departm ent r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  in  China were a 
h ig h ly  s k i l l e d  group of men. Most of them had long e:qperience 
in  China and spoke f lu e n t  C h i n e s e . T h e y  worked in  c lo s e  h a r ­
mony w ith  th e  American m i l i ta r y  e s tab lish m en t in  China and, 
indeed , fo u r fo re ig n  s e rv ic e  o f f i c e r s ,  John P. D av ies, J r . ,  
Raymond P. Ludden, John S tew art S e rv ic e , and John K. Bnomerson, 
were a ss ig n ed  d i r e c t l y  to  S t i l w e l l 's  s t a f f  as p o l i t i c a l  ad-
1 Q
v i s e r s .  Years l a t e r ,  John S tew art S e rv ice  d e sc r ib e d  th e se  
men as s tro n g ly  c o n se rv a tiv e  in  American term s. He s a id ,  how­
e v e r , t h a t  because of th e  s i tu a t io n  in  China where th e  Kuomintang 
governed badly  and th e  Communists governed w e ll ,  many of than  
adopted  a more fa v o ra b le  view of th e  Reds. R ather than  being 
pro-Communist in  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  b e l i e f s ,  however, they  sim ply 
tended to  be a n t i - K u o m i n t a n g , A s  p a r t  of th e  American ob­
s e rv e r  group e s ta b l is h e d  in  Yenan in  th e  summer of 1944,
^^L oyalty  I n v e s t ig a t io n . P a r t  2, 2163.
17lb id =; P a r t  2 , 2068.
IGjb id . . P a r t  2, 1994-1995, 2093.
l ^ I b id . .  P a r t  2 , 2053.
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S e rv ice  and Ludden s e n t  back r e p o r ts  u n d ersco rin g  th e  growing
20im portance of th e  Communist p a r ty  in  China.
A m il i ta r y  c r i s i s  developed in  China in  th e  summer of 
1944 which had e x te n s iv e  p o l i t i c a l  im p lic a tio n s ,^ ^  As a r e ­
s u l t  of th e  C airo  c o n fe ren c e , S t i lw e l l  i n i t i a t e d  a N orth Burma 
o f fe n s iv e  designed  to  open a lan d  ro u te  to  China, This o ffe n ­
s iv e  was approved by R oosevelt in  s p i t e  of G eneral C la ire  
C h e n n a u lt's  u rg in g s  t h a t  th e  l im ite d  su p p lie s  e n te r in g  China 
be channeled  d i r e c t l y  to  th e  F o u rteen th  A ir Force to  be used 
a g a in s t  Japanese  tro o p s  in  E ast China who were expected  to  
ta k e  th e  o f fe n s iv e  a g a in s t  C h e n n au lt's  a i r  b a se s . Because of 
c o n s id e ra tio n s  a r i s in g  ou t of th e  European th e a te r  of opera­
t io n s ,  lan d in g  c r a f t  a l l o t t e d  to  a  B r i t i s h  o p e ra tio n  which 
would su p p o rt S t i l w e l l 's  o f fe n s iv e  were w ithdraw n, Chiang 
u sed  t h i s  a long  w ith  th e  U nited  S ta te s  r e f u s a l  to  g ra n t a $1
b i l l i o n  loan  as j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  sw itch ing  h is  suppo rt to
22G eneral C hennault.
The G enera lissim o  found s e v e ra l  reaso n s  why su p p o rt of 
C h e n n a u lt 's  F o u rteen th  A ir Force was more a c c e p ta b le  than  co­
o p e ra tio n  w ith  S t i l w e l l 's  N orth Burma o p e ra tio n . While 
S t i l w e l l 's  p lan  would r e q u ir e  a heavy commitment of Chinese 
men and m a te r ia l ,  th e  b ru n t of co n tinued  a i r  o p e ra tio n s  in
20 I b id . . P a r t  2 , 2068.
21 The most com plete tre a tm e n t of th e  c r i s i s  in  China in  
1944 i s  in  Romanus and Sunderland, Command Problem s. 399-442,
^^D raft o f H urley Memoirs, x i ,  1; H urley P apers .
Romanus and S underland , Command Problem s. 297-398.
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E ast China would be borne by th e  American A ir Force, I f  th e  
Japanese  d id  a t t a c k  in  t h a t  a re a , none of C h iang 's  e l i t e  
A m erican -tra in ed  tro o p s  would be in  danger of being  m auled,
Because of th e s e  c o n s id e ra tio n s ,  Chiang gave G eneral 
C hennault and th e  F o u rteen th  A ir Force th e  go-ahead to  a t ta c k  
th e  Jap an ese , As long as th e  F o u rteen th  A ir Force was in a c ­
t i v e ,  th e  Japanese  had no i n t e r e s t  in  advancing along  th e  
E ast China f r o n t .  When C h en n au lt' s a i r  a t ta c k s  became b o th e r­
some to  th e  Jap an ese , however, they  launched an o ffe n s iv e  
aimed a t  d e s tro y in g  th e  bases from  which C h e n n au lt's  p lan es  
flew . T his was xdiat S t i lw e l l  had p r e d i c t e d , T h e  Chinese 
fo rc e s  in  E ast China w ere unab le  to  p r o te c t  th e  b a se s , Chiang 
th e r e f o re  w ith d rew -fo rces  a l lo c a te d  fo r  th e  Burma campaign and 
demanded a g r e a te r  sh a re  of th e  arm s, m u n itio n s, and o th e r  
m i l i t a r y  su p p lie s  earm arked fo r  th a t  o p e ra tio n . I t  became 
c le a r  to  S t i lw e l l  t h a t  perhaps th e  only way to  save th e  Burma 
o f fe n s iv e  was to  remove Chiang K ai-shek  from p o w e r , P o l i t i ­
c a l  c o n s id e ra tio n s  p o in te d  to  th e  same s o lu t io n .
The growing s t r e n g th  of th e  Communist p a r ty  made i t  a 
d e f i n i t e  th r e a t  to  th e  Kuomintang weakened by m il i ta r y  d e fe a ts .  
Sensing h is  new-found power, Mao T se-tung  began a c o n cen tra ted  
e f f o r t  to  win U n ited  S ta te s  su p p o rt. The p resen ce  of th e
23Romanus and S underland , Command Problem s. 297-398,
^ ^ S t i lw e l l ,  The S t i lw e l l  P a p e rs . 306=307. &
Sunderland; Command Problem s. 316-j l 4 ,
^% acA rthu r H e arin g s , P a r t  3, 2494, S t i lw e l l ,  The 
S t i lw e l l  P a p e rs . 321-322,
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American observer group, code named "D ix ie " , in  Yenan gave 
Mao access to  th e  Am ericans, By g ra n tin g  f re q u e n t in te rv ie w s  
to  th e  American o b se rv e rs , he hoped to  in f lu e n c e  them fa v o r­
a b ly , Mao was su c c e s s fu l in  h is  p lo y . The r e s u l t  of th e se  
in te rv ie w s  and o b se rv a tio n s  was a s e r ie s  of r e p o r ts  w hich, in  
e f f e c t ,  p o in te d  ou t th a t  Chiang was on th e  way ou t and Mao 
would someday r u le  a l l  o f China,
The r e p o r ts  recommended th a t  th e  U nited  S ta te s  should  
ex tend  a t  l e a s t  p a r t i a l  a id  to  th e  C hinese Communists, The 
o b se rv ers  in  Yenan b e lie v e d  th a t  t h i s  would b e n e f i t  th e  Uni­
te d  S ta te s  in  s e v e ra l  ways. F i r s t ,  t h i s  a id  would in d ic a te  
to  Chiang th a t  he d id  n o t have com plete su p p o rt of th e  U nited  
S ta te s  as he had b e lie v e d  and, th e re fo re ,  he  m ight more r e a d i ­
ly  i n i t i a t e  s o c ia l  and economic reform s aimed a t  w inning back 
f u l l  American co n fid en ce . By a id in g  th e  Communists, th e  Uni­
te d  S ta te s  would be g iven  a degree of f l e x i b i l i t y  in  i t s  China 
p o lic y  n o t p re s e n t vdien i t  gave a l l - o u t  su p p o rt to  th e  Kuomin­
tan g , M oreover, by a id in g  th e  Communists th e  U nited  S ta te s  
would be in  a b e t t e r  p o s i t io n  i f  Chiang K ai-shek  d id  f a l l ,  and 
be a l l i e d  w ith  a group which was a c t iv e ly  c a r ry in g  th e  war to  
th e  Japanese , These r e p o r t s ,  combined w ith  th e  in e f f e c t iv e  
e f f o r t s  of Chiang' s m i l i ta r y  o p e ra tio n s , seemed to  c a l l  f o r  a  
r e v is io n  of American p o lic y  in  China, The demand fo r  change 
in  American p o lic y  came p r im a r ily  from American m il i ta r y  and
26 The many r e p o r ts  of John S tew art S e rv ice  w r i t te n  in  
Yenan in  th e  summer o f 1944 were perhaps b e s t  summarized by 
George F, Kennan in  L oyalty  I n v e s t ig a t io n , P a t t  2, 2115,
42
d ip lo m atie  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  on th e  China scene ,
John S. S e rv ice  s ta te d  t h i s  p o s i t io n  most c le a r ly .  He 
urged th e  P re s id e n t to  a d v ise  Chiang K ai-shek  th a t  u n le ss  
U nited S ta te s  demands f o r  m i l i ta r y  co o p era tio n  and s o c ia l  and 
economic reform s were m et, he could  no lo n g er expect u n q u a li­
f i e d  American su p p o rt. S e rv ice  d e c la re d  th a t  i f  reform s were 
n o t fo rthcom ing , th e  U nited  S ta te s  should  begin g iv in g  lim ite d  
m i l i ta r y  su p p o rt to  th e  Communists, At th e  same tim e , th e  
U nited  S ta te s  should  p rep a re  f o r  th e  c o lla p s e  of th e  Chiang 
government and, i f  p o s s ib le ,  form a t h i r d  group which would 
be more l i b e r a l  than  th e  Kuomintang, bu t y e t  n o t Communist, 
F in a l ly ,  S e rv ice  though t t h a t  th e  U nited  S ta te s  should  p rep a re
fo r  th e  com plete c o n tro l  of China by th e  Communists and be in
27a p o s i t io n  to  in f lu e n c e  th e  newly emerging le a d e rs .
This was n o t th e  k in d  of ad v ice  which R oosevelt w anted. 
A lthough h i s  f a i t h  in  Chiang as a s tro n g  le a d e r  had been weak­
ened by th e  ev en ts  a t  th e  C airo  con fe rence  and su b seq u en tly , 
th e  P re s id e n t s t i l l  b e lie v e d  th a t  th e re  was no o th e r  a l t e r n a ­
t iv e  to  th e  G enera lissim o  in  China, But by l a t e  summer of 1944, 
i t  had become ev id e n t th a t  some new approach to  th e  muddle in  
China was c a l le d  f o r .  Since R oosevelt r e je c te d  th e  ad v ice  of
th e  experienced  d ip lom ats in  China, he had to  seek a more
28s a t i s f a c to r y  s o lu t io n  to  th e  problem ,
27The most s u c c in c t s ta tem en t of t h i s  p o lic y  i s  in  Re­
p o r t  of John S tew art S e rv ic e , "The Need of an American P o licy  
Toward th e  Problems C reated  by th e  R ise  of th e  C hinese Commu­
n i s t  P a r ty ,"  September 3, 1944; H urley P apers ,
^^W illiam  D, Leahy, I  Was There (New York: D u e ll,
Sloan and P ea rce , 1946), 2531
CHAPTER 111 
THE SOLUTim
As th e  c r i s i s  in  China worsened in  A ugust, 1944, Roose­
v e l t ,  u n ab le  to  f in d  an a l t e r n a t e  c o u rse , co n tinued  r e lu c ta n t ly  
to  fo llo w  th e  ad v ice  of th e  S ta te  Department and G eneral George 
C. M a rsh a ll, th e  Army C hief of S ta f f .  Supporting  S t i lw e l l ,  
th e  P re s id e n t se n t  strong-w orded  re q u e s ts  and sharp  n e a r ­
u ltim atum s to  th e  inç> ertu rab le  strong-m an in  Chungking,
S t i l l ,  Chiang re fu s e d  to  ta k e  any a c t io n  to  le s se n  th e  dangers 
growing ou t of th e  d e te r io r a t in g  m i l i ta r y  and p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a ­
t io n s .  R o o se v e lt’ s n o tes  and th in ly  v e i le d  th r e a ts  were 
b rin g in g  no r e s u l t s  and only  two a l t e r n a t iv e s  rem ained fo r  
th e  American P re s id e n t .  F i r s t  was th e  s o lu t io n  advanced by 
th e  m ilita iry  p e rso n n e l and fo re ig n  s e rv ic e  o f f ic e r s  in  China. 
They recommended is s u in g  an u ltim atum  to  Chiang K ai-shek , 
s t a t i n g  th a t  i f  he f a i l e d  to  i n i t i a t e  reform s and tu rn  over 
c o n tro l  of m i l i ta r y  o p e ra tio n s  in  China to  G eneral S t i lw e l l ,  
th e  U nited  S ta te s  would begin ex tend ing  a id  to  o th e r  fo rc e s  
in  C hina. R o o se v e lt’ s o th e r  cho ice  was to  send a s p e c ia l  
p r e s id e n t ia l  envoy to  China in  hopes th a t  a new mind, unham­
p ered  by th e  h o s t i l i t y  and pessim ism  which had developed on 
a l l  s id e s  in  C hina, could  end th e  c r i s i s .
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The co u rse  of a c t io n  advocated  by S t i lw e l l ,  h is  s t a f f ,  
and th e  American d ip lo m a tic  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  in  China d id  not 
p le a s e  th e  P re s id e n t,  He f e l t  i t  l e f t  th e  U nited  S ta te s  w ith ­
ou t a w orkable a l t e r n a t iv e  shou ld  Chiang K ai-shek  r e fu s e  to  
a ccep t th e  American c o n d it io n s . The P re s id e n t fe a re d  th a t  i f  
Chiang r e j e c te d  an u ltim atum , th e  U nited  S ta te s  would be un­
a b le  to  f in d  a n o th e r le a d e r  capab le  of keep ing  China in  th e  
w ar,^  The F ar E as te rn  war would then  become more c o s t ly  to  
th e  U nited  S ta te s  in  men and m a te r ia ls ;  f o r  American grand 
s t r a te g y  in  th e  P a c if ic  h inged  on th e  su p p o s itio n  th a t  th e  
main s t r i k in g  fo rc e  of th e  Japanese  army would rem ain t i e d  
down on th e  A sian c o n tin e n t ,  a rra y e d  a g a in s t  th e  C hinese reg u -
O
l a r  fo rc e s  of Chiang K a i-sh ek , I f  Chiang w ithdrew  h is  troops 
from th e  w ar, g re a t  numbers of Japanese  s o ld ie r s  would be f r e e  
to  r e s i s t  American o p e ra tio n s  in  th e  P a c i f i c ,  T h e re fo re , 
R ooseve lt w ished to  avo id  a showdown w ith  Chiang,
The o th e r  a l t e r n a t iv e ,  send ing  a s p e c ia l  p r e s id e n t ia l  
envoy to  C hina, was f a r  more a t t r a c t i v e  to  th e  P re s id e n t,
For many y e a rs  R oosevelt had found th e  u se  of s p e c ia l  r e p re ­
s e n ta t iv e s  an e f f i c i e n t  means o f accom plish ing  s p e c ia l  
d ip lo m a tic  ta s k s .  He d is l ik e d  w orking through  th e  S ta te  De­
partm en t and r e l i e d  on s tro n g  p e r s o n a l i t i e s ,  such as Harry
l o r a f t  o f H urley Memoirs, x i ,  8; H urley P ap ers ,
2
R ichard  M, L eighton  and R obert W, Coakley, G lobal Lo­
g i s t i c s  and S tra te g y . 1940-1943. V olJV  , P a r t  4 , of th e  ï^ar 
Departm ent in  U nited  S ta te s  Army in  World W y I I . ed , Kent 
R oberts G re e n fie ld  v o l s , ;  W ashington; U, S, Government 
P r in t in g  O ff ic e , 1947-1960), 525, Sherwood, R oosevelt and 
H opkins, 772,
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Hopkins and P a tr ic k  J ,  H urley , to  communicate h is  w ishes to
3
fo re ig n  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s .  Another f a c to r  made th is  a l t e r n a ­
t iv e  even more a c c e p ta b le .
The S ta te  and War Departm ents had been p re s s in g  Ghiang 
K ai-shek  to  have an American, a t  th e  tim e G eneral S t i lw e l l ,  
p la c e d  in  command of a l l i e d  fo rc e s  in  China w ith  hopes of un­
ty in g  th e  p re s s in g  m i l i ta r y  s n a r l  th e r e .^  E a r l ie r  in  th e  
y e a r . V ice P re s id e n t Henry W allace re c e iv e d  th e  G e n e ra liss im o 's  
b le s s in g  fo r  an American a ttem p t to  b rin g  to g e th e r  th e  Chinese 
Communists and th e  C hinese N a t io n a l is t  fo rc e s  in  a u n ite d  e f ­
f o r t  a g a in s t  th e  Jap an ese , thus la y in g  th e  groundwork f o r
5
fu tu re  d is c u s s io n s . Then, on Ju ly  8, 1944, Chiang K ai-shek  
had re q u e s te d  th a t  th e  P re s id e n t send a s p e c ia l  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  
to  China q u a l i f ie d  to  speak fo r  R oosevelt on p o l i t i c a l  and 
m i l i ta r y  m a tte r s .^  The P re s id e n t and h is  a d v ise rs  began th e  
search  f o r  a s u i ta b le  man to  send to  China.^
S ince th e  P re s id e n t had se n t H urley to  China once be­
fo re  and th e  r e s u l t s  had p le a se d  him, i t  was n o t s u rp r is in g
E l l i o t  R o o sev e lt, As He Saw I t  (New York: D u e ll,
Sloan and P ea rce , 1946), l931 Ètimson and Bundy, On A ctive  
S e rv ic e . 536.
^om anus and Sunderland , Command Problem s. 415.
5john C a r te r  V incent to  H urley , August 24, 1944; H urley 
P apers . Summary Notes on C onversations Between Vice P re s id e n t 
Henry A. W allace and P re s id e n t Chiang K ai-shek , June 1944 in  
China W hite P ap e r. 559.
^Leahy, I  Was T here . 255. R oosevelt to  Chiang, Ju ly  
13, 1944; H urley P ap ers .
^Stimson and Bundy, On A ctive  S e rv ice . 536. Leahy.
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t h a t  he though t of H urley f o r  an o th e r m ission . H urley was a 
dynamic, p o s i t iv e  man who had a re p u ta tio n  fo r  speaking  fra n k ­
ly ;  t h i s ,  coupled w ith  h is  r e p u ta tio n  as a m il i ta r y  d ip lom at, 
made him appear id e a l ly  made fo r  th e  jo b . R oosevelt decided  
to  send H urley to  China as h is  s p e c ia l  r e p re s e n ta t iv e  to  d ea l 
w ith  th e  command problem  which appeared  to  be th e  co re  of th e  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  between th e  U nited  S ta te s  and th e  Chungking gov­
ernm ent. H u rle y 's  name was forw arded to  Chiang K ai-shek  on 
August 9, and th e  G enera lissim o expressed  h is  approval of th e
Q
P r e s id e n t 's  c h o ic e . The P re s id e n t determ ined th a t  th e  moment 
was p ro p it io u s  to  send along  w ith  H urley scaaeone q u a l i f ie d  to  
d isc u ss  th e  economic fu tu re  of China. Donald M. Nelson was 
chosen fo r  th i s  ta s k . As head of th e  War P roduction  Board, 
he was one of R o o se v e lt 's  most in f lu e n t i a l  economic a id e s  
and a d v is e r s .9
On August 9, H urley met w ith  Joseph Grew, th e  s p e c ia l  
a d v is e r  on F ar E as te rn  a f f a i r s  of th e  S ta te  D epartm ent, who 
to ld  him th a t  he was being co n sid ered  fo r  a s p e c ia l  m ission  
to  C h i n a . T h e  nex t day, R oosevelt made h is  f i n a l  d e c is io n  
to  send H urley to  C hina, bu t i t  was n o t p u b lic ly  announced 
un tiD -^ugust 20.11 As y e t .  H urley had no d e ta i le d  inform a­
t io n  on th e  ta s k  b e fo re  him, but he must have surm ised th a t
R o o s e v e lt  to  Chiang, August 9, 1944; H urley P apers. 
R oosevelt to  Chiang, August 21, 1944; Hurley P ap ers .
^I b id .
l*^Hurley O ffice  D iary , 1944, August 9, 1944; H urley
P apers .
llNew York Times. August 20, 1944, 1.
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th e  growing c o n f l i c t  between S t i lw e l l  and Chiang was a t  th e  
h e a r t  of th e  m a tte r .
H urley began p re p a r in g  fo r  a m ission  to  China, On 
Sunday, August 13, he c o n fe rre d  w ith  th e  Chinese Ambassador 
and th e  nex t a fte rn o o n  ta lk e d  w ith  H arry Kung, th e  Chinese 
M in is te r  of F inance and th e  b ro th e r - in - la w  of Chiang K ai-shek , 
D ental appoin tm ents and a speech a t  th e  Army I n d u s t r i a l  Col­
leg e  on Wednesday consumed th e  nex t two days. By Thursday 
H urley was ag a in  c o n c e n tra tin g  on th e  China m iss io n . At fo u r  
t h i r t y  in  th e  a f te rn o o n , he met w ith  Major G eneral Thomas T.
Handy, th e  C hief of O p e ra tio n s , and th e  same evening d ined  a t
12th e  C hinese Embassy, A ll of th e se  a c t i v i t i e s  s e t  th e  s ta g e  
f o r  a l a t e  morning m eeting on F rid a y , August 18, w ith  P re s id e n t 
R o o sev e lt,
S h o rtly  b e fo re  noon. Hurley and Donald Nelson e n te re d  
th e  P re s id e n t’ s oval o f f ic e  w ith  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  C o rd e ll 
H u ll, They spoke w ith  R oosevelt only  b r i e f ly ,  f o r  H urley a r ­
r iv e d  back a t  h is  Shoreham B uild ing  o f f ic e  by tw elve f i f t y ,  
in  th a t  sh o r t  c o n fe ren c e . H urley re c e iv e d  th e  d i r e c t iv e  which 
se n t him w inging to  China a week l a t e r ,  to  t r y  to  so lv e  th e  
growing p o l i t i c a l  and m il i ta r y  p ro b lan s  th e r e .  H urley spen t 
th e  a fte rn o o n  m ulling  over th e  R oosevelt d i r e c t iv e .  A fte r  an­
o th e r  m eeting w ith  G eneral Handy th a t  evening . H urley went 
home, ag a in  to  ponder th e  meaning of th e  P r e s id e n t ia l  o rd e r ,
l^ O ff ic e  D iary , 1944, August 13-August 17, 1944; H urley
P ap e rs ,
13D ra ft of H urley Memoirs, x i i ,  5; H urley P ap ers ,
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H u rle y 's  in s t r u c t io n s  were b r i e f .  The P r e s id e n t ia l  l e t ­
t e r  c o n ta in e d  only two s h o r t  p a rag rap h s , but H urley in te rp re te d  
th e s e  parag rap h s in  l a t e r  y e a rs  to  j u s t i f y  a l l  h is  a c tio n s  in  
C hina, The l e t t e r  d e s ig n a te d  H urley as R o o se v e lt 's  p e rso n a l 
r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  to  G enera lissim o  Chiang K ai-shek  who would r e ­
p o r t  d i r e c t l y  to  th e  P re s id e n t .  H u rle y 's  p r in c ip a l  m ission  
was to  prom ote e f f i c i e n t  and harm onious r e l a t io n s  between th e  
G enera lissim o  and G eneral S t i lw e l l ,  and to  f a c i l i t a t e  S t i l ­
w e ll ' s  e x e rc is e  of command over th e  Chinese arm ies to  be p laced  
under h i s  d i r e c t io n .  In  th e  second parag raph  R oosevelt adv ised  
H urley  to  c o o rd in a te  h is  a c t i v i t i e s  w ith  th e  U nited S ta te s  Am­
b assado r in  C h i n a , H u r l e y  was to  leav e  fo r  China w ith in  a 
week.
The d e ta i l e d  p re p a ra t io n  fo r  th e  m ission  had to  tak e  
p la c e  in  th e  seven days b e fo re  H urley boarded th e  p lan e  fo r  
C hina. M eetings w ith  L ie u te n a n t G eneral Henry H, Arnold and 
S e c re ta ry  of th e  T reasu ry  Henry M orgenthau broadened H u rley 's  
u n d e rs tan d in g  of th e  problem s faced  by th e  Army A ir Force and 
th e  T reasu ry  Departm ent in  C hina, He co n tinued  h is  d is c u s ­
s io n s  w ith  G eneral Handy through th e  week and ta lk e d  w ith  
anyone who he though t p o sse sse d  in fo rm a tio n  which would a id  
him in  th e  su c c e s s fu l com pletion  of h is  ta s k . He met w ith  
Joseph  Grew a g a in . G eneral M a rsh a ll, Harry Hopkins, v a rio u s  
C hinese g e n e ra ls , and even th e  B r i t i s h  A m b a s s a d o r , T h e
l^R o o sev e lt to  H urley , August 18, 1944; H urley Papers,
^^Hurley OffL 
1944; H urley P ap ers ,
ff ic e  D iary , 1944, August 18, August 24,
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day b efo re  h is  d e p a r tu re , Thursday, August 24, 1944, H urley 
had a f i n a l  co n fe rence  w ith  th e  P re s id e n t.
M eeting f o r  le s s  than  an hour in  th e  l a t e  a fte rn o o n , 
th e  two men d isc u sse d  c o rru p tio n  in  th e  C hinese government and 
th e  p o l i t i c a l  a l t e r n a t iv e s  to  Chiang K ai-sh ek , The P re s id e n t 
c h a ra c te r iz e d  Mao T se-tung  as "probab ly  a com petent man, but 
u n tr ie d  in  th e  la rg e r  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  of governing C hina,"  
R oosevelt f e l t  t h a t  th e  lac k  of C hinese le a d e rs  fo rce d  th e  
U nited  S ta te s  to  depend on Chiang; th e r e fo re ,  th e  p o lic y  of 
th e  American government was to  su p p o rt th e  G enera lissim o , 
E x is tin g  American p o l ic y , he th o u g h t, made i t  im p o ssib le  f o r  
th e  U nited S ta te s  to  re c o g n ize  any o th e r  p o l i t i c a l  f a c t io n s  
in  China, S e c re ta ry  H u ll, th e  P re s id e n t p o in te d  o u t, had ex­
p la in e d  th i s  in  a message to  th e  Japanese  Ambassador b efo re  
th e  ou tb reak  of war in  th e  Far E a s t,^ ^
At th e  same m eeting . H urley d isc u sse d  h is  u n d ers tan d in g  
of th e  p e rs o n a l i ty  c o n f l i c t  ra g in g  in  China, He had d isc u sse d  
th e  problem of S t i lw e l l  w ith  v a rio u s  people  in  th e  F ar E ast
during  h is  a b o r t iv e  t r i p  to  China in  1943, and f e l t  he f u l ly
understood  th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  of d e a lin g  w ith  th e  c a u s t ic  Gene­
r a l ,  H urley and R oosevelt a lso  c o n sid e red  th e  m a tte r  of arming 
th e  Communists, but bo th  ag reed  th a t  th e  id e a  should  be r e j e c t ­
ed because of C h ian g 's  well-known apathy  toward th e  id ea ,^ ^
^^Document Handed by S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  C o rd e ll H u ll to
th e  Japanese Ambassador, November 26, 1941, in  China W hite
P ap e r. 464-466,
l^ D ra f t of H urley Memoirs, x i ,  8; H urley P apers ,
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A fte r  t h i s  f i n a l  b r ie f in g ,  H urley went home to  bed. The nex t 
morning he ro se  and journeyed  to  th e  N a tio n a l A irp o rt where 
he boarded a p lan e  f o r  China,
F ly ing  w est from th e  C a p ita l ,  H urley and Nelson flew  
over A laska and c ro sse d  S ib e r ia  to  Moscow. H urley wanted to  
c o n su lt  w ith  R ussian  o f f i c i a l s  because he b e lie v e d  th a t  a 
c l a r i f i c a t i o n  of th e  S o v ie t U nion 's p o lic y  re g a rd in g  China
1 Q
would s im p lify  h is  m iss io n . Chiang fe a re d  th a t  th e  S ov ie t 
Union would a id  th e  C hinese Communists in  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  to  
d e s tro y  th e  Kuomintang government. T h e re fo re , Chiang would be 
u n w illin g  to  e n te r ta in  any though ts of co o p era tio n  w ith  th e  
C hinese Communists u n le s s  he  cou ld  be a ssu red  th a t  th e  S ov ie t 
Union had no in te n t io n  o f su p p o rtin g  Mao T se-tung . H urley and 
Nelson a r r iv e d  in  Moscow on Wednesday, August 30, a t  6:05 p.m.
and were g re e te d  by a la rg e  p a r ty  of R ussian , American, and
19C hinese o f f i c i a l s .  The n ex t day, a t  fo u r  o 'c lo c k  in  th e  
a f te rn o o n . N elson, H urley , and A v ere ll Harrim an, th e  American 
Ambassador to  th e  S o v ie t Union, proceeded to  th e  o f f ic e  of 
R ussian  Foreign  M in is te r  V. M. M olotov,
Donald Nelson took  th e  lead  in  th e  d isc u ss io n  by sum­
m ariz ing  th e  v a rio u s  o b je c tiv e s  of both h i s  and G eneral 
H u rle y 's  m ission  to  C hina. He expressed  to  th e  S ov ie t Foreign  
M in is te r  th e  P r e s id e n t 's  d e s ir e  to  a id  China d u rin g  and a f t e r  
th e  war w ith  Japan . A fte r  a b r ie f  rev iew  o f th e  economic con-
^^Hurley to  R o o sev e lt, October 19, 1944; H urley P ap ers .
-^H urley China Log, 1944, August 25-August 30, 1944; 
H urley P ap ers ,
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d i t io n s  in  C hina, th e  m eeting tu rn e d  to  th e  problem  of 
Communist-Kuomintang u n i f ic a t io n ,
Molotov and th e  American re p re s e n ta t iv e s  ag reed  th a t  
th e  C hinese Communists were th e  m ajor opponents to  Chiang 
K a i-sh ek , Nelson to ld  Molotov th a t  p o l i t i c a l  u n i ty  was a 
r e q u i s i t e  to  e f f i c i e n t  m i l i ta r y  o p e ra tio n s  as w e ll as economic 
growth in  C hina, He then  asked th e  S ov ie t d ip lom at f o r  adv ice  
in  so lv in g  th e  m a tte r  of u n i f ic a t io n  in  China,
Molotov avoided  p roposing  any d e f in i t e  s o lu t io n  to  th e  
problem . He acknowledged th e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  of a u n i f ie d  C hina, 
but s t a te d  he cou ld  o f f e r  no ad v ice  on how to  ach iev e  i t .  He 
d id  co n ten d , however, th a t  th e  problem  could  p robab ly  b e s t  be 
view ed n o t from  W ashington n o r from Moscow b u t r a th e r  from 
Chungking, A f te r  s tu d ie s  were made th e re ,  he though t i t  m ight 
be p o s s ib le  f o r  th e  S o v ie t Union and th e  U nited  S ta te s  to  
adopt some m utual co u rse  of a c t io n  which would b rin g  about th e  
u n i f ic a t io n  o f th e  C hinese n a tio n , Molotov then  a ttem p ted  to  
change th e  s u b je c t ,  bu t Nelson was n o t so e a s i ly  d iv e r te d .
Nelson co n tin u ed  h is  e f f o r t s  to  g e t a  more d e f i n i t e  an­
swer from th e  c ra f ty  Communist. He knew th e  R ussians had a 
s u b s ta n t ia l  i n t e r e s t  in  C hina, t h e i r  c lo s e  n e ig h b o r, and to ld  
M olotov t h i s .  Nelson asked Molotov i f  he b e lie v e d  th e  p lan s  
o u t lin e d  by H urley and h im se lf  cou ld  be worked ou t w ith  th e  
p re s e n t  Chiang governm ent, Molotov r e p l ie d  th a t  he had no t 
had s u f f i c i e n t  o p p o rtu n ity  to  fo llo w  th e  developm ents in  Chi­
na , N e v e rth e le ss , o f f  th e  re c o rd , he o ffe re -d  some id ea s  which 
he b e lie v e d  m ight a id  Nelson and H urley in  t h e i r  m iss io n .
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M olo tov 's  d is c o u rse  covered  th re e  main problem s in  th e  
r e l a t io n s  between th e  S o v ie t Union and th e  government of 
Chiang K ai-sh ek . The f i r s t  grew out of th e  r o le  of th e  S ov ie t 
Union in  th e  u n su c c e ss fu l u p r is in g  le d  by Chiang H sueh-liang , 
th e  M anchurian w a rlo rd , in  1936, which r e s u l te d  in  Chiang' s 
c a p t iv i ty  in  S ian , The second was caused by th e  p resence  of 
la rg e  numbers of S o v ie t c i t i z e n s  l iv in g  in  th e  Chinese p rov­
in c e  of S ink iang , The th i r d  was th e  S ov ie t U nion 's 
r e la t io n s h ip  to  v ^ a t  Molotov r e f e r r e d  to  as th e  " s o -c a lle d "  
Communists in  N orth  China. This was th e  problem  which was of 
p rim ary  concern to  H urley ,
Molotov den ied  any S o v ie t r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  f o r  th e  in ­
t e r n a l  a f f a i r s  and developm ents in  China fo r  which a t  tim es 
th e  S o v ie t Union had been u n ju s t ly  blamed. He charged th a t  
th e  peop le  in  N orth China who claim ed they  were Communists 
w ere, in  r e a l i t y ,  n o t Communists a t  a l l  but m erely hungry 
peop le  who c a l le d  them selves Communists, As soon as they r e ­
c e iv ed  some food , he commented, they  would cease  to  be 
Communists, A w ider d i s t r ib u t io n  of U nited  S ta te s  a id  would 
g r e a t ly  reduce  th e  number of Communists in  China. The more 
Chiang oppressed  th e  C hinese, th e  more peop le  in  China would 
c a l l  them selves Communists. The S ov ie t Union, he argued, 
cou ld  no t be h e ld  re s p o n s ib le  fo r  t h i s .  I f  Chiang K ai-shek 
s tr a ig h te n e d  ou t h is  governm ent, he would be tro u b le d  f a r  le s s  
by d is s id e n t  e lem ents w ith in  th e  n a tio n , re g a rd le s s  of what 
they  c a l le d  th em se lv es.
Was Molotov speak ing  th e  t r u th  o r fo llow ing  a w ell
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p lanned  jruse to  convince th e  Americans th a t  th e  Communists in  
China were no t r e a l ly  Communists? Many f a c to r s  in d ic a te  th a t  
Molotov spoke th e  t r u th .  I t  i s  no t d i f f i c u l t  to  see  why Mao's 
group would n o t be p o p u la r in  th e  S o v ie t Union. F i r s t  of a l l ,  
th e  P o litb u re a u  of th e  C hinese Communist p a r ty  had branded Mao 
a d e v ia t io n i s t  in  1924 when he suggested  th a t  th e  t r u e  p ro le ­
t a r i a n  of China was th e  p e asa n t r a th e r  than  th e  in d u s t r i a l  
w orker of th e  c i ty .  S ince th a t  tim e , Mao had re c e iv e d  v i r t u a l ­
ly  no su p p o rt from th e  S o v ie t Union in  h is  e f f o r t s  to  b rin g  
about a communist r e v o lu t io n  in  China. Indeed , S ta l in  d id  no t 
begin to  su p p o rt Mao u n t i l  i t  became obvious th a t  Mao had 
n e a r ly  won p o l i t i c a l  supremacy in  China. T his tim e d id  not 
come u n t i l  th e  end of World War I I .
N elson, b e lie v in g  th e  t a lk s  had come to  an end, l e f t  
th e  room, bu t H urley and Ambassador Harriman rem ained. H urley 
ex p la in ed  th a t  h is  ta s k  was p r im a r ily  to  b rin g  m i l i ta r y  u n ity  
in  C hina. He d is c lo s e d  th a t  R oosevelt a u th o riz e d  him to  o f fe r  
to  M arshal S ta l in  a l l  n ecessa ry  in fo rm a tio n  on th e  cou rse  of 
th e  war in  th e  P a c i f ic .  G eneral H urley then  brought up th e  
d e s i r a b i l i t y  of S o v ie t p e rm iss ion  to  u se  ro u te s  through P e rs ia ,  
Alma A lta , and S ink iang , to  b rin g  m a te r ia l  in to  China, Molo­
to v  made no comment on t h i s  p ro p o sa l. A fte r  t h i s  exchange, 
H urley and Harriman l e f t  th e  S o v ie t Foreign  M in is te r  and r e ­
tu rn ed  to  th e  American E m b a s s y . H u r l e y  and Nelson rem ained
90 Two g en e ra l s tu d ie s  on S in o -S o v ie t R e la tio n s  a re :
Henry Wei, China and S o v ie t R ussia  (P r in c e to n : Van N ostrand ,
1956), and A itchen K. Wu. China and th e  S o v ie t Union; a Study 
of S in o -S o v ie t R e la tio n s  (London: Methuen, 195Ü).
^ ^ T ra n sc rip t of C onversation  between Donald M, N elson,
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in  Moscow a few more days, m eeting w ith  v a rio u s  d ip lo m a tic  
r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  in  th e  R ussian  c a p i ta l  and p a r t i c ip a t in g  in  
a re c e p tio n  a t  th e  American Embassy and a luncheon g iven  in  
t h e i r  honor by F ore ign  M in is te r  M olotov, E arly  Sunday morn­
in g , H urley and Nelson d ep arted  f o r  New D elh i where th ey  would 
meet G eneral S t i lw e l l ,
As H urley flew  over th e  M iddle E a s t, th e  ev en ts  of th e  
l a s t  th re e  weeks must have wekghed h e a v ily  on h is  m ind. Less 
th an  f i f t e e n  days ago, China meant l i t t l e  to  him. From th e  
tim e when Joseph Grew inform ed him th a t  th e  P re s id e n t was con­
s id e r in g  him f o r  a m ission  to  C hina, th e  problem s in  t h a t  f a r  
away n a tio n  seldom l e f t  h i s  mind, C hina, and th e  ev en ts  vdiich 
t r a n s p ir e d  th e re  d u rin g  th e  nex t y e a r  haunted  him f o r  th e  r e s t  
of h i s  l i f e .  The two weeks of b r ie f in g s  which he a tte n d e d  in  
p re p a ra tio n  f o r  th e  m issio n  only sc ra tc h e d  th e  su r fa c e  o f th e  
v a s t  problem  re p re se n te d  by China, H urley and th e  P re s id e n t 
had g re a t  f a i t h ,  however, in  th e  a b i l i t y  of two men, no m a tte r  
how wide th e  g u lf  between them, to  g e t to g e th e r  and th ra s h  ou t 
t h e i r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  man to  man. H u rle y 's  m eeting in  R ussia  
w ith  Molotov r e in fo rc e d  h is  con fidence  th a t  th e  m ission  would 
end in  e v en tu a l su c c e ss . H urley looked forw ard to  h is  m eet­
ing  w ith  G eneral S t i lw e l l  so th a t  he m ight begin  to  so lv e  th e  
problem s of u n ify in g  th e  main p o l i t i c a l  f a c t io n s  in  China and 
in c re a s in g  C hinese m i l i ta r y  e f fe c t iv e n e s s  a g a in s t  th e  Jap an ese ,
P a tr ic k  J ,  H urley , Averefcl Harrim an, and V. M, M olotov, Au­
g u s t 31, 1944; H urley P apers ,
^^H urley China Log, 1944, August 31-Septem ber 3, 1944; 
H urley P ap ers ,
CHAPTER IV 
HURLEY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK
At e x a c tly  te n  t h i r t y  in  th e  m orning, September 4 , th e  
C-54 c a rry in g  G eneral P a tr ic k  J ,  H urley and Donald M. Nelson 
to  th e  F ar E ast landed  in  New D elh i. They were met by a d e le ­
g a tio n  le d  by G eneral Joseph W. S t i lw e l l ,  th e  Commanding 
G eneral of th e  C hina-B urm a-India t h e a t e r .1 H urley and S t i lw e l l  
went d i r e c t l y  to  American h ead q u a rte rs  to  d isc u ss  th e  s i t u a ­
t io n  which th e  U nited S ta te s  faced  in  C hina. Nelson and th e  
r e s t  of th e  p a r ty  went to  th e  Im p eria l H o te l, bu t w ith in  th e  
hour N elson jo in e d  S t i lw e l l  and H urley.
There can be l i t t l e  doubt th a t  th e se  i n i t i a l  c o n fe r­
ences d e a l t  p r im a r ily  w ith  th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  which e x is te d  
between G enera lissim o  Chiang K ai-shek  and G eneral S t i lw e l l ,
The ta lk s  con tinued  d u rin g  lunch  a t  th e  Im p eria l H otel and on 
th rough  th e  a fte rn o o n  and even ing . The nex t morning H urley, 
N elson and S t i lw e l l  d ep a rted  fo r  Chabua, In d ia ,  w ith  S t i l ­
w e l l ' s Deputy, L ie u te n a n t G eneral D aniel 1. S u ltan . They s ta y ed  
a t  Chabua o v e rn ig h t as g u es ts  of G eneral S u ltan  and, on Wednes­
day, they  resumed t h e i r  t r i p  to  Chungking, a r r iv in g  th e re  a t
-H urley China Log, 1944, September 4 , 1944; H urley Pa­
p e r s .
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two tw enty in  th e  a f te rn o o n . The u su a l covey of o f f i c i a l s  
g re e te d  H urley and N elson, They then  h u r r ie d  to  t h e i r  ap­
p o in te d  q u a r te r s  to  r e s t  b e fo re  beginn ing  th e  harrow ing round
2o f m eetings which would begin  th e  nex t day.
H u rle y 's  i n i t i a l  m eeting  w ith  th e  G eneralissim o was a t  
11:00 a ,m ,, September 7, 1944, Chiang won H urley im m ediately, 
and H urley l e f t  th e  m eeting  w ith  a fav o ra b le  im pression  of 
th e  G en era liss im o , Every su g g estio n  th a t  H urley made, th e  
c r a f ty  C hinese le a d e r  appeared  w il l in g  to  ad o p t. He even ex­
p re s se d  a d e s i r e  to  see  S t i lw e l l  in  command of a l l  Chinese 
fo rc e s ,  Chiang, however, doubted th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  of a s e t t l e ­
ment w ith  th e  C hinese Communists, He im plied  th a t  th e  
Communist tro o p s  would have to  subm it to  th e  c o n tro l  of h im self 
and th e  N a tio n a l M il i ta ry  Council as a prim ary requ irem en t fo r  
a u n i f ie d  command. In s p i t e  of t h i s .  Hurley b e liev e d  th a t  a 
d e f in i t e  p ro sp e c t f o r  m i l i ta r y  u n i f ic a t io n  in  China e x is te d  
and th a t  th e  G enera lissim o  had shown a w illin g n e s s  to  comply 
w ith  th e  d e s ir e s  of th e  P re s id e n t,
The G eneral jou rneyed  on to  Ambassador Gauss' re s id e n c e , 
where h is  h igh  hopes of success were s h a t te re d . The p e ss im is ­
t i c  Ambassador p rocla im ed  th a t  no th ing  in  th e  w orld could 
p rev e n t th e  c o lla p s e  of th e  N a t io n a l is t  governm ent. This was, 
in  somewhat p la in  te rm s, what Ambassador Gauss and h is  s t a f f
^H urley China Log, 1944, September 4 - September 6 , 1944; 
H urley P ap e rs ,
H urley to  R oosevelt and M arsh a ll, September 8, 1944; 
H urley P ap e rs ,
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a t  th e  Chungking Embassy had be&i t e l l i n g  th e  S ta te  Department 
fo r  some tim e ,^  H urley cou ld  n o t u n d ers tan d  why Gauss p re ­
sen ted  no p r a c t i c a l  a l t e r n a t iv e s  to  such an outcome. H urley 
argued th a t  i f  Chiang c o lla p se d  i t  would mean d i s in te g r a t io n  
o f th e  C hinese army and a t  l e a s t  t h i r t y  o r  more Japanese  d i ­
v is io n s  would be re le a s e d  to  f ig h t  th e  Americans then  p o ised  
fo r  an in v as io n  o f th e  P h i l ip p in e s .^  He vehem ently d e c la re d  
th a t  i f  G auss' argum ents were c o r r e c t ,  he would r e tu rn  to  th e  
U nited  S ta te s  a t  once, knowing t h a t  th e  f a i l u r e  o f h i s  m ission  
was a  foregone c o n c lu s io n . Gauss, undaunted , r e in fo rc e d  h is  
argument by charg ing  th a t  th e  N a tio n a l government was c o rru p t , 
i n e f f i c i e n t ,  and in ca p ab le  o f re n d e rin g  any r e a l  s e rv ic e  to  
th e  U nited  S ta te s ,  e i t h e r  in  th e  war o r  a f te rw a rd . H urley was 
taken  back, bu t n o t f o r  a  moment d id  he a l t e r  h i s  c o n v ic tio n  
th a t  h i s  m ission  would succeed .^  G auss' pessim ism , however, 
was n o t th e  on ly  fo rebod ing  of f a i l u r e  which H urley met in  
th e  f i r s t  few days in  Chungking.
Hurley had b a re ly  s e t t l e d  down in  th e  C hinese c a p i ta l  
when a  f lo o d  of r e p o r ts  engu lfed  him. A s t a f f  study  p rep a red  
by G eneral S t i l w e l l 's  I n te l l ig e n c e  S ec tio n  in d ic a te d  th a t  Chi­
na was more than  a m i l i ta r y  problem . The r ^ o r t  dw elt on th e
^China W hite P apor. 64.
^Mary H. W illiam s, Chronology: 1941-1945. Vol. V III , 
P a r t  5 , o f S p e c ia l S tu d ie s  in  U n i t ^  S ta te s  Army in  World 
I I . ed. Kent R oberts G re e n fie ld  (53 v o l s . ;  W ashington: 0. Û,
Government P r in t in g  O ff ic e , 1947-1960), 302.
^S tatem ent o f H urley fo r  L if e . January  11, 1946; Hur­
le y  P apers .
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r e l a t i o n  of p o l i t i c s  to  m i l i ta r y  a c tio n  in  China, p o in tin g  out 
th a t  th e  Communist fo rc e s  in  China were in  no way su b o rd in a te  
to  Chiang K ai-shek , In  f a c t ,  th e  Communists had fo rce d  Chiang 
to  keep la rg e  p o r t io n s  of h is  army t i e d  down guard ing  th e  bor­
de r between Chinese Communist a re a s  and th o se  c o n tro l le d  by 
th e  Kuomintang.^
Three re p o r ts  from John S tew art S e rv ic e , th en  se rv in g  
w ith  th e  U nited S ta te s  Army O bserver Group a t  th e  Communist 
c a p i ta l  in  Yenan, reem phasized  th e  p o l i t i c a l  and m il i ta r y  dan­
g e rs  of th e  s i tu a t io n  in  C hina, The f i r s t  r e p o r t ,  "The Need 
For An American P o licy  Toward th e  Problems C reated  by th e  R ise  
of th e  Chinese Communist P a r ty ,"  p lead ed  f o r  a d e f i n i t e  p o lic y  
to  d e a l w ith  th e  Chinese Communists, The second in d ic a te d  th e  
growing s tr e n g th  of th e  Communist fo rc e s ,  and a th i r d  sketched  
th e  background of th e  C hinese Communist le a d e r s ,  d e p ic tin g  
them as h ig h ly  d e d ic a te d , v ig o ro u s , and i n t e l l i g e n t , ^
The Communists in  Yenan n o tic e d  H urley’ s a r r i v a l  and 
made a co n ce rted  e f f o r t  to  a t t r a c t  h i s  a t t e n t io n  by fo llo w in g  
a dua l s t r a te g y .  They launched a v igo rous propaganda a t ta c k  
on Chiang K ai-shek  and s im u ltan eo u sly  i n i t i a t e d  an e f f o r t  de-
7
"Notes on Problems Connected w ith  Our M ission in  
C hina,"  p rep a red  by G eneral S t i l w e l l 's  I n te l l ig e n c e  S ec tio n ; 
H urley P apers .
^Report by John S tew art S e rv ice , "The Need For An Ameri­
can P o licy  Toward th e  Problems C reated  by th e  R ise  of th e  
Chinese Communist P a r ty ,"  September 3, 1944; R eport by John 
S tew art S e rv ic e , "The Growth of th e  New F ourth  Army: An Ex­
ample of th e  P opular D em ocratic Appeal of th e  C hinese 
Communists," September 4 , 1944; R eport by John S tew art S er­
v ic e ,  "G eneral Im pression  of th e  Chinese Communist L ead ers ,"  
September 4 , 1944; H urley P apers .
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signed  to  fav o ra b ly  im press R o o se v e lt 's  s p e c ia l  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  
w ith  th e  more p ro g re s s iv e  fe a tu re s  of th e  Communist e f f o r t  in  
N orth  C hina, By fo llo w in g  th is  tw o -fo ld  p a th , th e  Communists 
hoped e v e n tu a lly , th rough  H urley , to  reach  th e  ea r of 
F ra n k lin  R o o sev e lt.
The s tro n g  c r i t i c i s m  of Chiang K ai-shek  began on Sep­
tem ber 7 , only one day a f t e r  H urley a r r iv e d  in  Chungking,
The Chieh Fang J ih  Pao, th e  house organ of th e  C hinese Commu­
n i s t  p a r ty ,  and th e  H sin Hua News Agency, a n o th e r arm of th e  
C hinese Communist p a r ty ,  v ig o ro u s ly  a tta c k e d  th e  G e n e ra lis ­
s im o 's  opening ad d ress  to  th e  t h i r d  s e s s io n  of th e  P e o p le 's  
P o l i t i c a l  C ouncil a t  Chungking, T his marked th e  f i r s t  d i r e c t  
c r i t ic i s m  by th e  Communist p a r ty  of th e  G eneralissim o s in c e  
th e  summer of 1943, S ig n i f ic a n t ly ,  th e  Communist ra d io  broad­
c a s te d  in  E n g lish , and th e re fo re  reach ed  most Americans in
9
C hina, W hile sh a rp ly  c r i t i c i z i n g  th e  Kuomintang governm ent, 
th e  Communists p a in te d  a com plim entary p ic tu r e  of them selves.
The C hinese Communists lacked  d i r e c t  access  to  G eneral 
H urley , But th e  American O bserver Group, s e n t  to  Yenan e a r l i e r  
in  th e  y e a r , p rov ided  th e  Communists w ith  a means of rea ch in g  
th e  s p e c ia l  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e .  With t h i s  in  mind, th e  Communists 
g ra n te d  th e  Americans in  Yenan a s e r ie s  of in te rv ie w s  and 
b r ie f in g s  in  which th e  Chinese Communist p a r ty  was p re se n te d  
in  glowing te rm s. They f e l t  c e r ta in  th a t  r e p o r ts  of th e s e
^Report by John S tew art S e rv ic e , "Communist C r i t ic is m  
o f Chiang K a i-s h e k 's  Opening Address to  th e  P e o p le 's  P o l i t i ­
c a l  C o u n c il,"  Septem ber 8, 1944; H urley P ap e rs ,
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b r ie f in g s  and in te rv ie w s  would be sen t to  Chungking and even­
t u a l ly  re a c h  H urley.
One s e r ie s  of l e c tu r e s  focused on Communist a d m in is tra ­
t io n  in  g u e r r i l l a  a re a s .  High rank ing  Communist le a d e rs  
d e sc r ib e d  t h e i r  g u e r r i l l a s  as th e  vanguard of a dem ocratic  
upheaval in  p e asa n t China which would i n i t i a t e  lo c a l  e le c t io n s  
and in a u g u ra te  land  refo rm . P easan ts and l ib e r a l s  a l ik e  
looked  to  th e  Communists, i t  was re p o r te d , because t h e i r  p ro ­
gram had th e  app roval of th e  peop le  and because no im portan t 
p o l i t i c a l  o p p o s itio n  had formed a g a in s t  them. In  summarizing 
t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s ,  th e  Communists sa id  th e  g u e r r i l l a s  used 
t h e i r  in f lu e n c e  in  a dem ocratic  way to  f u r th e r  dem ocratic  
en ds,^^  W hile i n d i r e c t ly  a ttem p tin g  to  im press H urley w ith  
th e  c o n c re te  accom plishm ents of th e  Chinese Communists in  ru ­
r a l  C hina, th e  Communists a ls o  hoped to  g ive  him a b roader 
view  of th e  p h ilo s o p h ic a l  background of th e  p e c u l ia r  brand of 
Communism developed by Chairman Mao T se-tung ,
The Communists chose a roundabout method to  ach ieve  
t h i s  end, Mr, Okano Susumu, a h igh  rank ing  le a d e r  in  th e  Jap ­
anese  Communist p a r ty ,  r e s id e d  in  Yenan, On September 8, 1944, 
two days a f t e r  Hurley a r r iv e d  in  China, Okano o u tlin e d  in  some 
d e t a i l  th e  program of th e  Japanese  Communist p a r ty .  U nusually 
m odera te , Okano' s program en v is io n ed  th e  p ro g ress  of Japan 
tow ard so c ia lism  by a g rad u a l development through p o l i t i c a l
^^Report by John S tew art S erv ice  "Development of Com­
m unist P o l i t i c a l  C on tro l in  th e  G u e r r i l la  B ases,"  September 
10, 1944; H urley P ap e rs ,
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democracy and d e m o c ra tic a lly  c o n tro l le d  c a p ita l is m , _In th e  
t r a n s i t i o n  p e r io d , th e  Communists would a l ly  them selves w ith  
any genu ine ly  dem ocratic  group. What Okano ske tched  was in  
r e a l i t y  Mao T se - tu n g 's  avowed brand of Communism fo r  China,
The emphasis on g rad u a l tra n s fo rm a tio n  and co o p era tio n  w ith  
p r iv a te  s e c to r s  of th e  n a tio n a l  economy h o p e fu lly  would a l ­
l e v ia t e  th e  f e a r  H urley harbo red  a g a in s t  a r a d ic a l  communist 
program  which en v is io n ed  ra p id  s o c ia l  and economic re v o lu ­
tio n ,^ ^  D esp ite  th e  clam or over th e  Communist is su e  and i t s  
obvious r e la t io n s h ip  to  th e  S tilw e ll-C h ia n g  feud , H urley con­
cerned  h im se lf  w ith  s e t t l i n g  th e  narrow er a sp e c ts  of th e  b a t t l e  
between th e  American G eneral and th e  Chinese G enera lissim o .
Chiang d id  no t n e g le c t  h is  two s p e c ia l  g u e s ts . In
m eeting a f t e r  m eeting , th e  G eneralissim o la v ish e d  a t t e n t io n
on H urley and N elson, On September 9 , Chiang K ai-shek  h e ld  a
la rg e  d in n e r honoring  R o o se v e lt 's  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s .  H urley ,
N elson, S t i lw e l l ,  Gauss, and most o th e r  h igh  rank ing  C hinese
and American o f f i c i a l s  were in  a tte n d a n c e . A fte r  an e x c e lle n t
m eal, Chiang proposed  a to a s t  to  th e  h e a l th  of th e  P re s id e n t
and h is  two d is t in g u is h e d  g u e s ts . Hurley re tu rn e d  th e  com pli-
12ment by to a s t in g  th e  h e a l th  of P re s id e n t Chiang, But 
d in n e rs  and to a s ts  could  n o t r e c o n c ile  th e  b a s ic  d if fe re n c e s  
between Chiang and S t i lw e l l ,  The ch a lle n g e  b e fo re  H urley
—' ^^Report by John S tew art S e rv ic e , "The Program of th e  
Japanese  Communist P a r ty ,"  September 8, 1944; Hurley P ap ers ,
p e rs .
^^Hurley China Log, 1944, September 9, 1944; H urley Pa-
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seemed to  be ever in c re a s in g ,
A c r i s i s  in  th e  f ig h t  o ccu rred  on September 15, A fte r  
c r ip p l in g  th e  m il i ta r y  e f f o r t  in  Burma by r e fu s in g  to  p ro v id e  
rep lacem en ts fo r  th e  C hinese u n i ts  f ig h t in g  th e r e ,  Chiang in ­
formed S t i lw e l l  th a t  i f  th e  o f fe n s iv e  in  Burma was n o t resumed 
w ith in  a week, he would w ithdraw  tro o p s  from th a t  f r o n t  and 
commit them in  th e  e a s t  where they  would be used  to  defend 
C h e n n au lt's  a i r  f i e l d s ,  S t i lw e l l  no ted  th e  m eeting in  h is  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  fa s h io n , s t a t i n g  th a t  th e  "crazy  l i t t l e  bas­
ta rd "  gave th e  "u su a l cockeyed rea so n s  and i d i o t i c  t a c t i c a l  
and s t r a t e g i c  c o n ce p tio n s . He i s  i m p o s s i b l e , T h e  n ex t day 
th e  G enera lissim o aga in  c a l le d  f o r  S t i lw e l l  and H urley and 
t h i s  tim e in s i s t e d  th a t  he be g iven f u l l  c o n tro l  o f Lend-Lease, 
H urley o b je c te d  to  th i s  r e q u e s t ,  and S t i lw e l l  commented th a t  
i f  th e  G enera lissim o  were a llow ed to  g e t c o n tro l  over d i s t r i ­
b u tio n  of Lend-Lease, h e , as th e  American commander in  China, 
would be "sunk,
On September 18, S t i lw e l l ,  s t i l l  angered over th e  de­
mands of Chiang K ai-sh ek , re c e iv e d  what he b e lie v e d  to  be good 
news. Upon recommendations from th e  S ta te  and War D epartm ents, 
P re s id e n t R oosevelt f i n a l ly  took  a f irm  stan d  a g a in s t  th e  d a l ­
ly in g  of th e  G en era liss im o , In  a v i r t u a l  u ltim atum , R oosevelt 
warned th a t  China was on th e  verge  of m i l i ta r y  c o l la p s e ,  and 
he th re a te n e d  to  w ithdraw  U nited  S ta te s  suppo rt from  C hiang 's
1^ S t i lw e l l ,  The S t i lw e l l  P a p e rs , 330, 
l ^ lb id . . 331,
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government u n le ss  S t i lw e l l  was made commander of C hinese f o r ­
ces and th e  a t ta c k  pursued  on th e  Burma f r o n t . S t i l w e l l ,  
o v e rjo y ed , ru sh ed  to  th e  G enera lissim o’ s re s id e n c e .
He a r r iv e d  w h ile  H urley was in  con ference  w ith  th e  
C hinese le a d e r .  The G eneral c a l le d  H urley out and re a d  th e  
m essage to  him. H urley urged th a t  i t  n o t be d e liv e re d  l e s t  
i t  d e s tro y  what p ro g re s s  had been made in  th e  n e g o tia t io n s .  
S t i lw e l l  d id  n o t sh a re  H urley ’ s f a i t h  in  th e  m ee tin g s, be­
l ie v in g  t h a t  only such an u ltim atum  as he now p o ssessed  cou ld  
fo rc e  Chiang to  make m eaningful co n cessio n s . He to ld  Hurley 
he must fo llo w  th e  o rd e rs  of th e  P re s id e n t. S t i lw e l l  handed 
th e  message to  Chiang K ai-shek  who re a d  i t  and commented only 
" I  u n d e rs ta n d .” W ith t h i s ,  th e  m eeting t e r m i n a t e d . A s  
S t i lw e l l  re tu rn e d  to  h is  o f f ic e ,  he composed a sa rd o n ic  n a r r a ­
t i v e  poem re c o u n tin g  th e  in c id e n t .
During th i s  p e rio d  of in c re a se d  te n s io n s  l a t e  in  Septem­
b e r , 1944, th e  Communists made two d i r e c t  approaches to  H urley. 
G eneral Chu Teh, th e  le a d e r  of th e  Communist a rm ies , s e n t a 
l e t t e r  to  H urley w hich a r r iv e d  on September 11. He in v i te d  
H urley to  v i s i t  th e  C hinese Communist c a p i ta l  a t  Yenan and a s ­
s e r te d  th a t  th e  Communist fo rc e s ,  i f  su p p lie d  w ith  th e  
n e ce ssa ry  equipm ent, could  p lay  an im portan t r o le  in  th e  ex-
^ % o o sev e lt to  Chiang K ai-shek , September 16, 1944; 
H urley P ap e rs .
^% acA rthu r H earin g s . P a r t  4 , 2866-2867, Hurley China 
Log, 1944, September 19, 1944; Hurley P ap ers . “
S t i lw e l l ,  The S t i lw e l l  P a p e rs . 334.
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p e c te d  c o u n te r -o ffe n s iv e  a g a in s t  th e  Japanese , The Communist 
G eneral spoke w ith  p r id e  of th e  prowess of th e  E ighth  Route 
Army and th e  New F ou rth  Army, c o n tra s t in g  t h e i r  many v ic to r ie s  
to  th e  innum erable d e fe a ts  su f fe re d  by th e  N a t io n a l is t  fo rc e s . 
He b oasted  of th e  two m ill io n  man P e o p le 's  M i l i t i a  and th e  
f iv e  hundred thousand man r e g u la r  fo rc e  of th e  C hinese Commu­
n i s t  p a r ty .  In  h is  l e t t e r ,  Chu Teh rem inded Hurley of th e
1 Q
u rg e n t s i tu a t io n  in  China,
Ten days l a t e r  a Communist r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  c a l le d  a t  th e  
American Embassy and renewed th e  in v i t a t io n  f o r  H urley and 
N elson to  v i s i t  Y e n a n , T h e  Communist spokesman a ls o  r e ­
q u ested  a m eeting  w ith  th e  two p r e s id e n t ia l  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s .  
Gauss inform ed th e  Communist agen t t h a t ,  w h ile  H urley and 
N elson w ere then  ab sen t from Chungking, i t  would be p o s s ib le  
to  a rra n g e  a c o n fe ren c e . The Ambassador, on th e  o th e r  hand, 
c au tio n e d  H urley about th e  wisdom of i n i t i a t i n g  co n v ersa tio n s  
w ith  th e  Communists w h ile  s t i l l  engaged in  ta lk s  w ith  th e
o n
G en era liss im o ,
A lthough th e  Communists wanted to  t a lk  w ith  H urley, 
th ey  reg a rd ed  him w ith  su sp ic io n , John S tew art S erv ice  com­
m ented many y e a rs  l a t e r  th a t  many rumors c i r c u la te d  in  th e  
Communist c a p i t a l  about th e  Hurley m issio n . P u b lic  sta tem en ts
^®Chu Teh to  H urley and N elson, September 10, 1944; 
H urley P ap ers ,
Î 9The Communist p a r ty  k ep t a n o n -o f f ic ia l  r e p re s e n ta ­
t i v e  in  th e  Chungking c a p i ta l ,
OQ
C larence  L, Gauss to  H urley, September 21, 1944; 
H urley P ap e rs ,
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o r ig in a t in g  in  Chungking im p lied  th a t  Hurley would a ttem p t to
b rin g  about an agreem ent between th e  two p a r t i e s  and u n ify  th e
two arm ies . N e v e rth e le ss , r e p o r ts  in  Yenan in  e a r ly  October
a s s e r te d  th a t  th e  only  imm ediate su b je c t of th e  n e g o tia t io n s
was C h iang 's  demand f o r  S t i l w e l l 's  r e c a l l .  S e rv ice  r e c a l le d
th a t  le a d e rs  in  Yenan b e liev e d  th a t  Hurley was g ra d u a lly
sw inging to  th e  su p p o rt of Chiang in  th e  hope, promoted by
T. V, Soong, th a t  C h ian g 's  co o p era tio n  on o th e r  is su e s  could
21be secu red  i f  S t i lw e l l  were removed,  ^ The Communists probab­
ly  in te r p r e te d  th i s  news w ith  mixed f e e l in g s ,  f o r  they  knew 
S t i lw e l l  favored  arm ing th e  Communist fo rc e s .  On th e  o th e r  
hand, i f  an a l l i a n c e  cou ld  be th ra sh ed  o u t, i t  m ight prove 
b e n e f ic ia l  to  th e  C hinese Communist p a r ty ,  f o r  i t  would c e r ­
t a in ly  re c e iv e  a sh a re  o f th e  American arms and equipment then  
flow ing in to  China, I f  th e  outcome of th e  H urley m ission  was 
vague and u n c e r ta in  to  th e  C hinese Communists, i t  was eq u a lly  
so to  H urley and th e  a d m in is tra tio n  in  W ashington,
The h ig h e s t le a d e rs  in  th e  government viewed th e  p e r ­
s o n a l i ty  c o n f l i c t  in  China w ith  alarm . P r e s id e n t ia l  a d v ise rs  
d isc u sse d  th e  problem  in  d e t a i l ,  lay in g  i t  b e fo re  th e  P re s id e n t 
on October 4 , 1944, The P re s id e n t b e lie v e d  th a t  e a r ly  in  
A ugust, 1944, th e  G eneralissim o had agreed  in  p r in c ip le  to  
d e s ig n a te  S t i lw e l l  as commander of th e  Chinese fo rc e s ,  as a 
s te p  toward m eeting th e  d e sp e ra te  m il i ta r y  s i tu a t io n  develop­
ing  in  China. In th e  two months which fo llow ed , however,
^^L oyalty  I n v e s t ig a t io n . P a r t  2, 1921,
66 22 Chiang K ai-shek  a p p a re n tly  re v e rse d  h is  p o s i t io n .  No one
knew what to  b e lie v e . An e n try  in  th e  d ia ry  of S e c re ta ry  of 
Navy James F o r r e s ta l ,  on O ctober 5, 1944, in d ic a te d  th e  con­
fu s io n  in  W ashington. F o r r e s ta l  reco u n ted  how th e  P re s id e n t 
f i r s t  decided  to  send a s t i f f  message to  Chiang K a i-sh ek , then
re v e rse d  h im se lf  and se n t  a m ild e r  one. F o r r e s ta l  f e l t  th a t
21th e  l in e s  of communication to  China had broken down. Mean­
w h ile , in  C hina, even ts took new tu rn s .
As of è a r ly  O ctober, H urley had n o t responded to  th e  
f e e le r s  s e n t out by th e  Yenan Communists. But they  knew H urley 
d e s ire d  to  u n ify  th e  Kuomintang and Communist armed fo rc e s  in  
China. In  c a s t in g  about f o r  a way to  inform  H urley of t h e i r  
p o s i t io n  on u n i f ic a t io n ,  they  adopted  a q u i te  sim ple  d e v ic e .
On O ctober 4 , Chairman Mao T se-tung  p re se n te d  a  d e ta i l e d  p ro ­
gram f o r  u n i f ic a t io n  a c c e p ta b le  to  th e  Chinese Communist p a r ty .  
Of c o u rse , newsmen and d ip lom ats no ted  Mao's p re s e n ta tio n  and 
in  t h i s  way H urley lea rn ed  of Mao's p o s i t io n .  A d isp a tc h  by 
Brooks A tkinson of th e  New York Times re p o r te d  M ao's program .
Mao's p ro p o sa l was q u i te  s im p le . He though t a n a tio n ­
a l  emergency co u n c il should  be c a l le d  w ith  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  
from a l l  f a c t io n s  in  China f ig h t in g  th e  Jap an ese . This c o u n c il 
should  d isc u ss  ways of w orking out u n i f ic a t io n  and propose a 
m an ifes to  la y in g  th e  fo u n d a tio n  upon vrfiich a newly formed gov­
ernm ent would o p e ra te  u n t i l  th e  end of th e  w ar. Mao
Leahy, I Was T here . 270.
23^ James F o r r e s ta l ,  The F o r r e s ta l  D ia r ie s ,  ed, W alter 
M il l i s  (New York: V iking P re s s , i y b i ; ,  l2 .
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m ain ta in ed  th a t  t h i s  m an ifes to  should  sp e c ify  th e  r ig h t s  of 
th e  peop le  and a b o lis h  a l l  laws and o rd inances d e s t ru c t iv e  to  
dem ocratic  n a t io n a l  u n i ty .  I t  should  c o n ta in , he c o n tin u ed , a 
new program  fo r  p o l i t i c a l ,  m i l i ta r y ,  economic, and s o c ia l  de­
velopm ent, Once th i s  m an ifes to  was d ra f te d  and accep ted  by 
th e  p a r t i e s  in v o lv ed , a new government would be form ed. Mao 
then  tu rn ed  to  more s p e c i f i c  problem s invo lved  in  form ing a 
governm ent.
He proposed  t h a t  th e  newly formed co u n c il should  e le c t  
government le a d e r s ,  because th e  war made i t  im p o ssib le  to  h o ld  
n a t io n a l  e le c t io n s .  He m ain ta ined  th a t  c e r ta in  elem ents in  
th e  Kuomintang should  n o t be allow ed to  ru n , p a r t i c u l a r ly  th e  
F a s c is t  u l t r a - c o n s e r v a t iv e  "C. C. c l i q u e , w h i c h ,  he a s s e r t ­
ed , c o n tro l le d  th e  government through th e  Kuomintang p a r ty  
m achinery. In  a d d it io n  to  form ing t h i s  new c iv i l i a n  c o a l i t io n  
governm ent, Mao d e c la re d  th a t  th e  m i l i ta r y  h ig h  command a ls o  
needed a com plete re o rg a n iz a tio n  because i t  no lo n g er commanded 
th e  r e s p e c t  of th e  p eo p le  and th e  s o ld ie r s .  He argued th a t  
when th e  war ended, i t  would be p o s s ib le  to  e le c t  a c o a l i t io n  
governm ent. He p ledged  th e  Communist p a r t y 's  su p p o rt of such 
a government as long as i t  was based upon dem ocratic  p r in c ip le s .
^^The "G. C. c liq u e "  was a f a c t io n  w ith in  th e  Kuomin­
ta n g , a ls o  known as th e  "O rgan iza tion  c l iq u e ,"  headed by 
th e  b ro th e rs  C h'en K uo-fu and Ch'en L i- fu .  T his f a c t io n  con­
t r o l l e d  th e  C e n tra l P o l i t i c a l  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  t r a in in g  c i v i l  
s e rv a n ts  and th e  Kuomintang c e n tr a l  s e c r e t a r i a t  and O rganiza­
t io n  M in is try , w ith  a l l  t h e i r  p e rso n n e l f i l e s ,  f in a n c ia l  
re s o u rc e s ,  and s e c r e t  p a r ty  p o l ic y . I t  was one of th e  main 
sou rces of C h iang 's  su p p o rt w ith in  th e  p a r ty .
? s■^Press W ire le ss  M essage, Brooks A tkinson to  New York 
Tim es. O ctober 4 , 1944; H urley P apers .
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W ith th i s  Communist program  in  hand, Hurley took a new look 
a t  th e  s i tu a t io n  in  China.
On every s id e  he encoun tered  o p p o sitio n  to  Chiang 
K a i-s h e k 's  r u le .  I t  came from both American and Chinese 
so u rc e s . Americans in  China found l i t t l e  to  p r a is e  in  Chiang, 
and on th e  C hinese s id e  i t  became more and more ap p aren t th a t  
la rg e  p o r tio n s  of th e  p o p u la tio n  d id  no t support th e  G eneral­
iss im o . A lthough th e  Kuomintang t r i e d  to  keep Hurley away from 
th e  more l i b e r a l  elem ents in  China, he e v e n tu a lly  came in  con­
t a c t  w ith  some of th e  C hinese l ib e r a l s  who were a rra y ed  a g a in s t  
th e  Chiang regim e. L ate  in  September, Dr. Sun Fo, th e  l ib e r a l  
son of Dr. Sun Y a t-se n , began s e r io u s ly  to  c o u rt th e  p re s id e n ­
t i a l  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e .  When Sun Fo f i n a l ly  met w ith  Hurley he 
sh a rp ly  c r i t i c i z e d  Chiang K a i-sh e k 's  re a c tio n a ry  p o l ic i e s ,  and
to ld  H urley he fav o red  a l ib e r a l i z a t i o n  of th e  government under
26Chiang. M oreover, C hinese r e s i s ta n c e  to  th e  Kuomintang on 
r a r e  occasions found i t s  way in to  th e  newspapers.
L ib e ra l  elem ents in  th e  Chinese p re ss  c a l le d  on Chiang 
to  make re fo rm s. They demanded an improvement in  th e  s o l ­
d i e r s ' l iv in g  c o n d itio n s  and in s i s te d  th a t  troops be se n t 
a g a in s t  th e  Japanese  r a th e r  than  th e  Communists to  th e  n o rth . 
One newspaper c a l le d  fo r  ra p id  a c tio n  to  b rin g  about a u n i f ic a ­
t io n  of th e  Communist and Kuomintang arm ies and c a l le d  fo r  th e  
o u s te r  o f u l t r a  r i g h t i s t  elem ents w ith in  th e  Kuom intang.27
2^Hurley China Log, 1944, September 15, 28, 29, 1944; 
H urley P ap ers .
27f , McCracken F is h e r  to  H urley w ith  E nclosu re , Octo­
ber 9, 1944; H u r l^  P ap e rs ,
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The growing d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  w ith  th e  Kuomintang among a l l  e le ­
ments in  China was a p tly  exp ressed  by John S tew art S e rv ice ,
On O ctober 10, 1944, S e rv ice  w rote h is  r e p o r t  Number 
40, "The Need fo r  G re a te r Realism  in  our R e la tio n s  w ith  
Chiang K a i-sh ek ,"  which f ig u re d  p rom inen tly  in  charges l a t e r  
b rought a g a in s t  him th a t  he was pro-Communist, S e rv ice  viewed 
th e  C hinese Communists as a s tro n g , v ib ra n t  fo rc e  in  China; 
a t  th e  same tim e he saw th e  re a c t io n a ry  Kuomintang d e s tro y in g  
any suppo rt i t  had among th e  p o p u la tio n . S e rv ice  charged  th a t  
th e  Kuomintang was no lo n g er e s s e n t ia l  to  th e  American p o s i­
t io n  in  China, He b e lie v e d  th a t  i f  Chiang re fu s e d  to  respond  
to  demands fo r  dem ocratic  refo rm , th e  U nited S ta te s  should  
s h i f t  i t s  su p p o rt to  o th e r  fo rc e s  in  China, meaning th e  Commu­
n i s t s ,  He argued th a t  th e  U nited S ta te s  was p ro v id in g  
e s s e n t ia l  su p p o rt to  th e  Chiang reg im e, and th a t  th e  U nited
S ta te s  should  s t a r t  to  u t i l i z e  i t s  im portan t p o s i t io n  and in -
28f lu e n c e  to  fo rc e  Chiang to  b rin g  about refo rm s.
The clam or a g a in s t  Chiang drew more of H u rle y 's  a t t e n ­
t io n  as th e  S t i lw e l l  co n tro v e rsy  drew to  a c o n c lu sio n . In  
r e a l i t y .  H urley p lay ed  only  a sm all p a r t  in  th e  f i n a l  d ism is s ­
a l  of S t i lw e l l  from C hina. E arly  in  O ctober, Chiang fo rm ally  
re q u e s te d  S t i l w e l l 's  rem oval. He d id  n o t, however, make h is  
demand p u b lic , Henry H, Kung, Chiang K a i-sh e k 's  b ro th e r - in -  
law , heard  Harry Hopkins comment a t  a W ashington c o c k ta i l  
p a r ty  th a t  th e  P re s id e n t had decided  to  remove S t i lw e l l ,
28R eport by John S tew art S e rv ice , "The Need fo r  G re a te r 
R ealism  in  our R e la tio n s  w ith  Chiang K a i-sh ek ,"  O ctober 10, 
1944; H urley P ap ers ,
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A c tu a lly , a t  t h i s  tim e , th e  d e c is io n  had no t been f in a l i z e d  
and H opkins' d is c lo s u re  was a c c id e n ta l .  Kung, however, im­
m ed ia te ly  re la y e d  th i s  in fo rm atio n  to  th e  G en era liss im o , a f t e r  
which Chiang made h is  u ltim atum  p u b lic .  Follow ing  t h i s  announce­
m ent, th e  G enera lissim o  would lo se  fa c e  i f  th e  U nited  S ta te s  
p e r s i s t e d  in  keep ing  S t i lw e l l  in  C hina, C h ian g 's  p u b lic  s t a t e ­
ment s e a le d  S t i l w e l l 's  f a t e .  On S a tu rd ay , O ctober 21, G eneral
O Q
Joseph W. S t i lw e l l  took  h is  leav e  of C hina, Even b e fo re  
S t i lw e l l  l e f t ,  however. Hurley had tu rn ed  h is  e n t i r e  a t t e n t io n  
tow ard th e  u n i f ic a t io n  problem .
Hurley had ag reed  to  meet w ith  Communist r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  
on O ctober 17, and as h is  f i r s t  c o n fro n ta tio n  w ith  th e  C hinese 
Communist r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  approached, he m ain ta in ed  h is  u su a l 
co n fid en ce . On Wednesday, October 11, H urley began to  p re p a re  
fo r  h is  m eeting w ith  th e  Communists by h o ld in g  ta lk s  w ith  th e  
Kuomintang n e g o tia to r s  who would speak fo r  t h e i r  p a r ty  i f  Hur­
le y  was su c c e s s fu l in  b rin g in g  th e  two f a c t io n s  to g e th e r .
As H urley neared  th e  d a te  of th e  m eeting he n o ted  in  a message 
to  th e  P re s id e n t:  " I  have th e  s o -c a l le d  Communist q u e s tio n
under d isc u ss io n  a t  th e  p re s e n t  tim e, and I am s a t i s f i e d  th a t
Z^The most com plete s e t  of documents r e l a t i n g  to  
S t i l w e l l 's  r e l i e f  from command in  China i s :  Oklahoma F i le ;
H urley P ap e rs , T his f i l e  c o n ta in s  a l l  documents p e r t in e n t  
to  S t i l w e l l 's  rem oval and was assem bled by S t i lw e l l ,  Of p a r ­
t i c u l a r  n o te  re g a rd in g  th e  Kung-Hopkins in c id e n t  a re  Documents 
20 and 23 in  th e  Oklahoma F i l e ,
^^Hurley China Log, 1944, O ctober 11, 1944; H urley Pa­
p e rs ,
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we w i l l  a r r iv e  a t  a s o lu t io n  to  th a t  p roblem ."  ^ A ll members 
of th e  Embassy d id  t h e i r  b e s t  to  p re p a re  H urley f o r  h is  
d is c u s s io n s .
The American Embassy s t a f f  w rote a b r ie f in g  sh e e t to  
a id  H urley in  h is  t a lk s  w ith  th e  Communist r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s .
I t  bore no s ig n a tu re  bu t c a r r ie d  th e  d a te  O ctober 17, th e  day 
of th e  f i r s t  m eeting w ith  th e  Reds. The ex p erien ced  d ip lo ­
mats wanted H urley to  emphasize to  th e  Communists, Tung Pi-wu 
and Lin H u-tang, th a t  th e  t a lk s  were com pletely  p r iv a te  and 
c o n f id e n t ia l ,  and th a t  n o th ing  o f th e  c o n v e rsa tio n s  should  be 
re v e a le d  w ith o u t H u rle y 's  a p p ro v a l. The rea so n s  f o r  such p re ­
c a u tio n s  were obv ious. Even th e  s l i g h t e s t  h in t  of U nited  
S ta te s  su p p o rt f o r  th e  C hinese Communists cou ld  r e s u l t  in  i r ­
re p a ra b le  changes in  th e  b a lance  of power in  C hina. Many 
g roups, p re c a r io u s ly  a l l i e d  w ith  Chiang, m ight w e ll s h i f t  to  
Mao i f  they  le a rn e d  th a t  th e  American r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  was en­
gaging in  d isc u ss io n s  w ith  th e  Communist f a c t io n .  A fte r  making 
th e  im portance o f t h i s  p o in t  p e r f e c t ly  c le a r ,  H urley was ad­
v ise d  to  begin  d is c u s s io n s  on c e r ta in  s p e c i f i c  p o in ts .
In th e  f i r s t  p la c e . H urley was to  s t r e s s  th a t  both  th e  
American and R ussian  governm ents were anxious to  see  m il i ta r y  
u n i f ic a t io n  in  C hina, The G eneral was then  to  o f f e r  h is  good 
o f f ic e s  to  a id  in  re a c h in g  an agreem ent between th e  Yenan 
group and th e  Kuomintang. A fte r  t h i s  s p e c i f ic  o f f e r  had been 
made. Hurley hoped to  p re s e n t  two more su g g e s tio n s .
31 H urley to  R o o sev e lt, O ctober 13, 1944; Hurley P a p e rs .
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Members of th e  Embassy s t a f f  in  Chungking f e l t  th a t  th e  
an ti-governm en t propaganda e f f o r t  being c a r r ie d  on by th e  Yenan 
group b e n e f i t te d  no one except th e  Japanese and th e  puppet gov­
ernm ent a t  Nanking. Such a campaign s e r io u s ly  handicapped any 
hope f o r  s e tt le m e n t. They adv ised  Hurley to  t r y  to  g e t th e  
Communists to  h a l t  th e  propaganda a s s a u l t  a g a in s t Chiang, I f  
th e  o p p o rtu n ity  p re se n te d  i t s e l f ,  Hurley was adv ised  to  su g g est 
a m eeting  between Mao T se-tung and Chiang K ai-shek , The Em­
bassy  s t a f f  p o in te d  out th a t  th e  l ik e l ih o o d  of such a m eeting , 
however, was r a th e r  rem ote a t  th e  tim e.
I f  th e  Communists re a c te d  fa v o ra b ly , i t  was suggested  
t h a t  H urley would p re p a re  a d r a f t  agreem ent fo r  th e  se ttle m e n t 
of th e  p o l i t i c a l  q u e s tio n  and hand i t  to  Kuomintang and Commu­
n i s t  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s .  Uneasy a t  th e  approaching co n fe ren ce , 
th e  Embassy s t a f f  re q u e s te d  th a t  b e fo re  H urley d ra f te d  any 
p ro p o sa l th a t  they  be given an o p p o rtu n ity  to  b rin g  th e  
G eneral up to  d a te  on r e la t io n s  between th e  two f a c t io n s .
They though t i t  would be p a r t i c u la r ly  v a lu a b le  i f  H urley knew 
th e  p o in ts  th a t  th e  Chiang government had a lread y  conceded and 
th e  p o in ts  th a t  i t  m ight be w il l in g  to  concede. They cau tio n ed
G eneral Hurley no t to  p re s e n t a p ro p o sa l which th e  Chiang gov-
32ernm ent would re fu s e  to  a cc ep t. With th e se  though ts in  
mind, H urley e n te re d  d isc u ss io n s  w ith  th e  Communist r e p re s e n ta ­
t iv e s .
The f i r s t  m eetings w ith  th e  Reds took p lac e  on October
32Unsigned su g g e s tio n s , October 17, 1944; Hurley Pa­
p e rs ,
73
17 and 18. In  th e se  m eetings th e  Communist n e g o tia to rs  
p re se n te d  t h e i r  p o s i t io n  on u n i f ic a t io n .  They favo red  u n i f i ­
c a tio n  of China under a government in  which what they  c a l le d  
dem ocratic  p r in c ip le s  cou ld  evo lve , a government by th e  
p eo p le . But fo r  war purposes they  were w il l in g  to  subm it to  
th e  le a d e rs h ip  of Chiang K ai-shek , On h earin g  t h i s ,  Hurley 
was c o n fid e n t th a t  th e  Communists would co o p era te  w ith  U nited 
S ta te s  or U nited  N ations fo rc e s  in  China fo r  a quick  d e fe a t  of 
Japan a f t e r  lan d in g  in  China, Hurley asked th e  Communists to  
p u t t h e i r  p ro p o sa ls  in  w r i t in g  and on Thursday, October 19,
H urley met w ith  Wang S h ih -ch ieh  and Chang Chih-chung, th e
33Kuomintang n e g o t ia to r s ,  and made a s im ila r  r e q u e s t .  A fte r  
m eeting  w ith  th e  Kuomintang n e g o tia to r s .  Hurley se n t an o p t i ­
m is t ic  r e p o r t  to  th e  P re s id e n t,
He inform ed R oosevelt t h a t  he had e n te re d  in to  conver­
s a t io n s  w ith  th e  Communists, a  f e a t ,  he s a id , t h a t  many people 
had b e lie v e d  im p o ssib le , H u r l^  s a id  he had advanced a formu­
la  f o r  u n i f ic a t io n  which would p u t Chiang in  u n q u estio n ab le  
command of a l l  armed fo rc e s  in  China and which acknowledged th e  
p o l i t i c a l  aim of a u n i te d  China under a government based on 
dem ocratic  p r in c ip le s .  Hurley c l a s s i f i e d  h is  r e p o r t  as only
in fo rm a tiv e , bu t s a id  th a t  f o r  th e  f i r s t  tim e i t  looked as i f
34u n i f ic a t io n  of a l l  m i l i ta r y  fo rc e s  in  China was p o s s ib le .
On October 21, th e  n e g o tia t io n s  took an o th e r s te p
^ % u rle y  China Log, 1944, October 19, 1944; Hurley to  
R o o sev e lt, October 19, 1944; Hurley Papers,
34Hurley to  R o o sev e lt, O ctober 19, 1944; H urley P apers ,
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fo rw ard . On th a t  d a te , H u rley 's  su g g estio n  th a t  both  s id e s  
p u t t h e i r  p ro p o sa ls  in  w r i t in g  began to  bear f r u i t ,  Kuomin­
tang  n e g o tia to r s  handed Hurley th e  government p ro p o sa ls  f o r  th e  
se ttle m e n t of d if f e re n c e s  between them selves and th e  Commu­
n i s t s .  The n ex t Monday, th e  Communist n e g o tia to r s ,  L in 
Tze-han and Tung P i-ifu , p re se n te d  t h e i r  re v is e d  su g g e s tio n s  fo r  
se ttle m e n t to  H urley . H urley went to  work t r y in g  to  b rid g e  th e  
gap between what proved to  be two w idely  se p a ra te d  p o s i t io n s .
The government p ro p o sa l c o n ta in e d  n in e  s p e c i f ic  p o in ts  
which were d iv id e d  in to  two c a te g o r ie s .  The f i r s t  f iv e  d e a l t  
w ith  m i l i ta r y  m a tte r s , w h ile  th e  l a s t  fo u r concerned p o l i t i c a l  
problem s. The Kuomintang program fo r  m i l i ta r y  u n i f ic a t io n  de­
manded th a t  th e  Communist fo rc e s  be formed in to  tw elve 
d iv is io n s  and be p lac ed  in  th e  f r o n t  l i n e s .  They would be un­
der com plete c o n tro l  o f th e  G eneralissim o and would be given 
th e  same tre a tm e n t as o th e r  u n i ts  in  th e  N a t io n a l is t  array.
This would have meant t h a t  they  would have been thrown in to  th e  
h e a v ie s t  f ig h t in g  w ith o u t p ro p er equipment and as a r e s u l t  would 
be d estro y ed  by th e  Jap an ese . I f  th e  Communists had ag reed  to  
t h i s  p o s i t io n  they  c e r ta in ly  would have been com plete ly  un­
r e a l i s t i c .  The p o l i t i c a l  p ro p o sa ls  were vague and o f fe re d  
n o th in g  c o n c re te  to  th e  Communists. T heir main su g g e s tio n  was
th a t  th e  Communist p a r ty  would be g iven some u n s p e c if ie d  ro le
35in  th e  government dom inated by th e  Kuomintang.
35"P roposa ls  f o r  th e  S e ttlem en t of th e  D iffe re n ce s  Be­
tween th e  C hinese Government and th e  Communists," O ctober 21, 
1944; H urley P ap e rs .
75
L ikew ise , th e  Communists o f fe re d  l i t t l e  o r n o th ing  
which cou ld  se rv e  as a b a s is  f o r  compromise. The Reds p r e f ­
aced t h e i r  p lan  fo r  u n i f ic a t io n  w ith  a rev iew  o f some of th e  
e a r l i e r  n e g o tia t io n s  w ith  th e  Kuomintang which had r e s u l te d  
in  f a i l u r e .  Perhaps th e  reaso n  f o r  th i s  was to  show th a t  th e  
Communist p a r ty  had been wronged on se v e ra l o ccasio n s by th e  
N a t io n a l i s t s ,  The a c tu a l  Communist u n i f ic a t io n  program , how­
e v e r , was l i t t l e  more than  a re s ta te m e n t of Chairman Mao 
T s e - tu n g 's  p o s i t io n  which he en u n c ia ted  in  Yenan on O ctober 4 , 
T his in c lu d ed  b a s ic  p o lic y  and p e rso n n e l changes, th e  end of 
one p a r ty  r u l e ,  th e  convening of a N a tio n a l Emergency C onfer­
ence w ith  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  of a l l  p o l i t i c a l  f a c t io n s  in  China 
to  form a c o a l i t io n  governm ent, and th e  re fo rm a tio n  of th e  
M il i ta ry  High Command in to  a J o in t  High Command, Even 
though H urley cou ld  see  th a t  th e re  was no easy road  to  com­
prom ise between th e se  two p o s i t io n s ,  he rem ained c o n fid e n t.
A lthough th e  Communists and Chiang used  s im ila r  words 
such as freedom , u n i ty ,  democracy, and se lf-g o v ern m en t, n e i th e r  
s id e  accep ted  t h e i r  t r u e  m eanings. To th e  Communists th e  id eas  
embodied in  th e se  words could  be ach ieved  only under a Commu­
n i s t  form of governm ent. To Chiang, they  would become a 
r e a l i t y  th rough  h is  benevo len t d ic ta to r s h ip .  T h e re fo re , i f  
e i th e r  s id e  accep ted  m i l i ta r y  or p o l i t i c a l  u n i f ic a t io n  on th e  
o p p o s i t io n 's  te rm s, i t  would mean i t  had s a c r i f i c e d  i t s  own 
id e a ls .  Both th e  Communists and Chiang wanted to  d e fe a t  Japan
^^Lin Tze-han and Tung Pi-wu to  H urley , O ctober 23,
1944; H urley P apers .
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and b u ild  a s tro n g , independent China. Of c o u rse , th e  b a s ic  
d i f f e r e n c e  p re v a i le d  as to  who would lea d  China to  th e se  g o a ls .
As H urley read  over th e  p o s i t io n  papers of th e  two 
p a r t i e s  he no ted  th e  s im i la r i ty  in  t h e i r  g o a ls . He a ls o  saw 
th a t  bo th  s id e s  u sed  th e  same words to  d e sc rib e  th e  ideas 
which were p a r t  of th e s e  o b je c tiv e s .  Hurley in te r p r e te d  words 
l ik e  freedom , u n i ty ,  democracy, and se lf-governm en t through 
h i s  ex p erien ces as an i n d iv id u a l i s t i c ,  self-m ade American, who 
has won re c o g n itio n  from bo th  s id e s  of th e  p o l i t i c a l  fen ce  in  
h i s  own co u n try . To H urley, th e  id eas  embodied in  th e  words 
used  by bo th  th e  Communists and th e  Kuomintang had reached  
t h e i r  f u l l e s t  ex p re ss io n  in  th e  U nited S ta te s  where two p o l i t i ­
c a l  p a r t i e s  had fo r  many y e a rs  shared  th e  p o l i t i c a l  power. 
T h e re fo re , he could  n o t u n ders tand  why th e  Communists and th e  
Kuomintang cou ld  n o t rea ch  an agreem ent on u n i f ic a t io n  and a t  
th e  same tim e ach ieve  t h e i r  avowed o b je c tiv e s . For th i s  
rea so n  he tended  to  m inim ize th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  b rin g in g  th e
■j?
two f a c t io n s  to g e th e r .
Up to  t h i s  p o in t  Hurley f e l t ,  somewhat n a iv e ly , th a t  
n e g o tia t io n s  had p ro g re sse d  w e ll. He had n o t accom plished 
much in  September because of th e  n ecessa ry  p reoccupa tion  w ith  
th e  S t i lw e l l  a f f a i r ,  but during  October he had seemed to  make 
s t a r t l i n g  p ro g re s s . By October 23, Hurley f e l t  th a t  he f u l ly  
unders tood  th e  p o s i t io n s  of both p a r t i e s .  While they seemed 
f a r  a p a r t  on th e  s p e c i f ic  term s under which they  would work
^^L oyalty  I n v e s t ig a t io n . P a r t  2, 1971.
77
to g e th e r ,  both th e  Communists and th e  Kuomintang had c a te g o r i­
c a l ly  s ta te d  th a t  they  favo red  u n i f ic a t io n .  Not only d id  they 
both  fav o r c o o p e ra tio n , they  both  p ro fe s se d  id e n t ic a l  goals 
fo r  th e  fu tu re  of C hina, Because bo th  s id e s  d e s ire d  a u n ite d  
China and because of t h e i r  s im ila r  g o a ls . Hurley f e l t  c o n f i­
dent th a t  he would be a b le  to  work out a compromise.
He was su re  th a t  th e  Hurley p e rs o n a l i ty  would succeed 
in  b rin g in g  Chiang K ai-shek  and Mao T se-tung  to g e th e r  even 
though th e  s u b tle  lo g ic  and co ld  rea so n in g  of th e  p ro fe s s io n ­
a l  d ip lom ats had f a i l e d  to  do th i s  many tim es b e fo re . Hurley 
a ls o  knew he had c a r r ie d  th e  n e g o tia t io n s  as f a r  as he could  
w ith  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  below th e  top  men. The tim e had come 
when he must meet w ith  th e  le a d e rs  of th e  two f a c t io n s .  He 
had access to  th e  G eneralissim o bu t th e  Communist le a d e r ,  Mao 
T se-tung , rem ained in  Yenan, I t  was c le a r  to  Hurley th a t  i f  
Mao would n o t come to  Chungking he would have to  go to  Yenan,
CHAPTER V 
THE COWBOY MEETS THE COMMISSARS
Both th e  Kuomintang and th e  C hinese Communists had 
c le a r ly  s ta te d  t h e i r  p o s i t io n s  on u n i f ic a t io n ,  and now Hurley 
must t r y  to  work ou t an agreem ent. In  o rd e r  to  h e lp  accom­
p l i s h  t h i s ,  H urley f e l t  he must go to  Yenan. He would be w e ll 
a ccep ted , f o r  he had a lre ad y  re c e iv e d  two in v i t a t io n s  to  v i s i t  
th e  Communist c a p i t a l ,  one from th e  top rank ing  m i l i ta r y  le a d ­
e r  in  th e  Red camp, Chu Teh. Furtherm ore , th e  c o n f l ic t in g  
d e s c r ip t io n s  of th e  C hinese Communists which he heard  in  
Chungking made H urley want to  meet th e  Communist le a d e rs  and 
make h is  own e v a lu a tio n  of them. The Kuomintang h ie ra rc h y  
spoke only e v i l  about th e  Communists and t h e i r  le a d e r ,  Mao 
T se-tung . But, th e  American community in  China because of 
t h e i r  anti-K uom intang p o s tu re  appeared  to  be pro-Com m unist.1 
The only p o in t th e  Kuomintang, th e  inform ed American communi­
ty ,  and even th e  Chinese Communists could  ag ree  upon was th a t  
th e  C hinese in  Yenan were Communists. Yet d u ring  H u rle y 's  
t a lk s  w ith  Molotov in  Moscow, th e  S ov ie t Foreign  M in is te r  de­
n ied  th a t  th e  anti-K uom intang group le d  by Mao T se-tung  were
^L oyalty  I n v e s t ig a t io n . P a r t  2, 2053.
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Communists, Every day H urley delayed  h is  t r i p  to  Yenan, more
c o n tra d ic to ry  m a te r ia l  about th e  Chinese Communist regim e
2c ro sse d  h is  desk .
On November 2, 1944, even w h ile  Hurley m ulled over h is  
pending jou rney  to  N orth C hina, Theodore H, W hite, th e  noted  
j o u r n a l i s t ,  then  working f o r  th e  Luce p u b l ic a t io n s ,  q u estio n ed  
Mao T se-tung  on th e  u n i f ic a t io n  problem , Mao acknowledged 
th a t  u n i ty  in  China was d e s i r a b le ,  p a r t i c u l a r ly  f o r  p u rsu ing  
th e  war a g a in s t  th e  Jap an ese , but he h e ld  l i t t l e  hope th a t  i t  
would ever come abou t. When asked about th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  of un­
ty in g  th e  Gordian kno t which tan g led  th e  r e l a t io n s  between th e  
Kuomintang and th e  Communist p a r ty ,  Mao r e p l ie d  th a t  only  a 
sword cou ld  accom plish  th e  ta s k . White p e rc e iv e d  th a t  th i s  
boded i l l  f o r  th e  imminent n e g o tia t io n s  and q u estio n ed  Mao 
about them.
Chairman Mao then  sag e ly  analyzed  th e  K uom intang's p ro ­
fe s se d  d e s i r e  f o r  u n i f ic a t io n .  With th e  Japanese  s t i l l  in  
China, he to ld  W hite, p u b lic  op in ion  in  China and abroad de­
manded u n i ty .  This was a g a in s t  th e  i n t e r e s t  of th e  Kuomintang, 
but th e  N a t io n a l is ts  would suppo rt u n i f ic a t io n  ta lk s  to  s a t i s ­
fy  th e  American demands fo r  a u n ite d  war e f f o r t .  These 
n e g o tia t io n s  were only a  d e lay in g  t a c t i c  to  be used w h ile  th e  
U n ited  S ta te s  d e fe a te d  Japan , With th e  Japanese  removed, th e  
Kuomintang fo rc e s ,  under Chiang K ai-shek , would tu rn  t h e i r  
a t t e n t io n  to  d e s tro y in g  th e  Communist p a r ty  in  China,
H urley P ap e rs ,
O
F ish e r  to  H urley w ith  E nclosu re , O ctober 28, 1944;
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Mao f e l t  only two f a c to r s  could  p ro h ib i t  th e  ou tb reak  
o f c i v i l  war when th e  Japanese l e f t  th e  Asian c o n tin e n t. F i r s t ,  
th e  C hinese peop le  d is l ik e d  c i v i l  war. Secondly, fo re ig n  pub­
l i c  op in ion  opposed i t  a ls o . Because of t h i s  Mao hoped th a t  
a fo re ig n  government would n o t support a f r a t r i c i d a l  c o n f l i c t  
in  C hina, The Chairman sa id  th a t  to  whip up sen tim en t f o r  a 
c i v i l  w ar, Chiang K ai-shek  con tinued  f a l s e ly  to  accuse th e  
Communists as running  dogs of Red im p eria lism . Even i f  fu ­
tu r e  u n i ty  among th e  U nited S ta te s ,  G reat B r i ta in ,  and th e  
U ,S ,S ,R , c o n tin u ed , th e se  charges would be w hispered  in to  th e  
e a rs  of fo re ig n  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s .
W hite then  asked Mao how th e  Communists would r e a c t  to  
th e  h o s t i l e  a c tio n s  of th e  Chungking government. As long as 
th e  Japanese  rem ained in  China, Mao sa id , he would no t move 
h i s  fo rc e s  a g a in s t  th e  Kuomintang, But, a c tio n s  a f t e r  th e  war
3
would be dependent upon th e  N a t io n a l is ts  and Chiang K ai-shek .
I f  Mao sounded c o n fid e n t, he probably  had j u s t  cause , fo r  th e  
r e p o r ts  which John Davies was sending back from Yenan in  e a r ly  
November p re d ic te d  " th e  Communists a re  in  China to  s ta y , and 
C h in a 's  d e s tin y  i s  no t C h iang 's but t h e i r s , " ^  The day a f t e r  
W h ite 's  in te rv ie w  w ith  Mao, Hurley took p o s i t iv e  s te p s  toward 
s o lu t io n  of th e  u n i f ic a t io n  problem ,
^ In te rv ie w  w ith  Mao T se-tung  by Theodore H, W hite, 
November 2, 1944; Hurley P apers,
^R eport by John P, D avies, "How Red Are th e  C hinese Com­
m un is ts?"  November 7, 1944; R eport by John P, D avies, "W ill 
th e  Communists Take Over China?" November 7, 1944; R eport by 
John P. D avies, "The Chinese Communists and th e  G reat Pow ers," 
Noveaber 7 , 1944; Hurley P apers .
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On November 3, Hurley met w ith  Dr* Wang S h ih -ch ieh  and 
G eneral Chang C hih-chung, th e  Kuomintang n e g o tia t io n  team ,^
At th i s  m eeting , H urley probab ly  inform ed th e  Kuomintang le a d ­
e rs  of h is  in te n t io n  to  v i s i t  Yenan, and gave Dr, Wang and 
G eneral Chang a copy of th e  f iv e  p o in t  b a s is  f o r  agreem ent be­
tween th e  two p a r t i e s  which he had d e riv e d  from th e  p o s i t io n  
papers g iven him. The p ro p o sa l c a l le d  fo r  u n i f ic a t io n  of a l l  
m i l i ta r y  fo rc e s  in  China under th e  le a d e rs h ip  of th e  G eneral­
iss im o , Both th e  Communists and th e  Kuomintang would ag ree  
to  su p p o rt th e  p r in c ip le s  of Sun Y at-sen  and pursue  u n sp e c i­
f i e d  p o l ic ie s  designed  to  promote g e n e ra l p ro g ress  and th e  
development of dem ocratic  p ro cesses  in  governm ent. The gov­
ernm ent of China would reco g n ize  th e  C hinese Communist p a r ty  
and a l l  o th e r  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  opposing th e  Japanese , At th e  
same tim e , th e  Communists would merge t h e i r  ^  fa c to  govern­
ment in  Yenan w ith  th e  N a tio n a l government in  Chungking, 
F in a l ly ,  a l l  o f f i c e r s  and s o ld ie r s  in  th e  army, w hether Commu­
n i s t  o r N a t io n a l i s t ,  would re c e iv e  equal trea tm en t and 
a llo w an ces ,^  This was th e  p lan  Hurley hoped to  p u t b e fo re  
Mao T se-tung , To do t h i s ,  however, he must go to  Yenan,
S h o rtly  b e fo re  h is  d e p a rtu re  fo r  Yenan from Chungking 
on November 7, G eneral Hurley se n t a d ram atic  message to  th e  
P re s id e n t;  "Today I am going in to  t e r r i t o r y  h e ld  by Communist 
t ro o p s ,"  He sa id  he hoped to  f in d  a b a s is  fo r  agreem ent
% u r l ^  China Log, 1944, November 3, 1944; Hurley Pa-p6irs •
^"B asis f o r  Agreem ent," October 28, 1944; Hurley P apers.
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between th e  N a tio n a l government and th e  Communist p a r ty  fo r  
th e  u n i f ic a t io n  o f a l l  m i l i ta r y  fo rc e s  in  China. Hurley added 
th a t  h is  a c tio n s  had th e  f u l l  consen t and approval of th e  
G eneralissim o and G eneral A lb e rt C, Wedemeyer, S t i l w e l l ’ s r e ­
p lacem ent.^  With th i s  p a r t in g  word, th e  G eneral boarded a 
p lan e  f o r  Yenan.
H u rley 's  h a s t i l y  assem bled d e le g a tio n  c o n s is te d  of him­
s e l f ,  L ie u te n a n t Horace In g , a Chinese-Am erican i n te r p r e t e r ,  
and a few o th e r s .  I t  was o rgan ized  and away so q u ick ly  th a t  
only a few peop le  knew what was happening. The whole advan tu re  
appealed  to  H urley ’s d ram atic  i n s t i n c t s .  I t  was an a d m itted ly  
dangerous f l i g h t ,  and H urley ’s p lan e  had a f i g h te r  e s c o r t  a 
good p o r t io n  of th e  way. Only when i t  came th rough  th e  c louds 
over th e  Communist c a p i ta l  was anyone r e a l ly  su re  he  was a r r i v ­
in g . C olonel David D. B a r r e t t ,  commander of th e  Yenan O bserver 
Group, had re c e iv e d  g a rb le d  r e p o r ts  of H u rley 's  impending v i s i t  
but no t u n t i l  he saw th e  p lan e  d id  he f u l ly  r e a l i z e  th a t  Hurley 
was about to  lan d .
As H urley’ s p lan e  approached th e  t in y ,  rough a i r s t r i p  
th a t  se rv ed  th e  Communists, B a r re t t  c a l le d  th e  Communist le a d ­
e r s ,  Then, he rushed  to  th e  s t r i p  to  g re e t  th e  incoming 
H urley. B a r re t t  reached  th e  f i e l d  d re sse d  in  h is  woolen u n i­
form and a heavy blue-denim  c o tto n  q u i l te d  c o a t , th e  s ta n d a rd  
garb  in  th e  f r i g id  Communist s tro n g h o ld . The p lan e  ta x ie d  to  
a  h a l t  and ou t s tepped  th e  re sp le n d e n t H urley, com plete w ith
^Hurley to  R o o sev e lt, November 7, 1944; H urley P apers .
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row upon row of r ib b o n s , Order of th e  Mexican A ztec E ag le , th e  
W hite Eagle of Y ugoslav ia , and s e v e ra l  o th e r  e q u a lly  flam boy­
a n t d e c o ra tio n s . The t a l l ,  handsome G eneral must have been 
taken  back when th e  pudgy, denim -clad  B a r re t t  c rack ed , "Gene­
r a l ,  you have a rib b o n  th e re  fo r  ev e ry th in g  bu t S hay 's 
R e b e llio n ,"  Meanwhile, th e  news of H u rley 's  a r r i v a l  caught 
th e  Communist h ie ra rc h y  e q u a lly  unprepared .
The b ig  th re e  of th e  C hinese Communist p a r ty ,  Mao Tse- 
tu n g , Chou E n - la i ,  and Chu Teh, scram bled on top  of one 
a n o th e r as they  p i le d  in to  Mao T se - tu n g 's  p r iv a te  au tom obile , 
a converted  am bulance. Through th e  rough , bumpy s t r e e t s  of 
Yenan th e  c a r  rac ed  to  g re e t  th e  American G enera l, The Commu­
n i s t s  rushed  from th e  ambulance and rac ed  a c ro ss  th e  f i e l d .  
H urley h a ile d  them l ik e  long l o s t  f r ie n d s  and shouted  h is  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  In d ian  war whoop. As th e  In d ian  b a t t l e  cry  
echoed a c ro ss  th e  h i l l s  of N orth China, a ra g  ta g  c o l le c t io n  
o f Communist s o ld ie r s  t r i e d  to  form them selves in to  some sem­
b lance  of an honor guard . In  one f i n a l  f l u r r y  of co n fu s io n , 
th e  honor guard f e l l  in to  p la c e  and C hinese bugles answered 
th e  Ind ian  war whoop.
The u su a l p le a s a n tr ie s  were exchanged in  th e  cow p a s ­
tu r e  which served  as an a i r p o r t ,  Mao and Chu Teh im pressed  
H urley im m ediately , b u t th e  G eneral re a c te d  a d v e rse ly  to  th e  
suave Chou E n - la i  much as he d id  to  th e  American d ip lom ats he 
had encoun tered  around th e  w orld . H urley l a t e r  s a id  he go t 
along  w e ll w ith  Mao from th e  beg inn ing . They posed fo r  p i c ­
tu re s  and once again  H urley gave h is  famous war whoop.
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A lthough no m ention i s  made of i t ,  i t  m ight w e ll be p o s s ib le  
th a t  H urley inc luded  h is  war dance, which he f re q u e n tly  p e r ­
formed w ith  l i t t l e  or no prom pting. A fte r  th e se  fo rm a l i t ie s  
o r la c k  of f o r m a l i t ie s ,  th e  p a r ty  a l l  got in to  Mao's ambulance 
and began th e  journey  to  H u rley 's  b i l l e t .
The comradeship of th e  t ig h t ly  packed ambulance gave 
Hurley a chance to  unlim ber h is  famous p e r s o n a l i ty .  He to ld  
some of h is  b e s t anecdotes which C olonel B a r re t t  t r a n s la te d  
w ith  id io m a tic  g u sto . G rossing a dry r i v e r  bed. H urley r e ­
marked to  Mao th a t  i t  rem inded him of h is  n a tiv e  s t a t e  of 
Oklahoma, where one cou ld  t e l l  when a school of f i s h  swam up­
r i v e r  by th e  cloud of d u st they  r a i s e d .  The Communist le a d e rs
g
g o t th e  f u l l  Hurley tre a tm e n t.
H urley watched c a r e fu l ly  from th e  window of th e  ambu­
lan ce  as i t  r o l le d  through th e  Communist c a p i ta l .  The h a s t i l y  
a le r te d  people had tu rn ed  out to  g re e t Hurley w ith  f r ie n d ly  
waves. He noted th a t  they  l iv e d  in  dugouts sc ra tc h e d  in  th e  
s id e s  of m ountains, f o r  bombing had d estro y ed  th e  u n p ro tec ted  
b u ild in g s . Hurley was no s tra n g e r  to  Communist governm ents, 
having  v i s i t e d  th e  S ov ie t Union se v e ra l tim es in  th e  p a s t .
What he saw in  Yenan, however, f a i l e d  to  r in g  a b e l l .  He 
found s to re s  open, c a t t l e  being tra d e d , and on every exchange 
th e  p r o f i t  m otive was th e  s in g le  determ in ing  f a c to r .  These
n
th in g s  c e r ta in ly  d id  no t look l ik e  Communism in  a c tio n  to  him,
^Statem ent of Hurley f o r  L if e . January 11, 1946: Hurley 
P ap ers , "China; Yahooi" Time, XLV (January  1, 1945), à8-29,
% acA rthur H earings. P a r t  4 , 2903,
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A fte r  r e s t in g  o v e rn ig h t, H urley began h is  d isc u ss io n s  
w ith  Chairman Mao a t  10:00 a .m ., November 8, 1944. The f i r s t  
m eeting , l a s t i n g  le s s  than  an hour, was n o t c r i t i c a l .  Hurley 
and Mao exchanged g re e tin g s  and H urley to ld  Mao of P re s id e n t 
R o o se v e lt 's  concern f o r  th e  fu tu re  of China. He then  p re ­
se n ted  th e  f iv e  p o in ts  which he had p rep a red  in  Chungking and 
which he hoped would se rv e  as a b a s is  fo r  an agreem ent on u n i­
f i c a t i o n .  Mao, a t  f i r s t ,  r e a c te d  s k e p t ic a l ly  and q u e s tio n e d  
H urley about i t s  o r ig in .  H urley confirm ed th a t  th e  p o in ts  
were a c c e p ta b le  to  Chiang K ai-shek . Mao then  ad journed  th e  
m eeting in  o rd e r to  study  th e  d e ta i l s  of th e  proposed a g re e ­
ment more c lo s e ly .
At th re e  in  th e  a fte rn o o n  th e  nex t day, th e  second 
m eeting convened, t h i s  tim e l a s t in g  th re e  and a h a lf  h o u rs .
Mao began by speak ing  of h is  d e s ire s  f o r  u n ity  and th e  e ssen ­
t i a l  p r e r e q u is i te s  to  agreem ent. C h in a 's  l i f e  hung in  th e  
b a lan ce , he s a id ,  and a l l  e f f o r t  should be d ire c te d  to  f i g h t ­
ing  th e  Japanese . Mao's d e s i r e  to  d e fe a t th e  Japanese 
surm ounted even h is  d i s t a s t e  f o r  th e  Kuomintang, and he o f ­
fe re d  to  subm it to  Kuomintang a u th o r i ty  in  o rd er to  ach ieve  
th e  f i n a l  o b je c tiv e  of a f r e e  and dem ocratic  China. F in a l ly ,  
he review ed th e  h ind rances p lac ed  in  th e  way of r e a l  coopera­
t io n  by th e  Kuomintang, and c i t e d  th e  many ways in  which th e  
Kuomintang h in d ered  h is  fo rc e s .  The Kuomintang surrounded th e  
Com munist-held t e r r i t o r y  w ith  tro o p s  which could  be used to  
f ig h t  th e  Japanese . Chiang, he s a id , suppressed  Communist ac ­
t i v i t i e s  in  Kuomintang t e r r i t o r y  and drove Communist p a r ty
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members th e re  underground. Only in  Chungking, he s a id , were 
th e  Communists even a b le  to  p r i n t  a newspaper. Because of 
th e se  f a c to r s ,  he q u estio n ed  th e  s in c e r i ty  of C h iang 's  e f f o r t s  
to  d e fe a t  th e  Japanese*
Mao com plained th a t  th e se  o p p ress iv e  p o l ic i e s  c o n tr a s t ­
ed sh a rp ly  to  th o se  of th e  Communist p a r ty , a s s e r t in g  th a t  as 
Chiang r e s i s t e d  u n i f i c a t io n ,  th e  chasm between them only 
widened and would lead  e v e n tu a lly  to  c i v i l  w ar. He s a id  th a t
th e  E igh th  Route Army and th e  New F ourth  Army, Communist m i l i ­
ta ry  u n i ts , , ,  h e ld  down v a s t  numbers of Japanese  fo rc e s .  I t  was 
th e  p resen ce  of th e se  very  fo rc e s ,  Mao c o n tin u ed , th a t  p re ­
ven ted  th e  Japanese  from a tta c k in g  and f i n a l ly  c ru sh in g  th e  
Kuomintang, Much of th e  success of th e  Communist fo rc e s ,  he 
s a id , was due to  th e  reform s which they  had i n i t i a t e d  among 
th e  p e a sa n ts , and th e  re a d in e s s  w ith  which th e  p e asa n ts  were 
w il l in g  to  su p p o rt th e  Communist cause amply dem onstrated  
th i s  f a c t ,
Mao sa id  th e  m i l i ta r y  d e fe a ts  of th e  Kuomintang oc­
c u rre d  because th e  peop le  no lo n g er suppo rted  Chiang and 
C h iang 's  army lack ed  th e  w i l l  to  f i g h t .  C orrup tion  ravaged 
th e  Kuomintang ra n k s , he charged , and C h iang 's  only r e a l
i n t e r e s t  in  prom oting u n i f ic a t io n  was to  de lay  long enough fo r
th e  U nited  S ta te s  to  d e fe a t  Japan ,
Hurley s a id  th a t  only th e  enemies of China d e s ire d  to  
see  China d iv id e d , Mao c o rre c te d  H urley , say ing  t h a t ,  w h ile  
he d id  no t d e s i r e  to  see  China d iv id e d , he f e l t  th a t  i t  would 
be im possib le  to  b rin g  about u n i ty  as long as Chiang K ai-shek
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co n tinued  h is  re a c t io n a ry  p o l i t i c a l  and economic p o l i c i e s .
The c o n v e rsa tio n s  con tin u ed  th roughou t th e  day w ith  hardy g ive  
and ta k e . F in a lly  though, Mao made a most im portan t s ta te m e n t. 
He sa id  he would accep t one of th e  p o in ts  on H u rle y 's  p ro p o sa ls  
in  f u l l  and was w i l l in g  to  n e g o tia te  th e  o th e r s .  H urley was 
d e lig h te d . They im m ediately hammered ou t a rough o u t l in e  of 
th e  re v is e d  f iv e  p o in ts .  Mao, Chou E n - la i ,  H urley and B a r re t t  
s a t  around th e  ta b le  making a d d it io n s ,  c o r r e c t io n s ,  changes 
h e re  and th e r e ,  and by seven o 'c lo c k  in  th e  evening they  had 
what seemed l ik e  a s o l id  b a s is  f o r  agreem ent.
The Yenan d r a f t  v a r ie d  c o n s id e ra b ly  from th e  f iv e  p o in ts  
H urley brought from Chungking. The Communists had added what 
amounted to  a b i l l  of r i g h t s ,  in c lu d in g  such item s as j u s t i c e ,  
freedom of co n sc ien ce , freedom of p r e s s ,  freedom  of speech , 
freedom of assem bly, and habeus co rp u s . D e ta il  changes were 
le s s  im p o rtan t, however, than  th o se  wrought in  th e  v iew po in t 
from which th e  document was w r i t te n .  In th e  p ro p o sa l o r ig in ­
a l ly  subm itted  by H urley , th e  Kuomintang le a d e rs  had o f fe re d  
to  make a p la c e  in  t h e i r  government fo r  some Communists, bu t 
Chiang had never in d ic a te d  a w il l in g n e s s  to  a c c e p t a t r u e  
c o a l i t io n  governm ent. In  th e  new d r a f t ,  th e  emphasis was 
changed so th a t  th e  Kuomintang and th e  C hinese Communist p a r ty  
were conceived  as equal p o l i t i c a l  fo rc e s  which would jo in  to  
form a c o a l i t io n  governm ent, under which a l l  m i l i ta r y  fo rc e s
^ ^ T ran sc rip t of M eetings w ith  Mao T se -tu n g , November 8, 
1944; S tatem ent of H urley fo r  L i f e , January  11, 1946; H urley 
P apers .
88
would be u n ite d . Hurley m issed th is  f in e  p o in t of d if f e r e n c e , 
f o r  he was c o n fid e n t th a t  he had worked out an accep tab le  
form ula fo r  u n i f ic a t io n .^ ^
On November 9 Hurley c o n fe rred  w ith  members of th e  
D ix ie  Group, and th a t  evening a tte n d e d  a banquet c e le b ra tin g  
th e  a n n iv e rsa ry  of th e  R ussian re v o lu tio n . The g u ests  con­
cerned  them selves w ith  having  a good tim e and p r a c t ic a l ly  
ig n o red  th e  occasion  being commemorated. Hurley was th e  l i f e  
o f th e  p a r ty .  Yahoos and war dances were l ib e r a l l y  mixed w ith  
Oklahoma humor, re m in isc e n t of W ill R ogers, Hurley b e lie v e d  
th a t  he had c lo sed  th e  p o l i t i c a l  gap in  China th a t  so many 
s a id  could  no t be b rid g ed ,
B efore le a v in g . Hurley d ra f te d  a c o n g ra tu la to ry  l e t t e r  
to  Chairman Mao, He c i te d  th e  le a d e r  f o r  h is  sp le n d id  coopera­
t io n  and le a d e rsh ip  as shown by h is  p a r ty 's  w illin g n e ss  to  
re a c h  an agreem ent w ith  Chiang K ai-shek , He deeply a p p re c i­
a te d  th e  q u a li ty  of mind and h e a r t  th a t  Mao had brought to  bear 
on th e  so lu tio n  of t h i s  most d i f f i c u l t  problem . Mao's work, 
H urley s a id , c o n tr ib u te d  to  th e  w e lfa re  of a u n ite d  China and 
a v ic to ry  of th e  U nited  N a tio n s , He hoped th a t  th e  coopera­
t io n  would c o n tin u e , no t only through v ic to ry  in  w ar, but 
th rough  a p e rio d  of l a s t in g  peace, and in  th e  r e c o n s tru c tio n  
of a dem ocratic  China.
^^"Agreement between th e  N a tio n a l Government of China, 
th e  Kuomintang of China and th e  Communist P a rty  of C h ina,"  
November 10, 1944; ü i r le y  P apers,
-^"China; Yahooi" Time. XLV (January  1, 1945), 28-29,
1 *3
Hurley to Mao, November 10, 1944; Hurley Papers,
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On th is  n o te  of hope, Hurley re tu rn e d  to  Chungking on 
th e  morning of November 10, w ith  a s igned  agreem ent which 
c le a r ly  im p lied  e q u a l ity  between th e  Kuomintang and th e  Chi­
nese  Communist p a r ty . To th i s  e x te n t th e  document was 
fundam entally  d i f f e r e n t  from th e  one which had been ag reed  to
by Chiang, Chou E n - la i  accompanied H urley to  Chungking to  iro n
14out any f u r th e r  d if fe re n c e s  in  th e  impending u n i f ic a t io n .
H urley now hoped to  add th e  name of Chiang K ai-shek  to  th a t  
document when he a r r iv e d  in  Chungking, As h is  p la n e  l e f t  
Yenan, G eneral Hurley s a t  back s a t i s f i e d  w ith  h is  m iss io n .
Only a few hours a f t e r  Hurley a r r iv e d  in  Chungking, how­
e v e r, th e  p ro sp e c ts  f o r  ah agreem ent on u n i f ic a t io n  took  a tu rn  
f o r  th e  w orse. A rriv in g  a t  5:15 p .m .. Hurley drove im m ediately 
to  h is  v i l l a ,  and a few hours l a t e r  Dr, T, V, Soong, th e  Kuo­
m intang Foreign  M in is te r ,  c a l le d  on him. A fte r  look ing  a t  th e  
Hurley-Kao agreem ent, Soong r e je c te d  i t  as a " b i l l  of goods," 
Soong's p o s i t io n  was a g re a t d isappoin tm ent to  H urley , The 
r e j e c t io n  dep ressed  him because he f e l t  bad anyway a f t e r  having 
c o n tra c te d  a co ld  in  Yenan, C onsequently , he went to  bed where 
he rem ained fo r  a w e e k , H u r l e y  made some a ttem p t to  c a rry  
on b u sin ess  but saw no v i s i t o r s  u n t i l  November 16, When he 
f i n a l ly  re tu rn e d  to  work, he had th e  Kuomintang c o u n te r-
^^Hurley China Log, 1944, November 10, 1944; H urley Pa­
p e rs ,
l^ A lb e rt C, Wedemeyer. Wedemeyer R ep o rts j (New York: 
Henry H olt and Company, 1958), 311,
p ro p o sa l to  th e  Yenan agreem ent. °
The new p ro p o sa l had fo u r p o in ts  couched in  th e  same 
p h rases  as th e  agreem ent of November 10. J u s t  as th e  Commu­
n i s t s  had changed H u rle y 's  o r ig in a l  p ro p o sa l, th e  Kuomintang 
su b tly  r e v is e d  t h e i r  November 10 agreem ent. In  f a c t ,  th e  fo u r  
p o in t  r e v is io n  c a l le d  fo r  a t o t a l  subm ission of th e  Communist 
p a r ty  to  th e  r u le  o f th e  K u o m i n t a n g . T h e  p o s i t io n s  of th e  
N a t io n a l is t s  and Communists were w orlds a p a r t .  A le s s  r e s o lu te  
person  than  H urley would have lo s t  hope in  u n i f ic a t io n  and be­
gun to  look  fo r  some o th e r  co u rse . H urley , however, co n tinued  
to  b e lie v e  w h o leh ea rted ly  in  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  of u n i t in g  th e  
Communist and th e  Kuomintang p a r t i e s .
The November 10 p ro p o sa ls  ag reed  upon by Hurley and th e  
C hinese Communists p roved unworkable fo r  s e v e ra l  re a so n s . Most 
im p o rtan t was th e  f a c t  th a t  n e i th e r  of th e  two p a r t i e s  was w i l l ­
ing  to  form a c o a l i t io n  which gave th e  o p p o sitio n  a chance to  
su rv iv e  as a perm anent p o l i t i c a l  fo rc e  in  China. Mao was w i l l ­
ing  to  ag ree  to  a c o a l i t io n  government only because he knew th e  
t id e  of power ran  in  h is  fa v o r . C le a r ly , Chiang cou ld  n o t ag ree  
to  any p ro p o sa l which would g ive  th e  Communists a  m eaningful 
fo o th o ld  in  governm ent. T h e re fo re , i t  should have been ob­
v ious to  Hurley th a t  u n i t in g  th e  two w arring  fa c t io n s  was a l l  
bu t im p o ss ib le . H urley , however, much as F ra n k lin  Delano
^"H urley China Log, 1944, November 11-16, 1944; Hurley
P apers .
l^Note Given to General Hurley by Dr. Wang Shih-chieh
and General Chang Chih-chung, November 15, 1944; Hurley Papers.
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R o o sev e lt, r e l i e d  on s p e c ia l  t a l e n t s  of p e rso n a l p e rsu as io n  
to  conquer im possib le  s i tu a t io n s .
Hurley had an ab id in g  f a i t h  in  h is  own a b i l i t y  to  b rin g  
th e  two p a r t i e s  to g e th e r .  N a ively , he b e lie v e d  h is  e f f o r t s  
would be s tro n g  enough to  c o u n te ra c t a l l  th e  problem s between 
th e  Communists and th e  N a t io n a l i s t s .  He b e lie v e d  th a t  through 
sim ple d is c u s s io n , he could  u n i te  th e  two p a r t i e s  which had 
been feud ing  f o r  n e a r ly  tw enty y e a r s .  Hurley f a i l e d  to  r e a l ­
iz e  th a t  he was n o t d e a lin g  w ith  th e  R epublican and D em ocratic 
p a r t i e s  in  th e  U nited  S ta te s ,  bu t r a th e r  two m o n o lith ic  p o l i t i ­
c a l  system s whose very  e x is te n c e  depended upon com plete c o n tro l  
of th e  governm ental framework.
H urley knew he had l o s t  th e  f i r s t  round in  th e  b a t t l e  
f o r  u n i ty  in  China. Yet he had made some p o s i t iv e  p ro g re s s .
He had c l a r i f i e d  th e  p o s i t io n s  of th e  two p a r t i e s ,  worked out 
a p o s s ib le  b a s is  fo r  agreem ent, and jou rneyed  to  Yenan where 
he secured  th e  s ig n a tu re  of Mao T se-tung  on a p roposed s e t t l e ­
m ent. A lthough th a t  agreem ent was r e je c te d  by th e  Kuomintang, 
he b e lie v e d  th a t  i t  would someday form th e  b a s is  upon which a 
u n i te d  China would be b u i l t .
CHAPTER VI
SWEET AND SOUR
The r e je c t io n  of th e  November 10 agreem ent by th e  
Kuomintang only m om entarily dampened H u rley 's  hopes fo r  u n i f i ­
c a tio n . By November 16 he was once again  o p tim is t ic  about 
th e  changes fo r  se t t le m e n t. Chou E n - la i  was in  Chungking and 
Hurley knew th a t  h is  p resen ce  g re a t ly  in c re a se d  th e  chances 
fo r  acco rd , Chou, one of th e  very  h ig h e s t o f f i c i a l s  in  th e  
Communist p a r ty ,  cou ld  speak w ith  a u th o r i ty  f o r  Mao. H urley 
b e lie v e d  Chiang K ai-shek  eag e rly  d e s ire d  an agreem ent and t h i s ,  
to o , was a fav o ra b le  f a c to r .  Hurley f e l t  t h a t  th e  o p p o sitio n  
to  u n i f ic a t io n  was coming from th e  Kuomintang p a r ty  and Chiang 
K a i-sh e k 's  p e rso n a l a d v is e r s ,  and thought th a t  they  had r e j e c t ­
ed th e  November 10 p ro p o sa l because i t  would have been too 
g re a t  a d e fe a t  fo r  them to  s u s ta in .  In an o p tim is t ic  r e p o r t  
da ted  November 16, Hurley to ld  th e  P re s id e n t th a t  he would 
co n tin u e  to  sea rch  f o r  a form ula f o r  u n i f ic a t io n  a c c e p ta b le  to  
bo th  s id e s , and which would r e s u l t  in  an e a r ly  s e t tle m e n t.^
The m il i ta ry  s i tu a t io n  in  China worsened when th e  Japa­
nese  E leventh  Army took K w eilin and Liuchow on November 10
-Hurley to Roosevelt, November 16, 1944; Hurley Papers.
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2w ith o u t a f i g h t .  In  th e  weeks which fo llow ed , John Davies 
ad v ised  Hurley to  m ain ta in  a more f l e x ib le  p o s i t io n  in  n e g o tia ­
t in g  w ith  th e  two C hinese p o l i t i c a l  f a c t io n s ,  Davies agreed  
th a t  fo r  th e  moment th e  U nited  S ta te s  could  n o t a f fo rd  to  aban­
don Chiang K ai-shek  because such a move would lo s e  more than 
cou ld  be ga ined . But he cau tio n ed  Hurley th a t  an o b je c tiv e  
a t t i t u d e  toward a l l  f a c t io n s  had to  be m ain ta in ed , and c i te d  
th e  B r i t i s h  e r r o r  of su p p o rtin g  a p o l i t i c a l l y  bankrupt regim e 
in  Y ugoslav ia .^  The impending R ussian in te rv e n tio n  in  th e  Far 
E a s t, Davies ad v ised , would make i t  n ecessa ry  fo r  th e  Chinese 
Communists to  s h i f t  e n t i r e ly  to  R ussia  fo r  m il i ta r y  and p o l i t i ­
c a l  su p p o rt. This in  tu rn  would g re a t ly  weaken u l tim a te  
American in f lu e n c e  w ith  th e  Communist regim e in  Yenan,
Davies s tro n g ly  fav o red  a c o a l i t io n  government which he 
b e lie v e d  would be most s a t i s f a c to r y  fo r  U nited S ta te s  i n t e r e s t s  
in  China, Davies knew th a t  Hurley h e ld  th i s  op in ion  a ls o  and 
th e re fo re  was as d ip lo m a tic  as p o s s ib le  when he s a id  th a t  th e  
l ik e l ih o o d  of such an agreem ent was a t  b e s t rem ote. F o r, as 
he w ro te , n e i th e r  p a r ty  would su rre n d er i t s  sovere ign  p o s i t io n
2C harles F, Romanus and R iley  Sunderland, Time Runs Out 
in  CBI. Vol. IX, P a r t  3, of The China-Burm a-India f h e a t e r , in  
U nited  S ta te s  Army in  World War 11, ed, k en t R oberts G re en fie ld  
(55 v o l s , ;  W ashington: Ü. S. Government P r in t in g  O ffic e , 1947-
1960), 56, C ited  h e r e a f te r  as Romanus and Sunderland, Time 
Runs Out,
In Y ugoslavia th e  B r i t i s h  had p e r s i s te d  in  su p p o rtin g  
r o y a l i s t  G eneral M ihalovieh , Commander in  C hief of th e  Yugoslav 
army under th e  d i r e c t io n  of th e  e x ile d  Yugoslav government in  
London, even though Communist p a r t i s a n s  led  by M arshal T ito  
more v ig o ro u s ly  a tta c k e d  th e  Germans and would p robably  con­
t r o l  th e  Country when th e  Germans were d riv en  o u t.
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m erely to  jo in  w ith  th e  o th e r . I f  u n i f ic a t io n  f a i l e d ,  as he 
p re d ic te d  i t  would, Davies found th e  cou rse  of a c tio n  c le a r .
The U nited S ta te s  would have to  g iv e  i t s  w holehearted  suppo rt 
to  one f a c t io n .
Davies b e lie v e d  th a t  a t  th e  moment th e  a l t e r n a t iv e s  were 
l im ite d  because of overdependence upon th e  Chungking regim e.
In o rd e r  to  expand th e  p o s s ib le  co u rses  of a c t io n , Davies ad­
voca ted  th a t  th e  U nited  S ta te s  should  g re a t ly  in c re a s e  i t s  
o p e ra tio n s  in  N orth  C hina. Thus, i f  i t  became n ecessa ry  fo r  
th e  U nited  S ta te s  to  r e ly  on th e  C hinese Communists to  p ro v id e  
a base of o p e ra tio n s , th e  groundwork fo r  w orking w ith  th a t  
group would a lre ad y  be l a i d .  Davies though t th e  U nited  S ta te s  
should  move a t  once to  work ou t an accom odation w ith  th e  Commu­
n i s t s .  O therw ise, th e  Americans m ight f in d  th a t  they  had lo s t  
ou t com plete ly  in  C hina, w ith  Chiang depending on th e  B r i t i s h  
and Mao on th e  R u ss ian s .
Davies argued th a t  i f  a cho ice  had to  be made between 
th e  Kuomintang and th e  Communists th e  U nited  S ta te s  should  
choose to  su p p o rt th e  Communists. The p o l i t i c a l  power in  Chi­
na was in  th e  p ro cess  of s h i f t in g  from Chiang to  th e  Communist 
fo rc e s ,  and acco rd ing  to  Davies i t  would only be a s h o r t  tim e 
b e fo re  th e  Communists became th e  s tro n g e s t  and most c o n s tru c ­
t iv e  u n ify in g  fo rc e  in  China. M oreover, because of c o n tro l  
of v a s t  a re a s  behind Japanese  l in e s  e x e rc ise d  by th e  Communist 
fo rc e s ,  they  would be of f a r  g r e a te r  s t r a t e g ic  v a lu e  to  th e  
U nited  S ta te s  in  th e  even t of an American lan d in g  on th e  
China m ainland.
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Davies to ld  H urley th a t  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  cou ld  no t r e ly  
on th e  B r i t i s h  or th e  R ussians to  a id  th e  Americans m a te r ia l ly  
in  C hina. T heir o b je c tiv e s  v a r ie d  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  from th o se  of 
th e  U nited  S ta te s .  The B r i t i s h ,  he s a id ,  d e s ire d  a d iv id e d  
China. To su p p o rt h is  c o n te n tio n s  about th e  B r i t i s h  and th e  
R u ss ian s , Davies subm itted  to  Hurley accounts of c o n v e rsa tio n s  
he had h e ld  w ith  o f f i c i a l s  in  th e  B r i t i s h  and S o v ie t Em­
b a s s ie s .^
I f  th e  U nited  S ta te s  openly d e c la re d  i t s e l f  in  fa v o r  of 
th e  Communist reg im e, Davies co n tin u ed , th e re  would be le s s  
d is tu rb a n c e  than  ex p ec ted . The Chiang government would rem ain 
v o c a l, bu t th e  U nited  S ta te s  would have a l l i e d  i t s e l f  w ith  th e  
most c o h e re n t, p ro g re s s iv e , pow erfu l fo rc e  in  C hina, he r e a ­
soned. A cting q u ick ly  through  th e  d i s t r ib u t io n  of su p p lie s  
and postw ar a id ,  Davies s a id ,  th e  U nited  S ta te s  could  e x e r t  
c o n s id e ra b le  in f lu e n c e  in  th e  d i r e c t io n  of C hinese n a tio n a lism  
and independence from S o v ie t and B r i t i s h  c o n tro l .  I f  th e  
U nited  S ta te s  chose to  rem ain w ith  th e  Kuomintang, i t s  a l ly  
would be a regim e which had proven i t s e l f  in ca p ab le  of u n ify ­
ing  China and of s l i g h t  u se  in  th e  f i n a l  a t ta c k  of th e  U nited  
S ta te s  on Jap an .^  H urley d id  no t a t  th e  tim e comment on 
D av ies ' a d v ice . However, th e  o p t im is t ic  Hurley c e r ta in ly  must
^R eport by John P. D av ies, "C onversation  w ith  S ov ie t 
A s s is ta n t  M il i ta ry  A tta c h e ,"  November 17, 1944; R eport by 
John P, D avies, " B r i t i s h  Views on th e  China S i tu a t io n ,"  No­
vember 17, 1944; H urley P apers .
^Report by John P. D avies, "American C hinese R e la tio n s  
During th e  Next Six M onths," November 17, 1944; H urley P ap e rs .
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have b e liev e d  Davies to  be a d e f e a t i s t  because of th e  fo re ig n  
se rv ic e  o f f i c e r 's  p re d ic t io n  of f a i l u r e  fo r  th e  u n i f ic a t io n  
t a l k s .  H urley could no t und ers tan d  such an a t t i t u d e  and th e  
u n fav o rab le  im pression  he p robab ly  formed of Davies grew in  
th e  months which fo llow ed .
Hurley was too invo lved  w ith  th e  n e g o tia t io n s  concern­
ing  u n i f ic a t io n  even to  c o n s id e r  a course  of a c tio n  i f  they  
f a i l e d .  On November 17, th e  Kuomintang p re se n te d  a new th re e  
p o in t  p ro p o sa l f o r  se ttle m e n t w ith  th e  Communist fo rc e s .
Dr. T. V. Soong gave i t  to  Hurley and asked th e  G eneral to  
p re s e n t i t  to  th e  Communists as h is  own b a s is  f o r  s e t t le m e n t. 
H urley g lanced  a t  th e  document and q u ick ly  r e je c te d  i t .  R ath­
e r  than  being c o n c i l ia to ry ,  i t  o rdered  th e  Communists to  
subm it to  th e  u n c o n d itio n a l r u le  of th e  Kuomintang,^ H urley 
to ld  Soong th a t  he would no t suppo rt such an u n c o n c ilia to ry  
p ro p o sa l,
Soong had a ttem pted  a c le v e r  ru se  which f a i l e d .  I f  
H urley gave th e  in flam a to ry  document to  th e  Communists as h is  
own, n e g o tia t io n s  would c e r ta in ly  have ended. The Communists 
knew th a t  only H u rley 's  e f f o r t s  and th e  le v e r  of American a id  
could  fo rc e  Chiang in to  a c o a l i t io n  government. I f  i t  appeared 
th a t  Hurley supported  th e  Kuomintang so com pletely  th a t  he 
would back such a one-s ided  o f fe r in g , th e  Communists would have 
been f u l ly  convinced th a t  he had n o t th e  s l i g h t e s t  s in c e r i ty  in  
h is  e f f o r t s  to  u n ify  China, This perhaps was e x a c tly  what th e
^Proposed basis for settlement given to Hurley by
T, V. Soong, November 17, 1944; Hurley Papers,
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Kuomintang wanted. The N a t io n a l is ts  had fo r  th e  moment, how­
e v e r, m isread  th e  degree to  which they could  m an ipu la te  H urley .
W hile m i l i ta r y  b a t t l e s  raged  and u n i f ic a t io n  ta lk s  se e ­
sawed back and f o r th ,  R oosevelt w a ited  e x p e c ta n tly  in  
W ashington, H u rle y 's  glowing re p o r ts  on th e  p ro sp e c t of s o lv ­
ing  C h in a 's  p o l i t i c a l  problems c o n tra s te d  sh a rp ly  w ith  war news 
from China. With th e  s i tu a t io n  u n c le a r , R oosevelt though t th a t  
h is  d i r e c t  in te rv e n tio n  in  th e  u n i f ic a t io n  d isc u ss io n s  would 
be h e lp fu l .^  To avoid  a r e p e t i t io n  of th e  S t i lw e l l  in c id e n t ,  
R oosevelt decided  to  u se  a s u b t le r  approach to  Chiang K ai-sh ek . 
He se n t a l e t t e r  to  H urley , a d v is in g  him to  inform  th e  G eneral­
issim o and th e  Communists t h a t ,  both  from h is  and th e  R ussian 
v iew p o in t, an agreem ent would g re a t ly  e x p ed ite  th e  o b je c tiv e  
of d e fe a tin g  th e  Japanese  in  China, C ry p t ic a l ly ,  R oosevelt 
u rged  Hurley to  em phasize th e  word "R ussians" to  th e
O
G enera lissim o ,
The l e t t e r  in d ic a te d  th e  P re s id e n t 's  im patience  w ith  
th e  China q u e s tio n  and th e  problems of d e a lin g  w ith  Chiang.
He had re p la c e d  S t i lw e l l  and expected a g re a t ly  in c re a se d  co­
o p e ra tio n . S t i lw e l l  had l e f t  China th re e  weeks b e fo re  and 
R oosevelt had y e t  to  see  any fa v o ra b le  a c tio n  on th e  p a r t  of 
Chiang because of th a t  a c t .  Ambassador Gauss re s ig n e d  h is  
p o s t and had d e p a rted  a week a f t e r  S t i lw e l l ,  and s t i l l  th e  
N a t io n a l is ts  had shown no evidence th a t  they  planned to  g e t on
^ F o rre s t a i .  The F o r re s ta l  D ia r ie s . 16.
O
Roosevelt to Hurley, November 18, 1944; Hurley Papers.
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w ith  th e  war a g a in s t  Japan . U nited  S ta te s  co ncessions to  
Chiang had seem ingly produced no p o s i t iv e  resp o n se  and th e  
P re s id e n t was even l e f t  w ith o u t an Ambassador in  C hina. In 
l ig h t  of t h i s  s i t u a t io n ,  R oosevelt decided  to  o f f e r  th e  p o s t 
to  H urley .^  C e r ta in ly , H urley cou ld  do as w e ll as had a lre ad y  
been done.
Armed w ith  th e  P r e s id e n t 's  l e t t e r  u rg in g  u n i f ic a t io n  
and an o f f e r  of th e  am bassadorsh ip . H urley went to  spend th e  
weekend a t  th e  G e n e ra lis s im o 's  v i l l a .  The two men d isc u sse d  
th e  Communist-Kuomintang s p l i t  and how i t  m ight be mended. 
Charm flow ed p ro fu se ly  a t  th e  two dynamic men tu rn e d  t h e i r  
t a l e n t s  to  w inning each o th e r .  When H urley inform ed th e  
G eneralissim o th a t  he was being  c o n s id e red  fo r  th e  ambassa­
d o rsh ip , th e  G enera lissim o  ro s e  and ru sh ed  to  H urley , shook 
hands w ith  him, s lapped  him on th e  back, and added th a t  he had 
worked and prayed  f o r  such to  happen fo r  two m onths. H urley 
to ld  th e  G enera lissim o he would n o t accep t th e  p o s t w ithou t 
th e  G e n e ra lis s im o 's  a p p ro v a l, a lth o u g h  he had a lre a d y  done so 
on November 1 7 . Chiang c au tio n e d  H urley about th e  dangers 
of d e a lin g  w ith  th e  Communists and a llu d e d  to  a re fo rm a tio n  of 
h is  own government which would b rin g  in  more l i b e r a l  dem ocrat­
i c  e lem en ts. In v ig o ra te d  by h is  weekend w ith  th e  Chinese 
le a d e r .  H urley re tu rn e d  to  Chungking on Monday m orning, No­
vember 19, and resumed c o n s id e ra tio n  of n e g o tia t io n s  which he
9
R oosevelt to  H urley, November 17, 1944; H urley P apers .
'^H u rley  to  R o o sev e lt, November l 7 , 1944; H urley P apers .
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hoped to  conclude s u c c e s s fu lly  in  th e  n e a r fu tu r e .
On November 21 Hurley met again  w ith  th e  Kuomintang
le a d e r s .  They had re v is e d  t h e i r  th re e  p o in t  p ro p o sa l which
they  had a ttem p ted  to  f o i s t  upon him a week e a r l i e r .  A lthough
m ild e r in  form , i t  s t i l l  d id  no t make th e  g u a ran tees which th e
12Communists deemed e s s e n t ia l  fo r  a l a s t in g  s e tt le m e n t.^  F i f ty -  
f iv e  m inutes a f t e r  th e  Kuomintang d e le g a tio n  l e f t ,  Chou E n - la i  
and h is  a id e  a r r iv e d  a t  H u rley 's  o f f i c e .  P robably  a t  t h i s  
m eeting . H urley su b m itted  th e  new Kuomintang p ro p o sa l to  th e  
Communists, Chou d e p a rted  w ith  th e  document in  o rd e r th a t  he 
m ight examine i t  c a r e f u l ly  b e fo re  h is  n ex t m eeting w ith  Hur­
le y , schedu led  fo r  th e  nex t day,
At s ix  in  th e  evening th e  same day, Soong met w ith  
H urley to  d isc u ss  some a l t e r n a t iv e s  to  u n if ic a t io n ,^ '^  Soong 
must have r e a l iz e d  th a t  th e  p re s e n ta tio n  of th e  th re e  p o in t  
p ro p o sa l would end Communist p a r t i c ip a t io n  in  th e  u n i f ic a t io n  
t a l k s .  In  th e  evening m eeting , th e  F ore ign  M in is te r  p re se n te d  
th re e  s u g g e s tio n s , a l l  of which invo lved  renewed emphasis on 
equ ipp ing  and t r a in in g  Kuomintang fo rc e s ,  Soong im p lied  th a t  
any of th e se  co u rses  would en ab le  th e  N a t io n a l i s t  fo rc e s  to  
ta k e  th e  o f fe n s iv e  w ith in  s ix  m onths. T his appeared to  be a
^^Hurley China Log, 1944, November 19, 1944; H urley
P ap ers ,
l^p roposed  b a s is  fo r  se t tle m e n t g iven  to  H urley by 
Dr. Wang Shih= chieh , November 21, 1944; H urley P ap ers ,




very  o p t im is t ic  e s t i m a t e . I n  s p i te  of Soong*s o f f e r ,  Hurley 
con tinued  to  p re ss  f o r  u n i f ic a t io n  a t  th e  m eeting w ith  Chou 
E n - la i  th e  nex t day. I t  was th e  l a s t  m eeting Hurley had w ith  
th e  Communist r e p re s e n ta t iv e  b e fo re  he re tu rn e d  to  Yenan.
The Kuomintang r e a l iz e d  th a t  t h e i r  th re e  p o in t p ro p o sa l 
which Hurley had given Chou E n - la i  would l ik e ly  r e s u l t  in  an 
end to  n e g o tia t io n s  on p o l i t i c a l  and m il i ta r y  u n i f ic a t io n .
They probably  a lso  f e l t  co n fid e n t th a t  Chou would n o t te rm in a te  
th e  ta lk s  w ithou t f i r s t  c o n su ltin g  Mao T se-tung  in  Yenan. Mean­
w h ile , th e  Kuomintang and Chiang s e t  out to  im press th e  
Americans fa v o ra b ly , Hurley in  p a r t i c u l a r .  To win American 
su p p o rt, Chiang re s h u f f le d  h is  c a b in e t. He removed some of 
th e  more o b je c tio n a b le  r e a c t io n a r ie s ,  such as G eneral Chen 
Cheng, h is  War M in is te r , and s u b s ta n t ia l ly  reduced  th e  power 
of h is  b ro th e r - in - la w , H. H. Kung. On th e  su rfa c e  i t  appeared  
th a t  Chiang K ai-shek  had indeed l ib e r a l i z e d  h is  governm ent.
In r e a l i t y ,  he re p la c e d  well-known r e a c t io n a r ie s  w ith  l e s s e r -  
known r e a c t io n a r ie s .  This f a c t  escaped no one f a m il ia r  w ith  
th e  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  invo lved  in  Chinese p o l i t i c s . U n f o r t u ­
n a te ly ,  Hurley was no t among th e se  in d iv id u a ls .
Hurley spen t Sunday, November 26, a t  th e  G e n e ra liss im o 's  
coun try  e s ta te  where th e  G eneralissim o sought to  convince Hur­
ley  th a t  th e  Kuomintang was u ndertak ing  genuine re fo rm s. A fte r
^ ^A lte rn a tiv e s  to  se ttle m e n t of Communist q u estio n  given 
to  Hurley by T. V. Soong, November 21, 1944; Hurley P apers.
^^American In fo rm ation  S erv ice  e x tra c t  of Domei E ng lish  
S erv ice  of November 25 and 26, 1944, November 27, 1944; Hurley 
P apers .
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d in n er Chiang came to  s i t  on th e  veranda of H u rley 's  c o tta g e . 
For two hours they  s a t  gazing a t  th e  moon and, w ith  th e  a id  
of an i n t e r p r e t e r ,  d isc u sse d  w orld a f f a i r s .  The G e n e ra lis ­
sim o, in  ex trem ely  good humor, exp ressed  h is  s a t i s f a c t i o n  
w ith  th e  r e l a t io n s  between th e  U nited  S ta te s  and China.
Hurley re tu rn e d  to  Chungking on Monday, re la x e d  and re f re s h e d  
by th e  m ountain a i r .  He met w ith  th e  Communists and th e  N ation­
a l i s t s ,  as w e ll as w ith  Congressman Mike M ansfield  of Montana 
who was in  th e  China th e a te r  to  observe c o n d itio n s  th e re .
On November 28, Chou E n - la i  began h is  e f f o r t s  to  r e tu rn  
to  Yenan bu t he was delayed  fo r  se v e ra l  days because of w eath­
e r ,  H urley m isread  Chou's in ten d ed  d e p a rtu re  as a s ig n  th a t  
agreem ent was imminent. He b e lie v e d  both  p a r t i e s  were anxious 
f o r  a s e ttle m e n t and th a t  only th e  w eather p rev en ted  consumma­
t io n  of an agreem ent a t  an e a r ly  d a te . He thought th a t  Chou 
E n - la i  was re tu rn in g  to  Yenan only to  g e t th e  approval of Mao 
T se-tung  and th e  C en tra l Committee of th e  Communist p a r ty .
In  r e a l i t y  Hurley had no sound b a s is  f o r  h is  con fidence ; but 
h is  o p t im is t ic  ou tlook  was in  p a r t  th e  p roduct of occu rrences 
in  Washington during  th e  same week.
On November 22, th e  P re s id e n t fo rm ally  nom inated Hurley 
fo r  th e  p o s t of Ambassador to  China, S ix  days l a t e r  h is  name 
was se n t to  th e  Senate by s p e c ia l  m essenger, and by November 
29, th e  Senate had approved h is  n o m i n a t i o n , R e a c t i o n  in  th e
17Hurley China Log, 1944, November 26-27, 1944; Hurley
Papers,
1^Hurley to  R ooseve lt, November 29, 1944; H urley P apers .
l ^ S te t t in iu s  to  H urley , November 28, 1944; H urley Papers,
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U nited  S ta te s  v a r ie d .  The New York World Telesram  s a id ,  "The 
O r ie n ta is  may no t u n d ers tan d  him, bu t they  c a n 't  he lp  bu t l ik e  
him ." Some e d i to r ia l i z e d  th a t  H urley was e x a c tly  what China 
needed, a businessm an and a s o ld ie r  r a th e r  than  a t r a in e d  d ip ­
lom at. O thers q u estio n ed  th e  f a c t  th a t  he had l i t t l e  t r a in in g  
in  bo th  d ip lo m a tic  m a tte rs  and Far E aste rn  a f f a i r s  bu t gener­
a l l y  ag reed  th a t  h is  c lo s e  c o n ta c ts  both  w ith  th e  W hite House 
and Chiang K ai-shek  made up f o r  h is  lack  of form al t r a in in g .
One ob se rv er r e p o r te d  th a t  th e  nom ination of Hurley and Edward
R. S t e t t i n iu s ,  f o r  th e  p o s t of S e c re ta ry  of S ta te ,  marked a
20sharp  change to  th e  r i g h t  fo r  P re s id e n t R ooseve lt,
H urley im m ediately assumed h is  d u t ie s  as Ambassador, 
a lth o u g h  he was n o t fo rm a lly  p re se n te d  to  th e  N a t io n a l is t  
government u n t i l  December 12, and indeed h is  c re d e n t ia ls  d id  
no t a r r iv e  u n t i l  some tim e in  January . S h o rtly  a f t e r  H urley 
began fu n c tio n in g  as Ambassador, a r e p o r t  came a c ro ss  h is  desk 
of an in te rv ie w  h e ld  by a B r i t i s h  C olonel w ith  a Kuomintang 
G enera l. The C hinese G eneral had to ld  th e  B r i t i s h  o f f i c e r  
th a t  i t  was an e r ro r  to  a ttem p t to  u n i te  th e  Communists and th e  
Kuomintang. The G eneral c a l le d  th e  Communists s ly  and u n t r u s t ­
w orthy , ch arg ing  th a t  t h e i r  only o b je c tiv e  in  China was to
engage in  m a lic io u s  propaganda a g a in s t  th e  c e n t r a l  govern- 
21m ent. Hurley c a l le d  in  th e  quoted  Chinese G eneral to
20H urley C lipp ing  Book, 1944; H u rl^ ' P ap ers .
21Memorandum of C onversation  between G eneral L i Tsung- 
je n  and C olonel L. T. R ide, December 4 , 1944; Hurley P apers .
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q u e s tio n  him about th e  in te rv ie w .
When th e  C hinese G eneral den ied  th e  s ta tem en ts  a t t r i ­
buted  to  him in  th e  B r i t i s h  r e p o r t ,  Hurley assumed th a t  th e  
B r i t i s h  were engaged in  a co n sp iracy  to  f r u s t r a t e  h is  a ttem p ts  
to  u n ify  China. Im m ediately , H urley c a l le d  on th e  B r i t i s h  
Ambassador, S ir  Horace Seymour, where he branded th e  r e p o r t  
f a l s e  and sa id  i t  had been in ten d ed  to  in f lu e n c e  U nited  S ta te s  
c a re e r  fo re ig n  s e rv ic e  o f f i c e r s  a g a in s t  u n i f i c a t io n .  The
B r i t i s h  Ambassador found h im se lf  a t  a lo s s  to  e x p la in  th e
22s tra n g e  a t ta c k ,  bu t he ag reed  to  w ithdraw  th e  l e t t e r .  This 
in c id e n t  ex em p lified  th e  a t t i t u d e  H urley adopted  toward any­
one r e p o r t in g  in fo rm a tio n  which suggested  th a t  u n i f ic a t io n  was 
le s s  than  p o s s ib le  o r d e s i r a b le .  T his r i g id  v iew po in t le d  
e v e n tu a lly  to  h is  s p l i t  w ith  v i r t u a l l y  every inform ed in d i ­
v id u a l in  C hina, excep t th e  Kuomintang le a d e rs h ip .
H urley had w a ited  f o r  word from th e  Yenan c a p i ta l  fo r  
more than  a week when, on December 8 , he re c e iv e d  a l e t t e r  
from Chou E n - la i ,  Much to  H u rle y 's  dism ay, i t  seemed to  end 
any chance of u n i f ic a t io n  in  th e  fo re s e e a b le  f u tu r e ,  Chou 
re p o r te d  th a t  a f t e r  d is c u s s io n s  ;-id.th Chairman Mao T se -tu n g , 
they  had agreed  th a t  i t  was im p o ssib le  to  f in d  any fundam ental 
common ground in  th e  two p o s i t io n s  talc en by them and th e  Kuo­
m intang, The N a t io n a l i s t  th r e e  p o in t  co u n te r p ro p o s it io n  
c le a r ly  d isa g re e d  w ith  Communist su g g e s tio n s  fo r  a c o a l i t io n  
government and a u n i te d  m i l i ta r y  c o u n c il .  T h is , coupled  w ith  
22 Statement of Hurley for Life, January 11, 1946; Hur­
ley Papers,
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th e  r e f u s a l  of th e  Communists' f iv e  p o in t p ro p o sa l, p rec lu d ed  
any p o s s ib i l i ty  of Chou's r e tu rn  to  Chungking fo r  con tinued  
ta lk s .
The Communists, Chou inform ed H urley, p lanned  now to  
p u b lish  th e  f iv e  p o in t agreem ent. By doing th i s  they  hoped to  
draw th e  a t t e n t io n  of th e  p u b lic  to  th e  un reasonab le  a t t i t u d e  
toward u n ity  h e ld  by th e  Kuomintang. In h is  l e t t e r  Chou d id  
no t r u le  ou t th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  of m i l i ta r y  coo p era tio n  w ith  th e  
Americans and exp ressed  a d e s i r e  to  co n tin u e  ta lk s  w ith  H urley 
and G eneral Wedemeyer concern ing  th a t  m a tte r . The Communists 
wanted to  see th e  U nited  S ta te s  Army O bserver Group in  Yenan
under th e  command of C olonel David B a r re t t  con tinued  and in
23f a c t  even expanded. I t  appeared th a t  th e  move to  b rin g  about 
p o l i t i c a l  and m il i ta r y  u n i f ic a t io n  in  China had f a i l e d .
In  th e  s h o r t  month s in c e  H u rley 's  t r i p  to  Yenan, th e  
ta lk s  on u n i f ic a t io n  had tu rn ed  a f u l l  c i r c l e .  Complete s t a l e ­
m ate, to  impending agreem ent, and back to  com plete s ta le m a te , 
a l l  had come to  naught. In  th e  same month. H u rley 's  m ission  
was expanded. He was no lo n g er a s p e c ia l  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e ,  a 
v i s i t i n g  firem an to  p u t out a f i r e ;  he was now a f u l l  f led g ed  
Ambassador. As Ambassador, he assumed f u l l  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  
th e  even ts tak in g  p la c e  in  China. I f  China could  be saved, 
th e  g lo ry  would be H u rle y 's . I f  China f e l l ,  th e  blame would 
a lso  be h i s .
23
Chou E n - la i  to  H urley, December 8, 1944; Hurley Pa­
p e rs .
CHAPTER VII
HURLEY MARCHES ON
During December H urley con tinued  to  p re s s  fo r  u n i f ic a ­
t io n  in  th e  fa c e  o f th e  d isco u rag in g  l e t t e r  from Chou E n - la i .
He had no t l o s t  hope, fo r  a r e p o r t  subm itted  by C olonel B a r re t t  
w ith  th e  Chou l e t t e r  shed l ig h t  on th e  unexpected ru p tu r in g  of 
th e  d is c u s s io n s , and h in te d  th a t  th e  Communists would s t i l l  
t a l k .  On December 8 , Mao c a l le d  B a r re t t  to  h is  o f f ic e  and ex­
p la in e d  to  him in  p ic tu re sq u e  term s why he had r e j e c te d  th e  
th re e  p o in t p ro p o sa l which Chiang o ffe re d  in  l i e u  of th e  Novem­
ber 10 agreem ent. He denounced C h iang 's  p lan  as a scheme to  
d e s tro y  th e  Communist p a r ty ,  o f fe r in g  only m eaning less con­
c e ss io n s  in  r e tu r n  fo r  com plete su rre n d e r  by th e  Communists,
Mao expressed  h is  d isappo in tm en t in  H u rle y 's  a c t io n s .
He cou ld  no t understand  why Hurley had abandoned th e  f iv e  p o in t 
p ro p o sa l th a t  Hurley h im self had drawn up and p rocla im ed  as 
being  f a i r  to  both  s id e s ,  Mao thought H u rley 's  fa v o r i t is m  
toward th e  Kuomintang le d  him to  ig n o re  th e  G e n era liss im o 's  
r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  C h in a 's  c r i s i s ,  and b e liev ed  i t  was u n fa i r  
t h a t  th e  Communists, w ith  no p a r t  in  th e  c r i s i s ,  should  be 
asked by H urley to  g ive  up so much when th e  G eneralissim o 
s a c r i f i c e d  n o th in g . The Chairman sa id  th a t  th e  U nited  S ta te s
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would le a rn  th e  e r r o r  of i t s  ways when a l l  China was l o s t  be­
cause of th e  b lu n d erin g  of th e  G enera lissim o .
The Communists, Mao s a id , d i f f e r e d  from Chiang K ai-shek  
in  th a t  they  could  s ta n d  on t h e i r  own f e e t  l ik e  f r e e  men. He 
d e c la re d  th a t  th e  Communist fo rc e s  could  be of g re a t  a id  to  
th e  U nited  S ta te s  and h a s te n  th e  d e fe a t  of Japan . But i f  th e  
U nited  S ta te s  chose to  abandon them, Mao warned th a t  they 
could  tu rn  e lsew here  f o r  a id .  In any e v en t, th e  Chairman con­
t in u e d , th e  Communist p a r ty  had fough t th e  Japanese f o r  many 
y e a rs  w ith o u t o u ts id e  a id  and they  would co n tin u e  to  do so in  
th e  fu tu re  no m a tte r  what happened. Mao sa id  t h a t  th e  Novem­
ber 10 agreem ent which he had s igned  and which H urley had 
taken  to  Chungking f o r  th e  G e n e ra lis s im o 's  s ig n a tu re  r e p r e ­
se n ted  h is  f i n a l  o f f e r .
Chiang K a i-s h e k 's  r e f u s a l  of a c o a l i t io n  governm ent,
Mao s a id ,  made i t  n ecessa ry  f o r  him to  ta k e  c e r ta in  a c t io n s .
He would send ou t a c a l l  fo r  th e  fo rm ation  of a u n i te d  commit­
te e  w ith  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  of a l l  th e  P e o p le 's  P o l i t i c a l  C ouncils 
in  th e  v a rio u s  re g io n s  under h is  c o n tro l .  When th i s  o rg a n iz a ­
t io n  took shape, he would then  ask  th a t  i t  be reco g n ized  by 
Chiang K a i-sh ek . I f  Chiang re fu s e d , he would form a s e p a ra te  
governm ent. Mao added q u ic k ly , however, th a t  th e  Communist 
p a r ty  was s t i l l  w i l l in g  to  n e g o tia te  on th e  b a s is  of th e  f iv e  
p o in t  agreem ent.
Chairman Mao's a t t i t u d e  th roughou t th e  in te rv ie w  was 
extrem ely  r e c a l c i t r a n t .  S ev era l tim es he went in to  a v io le n t  
ra g e , sh o u tin g  over and over a g a in , "We w i l l  no t y i e ld  any
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f u r th e r ,"  and a llu d e d  to  Chiang as a " t u r t l e ' s  egg ,"  A ll th e  
w h ile , Colonel B a r re t t  a p p a re n tly  rem ained calm t ry in g  to  ap­
p r a is e  f u l ly  th e  s i t u a t i o n .  Every em otional p o in t  made by 
Chairman Mao was, a cco rd in g  to  Chou E n - la i ,  suppo rted  w ith  
c o ld , c a lc u la t in g  re a so n , B a r re t t  l e f t  th e  in te rv ie w  fe e l in g  
th a t  he had ta lk e d  in  v a in  to  two c le v e r ,  r u th le s s ,  and deter=  
mined le a d e rs  who f e l t  a b s o lu te ly  su re  of t h e i r  s t r e n g th ,^
The evening of th e  lU th , H urley drew up th e  f i r s t  d r a f t  
of h is  re p ly  to  Chou E n - la i 's  l e t t e r  of December 8, That even­
ing  he d ined  w ith  T, V, Soong and showed him th e  d r a f t  answ er, 
Soong found flaw s in  i t  and ad v ised  H urley to  send a radiogram
ask in g  Chou to  de lay  p u b lis h in g  th e  f iv e  p o in t  p ro p o sa l u n t i l
2
B a r re t t  r e tu rn e d  to  Yenan w ith  a l e t t e r  from H urley , Soong 
p robab ly  p o in te d  out t h a t  t h i s  would g ive  tim e to  w r i te  a more 
c a r e f u l ly  worded r e p ly .  The nex t day H urley met w ith  Soong 
tw ic e . The f i r s t  m eeting  in c lu d ed  Dr, Wang S h ih -ch ieh  and 
G eneral Chang C hih-chung, th e  c h ie f  Kuomintang n e g o tia to r s  on 
th e  u n i f ic a t io n  q u e s tio n , Soong re tu rn e d  a t  f iv e  o 'c lo c k ,  and 
a t  s ix  bo th  went to  d isc u ss  th e  m a tte r  w ith  th e  G eneralissim o,'*  
The r e s u l t in g  l e t t e r  was designed  to  p rev e n t th e  Commu­
n i s t s  from p u b lish in g  t h e i r  f iv e  p o in t  p ro p o sa l and to  p ro v id e  
a means by which H urley m ight reopen n e g o tia t io n s .  H urley
^Report by David D, B a r r e t t ,  " In te rv ie w  w ith  Chairman 
Mao T se -tu n g ,"  December 10, 1944; H urley P ap e rs ,
2
Hurley to  Mao, December 11, 1944; H urley P apers ,
^Hurley China Log, 1944, December 10-11, 1944; Hurley
Papers,
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w rote Chou th a t  he co n sid ered  bo th  th e  f iv e  p o in t agreem ent 
and th e  th re e  p o in t p ro p o sa l as s te p s  in  n e g o tia t io n  and, 
th e re fo re ,  as f a r  as he was concerned, n e g o tia t io n s  rem ained 
open. The N a tio n a l government wanted to  co n tin u e  t a lk s  and he 
f e l t  t h a t  th e  exchange of id eas should  proceed  u n le s s  th e  Com­
m unists d e f in i te ly  chose to  end them. P u b l ic i ty  g iven to  any 
phase of th e  d is c u s s io n s , he c au tio n e d , could  in c re a s e  th e  con­
tro v e rsy  and p rec lu d e  a u n i f ic a t io n  of China. F in a l ly ,  Hurley
re fu s e d  to  g ive  h is  consen t to  th e  p u b lic a tio n  of th e  term s
4
of th e  November lO th f iv e  p o in t p ro p o sa l a t  th a t  tim e.
I t  does no t appear th a t  H urley thought th e  f iv e  p o in t  
p lan  was m erely a  s te p  in  n e g o tia t io n s  when he drew i t  up in  
Yenan, He considered  th e  p ro p o sa ls  a b a s is  fo r  a f a i r  a g re e ­
ment and th i s  was in d ic a te d  by b lanks a t  th e  bottom of th e  
paper f o r  th e  s ig n a tu re s  of Mao, Chiang, and two w itn e s se s .
Two of the  spaces were s ig n ed , th a t  of Mao and th e  one a l l o t ­
te d  to  Hurley as a w itn e ss , A sim ple p ro p o s itio n  on which to  
base a s e ttle m e n t would no t l ik e ly  have in c lu d ed  th e s e  s ig n a ­
tu r e s ,  VJhether Hurley t r u ly  re v is e d  h is  a t t i t u d e  toward th e  
f iv e  p o in t agreem ent or w hether he was m erely grop ing  fo r  a 
way to  reopen n e g o tia t io n s , i t  i s  im possib le  to  say . In any 
e v en t, d i f f i c u l t  f ly in g  c o n d itio n s  p rev en ted  th e  l e t t e r  from 
reach in g  Yenan fo r  th re e  days,^
'^B raft of L e t te r  from H urley to  Chou E n - la i ,  n , d , ,  
w ith  c o rre c tio n s  by T. V, Soong da ted  December 11, 1944;
H urley P apers,
5
Hurley to Mao, December 14, 1944; Hurley Papers,
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On December 12, H urley d esc rib e d  fo r  P re s id e n t R oosevelt 
th e  o b je c tio n s  which th e  Communists found in  d e a lin g  w ith  th e  
G enera lissim o  and h is  government. He then  c h a s t is e d  th e  
N a t io n a l is t  government f o r  re fu s in g  to  g ive  th e  Communist No­
vember lO th o f f e r  p ro p er c o n s id e ra tio n . Hurley sa id  th a t  th e  
G enera lissim o  d e s ire d  a f a i r  se ttle m e n t but was unab le  to  d ea l 
w ith  th e  problem  d i r e c t ly  because of th e  w orsening m il i ta r y  
s i tu a t io n  in  C hina.^ Chiang had asked Hurley to  a ttem p t to  
reopen n e g o tia t io n s ,  bu t H urley in s i s t e d  th a t  th e  government 
i t s e l f  tak e  s te p s  to  renew ta lk s  w ith  th e  Communist p a r ty  and 
assume r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  f o r  t h e i r  success o r f a i l u r e .  Hurley 
was r e lu c ta n t  to  be p lac ed  in  th e  same p o s i t io n  he had been by 
th e  r e f u s a l  of th e  November 10th  agreem ent.^
Hurley had been a c tin g  in  th e  c a p a c ity  of Ambassador 
s in c e  th e  re s ig n a t io n  of C larence Gauss on November 1, a lthough  
h is  o f f i c i a l  appointm ent was n o t approved by th e  Senate u n t i l  
November 30. He had p lanned  to  w a it u n t i l  h is  c re d e n t ia ls  
a r r iv e d  from W ashington b e fo re  o f f i c i a l l y  occupying th e  o f f ic e ,  
bu t when i t  appeared th a t  i t  would tak e  s e v e ra l  weeks fo r  th e  
c r e d e n t ia ls  to  reach  C hina, he decided  i t  would be b e s t to  end 
h is  r o le  as s p e c ia l  p r e s id e n t ia l  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e .  On December 
12, 1944, Hurley was fo rm ally  p re se n te d  to  th e  Chinese govern­
ment as th e  American Ambassador to  C hina.^
^The G eneralissim o seldom e n te re d  in to  n e g o tia t io n s  d i ­
r e c t l y ,  but r a th e r ,  T. V. Soong, Wang S h ih -ch ieh  and o th e r  
Kuomintang o f f i c i a l s  were charged  w ith  th e  day to  day m eetings.
^Hurley to  R o o sev e lt, December 12, 1944; H urley P apers . 
G ibid .
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The nex t day, December 13, H urley, now w ith  f u l l  Am­
b assado r s t a tu s ,  and o th e r  h igh  ran k in g  American o f f i c i a l s  
met w ith  Chiang K ai-shek  to  d isc u ss  th e  w orsening m il i ta ry  
s i tu a t io n .  A f te r  th e  m eeting , th e  G eneralissim o asked Hurley 
about th e  p ro g re ss  of n e g o tia t io n s  between th e  N a t io n a l is t  
government and th e  Communist p a r ty . Chiang probab ly  was f u l ­
ly  aware of th e  very  l a t e s t  developm ents, bu t he knew of 
H urley ' s i n t e r e s t  in  th e  m a tte r  and wanted to  know th e  Ameri­
c a n 's  v iew p o in t. He complimented H urley on h is  e f f o r t s  to  
b rin g  about an agreem ent, and sa id  Foreign  M in is te r  Soong would 
c o n tin u e  to  co o p e ra te  f u l ly  in  f in d in g  an a c c e p ta b le  b a s is  fo r  
u n i f ic a t io n  between th e  N a t io n a l is t s  and th e  Communists.^
M eanwhile, B a r re t t  had been unab le  to  leav e  Chungking 
by a i r  because of w eather c o n d it io n s . A lready th re e  c ru c ia l  
days had passed  w ith o u t H u rley 's  answer reach in g  th e  Commu­
n i s t s ,  He se n t a rad iogram  to  Yenan ex p la in in g  B a r r e t t 's  
d e lay  and a ssu re d  Mao th a t  th e  C olonel would a r r iv e  as soon as 
p o s s i b l e , H u r l e y  took  th e  o p p o rtu n ity  g iven him by bad 
w eather to  d r a f t  an o th e r l e t t e r  to  Chairman Mao, thank ing  him 
fo r  h is  h o s p i t a l i ty  and a s e t  of photographs which th e  C h a ir­
man had se n t to  Chungking w ith  B a r r e t t , O n  December 15, 
B a r r e t t ,  a long w ith  John P. D avies, reached  Yenan,
The n e g o tia t io n s  w ith  th e  Communists came up in  se v e ra l
^Hurley China Log, 1944, December 13, 1944; H urley Pa­
p e rs ,
^*^Hurley to  Mao, December 14, 1944; Hurley P ap ers , 
l l l b i d .
Ill
q u e s tio n s  a t  a p re s s  co n fe ren ce  h e ld  by H urley a f t e r  B a r re t t  
and Davies had l e f t  Chungking, When q u estio n ed  about the  
t a l k s ,  H urley r e p l ie d  t h a t ,  s in c e  they  were s t i l l  in  p ro g re s s , 
he p re fe r r e d  n o t to  make any s ta te m e n t. Examined c lo s e r  about 
h i s  own p e rso n a l f e e l in g s .  H urley r e p l ie d  t h a t  he hoped every 
elem ent would be a b le  to  u n i te  to  d e fe a t  th e  Jap an ese , He 
gave no in d ic a t io n ,  how ever, t h a t  th e  m eetings were dead­
l o c k e d , 12 Not knowing what th e  outcome of D av ies ' and 
B a r r e t t 's  v i s i t  to  Yenan would be . H urley sp en t an in a c t iv e  
bu t te n s e  weekend. On Monday, December 18, D avies and B a r re t t  
r e tu rn e d  from th e  Communist c a p i t a l ,
Davies gave a f u l l  r e p o r t  on h is  co n fe ren ces w ith  th e  
Communist b ig  th r e e ,  Chou E n - la i ,  Mao T se -tu n g , and Chu Teh, 
Davies deemed th e  long in te rv ie w s  g ran te d  him by th e  Communist 
le a d e rs  an e x c e p tio n a l m a n ife s ta t io n  of good w i l l .  He was im­
p re sse d  by th e  supremacy of Mao over th e  o th e r  Communist 
le a d e rs  and th e re  was no q u e s tio n  in  D av ies ' mind th a t  Mao ran  
th e  C hinese Communist p a r ty ,  Davies n o ted  th e  c o u rte sy  w ith  
which he was t r e a te d  and though t th a t  perhaps th e  Communists 
b e lie v e d  they  had been unduly b r is k  w ith  C olonel B a r re t t  when 
th ey  r e je c te d  th e  G e n e ra lis s im o 's  co u n te r p ro p o sa ls ,
D av ies ' t a lk  w ith  Chou covered  a broad f i e l d .  The 
two men de lved  most d e ep ly , however, in to  th e  d i f f i c u l t  po­
l i t i c a l  s i tu a t io n  in  which Chiang K ai-shek  found h im se lf as a 
r e s u l t  of h is  numerous and c o n tin u in g  d e fe a ts  a t  th e  hands of
^2T ra n s c r ip t  of H urley P re ss  C onference, December 15, 
1944; H urley P ap ers ,
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th e  Japanese . Chou no ted  th a t  th e  G eneralissim o took th e  o f­
fe n s iv e  only a f t e r  e x te n s iv e  prodding by th e  Americans and then 
only h a lf - h e a r te d ly .  Davies was s tru c k  by Chou's assum ption , 
th e  same one in c id e n tly  he ld  by D avies, th a t  th e  rea so n  fo r  
th e  G e n e ra lis s im o 's  re lu c ta n c e  to  a t ta c k  th e  Japanese  was a 
de fa c to  n on -agg ression  agreem ent w ith  them. They a ls o  d i s ­
cussed  th e  Communist scheme of e s ta b l is h in g  an a d m in is tra t iv e  
fe d e ra tio n  over th e  a re a s  which were under Communist c o n tro l ,  
Chou favored  such a s te p  but Mao rem ained c a u tio u s . A pparent­
ly  Mao, s in c e  h is  in te rv ie w  w ith  B a r re t t  a week e a r l i e r ,  had 
decided  to  de lay  such a c t io n , a t  l e a s t  fo r  th e  moment.
In a c o rd ia l  m eeting w ith  Chairman Mao T se -tu n g , th e  
main to p ic  was S ino-Japanese  c o o p e ra tio n , Mao s a id  t h a t  th e  
Japanese appealed  to  Chiang on two p o in ts :  f i r s t ,  h i s  s tro n g
p a n -A s ia tic  f e e l in g s ;  and second ly , C h ian g 's  anti-Com m unist 
sen tim en ts . But he exp ressed  h e a r ty  amusement a t  th e  Jap a ­
nese  e f f o r t s  to  d e a l w ith  Chiang. He s a id  i t  was im p o ssib le  
fo r  anyone to  do b u sin ess  w ith  Chiang K ai-shek , With th e  Com­
m u n is ts , Mao laughed, th e  G eneralissim o would always n e g o tia te  
but never come to  an u n d e rs tan d in g . W ith th e  Am ericans, Chiang 
would always p rocla im  h is  d e te rm in a tio n  to  p ro se c u te  th e  war 
a g a in s t Japan as v ig o ro u sly  as p o s s ib le ,  bu t he would never 
s e r io u s ly  assume th e  o ffe n s iv e . F in a l ly ,  Mao s a id , Chiang 
would always c o lla b o ra te  w ith  th e  Japanese , but he would never 
su rren d er to  them.
Davies rounded out h is  in te rv ie w s w ith  th e  Communist 
t r iu m v ira te  when he met on th e  morning of th e  17th  w ith
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Chu Teh and o th e r  Communist m il i ta r y  le a d e rs .  G eneral Chu 
made th e  u su a l claim s of expanding Communist s t re n g th  accom­
pan ied  by charges of Kuomintang ag g re ss io n  a g a in s t  Communist 
fo rc e s  in  v a rio u s  p a r t s  of China. When q u estio n ed  about th e  
e f fe c t iv e n e s s  of g u e r r i l l a s  under th e  c o n tro l of th e  Kuomin­
ta n g , G eneral Chu s a id  they  e i th e r  c o lla b o ra te d  w ith  th e  
Japanese  or a t  b e s t were in e f f e c t iv e .  The Communist m il i ta ry  
men then  expressed  an i n t e r e s t  in  th e  European th e a te r  and 
American o p e ra tio n s  in  th e  P a c i f i c ,  com plim enting Davies on 
th e  v a lo r  of American tro o p s , Davies re c e iv e d  th e  d i s t i n c t  
im pression  th a t  th e  Communists l ik e d  Americans and hoped to  
co o p era te  w ith  them,^
Chairman Mao and Chou E n - la i  had se n t l e t t e r s  to  Hurley 
and t h e i r  co n te n ts  had to  be in te r p r e te d  in  l ig h t  of D av ies ' 
r e p o r t .  Mao's l e t t e r  was u n u su a lly  b r i e f .  In  i t  th e  C h a ir­
man c i t e d  an answer to  a c o n g ra tu la to ry  message which he se n t 
to  P re s id e n t R oosevelt on R o o se v e lt 's  r e e le c t io n .  In th e  r e ­
p ly  R oosevelt s a id  th a t  th e  U nited  S ta te s  would co o p era te  w ith  
a l l  a n ti-Ja p a n e se  fo rc e s  in  China to  d e fe a t  th e  Japanese , Mao 
asked Hurley to  t e l l  th e  P re s id e n t t h a t ,  as le a d e r  of th e  Chi­
nese  Communist p a r ty ,  he su b sc rib ed  f u l ly  to  th i s  p o l ic y , and 
thanked him. Seemingly, Mao was c a l l in g  to  H u rley 's  a t t e n ­
t io n  what he b e lie v e d  to  be th e  t r u e  American p o lic y  in  
C h i n a , M a o  was c le a r ly  lo s in g  p a tie n c e  w ith  H u rley 's  demand
13Report by John D avies, " V is i t  to  Yenan, December 15- 
17 ," December 27, 1944; Hurley P apers .
^“^ a o  to  H urley , December 16, 1944; Hurley P apers ,
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fo r  u n i f i c a t io n  on one hand, and f a i l u r e  to  adopt a r e a l i s t i c  
a t t i t u d e  which would make th a t  p o s s ib le  on th e  o th e r , Chou's 
l e t t e r  focused  more s p e c i f i c a l ly  on th e  n e g o tia t io n s .
Chou ag reed  not to  p u b lis h  th e  f iv e  p o in t  p ro p o sa l of 
November 11, but he a tta c k e d  th e  Kuomintang f o r  a com plete 
la c k  of s in c e r i ty  in  coming to  a m eaningful agreem ent. The 
fundam ental d i f f i c u l t y ,  he d e c la re d , was the  u n w illin g n e ss  of 
th e  Kuomintang to  fo rsa k e  o n e -p a rty  r u le  and a ccep t a demo­
c r a t i c  c o a l i t io n  governm ent, Chou, however, l e f t  th e  door 
open fo r  f u r th e r  n e g o tia t io n s  when he s a id  th a t  th e  Communist 
p a r ty  would be w il l in g  to  n e g o tia te  whenever th e  Kuomintang 
showed s u f f i c i e n t  s i n c e r i t y , T h e  door, th en , was no t as 
t i g h t l y  sh u t to  f u r th e r  n e g o tia t io n s  as Hurley had fe a re d .
The new Ambassador im m ediately began an o th e r round of con­
fe re n c e s  w ith  th e  G enera lissim o and o th e r  Kuomintang le a d e rs  
in  o rd e r  to  a r r iv e  a t  a modus v iv en d i f o r  u n i f ic a t io n  a c c e p t­
a b le  to  both  p a r t i e s .
Hurley met w ith  Chiang on December 18, 19, and 20, and 
se n t l e t t e r s  to  Mao and Chou on th e  2 l s t ,  He applauded th e  
Communists f o r  leav in g  th e  way open fo r  f u r th e r  ta lk s  on u n i­
f i c a t i o n ,  I t  was h is  b e l ie f  th a t  th e  Chinese N a t io n a l is t  
government a ls o  d e s ire d  to  c o n tin u e  n e g o tia t io n s  and he hoped 
th a t  e i t h e r  Mao o r G eneral Chou would r e tu rn  to  Chungking fo r  
th a t  p u rpose . Hurley w rote th a t  th e  chances of success along 
th e  g e n e ra l l in e s  of th e  Communist p ro p o sa ls  were b r ig h te r  than
l^Chou to Hurley, December 16, 1944; Hurley Papers,
ever b e f o r e . W h i l e  w a itin g  fo r  an answ er, H urley p rep a red  
a d e ta i le d  summary of h i s  a c t i v i t i e s  in  China f o r  th e  new 
S e c re ta ry  of S ta te ,  Edward R, S t e t t i n iu s ,  J r .
H u rley 's  e x te n s iv e  r e p o r t  was in ten d ed  to  in form  th e  
S e c re ta ry  on c o n d itio n s  in  China. H urley o u tl in e d  th e  m ission  
which had been g iven to  him by P re s id e n t R oosevelt and to ld  
th e  S e c re ta ry  th a t  s in c e  h is  a r r i v a l ,  and th e  assignm ent of 
G eneral Wedemeyer to  C hina, r e l a t i o n s  between th e  N a tio n a l­
i s t  government and American o f f i c i a l s  in  China had n o ta b le  
improved, C hina, he  s a id ,  was moving slow ly  tow ard democracy 
but rem ained fo r  th e  moment a benevo len t d ic ta to r s h ip  under 
Chiang K ai-sh ek , H urley s a id  h is  long d is c u s s io n s  w ith  th e  
G enera lissim o on th e  S in o -S o v ie t q u e s tio n  r e s u l te d  in  a more 
c o n c i l ia to r y  a t t i t u d e  on th e  G e n e ra lis s im o 's  p a r t  re g a rd in g  
th e  m a tte r  of u n i f i c a t i o n .  Chiang, once a ssu re d  th a t  th e  
S ov ie t Union had no i n t e r e s t  in  C hina, was much more w il l in g  
to  make concessions to  ach iev e  m i l i ta r y  u n i f ic a t io n  w ith  th e  
Communist p a r ty  in  Yenan in  o rd e r to  f u r th e r  th e  war a g a in s t  
Japan .
N o n e th e less , H urley exp ressed  h is  d isappo in tm en t over 
th e  deadlocked n e g o tia t io n s .  The Kuomintang, he s a id ,  had an 
o p p o rtu n ity  to  make a se t tle m e n t w ith  th e  Communists but had 
re fu s e d  to  do so . H urley had persuaded  Chiang K ai-shek  and 
o th e rs  in  th e  N a tio n a l government of th e  n e c e s s i ty  f o r  u n i f ic a ­
t io n  bu t was a t  th e  moment b a t t l in g  to  convince th e  Kuomintang
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^^Hurley to Mao, December 21, 1944; Hurley Papers.
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to  make l i b e r a l  p o l i t i c a l  concessions to  th e  Communists, He 
sa id  th e  Kuomintang t r i e d  to  avo id  th e  use  of th e  word " c o a l i ­
t io n ” and he viewed t h i s  as th e  main stum bling  b lo ck . Hurleur 
saw l i t t l e  d if fe re n c e  between th e  avowed p r in c ip le s  of th e  
N a tio n a l government, th e  Kuomintang, and th e  C hinese Communist 
p a r ty  and looked e lsew here  fo r  th e  f a i l u r e  o f th e  t a lk s .
Hurley blamed h is  f a i l u r e  to  ach ieve  u n i f ic a t io n  on th e  
i n ^ e r i a l i s t  b loc  of n a tio n s  le d  by G reat B r i ta in ,  and on Ameri­
can m il i ta r y  o f f i c i a l s  and fo re ig n  s e rv ic e  o f f i c e r s  who 
b e lie v e d  th a t  th e  C hinese N a t io n a l is t  government and Chiang 
K ai-shek  would u l t im a te ly  f a l l .  The B r i t i s h ,  he charged , ex­
e r te d  a s tro n g  in f lu e n c e  to  keep China d iv id ed  so th a t  they  
m ight re g a in  th e  s p e c ia l  p o s i t io n  they  enjoyed in  China b e fo re  
th e  war. J u s t  how t h i s  in f lu e n c e  was brought to  b e a r . Hurley 
d id  n o t e x p la in , H u r l^  s a id  th e  Americans in  China who 
though t Chiang would f a l l  encouraged th e  Communists n o t to  
perm it t h e i r  tro o p s  to  be u n ite d  w ith  th e  C hinese army because 
th e  c o lla p s e  o f Chiang would fo rc e  th e  U nited S ta te s  to  d e a l 
w ith  th e  Chinese Communists, At t h i s  tim e H urley b e lie v e d  th e  
s e n io r  o f f ic e r s  of th e  Embassy to  be in  agreem ent w ith  him on 
th e  m a tte r  of u n i f ic a t io n .  He summarized a l l  th e  p ro te s ta t io n s  
a g a in s t  u n i f ic a t io n  in  China as being  s to c k  argum ents of im­
p e r i a l i s t s  and a l l  o th e rs  who opposed th e  p r in c ip le s  of th e  
A t la n t ic  C h a rte r .
A c r i t iq u e  of H u rle y 's  r e p o r t  was p rep a red  in  th e  S ta te
Hurley to  S te t t in iu s ,  December 23, 1944; Hurley Pa­
p ers,
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D epartm ent, W hile acc ep tin g  H u rle y 's  in te r p r e ta t io n  of h is  
m ission  and acknowledging th a t  American r e la t io n s  in  China had 
improved s in c e  S t i l w e l l 's  rem oval, S ta te  Department re p re se n ­
t a t i v e s  took ex cep tio n  to  H u rle y 's  o p t im is t ic  a p p ra is a l  of 
Chiang K ai-shek , C hiang' s a c t i v i t i e s  in  th e  p a s t ,  they  s a id , 
d id  n o t m erit con fidence  in  h is  a b i l i t y  to  move tow ard t r u e  
democracy. N e ith e r  d id  th e  S ta te  Departm ent c r i t iq u e  sh a re  
H u rle y 's  optim ism  on th e  m a tte r  of C hinese u n i ty .
The c r i t iq u e  rem inded th e  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  t h a t  th e  
d if fe re n c e s  in  v iew poin t between Chiang and th e  Communists were 
sinq>le b u t fundam ental, Chiang was p rep a red  to  g ra n t th e  Com­
m unists r e p re s e n ta t io n  in  th e  governm ent, p ro v id in g  such 
re p re s e n ta t io n  had no c o n tr o l l in g  o r d i r e c t in g  in f lu e n c e . The 
Communists, on th e  o th e r  hand, would n o t accep t such a  propo­
s a l ,  They wanted a t r u e  c o a l i t io n  governm ent, a government in  
which t h ^  would have a d i r e c t  say in  th e  p o l ic ie s  and admin­
i s t r a t i o n  of th e  n a tio n . I t  seemed u n l ik e ly , th e  c r i t iq u e  
c o n tin u ed , th a t  Chiang would be w i l l in g  to  g ra n t th a t  much to  
th e  Communists.
The a n a ly s is  of S ta te  Departm ent o f f i c e r s  d ism issed  
H u rle y 's  charges a g a in s t  th e  i n ç e r i a l i s t s  and American o f f i ­
c i a l s  in  China as be ing  based on m isu n d ers tan d in g s . The 
c y n ic a l o u tlo o k  of European d ip lom ats in  China c o n tra s te d  
sh a rp ly  w ith  th e  optim ism  expressed  by H u r l^  and q u i te  l ik e ly  
H urley m is in te rp re te d  such an o u tlook  as o p p o s itio n  to  Chinese 
u n i ty ,  Hi.s d isagreem ent w ith  th e  Americans in  China was w r i t te n  
o f f  as caused by d if fe re n c e s  of o p in io n .
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The c r i t iq u e  c au tio n e d  t h a t ,  w h ile  Ambassador Hurley 
d id  n o t sh a re  th e  o p in io n  th a t  Chiang would f a l l ,  i t  was a 
v iew po in t which shou ld  be taken  in to  c o n s id e ra tio n . The 
f u r th e r  d i s in te g r a t io n  o f Chungking' s a u th o r i ty  was a c o n tin ­
gency f o r  which th e  U nited  S ta te s  should  be p rep a red . Whoever 
p rep a red  th e  c r i t iq u e  of th e  H urley message s a id  th a t  i f  
C h ian g 's  e f f o r t s  to  re a c h  a se ttle m e n t w ith  th e  Canmunists d id  
n o t succeed , s e r io u s  though t should  be g iven to  th e  e s t a b l i s h ­
ment of a supreme American command under Chiang of a l l  tro o p s  
in  C hina.
The d if fe re n c e s  between th e  views of th e  S ta te  D epart­
ment o f f i c i a l s  as e x p re ssed  in  th e  c r i t iq u e  and th o se  of 
H urley were im p o rta n t. H urley had f a i t h  in  C h ian g 's  a b i l i t y  
to  move China tow ard u n i ty  and democracy; th e  S ta te  Department 
o f f i c i a l s  d id  n o t .  H urley though t th a t  th e  stum bling  b locks 
in  th e  p a th  of u n i f ic a t io n  were sem antic  and th e  o p p o s itio n  
from im p e r ia l i s t  n a tio n s  and American o f f i c i a l s  in  C hina. The 
S ta te  Departm ent o f f i c i a l s  s a id  u n i f ic a t io n  was u n lik e ly  be­
cause of fundam ental d i f f e re n c e s  between th e  two f a c t io n s .
The day a f t e r  H urley se n t h is  r e p o r t  to  W ashington, he 
re c e iv e d  a message from Chairman Mao T se-tung . I t  appeared  to  
c o n ta in  a f e e l e r  to  reopen  t a l k s .  A fte r  acknowledging th e  r e ­
c e ip t  of H u rle y 's  l e t t e r ,  Mao s a id  th a t  p re p a ra tio n s  f o r  an 
im p o rtan t co n fe ren ce  would keep Chou E n - la i  in  Yenan. He 
s t i l l  doubted th e  s in c e r i ty  of th e  Kuomintang in  th e  n e g o tia ­
^^Unsigned c r it iq u e  of H urley's December 23, 1944,
message to  S te t t in iu s ,  December 26, 1944; Hurley Papers.
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t io n s ,  b u t su ggested  th a t  a co n fe ren ce  be h e ld  a t  Yenan in  th e
n ear f u t u r e . H u r l e y  s e n t  B a r re t t  back to  Yenan on December
2026 w ith  a v e rb a l  answer to  Chairman Mao's p ro p o sa l. L i t t l e  
d id  th e  Ambassador know th a t  n e g o tia t io n s  would soon tak e  on 
a s t a r t l i n g  new a s p e c t .
On December 29, B a r re t t  re tu rn e d  from Yenan w ith  a 
l e t t e r  from Chou E n - la i  f o r  H urley . I t  in d ic a te d  th a t  th e  
Communists would n o t c o n tin u e  a b s t r a c t  d isc u ss io n s  on th e  
q u e s tio n  of u n i f i c a t io n .  In s te a d , Chou p u t f o r th  fo u r  p o in ts  
which th e  Reds o f fe re d  as p r e r e q u is i te s  to  any new t a l k s .  The 
p o in ts  in c lu d ed  r e l e a s e  of p o l i t i c a l  p r is o n e rs ,  w ithdraw al of 
th e  Kuomintang army su rround ing  th e  Communist fo rc e s ,  a b o l i t io n  
o f a l l  r e p r e s s iv e  r e g u la t io n s  r e s t r i c t i n g  freedom  of th e  peo p le , 
and th e  c e s s a t io n  o f a l l  s p e c ia l  S e c re t S e rv ice  a c t i v i t i e s .
I f  th e  Kuomintang implem ented th e s e  su g g e s tio n s , th e  Commu- .. 
n i s t s  would ta k e  p a r t  in  new exchanges on th e  problem  of 
u n i f ic a t io n .  An e r r o r  in  p a ra p h ra s in g , Chou s a id ,  had r e ­
s u l te d  in  H u rle y 's  b e l i e f  t h a t  th e  Communists had o f fe re d  to
21co n tin u e  t a lk s  in  Yenan.
B a r re t t  r e p o r te d  on h is  c o n v e rsa tio n s  w ith  th e  Commu­
n i s t  le a d e rs  on December 28 and c l a r i f i e d  th e  rea so n s fo r  th e  
new Communist p o s i t io n .  According to  B a r r e t t ,  Mao and Chou 
d id  n o t b e lie v e  th e  P re s id e n t and th e  peop le  of th e  U nited
*^Mao to  H urley , December 22, 1944; B urley P apers .
20Chou to  Hurley, December 28, 1944; Hurley Papers.
21 Ib id .
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S ta te s  r e a l iz e d  how l i t t l e  th e  G enera lissim o re p re se n te d  th e  
C hinese p eo p le , o r to  what e x te n t he had lo s t  t h e i r  su p p o rt. 
They s a id  many p a r t i e s ,  f a c t io n s ,  and in d iv id u a ls  in  C hina, in  
a d d it io n  to  th e  C hinese Communists, e a rn e s t ly  d e s ire d  refo rm a­
t io n  and re o rg a n iz a tio n  of th e  governm ent. In  o rd e r to  
e n lig h te n  Htrcley and hence th e  P re s id e n t,  th e  Communists se n t 
a long l i s t  of over f i f t y  non-Communists opposed to  th e  ex- 
c e sse s  p ra c t ic e d  by th e  Kuomintang.
Perhaps because o f a  w orsening s in u s  c o n d itio n  which
re q u ire d  d a ily  tre a tm e n t. G eneral H urley d id  n o t answer th e
23l e t t e r  f o r  a lm ost a week. On January  3 , H urley went to  th e  
G e n e ra lis s im o 's  v i l l a  on Yellow M ountain to  spend th e  n ig h t .  
That evening and in to  th e  n ex t m orning, they  had long d is c u s ­
s io n s , th rough  i n te r p r e t e r s ,  concern ing  th e  Communist problem . 
H urley con tinued  to  push fo r  a c o a l i t io n  governm ent. The 
G eneralissim o r e p l ie d  th a t  he though t a  c o a l i t io n  c a b in e t 
would be a good id e a , b u t th a t  he w ished to  avoid  th e  u se  of 
th e  word " c o a l i t io n " .  Chiang s a id  t h a t  he w anted to  make th e  
reform s which th e  Communists demanded bu t d id  no t want to  
g iv e  th e  Communists c r e d i t  fo r  fo rc in g  him to  make them. The 
nex t morning th e  G enera lissim o  came to  K u r i l ' s  c o tta g e  fo r  
b re a k fa s t  a f t e r  which th e  two men walked and ta lk e d  f o r  s e v e ra l  
h o u rs . H urley re tu rn e d  to  Chungking and th a t  evening th e
19B a r re t t  to  H urley w ith  E nclosu re , December 30, 1944; 
H urley P apers .
23The danç) a i r  in  Chungking c o n s ta n tly  i r t i t a t e d  Hur­
l e y 's  s in u se s  du ring  h is  y e a r  in  China.
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two men met a g a in .
Hurley c o n fe rre d  w ith  Chiang on F rid a y , January  5, and 
f i n a l l y ,  on th e  6 th , he d ra f te d  an answer to  th e  l e t t e r  from 
Chou E n - la i  d a ted  December 28.^4 The Ambassador exp ressed  h is  
d is p le a s u re  a t  th e  d e p a r tu re  from th e  o r ig in a l  p rocedu re  which 
was to  a r r iv e  a t  an agreem ent on th e  g en era l p r in c ip le s  fa c in g  
them b e fo re  d isc u ss in g  any s p e c i f ic  d e t a i l s .  He though t th a t  
th e  t a lk s  should co n tin u e  in  keep ing  w ith  th e  o r ig in a l  p ro ­
ced u res . As a c o u n te r-p ro p o sa l to  th e  fo u r p o in ts .  H urley 
agreed  to  jou rney  once aga in  to  Yenan w ith  Dr. T. V. Soong 
and o th e r  Kuomintang n e g o t ia to r s .  I f  an agreem ent in  p r in ­
c ip le  was reached  in  Yenan, Chairman Mao and G eneral Chou 
could  r e tu rn  to  Chungking to  conclude th e  agreem ent. H urley 
asked Chou to  g iv e  th e  su g g estio n  h is  c a re fu l  c o n s id e ra tio n  
and re p ly  by l e t t e r  th rough  Colonel B a r r e t t . ^5
Meanwhile, th e  d if fe re n c e s  which Hurley had been 
e x p e rien c in g  w ith  some of th e  o th e r  Americans s ta t io n e d  in  
China came more in to  th e  open. I t  was g e n e ra lly  accep ted  
t h a t  H urley caused S t i l w e l l 's  rem oval. And th e re  was some 
b e l i e f  th a t  C larence  Gauss had re s ig n e d  from th e  p o s t of 
Ambassador because he was i r r i t a t e d  by th e  c o n s ta n t m eddling 
of s p e c ia l  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  se n t ou t from W a s h i n g t o n . ^6 Both
^'^Hurley China Log, 1944-1945, Decmnber 28, 1944- 
January  6 , 1945; H urley P ap ers .
? s _Hurley to  Mao and Chou, January  7 , 1945; H urley Pa­
p e rs ,
^^Washington P o st. November 19, 1944, Hurley C lipping
Book, 1944; Hurley Papers.
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th e s e  men were h ig h ly  re sp e c te d  by members of t h e i r  s t a f f .
When H urley assumed th e  p o s i t io n  o f Ambassador, he in h e r i te d  
t h i s  same s t a f f .  Q u ite  n a tu r a l ly ,  th e s e  men re s e n te d  working 
under H urley who they  though t was a f a c to r  in  th e  rem oval of 
t h e i r  p rev io u s  s u p e r io rs  whom they  re s p e c te d . The Embassy 
s t a f f  and th e  American m i l i ta r y  s t a f f  in  China were bo th  h ig h ­
ly  p ro fe s s io n a l  o rg a n iz a t io n s . P a r t  of th e  tremendous re s p e c t  
en joyed  by bo th  G eneral S t i lw e l l  and Ambassador Gauss came be­
cause  th e y , to o , were p ro fe s s io n a ls .  H urley was n e i th e r  a 
p ro fe s s io n a l  s o ld ie r  no r a  p ro fe s s io n a l  d ip lom at. He was 
r a th e r  a h ig h ly  a f f e c ta t io n s  p o l i t i c i a n .  In c id e n t a f t e r  i n c i ­
den t c re a te d  f r i c t i o n  between Hurley and h is  s t a f f .
H u rle y 's  problem s w ith  fo re ig n  s e rv ic e  o f f i c e r s  in  th e  
Embassy were v a r ie d . From th e  moment of h is  a r r i v a l  in  C hina, 
H urley found t h a t  th e  p ro fe s s io n a l  d ip lom ats re fu s e d  to  accep t 
th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of u n i f i c a t io n .  From Ambassador Gauss to  John 
S tew art S e rv ic e , H urley met w ith  g e n e ra l pessim ism  and a 
re a d in e s s  to  sc rap  Chiang K ai-shek  in  fav o r of some o th e r  le a d ­
e r .  The se r io u sn e s s  of th e se  d if fe re n c e s  of o p in io n  were 
m agn ified  to  some e x te n t  by th e  a c t i v i t i e s  of th e  Kuomintang 
w hich, th rough  th e  C hinese S e c re t S e rv ic e , endeavored to  con­
v in ce  H urley th a t  members of h is  s t a f f  were invo lved  in  a
no
co n sp iracy  to  overthrow  th e  N a t io n a l i s t  governm ent. ° A lthough
S tatem ent of H urley f o r  L i f e . January  11, 1946;
R eport by John S tew art S e rv ic e , " th e  Need f o r  G re a te r  Realism  
in  Our R e la tio n s  w ith  Chiang K a i-sh ek ,"  O ctober 10, 1944;
H urley to  Orlando Ward, Januairy 11, 1952, 20-21; H urley P ap e rs .
28Hurley to  Ward, January 11, 1952, 27; Hurley Papers.
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i t  i s  u n l ik e ly  t h a t  H urley i n i t i a l l y  accep ted  th e s e  charges 
made by th e  C hinese S e c re t S e rv ice  a t  fa c e  v a lu e , he came to  be­
l ie v e  them in  h is  l a t e r  y e a r s . A t  th e  tim e, however. H u rley 's  
d i f f e re n c e s  w ith  h i s  s t a f f  w ere of a more p e rso n a l n a tu re .
A f te r  H urley had been confirm ed as Ambassador, he went 
to  th e  A m bassador's r e s id e n c e . He found i t  f u l l  of c a re e r  
fo re ig n  s e rv ic e  o f f i c e r s  who had moved ou t of th e  Embassy.
George A tcheson, th e  s e n io r  o f f i c e r  in  th e  Embassy, to ld  Hur­
le y  th a t  th e re  was no bed f o r  him in  th e  A m bassador's 
re s id e n c e  and t r i e d  to  convince H urley th a t  he shou ld  s ta y  in  
th e  q u a r te r s  p ro v id ed  by th e  Army. Atcheson s a id  th a t  G auss 's  
bed had been h is  p e rso n a l p ro p e rty  and th a t  on h i s  d e p a rtu re  
Ambassador Gauss had g iven  i t  to  A tcheson. H urley b e lie v e d  he 
was be ing  d e l ib e r a te ly  a f f ro n te d .  When H u r l^  demanded th a t  
th e  men le a v e  h is  house , A tcheson r e p l ie d  th a t  th e  fo re ig n  
s e rv ic e  o f f ic e r s  had a  r i g h t  to  l iv e  in  i t .  They were fo rced  
to  le a v e  anyway b u t th e  e n t i r e  in c id e n t  l e f t  bo th  s t a f f  and
on
Ambassador H urley q u i te  angry w ith  one a n o th e r . But, Hur- 
l e y 's  problem s w ith  Americans in  China extended f a r  beyond 
such m inor p e rso n a l annoyances.
The American p re s s  corps in  China lab o red  under hamper­
in g  r e s t r i c t i o n s .  T h eir d isp a tc h e s  were su b je c t to  a r i g id  
c en so rsh ip  by th e  N a t io n a l i s t  government which would no t a llow
^^H urley to  Ward, January  11, 1952; Hurley P apers ,
H urley makes th e  most com plete s ta tem en t of th e  " S t i lw e l l  
C o n sp ira cy ."
Statement of Hurley fo r  L if e . January 11, 1946;
Hurley Papers,
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any u n fav o rab le  m a te r ia l  to  be d isp a tc h ed  from C hina, More­
over, i f  a r e p o r te r  l e f t  China and w rote un comp lim en t airy 
s to r i e s  about th e  Chiang regim e o r th e  N a t io n a l is t  war e f f o r t ,  
he would no t be àllow ed to  r e e n te r  C hina, T h ere fo re , th e  
p re s s  became very  dependent upon a  c o o p e ra tiv e  a t t i t u d e  on th e  
p a r t  of th e  American d ip lom ats and m il i ta r y  p e rso n n e l s t a ­
tio n e d  in  C hina. These American o f f i c i a l s  would fre q u e n tly  
make a v a i la b le  to  co rresp o n d en ts  c l a s s i f i e d  m a te r ia l  which 
was o b je c tio n a b le  to  th e  C hinese government in  o rd e r  th a t  th e  
p re s s  would f u l ly  u n d e rs tan d  American problem s in  A sia , Gen­
e r a l  S t i lw e l l  co o p era ted  to  th e  f u l l e s t  e x te n t in  t h i s  way, as
31d id  Ambassador Gauss,
W ith S t i l w e l l ’ s d e p a r tu re , th e  p re s s  found i t  more d i f ­
f i c u l t  to  g e t i t s  s t o r i e s  through th e  C hinese N a t io n a l is t  
c en so rs . M oreover, s in c e  much of th e  in fo rm a tio n  a v a i la b le  to  
th e  p re s s  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  came from th e  Embassy s t a f f  and th e  
American m i l i ta r y  s t a f f ,  t h e i r  s t o r i e s  took on a d ec id ed ly  a n t i .  
H urley s l a n t .  H urley became invo lved  in  a d isagreem ent w ith  
Theodore H, W hite, th e  co rresponden t fro m .Time and L ife  maga­
z in e s ,  on November 8, 1944, when H urley a r r iv e d  in  Yenan,
H urley b e liev e d  W h ite 's  a c t i v i t i e s  in  Yenan were d e f in i te ly  
a g a in s t  th e  i n t e r e s t s  of u n i f ic a t io n  and from th a t  moment.
W hite and H urley became e n e m i e s , W h i t e ,  as p re s id e n t  o f th e  
F oreign  C orrespondents Club in  China in  th e  y e a rs  1944-1945,
^^L oyalty  I n v e s t ig a t io n . P a r t  2 . 2101-2102. 2144-2145, 
2095-2097.
^^"Note f o r  F i l e , "  November 8 , 1944; H urley P ap e rs ,
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h e ld  c o n s id e ra b le  in f lu e n c e  among th e  o th e r  p re s s  re p ré s e n ta -
O O
t iv e s  in  China. From t h i s  tim e on H u rle y 's  r e l a t io n s  w ith  
th e  American p re s s  corps in  China worsened b u t, because of 
cen so rsh ip  by th e  C hinese governm ent, l i t t l e  r e a l  d e ro g a to ry  
c r i t i c i s m  of H urley reach ed  th e  U nited  S ta te s ,
B a r le y 's  sm oldering  feud  w ith  Americans in  China and 
p a r t i c u l a r ly  th e  Embassy s t a f f  e ru p ted  in  an open b a t t l e  be­
tween H urley and John Paton D avies, D avies, a  s e n io r  fo re ig n  
s e rv ic e  o f f i c e r ,  had been a  long -tim e  f r ie n d  of G eneral S t i l ­
w e ll .  The two men met in  China y ears  b e fo re  th e  o u tb reak  o f 
th e  w ar, and Davies became a c lo s e  a d v is e r  of G eneral S t i lw e l l  
du ring  th e  w ar,^^  Something o f a  c y n ic , Davies tended  to  look  
a t  th e  gloomy s id e  of th e  s i t u a t i o n , M o r e o v e r ,  Davies was a 
s taunch  advocate  of p ro fe s s io n a lism  in  d i p l o m a c y , I t  was 
only  a m a tte r  o f tim e u n t i l  Davies and H urley came in to  c o n f l i c t .  
In a s e r ie s  o f r e p o r ts  w r i t te n  in  December, Davies be­
gan in d i r e c t ly  to  c r i t i c i z e  H urley, Davies openly s ta te d  th a t  
th e  a ttem p ts  a t  u n i f ic a t io n  had f a i l e d .  T h is , of c o u rse , was 
d i r e c t ly  opposed to  H u rle y 's  b e l i e f , I n  a  r e p o r t  by Davies 
t i t l e d ,  "The G e n e ra lis s im o 's  Dilemmas", he took  a com plete ly
^^L oyalty  I n v e s t ig a t io n . P a r t  2, 2092,
^^ o y a l t y  I n v e s t ig a t io n . P a r t  2 , 2095-2097,
^^For example see  R eport by John P, D avies, "The Gener­
a l i s s im o 's  Dilemmas," December 9, 1944; Hurley P apers ,
^ ^ P ro fess io n a lism  i s  a  c e n t r a l  theme th roughou t John 
Paton D avies, J r . ,  F o re ign  and O ther A f fa ir s  (New York:
W, W, N orton, 1964),
^^John P, D avies. "Proposed Statement of American
P o licy ,"  December 12, l944; Hurley Papers,
o p p o s ite  view of th e  China s i tu a t io n  from th a t  of H u rl^ .-^ °
I t  i s  q u i te  l ik e ly  t h a t  Davies made no s e c re t  of h is  opposi­
t io n  to  H urley and h is  p o l i c i e s ,  p a r t i c u la r ly  a f t e r  he had 
a rranged  a t r a n s f e r  to  th e  Embassy a t  Moscow, Davies f i n a l ­
ly  l e f t  China f o r  th e  S o v ie t c a p i ta l  bu t n o t b e fo re  H urley 
made a v ic io u s  v e rb a l a t ta c k  on him, w itn essed  by G eneral 
Wedemeyer.^^
The s ig n if ic a n c e  of t h i s  feud  and o th e r  d isag reem en ts 
w ith  s t a f f  members, and th e  p r e s s ,  grew d u rin g  H u rle y 's  te n u re  
in  C hina. From th i s  p o in t  on, H urley tended  to  r e j e c t  a l l  of 
th o se  who in  any way c r i t i c i z e d  h is  a c t i v i t i e s ,  b e lie v in g  th a t  
they  em inated  from "p e rso n s , o rg a n iz a tio n s  o r fo re ig n  govern­
ments who have p re d ic te d  o r  who d e s i r e  th e  c o lla p s e  of th e  
C hinese N a tio n a l governm ent."^0 H urley seemed to  th in k  th a t  
a c t iv e  e f f o r t s  were being  made to  sabo tage  h is  p o l ic y .
The growing feud  between H urley and low er le v e l  Ameri­
can d ip lom ats in  China was to  have a s u b s ta n t ia l  e f f e c t  on 
American p o lic y  th e r e .  These men were t r a in e d  d ip lom ats and 
f a c i l e  in  th e  u se  of s u b t le  lo g ic .  M oreover, when argu ing  
w ith  H urley on th e  v a rio u s  m a tte rs  which a f f e c te d  th e  s i t u a ­
t io n  in  C hina, they  were a b le  to  u se  t h e i r  e x p e r t is e  to  gain  
th e  upper hand. H urley , u n w illin g  to  su rre n d e r h is  p o s i t io n  
and y e t  no t p o sse ss in g  th e  e x p e rt knowledge n ecessa ry  to
^-Above, fn .  35.
^^Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer R e p o r ts ! . 318-319.
^^H urley to  S t e t t i n iu s ,  December 29, 1944; H urley Pa­
p e rs .
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defend  i t ,  would r e fu s e  to  argue and r a th e r  s t a t e  h is  p o s i­
t io n  in  a b so lu te  te rm s, s h u t t in g  h is  mind to  a l l  p ro  o r con 
argum ents. Not only  d id  t h i s  succeed  in  f u r th e r  angering  th e  
fo re ig n  s e rv ic e  o f f i c e r s ,  b u t i t  c a s t  American p o lic y  in  Chi­
na  in  an in f le x ib l e  mold which r e s u l te d  in  ^  fa c to  u n q u a lif ie d  
su p p o rt f o r  Chiang*s governm ent.
CHAPTER V III 
GAMBITS, WITCH-HUNTS AND AN EARLY THAW
The n e g o tia t io n s  w ith  th e  Communists took a s tra n g e  
tw is t  when, on January  9 , 1945, a  message a r r iv e d  from Yenan 
fo r  G eneral Wedemeyer. Mao T se-tung  and Chou E n - la i  req u e s­
te d  p e rm iss io n  to  v i s i t  W ashington and e x p la in  th e  p o s i t io n  
o f th e  C hinese Communist p a r ty  to  P re s id e n t R o o sev e lt. Mao's 
d e s i r e  to  meet d i r e c t ly  w ith  th e  American P re s id e n t in d ic a te d  
th a t  th e  C hinese Communists no lo n g er had f a i t h  in  H u rley 's  
a b i l i t y  to  fo rc e  Chiang K ai-shek  in to  a c o a l i t io n  governm ent. 
Indeed , H urley by now was a staunch  su p p o rte r  of th e  Kuomin­
tang  governm ent, and t h i s  made i t  appear u n l ik e ly  th a t  he would 
co n s id e r  a id in g  th e  Communists i f  u n i f ic a t io n  a ttem p ts  f a i l e d .  
The Communist le a d e rs  s p e c if ie d  th a t  th e  knowledge o f t h e i r  
re q u e s t  be k ep t from th e  N a t io n a l i s t  government so t h a t  they  
would n o t lo se  face  i f  th e  P re s id e n t chose n o t to  i n v i t e  them 
to  W ashington.^
Mao's a t t e n ^ t  to  t a lk  w ith  R oosevelt must have stemmed 
from th e  im p o rtan t con fe rences which were h e ld  in  Chungking in  
l a t e  December and e a r ly  Januazry. In th e se  m ee tin g s, th e  Com-
^Richard L. Evans to  Wedemeyer fo r  Joseph K. Dickey, 
January  9 , 1945; H urley P apers .
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m unlsts agreed  th a t  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  of compromise w ith  Chiang 
K ai-shek  no lo n g er e x is te d .  A lthough th e  Communist le a d e rs  
r e fu s e d  to  d isc u ss  th e  q u e s tio n  of c i v i l  w ar, American observ ­
e rs  in  Yenan b e lie v e d  th a t  th e  C hinese Communists were 
a c t iv e ly  p re p a rin g  f o r  la rg e  s c a le  c i v i l  w ar. Few of th e s e  
Americans doubted th a t  a l l  of so u th  and so u th e a s t China behind 
Japanese  l in e s  would be in  Red hands w ith in  th e  y e a r ,  f o r  i t  
was no s e c r e t  t h a t  p a r ty  o rg a n iz e rs  and m i l i ta r y  le a d e rs  were 
le a v in g  Yenan in  la rg e  numbers f o r  th e se  re g io n s . At th e  same
tim e , i t  was p re d ic te d  th a t  by th e  end of 1945 th e  C hinese Com-
2
m unists would c o n tro l  more than  a m il l io n  tro o p s .
These w a r lik e  p re p a ra tio n s  p o in te d  to  a new hard  l in e  
by th e  C hinese Communists. The Yenan le a d e rs  seemed to  have 
decided  th a t  i t  was tim e f o r  th e  U nited  S ta te s  to  make a de­
c is io n  between Chiang and c i v i l  w ar, o r th e  Communists and 
c o a l i t io n  governm ent. I n f lu e n t ia l  Communists commented th a t  
i f  America b o ls te re d  Chiang w ith  arms and equipm ent and n o t 
th e  Communists, i t  would b ear th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  f o r  th e  r e ­
s u l t s  in  C hina.^
Although th e  re q u e s t  to  meet w ith  P re s id e n t R oosevelt 
was d en ied , th e  Reds d id  n o t g iv e  up hope of tu rn in g  th e  Amer­
ic a n s  a g a in s t  Chiang. Rumors had been rang)ant th roughout 
Chungking of an impending K uom intang-Japanese u n d ers tan d in g  
w ith  th e  u l t im a te  pu rpose  of d e s tro y in g  th e  Communists.4 
These rumors were s tre n g th e n e d  when a r e p o r t  of a con ference
^Ibid. ^ ib id . ^Ibid.
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w ith  G eneral Chou E n - la i  reached  Chungking January  11, 1945,
At te n  t h i r t y  on th e  morning of January  10, Chou E n - la i  
c a l le d  an u rg e n t m eeting w ith  rank ing  American re p re s e n ta t iv e s  
in  Yenan. Chou s a id  t h a t  he had some s t a r t l i n g  in fo rm a tio n .
He s p e c i f ie d ,  however, t h a t  b e fo re  r e v e a lin g  th e  news th a t  i t  
m ust be r e s t r i c t e d  to  Wedemeyer, and th a t  G eneral Wedemeyer 
a lo n e  should  d ec id e  on i t s  d is p o s i t io n  in  th e  U nited  S ta te s .  
Chou s p e c i f i c a l ly  s ta te d  t h a t ,  "G eneral H urley must n o t g e t 
t h i s  in fo rm a tio n  as I  d o n 't  t r u s t  h is  d i s c r e t io n ."  The c ab le  
r e f e r r e d  only  to  n e g o tia t io n s  which invo lved  th e  most e x a lte d  
p e rso n ag es , m i l i ta r y  and c iv i l i a n ,  in  A sia . Chou E n - la i  had 
re fu s e d  to  a llo w  th e  tra n sm iss io n  o f t h i s  m a te r ia l  v ia  ra d io  
and had re q u e s te d  th a t  Wedemeyer ccme to  Yenan a t  once or d i s ­
p a tc h  an im p l ic i t ly  t r u s te d  o f f i c e r  such as David B a r re t t  to  
r e c e iv e  th e  f u l l  s to ry .  According to  th e  r e p o r t  ^ i c h  reached  
Chungking, Chou documented p a r t  of h is  s to ry  w ith  co p ies  of 
co rrespondence  o f h ig h  a u th o r i ty .^
Based on th e  ske tchy  in fo rm a tio n  from Yenan, a  hypoth­
e s is  was advanced t h a t  Chou had p roo f of a K uom intang-Japane se 
agreem ent, John K. Emmerson, one of th e  fo re ig n  s e rv ic e  o f f i ­
c e rs  a tta c h e d  to  Wedemeyer's s t a f f ,  c au tio n ed  a g a in s t  making 
any s o l id  e v a lu a tio n  u n t i l  th e  ev idence a r r iv e d ,  bu t he d id  
make s(xne t e n ta t iv e  o b se rv a tio n s . Emmerson s a id  t h a t  many 
m otives m ight pronç>t th e  Communists to  inform  th e  U nited  S ta te :  
t h a t  th e  Japanese  and Chungking govem m m ts had reached  an
^Evans to  Wedemeyer for Dickey, January 10, 1945;
Hurley Papers,
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agreem ent and in  h is  op in ion  good reaso n s e x is te d  to  accep t 
th e  c r e d i b i l i t y  of th e  Communist ev idence .
Emmerson b e lie v e d  th a t  th e  Japanese and th e  Kuomintang 
could  ga in  d e f i n i t e  advan tages from such an agreem ent. I t  
would a llo w  bo th  th e  Jap an ese  and th e  Kuomintang to  devote 
t h e i r  f u l l  a t t e n t io n  to  t h e i r  most dangerous enemy, th e  Chi­
n e se  Communists. M oreover, such an accord  would f o r e s t a l l  any 
p o s s i b i l i t y  of a Communist-Kuomintang a l l i a n c e  and would en­
a b le  Chiang to  a c t  as an in te rm e d ia ry  and to  r e la y  peace 
f e e le r s  between Japan and th e  A l l ie s .  The Chungking govern­
m ent, however, would r i s k  th e  lo s s  of U nited S ta te s  in v es tm en ts , 
Lend-L ease, and f r ie n d s h ip  by jo in in g  Japan . T h ere fo re , Emmer­
son rea so n e d , i f  such an agreem ent e x is te d ,  i t  would be s e c re t  
and l im i te d  to  s p e c i f i c  p o in ts  and would never in v o lv e  su rre n ­
d e rin g  to  Japan , Emmerson suggested  th a t  Wedemeyer send a 
r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  to  Yenan to  make a thorough in v e s t ig a t io n  of th e  
charges and p re p a re  a r e p o r t  f o r  p re s e n ta tio n  to  th e  h ig h e s t 
a u th o r i t i e s  in  W ashington.^
M ao's answer to  K u r i l ' s  l e t t e r  of January  7 a ls o  a r ­
r iv e d  in  Chungking on th e  11 th . Mao r e je c te d  H u rley 's  re q u e s t 
f o r  a c o n tin u a tio n  of t a lk s  on th e  u n i f ic a t io n  q u estio n  because 
he s t i l l  doubted  th e  s in c e r i ty  of th e  Kuomintang. Mao d e c la re d  
t h a t  th e  n e g o tia t io n s  of th e  l a s t  e ig h t  y e a rs  had proven c le a r ­
ly  t h a t  th e  N a t io n a l i s t  government d id  no t want a s e t t le m e n t. 
N e v e r th e le s s , he o f fe re d  to  send Chou E n - la i  back to  Chungking
^R eport by John K. Emmerson, "Communist R eport o f Kuo­
m in tang-Japanese  A greem ent," January  13, 1945; Hurley P apers .
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i f  th e  Kuomintang ag reed  to  a  new s e t  of p ro p o sa ls .
Chairman Mao then  o u tlin e d  a p lan  fo r  a N a tio n a l A ffa ir s  
co n fe rence  to  be c a l le d  in  Chungking. Members of th e  Kuomin­
ta n g , th e  Communist p a r ty ,  and th e  Dem ocratic F e d e ra tio n , a 
weakly d e fin e d  th i r d  fo rc e  c o a l i t io n ,  would be re p re se n te d  a t  
th e  m ee tings. The Kuomintang would have to  g u a ran tee  th a t  th e  
p roceed ings of th e  co n fe ren ce  would be p u b lic  and th a t  th e  
d e le g a te s  would have equal s ta n d in g  and freedom  of t r a v e l .  I f  
th e  Kuomintang found th e s e  p ro p o sa ls  a c c e p ta b le , Mao would then  
send Chou E n - la i  to  Chungking to  p a r t i c i p a te  in  p re p a ra to ry  
ta lk s  which would le a d  to  th e  co n fe ren ce .^
Hurley was becoming ex asp e ra ted  w ith  th e  i n a b i l i t y  of 
th e  Kuomintang and th e  Communists to  g e t to g e th e r .  He though t 
th a t  he had made good p ro g re ss  by b r in g in g  Chiang K ai-shek  to  
th e  n e g o tia t in g  t a b le  and in f lu e n c in g  him to  i n i t i a t e  re fo rm s, 
bu t c e r ta in  groups in  China had s y s te m a tic a lly  r e s i s t e d  h is  
a ttem p ts  to  u n ify  th e  n a tio n . Hurley b e lie v e d  th a t  s ta n d p a t 
e lem ents in  th e  Kuomintang p a r ty ,  a f a c t io n  w ith in  th e  Commu­
n i s t  p a r ty ,  th e  I m p e r ia l i s t  governm ents. Dr. Soong, and 
American d ip lo m a tic  and m il i ta r y  o f f i c i a l s  were th e  most im­
p o r ta n t  so u rces of r e s i s ta n c e  to  h is  u n i f ic a t io n  program . Yet 
he f e l t  t h a t  he had overcome a l l  of th e se  a t  about th e  tim e 
when th e  Communists subm itted  th e  fo u r  c o n d itio n s  to  con tinued  
d isc u ss io n s  of December 28 and broke o f f  th e  t a lk s .^
^Mao to  H urley , January  11, 1945; Hurley P apers .
Q
Hurley to  R oosevelt, January 14, 1945; Hurley Papers.
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Hurley searched  f r a n t i c a l l y  d u ring  th e  f i r s t  two weeks 
of January  to  d isc o v e r th e  cause  of th e  ru p tu re d  n e g o tia t io n s .  
Some tim e e a r ly  in  th e  new y e a r  Hurley le a rn e d , p robab ly  
th rough  Kuomintang so u rc e s , t h a t  a m il i ta r y  p lan  which he had 
d isc u sse d  w ith  M ajor G eneral R obert B. McClure, Wedemeyer's 
C hief o f S ta f f ,  had leak ed  to  th e  Communists, H urley d isc u sse d  
th e  m a tte r  w ith  McClure on January  5, bu t a t  th a t  tim e G eneral 
McClure s ta te d  th a t  to  h is  knowledge no such p lan  had been p re ­
se n ted  to  th e  Communists by U nited  S ta te s  p e rs o n n e l.^  H urley 
was n o t s a t i s f i e d  and con tinued  to  in v e s t ig a te .
By January  14, H urley b e lie v e d  he had p iec ed  to g e th e r  
th e  t r u e  s to ry  of what had happened. G eneral McClure had 
d ra f te d  a p lan  which would be fo llow ed  i f  th e  U nited  S ta te s  
should  d ec id e  to  g ive  l im ite d  a id  to  th e  Chinese C o m m u n is ts .10 
This p lan  e n v is io n ed  th e  placem ent of h ig h ly  t r a in e d  u n i t s  in  
Communist t e r r i t o r y  to  d e s tro y  Japanese  communication l i n e s .
The Communists would be used  f o r  b u ild in g  a i r  f i e l d s ,  as 
g u id es , to  g ive  p ro te c t io n  to  th e  v a rio u s  d em o litio n  g roups, 
and to  t r a n s p o r t  s u p p lie s , dem o litio n  equipment and fo o d s tu f f s  
to  th e  o u tly in g  groups from th e  base  a i r f i e l d s .  In  a d d it io n , 
th e  Communists would e f f e c t  n ig h t  a t ta c k s  and c a rry  o u t r e ­
connaissance  m issions a g a in s t  th e  Japanese under U nited  S ta te s  
d i r e c t io n .  T i t l e  to  a l l  equipment ^sed  in  th e se  o p e ra tio n s  
would rem ain w ith  th e  U nited  S ta te s ,
W edemeyer to  M arsh a ll, January  27, 1945; H u r l^  P ap ers ,
^^ Ibid,
T ra n s c r ip t  o f C onversation  between G eneral R obert B,
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McClure d isc u sse d  th e  p lan  w ith  H urley, The Ambassador
s a id  th a t  from th e  m i l i ta r y  v iew poin t th e  p lan  sounded f in e ,
bu t he though t i t  cou ld  be troublesom e i f  i t  became known to
th e  Communists. As a sa feg u a rd , Hurley ad v ised  th e  a d d itio n
of a c la u se  making th e  e n t i r e  scheme su b je c t  to  th e  approval
of th e  G enera lissim o . McClure agreed  and added th e  c la u se  in
p e n c i l  a t  th e  bottom  o f th e  p ro p o sa l. A gainst H u rley 's  adv ice
McClure d isc u sse d  th e  scheme w ith  T. V, Soong and l a t e r  w ith
G eneral Chen Cheng, th e  C hinese War M in is te r . Both exp ressed
12
t h e i r  i n t e r e s t  in  th e  id e a  bu t made no commitments.
McClure was e x c ite d  by th e  p ro sp e c t o f th e  p la n  and in ­
deed hoped to  command th e  u n i ts  committed to  i t  i f  i t  were 
a d o p t e d . B e c a u s e  of h is  i n t e r e s t ,  McClure wanted to  in v e s ­
t i g a t e  th e  p ro p o s a l 's  f e a s i b i l i t y  from every  a n g le . L a te  in  
December, C olonel B a r re t t  was d isp a tc h ed  to  Yenan w ith  a mes­
sage  from G eneral H urley to  Mao T se-tung . McClure se iz e d  th e  
o p p o rtu n ity  to  send L ie u te n a n t Colonel W il l is  H. B ird  of th e  
O ff ic e  of S t r a te g ic  S e rv ice s  w ith  B a r re t t ,  and d ir e c te d  B ird  
to  e x p lo re  w ith  th e  Communist m il i ta r y  a u th o r i t i e s  th e  p r a c t i ­
c a l i t y  of u s in g  a s p e c ia l  u n i t  f o r  o p e ra tio n s  in  th e  a re a s  
under th e  c o n tro l  of th e  Communist fo rc e s .  McClure d id  n o t in ­
ten d  th a t  B ird would convey th e  im pression  th a t  such a  p lan
McClure and G eneral Chen Cheng on December 19, 1944; Hurley 
P a p e rs .
^^Wedemeyer to  M a rsh a ll, January  27, 1945; T ra n s c r ip t  
of C onversation  between G eneral McClure and G eneral Chen 
Cheng on December 19, 1944; H urley P ap e rs .
^^Transcript o f Conversation between General McClure
and General Chen Cheng on December 19, 1944; Hurley Papers.
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had been p rep a red  o r  was being  d isc u sse d  in  Chungking,
When th e  two C olonels reached  Yenan, B a r re t t  im pressed 
upon th e  Communists t h a t  any s ta tem en ts  made were no t commit­
ments and should  be h e ld  in  th e  utm ost se c re cy , B a r re t t  and 
B ird  to ld  Chu Teh t h a t  i t  m ight be p o s s ib le  f o r  American tro o p s 
to  o p e ra te  in  C om m unist-con tro lled  t e r r i t o r y  w hether or n o t a 
p o l i t i c a l  s e t t le m e n t was made by th e  Communists and th e  Chung­
k in g  governm ent, bu t th a t  th e  accep tance  of such a  p lan  would 
have to  be based upon N a t io n a l i s t  ap p ro v a l. When Chu Teh asked 
i f  th e  p la n  cou ld  be c a r r ie d  ou t w ith o u t N a t io n a l is t  concur­
re n c e , B ird  s a id  t h a t  i t  was p o s s ib le  bu t u n l ik e ly  u n le ss  
U nited  S ta te s  p o lic y  changed. Throughout th e  d is c u s s io n , bo th  
o f f i c e r s  em phasized th e  t e n t a t i v e  n a tu re  of th e  t a lk s ,
On January  14, H urley re p o r te d  to  W ashington th a t  th e  
McClure p la n , which he  s a id  was d ra f te d  w ith o u t W edem ^er's 
a p p ro v a l, had been made known to  th e  Communists and as a r e ­
s u l t  t a lk s  on u n i f ic a t io n  were broken o f f  by th e  Yenan 
le a d e r s .  H urley s a id  th a t  M cC lure's scheme en v is io n ed  by­
p a ss in g  th e  N a t io n a l i s t  government to  rea ch  an agreem ent w ith  
th e  Communist p a r ty .  Under th e  term s of t h i s  acco rd , th e  
Communist army would re c e iv e  su p p lie s  and Lend-Lease w ithou t 
th e  app rova l of th e  N a t io n a l i s t  government. Hurley im plied  
t h a t  i f  such an agreem ent became a r e a l i t y ,  i t  would be f u t i l e  
to  t r y  to  save th e  N a t io n a l i s t  governm ent. From B i r le y 's  ex­
p la n a t io n ,  i t  seemed th a t  h ig h  ran k in g  o f f ic e r s  on Wedemeyer's
^^Wedemeyer to  M arshall, January 27, 1945; Hurley Pa­
p ers,
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s t a f f  had opened se p a ra te  n e g o tia t io n s  w ith  th e  Communists 
which would have d e s tro y ed  th e  Kuomintang government w ith o u t 
th e  app roval o f Wedemeyer, Bkirley, o r Chiang K ai-shek ,
H urley lin k e d  th e  re q u e s t  f o r  a m eeting in  W ashington 
by Mao and Chou to  th e  supposed d is c lo s u re  of a Kuomintang- 
Japanese  agreem ent. He saw th e se  two in c id e n ts  c lo s e ly  t i e d  
to  th e  Communist d isco v ery  of th e  McClure p la n . H urley s a id  
t h a t  th e  Communist a ttem p t to  keep s e c r e t  th e  re q u e s t f o r  a con­
fe re n c e  w ith  th e  P re s id e n t,  and th e  q u a l i f ic a t io n  th a t  he no t 
be to ld  of th e  in fo rm a tio n  re g a rd in g  K uom intang-Japanese r e ­
l a t i o n s ,  were designed  to  p re v e n t him from le a rn in g  of t h e i r  
a ttem p t to  se cu re  P r e s id e n t ia l  app roval f o r  th e  McClure 
p ro p o sa l.
In  s p i t e  of th e  im passe caused by th e  r e v e la t io n  o f  th e  
McClure scheme to  th e  Communists, H urley saw a chance to  s a l ­
vage th e  s i tu a t io n .  He ad v ised  P re s id e n t R oosevelt to  secu re  
C h u rc h i l l 's  and S t a l i n 's  su p p o rt a t  th e  Y a lta  m eeting fo r  th e  
im m ediate u n i f ic a t io n  of a l l  m i l i ta r y  fo rc e s  in  China and a 
postw ar u n if ie d  dem ocratic  China, The P re s id e n t was adv ised  
to  o f f e r  to  meet w ith  Chiang K ai-shek  and Mao T se-tung  on th e  
c o n d itio n  th a t  they  rea ch  an agreem ent between them selves. I f  
R oosevelt d id  t h i s .  H urley prom ised he would be a b le  to  p la c e  
in  th e  hands of th e  P re s id e n t th e  co%>lete p lan s  f o r  th e  u n i f i ­
c a t io n  of th e  m i l i ta r y  fo rc e s  in  C hina, th e  re c o g n itio n  of th e  
C hinese Communist p a r ty  as a le g a l  p o l i t i c a l  p a r ty ,  th e  r e p r e ­
s e n ta t io n  of a l l  p a r t i e s  in  th e  C hinese governm ent, th e  
l ib e r a l i z a t i o n  o f th e  C hinese governm ent, th e  prom otion of
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dem ocratic  p ro c e s s e s , th e  e s ta b lish m e n t of fundam ental freedom  
and in d iv id u a l  r i g h t s ,  and th e  c o n s tru c tio n  of a r e u n i te d ,  
dem ocratic  China.
The P re s id e n t a p p a re n tly  accep ted  H u rle y 's  r e p o r t  a t  
fac e  v a l u e . F o r  on ad v ice  of th e  P re s id e n t,  George C, 
M arsha ll s e n t an in q u iry  to  G eneral Wedemeyer on January  16, 
r e q u e s tin g  im m ediate in fo rm a tio n  re g a rd in g  d is c lo s u re  o f th e  
McClure p la n  to  th e  Communists, to g e th e r  w ith  W edaaeyer's 
recommendation f o r  a p p ro p r ia te  f u r th e r  a c t i o n . W e d e m e y e r ,  
on a v i s i t  to  th e  f r o n t  in  Salween, ru sh ed  to  Kunming in  o rd er 
to  re a d  th e  u rg e n t m essage from M a rsh a ll. When he rea d  i t ,  he 
was tho rough ly  confused  f o r  he was t o t a l l y  uninform ed on th e  
m a tte r .  He th en  went d i r e c t l y  to  Chungking and met w ith  Hur- 
1 ^ .  G eneral Wedemeyer exp ressed  h is  d is p le a s u re  t h a t  Hurley 
had made such se r io u s  charges a g a in s t  members o f h i s  s t a f f  w ith ­
ou t f i r s t  c o n su ltin g  him. Wedemeyer b e lie v e d  th a t  H u rle y 's  
a c tio n s  had r e f l e c t e d  on h i s  a b i l i t y  as Commander o f American 
tro o p s  in  China to  make d e c is io n s  re g a rd in g  h is  s t a f f ,  and had 
v io la te d  accep ted  p rocedu res which were v i r t u a l l y  t r a d i t i o n a l  
in  th e  U nited  S ta te s  Army. He ag reed , however, t h a t  i f  th e  
in fo rm a tio n  re g a rd in g  th e  McClure p lan  and i t s  d is c lo s u re  to
th e  Communists was c o r r e c t ,  d r a s t i c  m easures would be tak e n .
18He i n i t i a t e d  an im m ediate in v e s t ig a t io n .
^ 'H u rley  to  R o o sev e lt, January  14, 1945^ H urley P ap e rs . 
16
17
^^Leahy, I  Was T here . 289.
M arsha ll to  Wedemeyer, January  15, 1945; H urley  P ap ers . 
l^Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer R eports I . 305-306.
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By January  19, Wedemeyer though t he had enough f a c t s  to  
answer th e  Q hief o f S ta f f ,  He s a id  th e  co n tro v e rsy  had r e ­
s u l te d  vdien M cC lure's p lan  somehow leak ed  to  th e  Chinese 
Communists, He to ld  how McClure had d isc u sse d  i t  w ith  Ï ,  V, 
Soong, H urley, War M in is te r  Chen Cheng, and C olonel B a r r e t t ,  
Based on M cC lure's s ta tem en t to  H urley January  5, t h a t  he  had 
d isc u sse d  th e  p lan  w ith  no one e ls e ,  Wedemeyer suggested  th a t  
th e  p ro p o sa l had p robab ly  reached  th e  C hinese Communists th rough  
e i t h e r  Dr, Soong o r G eneral Chen r a th e r  th an  one of h i s  o f f i ­
c e r s ,  Wedemeyer recommended th a t  no f u r th e r  a c t io n  be taken  
u n le s s  and u n t i l  f u r th e r  c ircum stances o r  developm ents i r r e ­
fu ta b ly  in d ic a te d  th a t  th e  p lan  d id  le a k  to  th e  Communists 
th rough  U nited  S ta te s  Army so u rc es . The G eneral added th a t
H urley concurred  in  th e  recommendation b u t d id  n o t ag ree  to
19Wedemeyer's s ta te m e n t of f a c t s .
On January  23, an o th e r message a r r iv e d  in  Chungking from 
G eneral M a rsh a ll, M arsh a ll asked s p e c i f i c a l ly  i f  th e  U nited  
S ta te s  p e rso n n e l contem plated  bypassing  th e  G enera lissim o  r e ­
g a rd in g  th e  employment of Communist t ro o p s . He wanted to  
know th e  s ta tu s  o f such a  p lan  and vdio fo rm u la ted  i t .  F in a l­
l y ,  M arsha ll expec ted  more in fo rm atio n  re g a rd in g  th e  m a tte rs  
on vAiich Wedemeyer and H urley d id  n o t a g re e . The s i tu a t io n  was 
c o n sid e red  so grave th a t  R oosevelt though t th a t  perhaps he 
shou ld  p e rs o n a lly  c o n ta c t th e  G enera lissim o on th e  m a tte r ,
19Wedemeyer to  M arshall, January 19, 1945; Hurley Pa­
p ers ,
^M arshall to  Wedmneyer, January 23, 1945; Hurley Pa­
p ers ,
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I t  took  Wedemeyer fo u r  days to  g e t a more a c c u ra te  p ic ­
tu r e  of what had happened. Wedemeyer was g re a t ly  su rp r is e d  to  
le a rn  t h a t  L ie u te n a n t C olonel B ird , th e  Deputy C hief of th e  
O ff ic e  of S t r a te g ic  S e rv ices  in  China, had gone to  Yenan,
On q u e s tio n in g , he  found t h a t  McClure had d isp a tch ed  B ird  to  
f o r e s t a l l  a p ro p o sa l by M ajor General W illiam  J ,  Donovan, th e  
C hief o f th e  O ffice  of S t r a te g ic  S e rv ic e s , m om entarily ex p ec t­
ed in  C hina, to  v i s i t  Yenan. In  h is  answer to  M arsh a ll, 
Wedemeyer r e g r e t te d  t h a t  h i s  peop le  had become invo lved  in  
such  a  d e l i c a t e  s i t u a t i o n ,  bu t re fu se d  to  b e lie v e  t h a t  th e  
in c id e n t  was a main cause  f o r  th e  breakdown of n e g o tia t io n s .  
A lthough Wedemeyer d id  n o t a g re e  w ith  H u rley 's  in te r p r e ta t io n  
o f th e  in c id e n t ,  they  had reach ed  cm nplete accord  on th e  f a c ts  
and th e  co n c lu sio n s  of th e  c a se . The e a r l i e r  d if fe re n c e s  w ith  
H urley w ere c le a re d  up when Wedemeyer became aware of d is c u s ­
s io n s  which had tak en  p la c e  in  Yenan between B ird  and th e  
Communist le a d e r s .  He added th a t  th e re  would be no need fo r
d is c u s s in g  th e  m a tte r  w ith  th e  G eneralissim o f o r  he had shown
21no concern over th e  m a tte r .
In  th e  m iddle of th e  co n tro v e rsy  over th e  McClure p la n , 
John S tew art S e rv ice  re tu rn e d  to  China as a rep lacem ent f o r  
John D av ies. H urley , a lre a d y  angry over th e  McClure c o n tro ­
v e rs y , c a l le d  S e rv ice  to  h is  o f f ic e  about January  20. When 
th e  fo re ig n  s e rv ic e  o f f i c e r  re p o r te d  to  th e  Ambassador, he was 
t o ld  th a t  i f  he  in te r f e r e d  w ith  Hurley in  any way, which
^^Wedemeyer to  M arshall, January 27, 1945; Hurley Pa­
p ers ,
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S erv ice  took  to  mean making any p o lic y  recommendations a t  a l l ,  
H urley would b reak  him .^^ This c o n v ersa tio n  again  dem onstrated  
th e  poor s t a t e  of r e l a t i o n s  between H urley and th e  fo re ig n  s e r ­
v ic e  o f f ic e r s  in  China,
The same day H u r l ^  met w ith  S e rv ice , he w rote a n o te  
to  Chairman Mao. He to ld  Mao th a t  th e  Kuomintang had o ffe re d  
to  make new concessions in c lu d in g  th e  e s tab lish m en t of a war 
c a b in e t which would in c lu d e  C hinese Communist r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s .  
H urley though t i t  would be a g re a t  p i ty  i f  such fa r - re a c h in g  
government p ro p o sa ls  were r e je c te d  o u t of hand and ad v ised  Mao 
t:o send G eneral Chou to  Chungking to  d isc u ss  them .^^ Two days 
l a t e r  Hurley was inform ed th a t  th e  C e n tra l E xecutive Committee 
of th e  C hinese Communist p a r ty  had d isc u sse d  th e  new Kuomin­
tang  o f f e r ,  and l a t e r  th e  same day he re c e iv e d  th e  encouraging 
news th a t  Chou E n - la i  would a r r iv e  in  Chungking on January  24, 
With t h i s  sim ple  message H urley b e lie v e d  th a t  th e  thaw in  ne­
g o t ia t io n s  had a t  l a s t  a r r iv e d .  M oreover, on th e  p lan e  w ith  
Chou would come p roo f o f th e  a lle g e d  n e g o tia t io n s  between th e  
Kuomintang and th e  Jap an ese .
Papers,
^^L oyalty  I n v e s t ig a t io n . P a r t  2, 2075,
n o
Hurley to  Mao, January  20, 1945; H urley P apers , 
^ ^ o r r i s  B, DePass to  H urley , January  22, 1945; Hurley
CHAPTER IX 
A FALSE SPRING
On th e  p la n e  b r in g in g  Chou from Yenan came a l e t t e r  f o r  
Wedemeyer from Chu Teh, I t  co n ta in ed  th e  s o - c a l le d  p ro o f of 
K uom intang.Japanese n e g o tia t io n s  and a p lan  to  su b v e rt th e  
Japanese  puppet fo rc e s  w ith  f in a n c ia l  a id  of th e  U nited 
S ta te s .  1 A gainst th e  w ishes of th e  Communists, W edem^er 
showed th e  l e t t e r  and i t s  en c lo su re s  to  H urley . The Ambassa­
dor was u n in ^ re sse d . The document which p v^po rted  to  prove 
th e  e x is te n c e  of K uom intang-Japanese ta lk s  was w r i t te n  in  
C hinese on unheaded p ap er w ith o u t a s ig n a tu re  of o r ig in  or 
d a te ,  and H u r l^  branded i t  a  weak and clumsy fa k e .^
M oreover, H urley saw a c lo s e  r e l a t i o n  between th e  un­
s u b s ta n t ia te d  s to ry  o f K uom intang-Japanese n e g o tia t io n s  and
O
th e  p le a  f o r  American f in a n c ia l  a id .  The Communists hoped. 
H urley deduced, th a t  i f  Americans accep ted  th e  f i r s t  document, 
then  th e  a id  re q u e s t  would be approved. The Ambassador be­
l ie v e d  th a t  th e  Communist a t t e n ^ t  to  keep him from view ing th e
^Ghu Teh to  Wedemeyer, January  23, 1945; H urley P ap e rs .
^ "S e c re t In fo rm atio n  R egarding th e  In te rc o n n e c tio n s  Be­
tween th e  Japanese  Puppets and Chungking;" H urley  P apers .
q
"1945 P ro je c t  and Budget f o r  Undermining and B ring ing  
Over Puppet F o rc e s ;"  H urley P apers .
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l e t t e r  and i t s  en c lo su re s  was m o tiva ted  by a f e a r  th a t  he 
would q u ick ly  see  th rough  t h e i r  scheme. I t  was H u rle y 's  op in ­
io n  th a t  i f  any a id  to  th e  Communists was approved b e fo re  an 
acco rd  had been reach ed  between th e  Reds and th e  Kuomintang, 
i t  would mean th e  c o lla p s e  of th e  Chungking governm ent,^
The q u e s tio n a b le  p ro o f and th e  accompanying re q u e s t  f o r  
American a id  tended  to  r e in f o r c e  th e  p o s i t io n  H urley had taken  
when th e  news th a t  such p roo f e x is te d  reached  Chungking in  e a r ­
ly  Jan u ary , He had s a id  then  th a t  i t  was p a r t  of a p lo t  to  
bypass Chiang*s government and win American fa v o r . His m inor 
v ic to r y  on t h i s  p o in t ,  coupled w ith  Chou's r e tu rn  to  Chung­
k in g  to  reopen th e  n e g o tia t io n s  which everyone had s a id  would 
f a i l ,  encouraged H urley to  ta k e  an even more d i s to r te d  view 
of h is  r o le  in  C hina, h is  m iss io n , and th e  peop le  around him. 
H urley had taken  to  s e l f - g l o r i f i c a t i o n  and f e l t  t h a t  he 
a lo n e  was cap ab le  of making e i t h e r  d e c is io n s  o r  r e p o r ts  on th e  
s u b je c t  of Kuomintang-Communist n e g o tia t io n s .  He b e lie v e d  
w h o leh ea rted ly  t h a t  h i s  r o le  in  American h is to r y  was u n ique .
His m iss io n , he s a id , was f a r  more w orthy of c o n s id e ra tio n  
th an  i t  had re c e iv e d  in  America, F urtherm ore, H urley though t 
t h a t  th e  main rea so n  he had f a i l e d  to  accom plish  th e  ta s k  a s ­
s ig n ed  him by th e  P re s id e n t was th e  b a r r i e r  c re a te d  by th e  
in e f f e c tu a l  b u re a u c ra ts  who surrounded him in  th e  American Em­
b a ssy , More and more H urley seemed to  o p e ra te  a lo n e ,^  He
R e p o r t  by H u r l^  to  S t e t t i n iu s ,  "KMT-Communist Nego­
t i a t i o n s , "  P a r t  I I I ,  February  17, 1945; H urley P ap e rs ,
^Theodore H, W hite and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder Out of 
China (New York: W illiam  S loane A sso c ia te s , l9 4 è ) , 24^,
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im agined h im se lf  s in g leh an d ed ly  co o rd in a tin g  th e  a c t i v i t i e s  
of a l l  American agenc ies in  China, conducting  c o n tin u a l m i l i ­
ta ry  co n fe ren ces w ith  Wedemeyer and th e  G enera lissim o , 
a tte n d in g  to  th e  r e g u la r  d u t ie s  of th e  Embassy, and a t  th e  
same tim e c a rry in g  on f u l l - t im e  n e g o tia t io n s .^
When H urley se n t a r e p o r t  r e f l e c t in g  h is  views to  Wash­
in g to n , George A tcheson, th e  F i r s t  S e c re ta ry  of th e  Embassy, 
f e l t  i t  h is  duty  to  inform  th e  Ambassador th a t  th e  Embassy 
s t a f f  d id  n o t ag ree  w ith  h is  p o s i t io n .  In  c o o rd in a tio n  w ith  
th e  o th e r  p o l i t i c a l  o f f i c e r s  on th e  s t a f f ,  A tcheson p rep a red  
a c r i t iq u e  in  an e f f o r t  to  c o r re c t  what he co n sid ered  H u rle y 's  
warped view  of th e  s i tu a t io n  in  China. Atcheson s a id  th a t  to  
h i s  knowledge, no one on th e  Embassy s t a f f  had opposed 
H u r le y 's  a ttem p ts  to  u n ify  China and moreover th e  s t a f f  was 
w i l l in g  and a b le  to  o f f e r  H urley as much a id  as p o s s ib le  in  
p u rsu in g  h is  m iss io n . A tcheson commented th a t  i f  he were in  
W ashington, he would assume from H urley ' s r e p o r t  th a t  th e  Em­
bassy  s t a f f  was of l i t t l e  u se  in  China and should  be re p la c e d . 
He hoped th a t  H urley d id  n o t h o ld  such an o p in io n , bu t d id  
n o t w ish  to  argue  about i t .  A tcheson 's  a c tio n s  dem onstrated  
th a t  th e  o p p o s itio n  to  H urley among th e  p ro fe s s io n a l  d ip lom ats 
in  China was grow ing.^
H u r l^  d id  n o t l im i t  h is  c r i t ic i s m  of p ro fe s s io n a l  d ip -
^R eport by Hurley to  S t e t t i n iu s ,  "KMT-Communist Nego­
t i a t i o n s , "  Pream ble, January  31, 1945; H urley P apers .
^Undated c r i t iq u e  by George Atcheson of R eport by Hur­
le y  to  S t e t t i n iu s ,  "KMT-Communist N e g o tia tio n s ,"  Pream ble,
P a r t  I ,  P a r t  I I ,  January  31, 1945; H urley P ap e rs .
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lom ats to  th o se  on th e  Embassy s t a f f .  He b e lie v e d  an o th e r 
rea so n  f o r  th e  f a i l u r e  of u n i f ic a t io n  was th e  r e s i s ta n c e  to  
th e  p o lic y  approved by th e  P re s id e n t and th e  S e c re ta ry  of 
S ta te  by th e  d ip lo m a tic  o f f i c i a l s  in  th e  S ta te  D epartm en t's  
D iv is io n  of C hinese A ffa ir s  in  W ashington. H urley thought 
t h a t  th e  S ta te  Departm ent was so i n e f f i c i e n t  and such an in ­
e f f e c t iv e  in s tru m en t to  implement fo re ig n  p o lic y  th a t  i t  
fo rc e d  th e  P re s id e n t to  c a rry  on th e  c o u n try 's  fo re ig n  r e l a ­
t io n s  th rough  p e rso n a l re p re se n ta tiv e s ,®
The w idening g u lf  between Hurley and th e  S ta te  D epart­
m ent, bo th  in  Chungking and W ashington, made i t  c le a r  th a t  
H urley would have to  jou rney  to  W ashington to  g e t th e  s i t u a ­
t io n  c le a re d  up . He was unab le  to  le a v e , however, w h ile  th e  
n e g o tia t io n s  between Chou E n - la i  and th e  Kuomintang co n tin u ed . 
H urley a tte n d e d  most o f th e  d isc u ss io n s  a t  th e  in v i ta t io n  of 
both  p a r t i e s ,  and he was c o n fid e n t th a t  h is  p resence  would a id  
in  b rin g in g  th e  ta lk s  to  a su c c e s s fu l co n c lu sio n .
The n e g o tia t io n s  had begun im m ediately a f t e r  Chou's 
a r r i v a l  in  Chungking on January  24, At th e  end of th e  second 
m eeting th a t  same day. Dr, Wang S h ih -ch ieh , th e  Kuomintang 
c h ie f  n e g o tia to r ,  p re se n te d  th re e  new p o in ts  fo r  Chou E n - la i 's  
c o n s id e ra tio n . The Kuomintang o f fe re d  to  e s ta b l is h  a War 
C ab inet w ith  a membership of seven to  n in e  men. The C hinese 
Communist p a r ty  would have r e p re s e n ta t io n  in  th e  War C abinet 
a long  w ith  o th e r  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  in  China, Secondly, th e
®Hurl^ to  S te t t in iu s , February 12, 1945 (unsent);
Hurley Papers,
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G eneralissim o o f fe re d  to  ap p o in t th re e  o f f i c e r s ,  one American, 
one Kuomintang, and one Chinese Communists, who would make r e c ­
ommendations re g a rd in g  th e  re o rg a n iz a tio n  of C hinese Communist 
su p p lie s  and tro o p s  f o r  approval by th e  G enera lissim o , F in a l­
ly ,  th e  C hinese Communist fo rc e s  would be p lac ed  under th e  
command of an American Army o f f i c e r  f o r  th e  d u ra tio n  of th e
9
war a g a in s t  Japan . H urley cau tio n ed  both  s id e s  t h a t  he had 
no a u th o r i ty  to  ag ree  th a t  an American would p a r t i c i p a te  in  
any such p la n ,^ ^  There was l i t t l e  doubt on e i t h e r  s id e ,  how­
e v e r , t h a t  t h i s  was p o s s ib le .  The m eeting ad jou rned  and Chou 
E n - la i  re c e iv e d  a chance to  f u l ly  d ig e s t  th e se  th re e  new 
p o in ts .
The n ex t day Chou gave H urley h i s  views on th e  Kuo­
m intang p ro p o sa ls . Dr, Wang S h ih -c h ie h , he s a id , had e i t h e r  
pu rpose ly  evaded th e  i s s u e ,  o r th e  Communists had f a i l e d  to  
in g re s s  him w ith  t h e i r  c h ie f  o b je c t iv e s .  The whole document 
was p re d ic a te d  on th e  id e a  t h a t  co ncessions would be made by 
th e  Kuomintang w h ile  i t  rem ained in  f u l l  c o n tro l  of th e  gov­
ernm ent,
Chou then  re p e a te d  th e  p o s i t io n  taken by Mao T se-tung  
and h im se lf when H urley had c o n fe rred  w ith  them a t  Yenan.
The Communist p a r ty  would n o t subm it th e  command of i t s  tro o p s  
to  th e  Kuomintang, I t  would, however, ag ree  to  p la c e  th e  con-
^A d d itio n a l Three P o in ts  Given to  G eneral H urley by 
Dr, Wang S h ih -c h ie h , January  24, 1945; H urley P ap ers ,
l^R eport by H urley to  S t e t t i n iu s ,  "KMT-Communist Ne­
g o t ia t io n s ,"  P a r t  IV, February 18, 1945; Hurley P apers ,
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t r o l  of i t s  tro o p s  under a new N a tio n a l government which would 
r e p re s e n t  a genuine c o a l i t io n  a d m in is tra t io n . This c o a l i t io n  
government would have to  be composed o f r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  o f th e  
v a rio u s  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s .  Chou a ls o  took ex cep tio n  to  th e  
K uom intang's i n t e r e s t  in  re o rg a n iz in g  th e  Communist armed 
fo rc e s .  A greeing th a t  th e  c o n s u l ta t iv e  ccxnmission should  
be ap p o in ted  fo r  th e  re o rg a n iz a tio n  and u n i f ic a t io n  of th e  
C hinese a rm ies , he would n o t, however, pe rm it such a commis­
s io n  to  re o rg a n iz e  Communist tro o p s  a lo n e . He m ain ta ined  
th a t  th e  e n t i r e  Chinese m i l i ta r y  e s tab lish m en t whould be r e ­
o rg an ized  r a th e r  than  j u s t  th e  Red army. Chou was w i l l in g  to  
have an American se rv e  on th e  commission d i r e c t in g  such a r e ­
o rg a n iz a tio n .  ^^
On Tuesday, January  31, H urley c a l le d  on th e  G enera l­
is s im o . P re se n t a t  th e  co n fe ren ce  were H urley , th e  
G en era liss im o , and Wang S h ih -c h ie h . Chiang announced th a t  on 
May 4 he would c a l l  a m eeting in  keep ing  w ith  th e  w i l l  o f Dr, 
Sun Y a t-sen  f o r  th e  purpose o f ta k in g  s te p s  to  d r a f t  a  c o n s t i ­
t u t io n .  This c o n s t i tu t io n  would p ass  c o n tro l  of th e  N a tio n a l 
government to  th e  peop le  and a b o lis h  th e  o n e -p a rty  r u le  o f  th e  
Kuomintang. In th e  G e n e ra lis s im o 's  o p in io n , a l l  th e  p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t i e s  in  C hina, in c lu d in g  h is  own, c o n s t i tu te d  le s s  than  
2 p e r  cen t of th e  C hinese p e o p le . T h e re fo re , i t  would n o t be 
in  th e  b e s t  i n t e r e s t s  of China to  tu rn  c o n tro l  of th e  govern­
ment over to  any p o l i t i c a l  group o r c o a l i t io n  o f p o l i t i c a l
l l lb id .
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groups, Chiang b e lie v e d  th a t  i t  was h is  duty to  have a demo­
c r a t i c  c o n s t i tu t io n  f o r  China adopted by a convention  in  which 
a l l  th e  peop le  of C hina, n o t only th e  o rgan ized  p o l i t i c a l  mi­
n o r i t i e s ,  would p a r t i c ip a te .
The G enera lissim o then  tu rn ed  h is  a t te n t io n  d i r e c t l y  to  
th e  C hinese Communists, He sa id  they  were non-dem ocratic  and 
p ro fe s se d  to  be dem ocrats only fo r  th e  purpose of t ry in g  to  
a ch iev e  c o n tro l  of th e  a d m in is tra tio n  o f th e  N a tio n a l govern­
m ent. He m inim ized th e  danger o f th e  Communists and denounced 
them in  sc a th in g  term s. But H urley had heard a l l  of t h i s  be­
fo re  and suggested  to  Chiang th a t  such d isc u ss io n s  only l o s t  
v a lu a b le  tim e. H urley reminded th e  Chinese le a d e r  th a t  he 
cou ld  a f fo rd  to  make concessions to  o b ta in  c o n tro l  o f th e  Com­
m unist armed fo rc e s  and th a t  th e  most im portan t o b je c tiv e  a t  
th e  moment was th e  u n i f ic a t io n  of th e  m il i ta r y  e f f o r t  a g a in s t  
th e  Jap an ese , I f  u n i ty  became a f a c t ,  Hurley im p lied , c i v i l  
war would be p rev en ted  and a u n ite d , f r e e  China under a demo­
c r a t i c  c o n s t i tu t io n  would emerge,
In  s p i t e  o f th e  G e n e ra liss im o 's  h o s t i l e  a t t i t u d e  toward 
th e  Communists, th e  n e g o tia t io n s  con tinued  d a i ly .  During th e  
c o u rse  o f th e  t a l k s ,  Chou devoted most of h is  tim e to  pushing  
a  f r ie n d ly  c o n s u l ta t iv e  m eeting in  Chungking w ith  re p re s e n ta ­
t iv e s  of th e  Kuomintang, th e  Communist p a r ty , and o th e r  groups, 
Chou wanted n a t io n a l ly  re sp e c te d  in d iv id u a ls  w ithou t s p e c i f ic  
p a r ty  a f f i l i a t i o n  a ls o  to  p a r t i c ip a te  in  th e  m eetings. Hurley
l^ lb id .
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l ik e d  th i s  su g g estio n  fo r  he had long suggested  th a t  such a
group be i n s t i t u t e d  to  d e v ise  a way to  u n ify  China and se rv e
as a s te e r in g  com m ittee to  gu ide th e  conduct o f a l l  p a r t i e s
13du ring  th e  t r a n s i t i o n  p e r io d .
On th e  w hole, however, H urley rem ained u n s a t i s f i e d  w ith  
th e  t a l k s .  At each m eeting  bo th  s id e s  viewed w ith  alarm  th e i r  
o p p o n en t's  re c o rd  and p o in te d  w ith  p r id e  a t  t h e i r  own, T. V, 
Soong emerged as th e  spokesman fo r  th e  Kuomintang w h ile  Chou 
E n - la i  re p re se n te d  th e  Communists. Soong argued  th a t  th e  Kuo­
m intang was th e  h i s t o r i c  p a r ty  o f re v o lu tio n  in  C hina, th e  
p a r ty  o f Sun Y a t-sen , and, th e r e f o re ,  had a r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  to  
China. Chou agreed  w ith  Soong, bu t r e p l ie d  t h a t  th e  tim e had 
come when, in  accordance w ith  th e  w i l l  of Dr. Sun Y at-sen  and 
th e  d e s ir e s  o f th e  C hinese p eo p le , th e  government should  be 
re tu rn e d  to  c o n tro l  of th e  p eo p le .
Chou s a id  th a t  th e re  was only one su c c e s s fu l way to  con­
duct th e  government d u rin g  th e  t r a n s i t i o n  p e r io d . That was to  
form a t r u e  c o a l i t io n  government by th e  m ajor p a r t i e s  based on 
t r u s t  o f each o th e r . Soong opposed su rre n d e rin g  c e n t r a l  au­
th o r i ty  to  a c o a l i t io n  d u ring  th e  war because i t  m ight r e s u l t  
in  weakening th e  governm ent. Chou coun tered  by say ing  th a t  
w ith  p ro p er co n ce ss io n s , th e  c e n t r a l  government would have un­
l im ite d  su p p o rt from th e  Communist p a r ty . I f  China rem ained 
d iv id e d , Chou s a id , th e  im p e r ia l i s t  powers would again  p re ­
ven t China from develop ing  econom ically  and ta k in g  i t s  j u s t
l^ lbid .
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p la c e  in  th e  w orld . Throughout th e  m ee tings, H urley k ep t in  
c o n s ta n t touch  w ith  th e  Kuomintang n e g o tia to r s  and met f r e ­
q u en tly  w ith  Chou E n - la i ,
During th e  l a s t  week o f Jan u ary , Dr. Wang began to  
f e e l  th a t  H urley was fav o rin g  th e  p o s i t io n  being  advanced by 
Chou E n - la i ,  A lthough H urley , as m ed ia to r, was supposed to  
be n e u tr a l  in  th e  d is c u s s io n s , th e  Kuomintang had come to  ex­
p e c t  h i s  su p p o rt. The Kuomintang knew th a t  i f  th e  Communists 
cou ld  win H urley to  t h e i r  s id e ,  th e  Chungking government would 
be in  a very  dangerous p o s i t io n .  F in a l ly ,  Dr, Wang to ld  H urley 
th a t  he seemed to  be s id in g  w ith  th e  Communists in  th e  t a l k s .  
H urley den ied  th a t  he had ag reed  w ith  Chou bu t s a id  th a t  to o  
much tim e had a lre a d y  been w asted  d eb a tin g  th e  fundam ental i s ­
sues in v o lv ed . He d e c la re d  t h a t  c o n fe rees  had made too  many 
sp eech es , and had f a i l e d  to  ta k e  enough a c t i o n ,
This s ta tem en t by H urley s t a r t l e d  th e  Kuomintang o f f i ­
c i a l  and prompted him to  form a com m ittee w ith  Chou E n - la i  fo r  
th e  purpose of drawing up p ro p o sa ls  from which firm  agreem ents 
might be developed . Only a few days l a t e r ,  on February  3,
Dr, Wang p re se n te d  a d r a f t  of th e  proposed agreem ent. I t  p ro ­
v ided  t h a t  a  m eeting o f th e  N a t io n a l i s t  and Communist 
r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  would be c a l le d  to  form a p o l i t i c a l  c o n su lta ­
t io n  com m ittee. The com m ittee would study  th e  s te p s  to  be 
taken  to  end th e  p e rio d  o f o n e -p a rty  tu te la g e ,  and e s t a b l i s h  
a c o n s t i tu t io n a l  governm ent. I t  would d e v ise  a common p o l i t i -
l^ lbid , l^Ibid.
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c a l  program to  be fo llow ed  in  th e  f u tu re  and would de te rm ine  
th e  way in  which members of th e  p a r t i e s  o u ts id e  th e  Kuomintang 
would be taken  in to  th e  new N a tio n a l governm ent. Once th e  
com m ittee had unanim ously accep ted  a p la n , i t  would be sub­
m itte d  to  th e  N a tio n a l government fo r  app roval and ex ecu tio n . 
D uring th e  tim e th e  com m ittee m et, bo th  s id e s  would r e f r a in  
from m utual re c r im in a t io n s .^ ^
An e la te d  Hurlipy met w ith  Chou E n - la i  a  s h o r t  tim e l a t ­
e r .  Chou s a id  he had se n t  th e  d r a f t  agreem ent to  Yenan and 
th a t  fo r  th e  f i r s t  tim e he b e liev e d  th e  t a lk s  were approach­
in g  th e  p o in t where bo th  s id e s  could c o o p e r a t e , H u r l e y ' s  
hopes were a ls o  h ig h , b u t th ey  were tem pered by some se r io u s  
d o u b ts . For one th in g ,  u n i f ic a t io n  of th e  armed fo rc e s  r e ­
mained p re d ic a te d  on p o l i t i c a l  a c tio n  to  be taken  by th e  
Kuomintang in  th e  f u tu r e .  H u r l^  knew f u l l  w e ll by t h i s  tim e 
th a t  th e  Kuomintang would be u n lik e ly  to  ta k e  such a c t io n  w ith ­
ou t a g re a t  d e a l of p re s s u re .  M oreover, a l l  recom mendations 
o f th e  p o l i t i c a l  c o n s u l ta t iv e  committee re q u ire d  th e  unanimous 
app rova l o f a l l  p a r t i c ip a n t s ,  and th i s  l im ite d  th e  l ik e l ih o o d  
o f a c tio n  fo r  i t  gave e i t h e r  s id e  an a b so lu te  v e to  over any 
p ro p o sa l.
The day a f t e r  th e  m eeting w ith  Chou E n - la i ,  H urley d i s ­
cussed  th e  m a tte r  w ith  th e  G enera lissim o . I t  d id  n o t ta k e
l^ D ra f t  o f Agreement Concerning th e  I n te r - P a r ty  Con­
fe re n c e  g iven  to  H urley by Wang S h ih -ch ieh , February  3, 1945; 
H urley P ap e rs .
^^Report by Hurley to  S te t t in iu s , "KMT-Communist Nego­
t ia t io n s ,"  Part IV, February 18, 1945; Hurley Papers.
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long to  le a rn  th a t  Chiang d isapproved  of th e  plan* The Gen­
e ra lis s im o  though t th a t  th e  Communists had o b ta in ed  what they 
had been endeavoring  to  g e t a l l  a lo n e , namely, a f u l l  c o a l i t io n  
governm ent. Hurley took  excep tion  to  th e  G en era liss im o 's  
ch arg e . He s a id  th a t  only one o th e r  document in  th e  long 
s e r ie s  o f t a lk s  o f fe re d  as good a chance of reach in g  a work­
in g  agreem ent w ith  th e  Communists, The p ro p o sa l Hurley 
r e f e r r e d  to  was th e  f iv e  p o in t agreem ent of November, The 
Communists, H urley b e lie v e d , would s t i l l  accep t a  rea so n a b le  
r e v is io n  o f i t ,  and H urley rem inded th e  G eneralissim o th a t  in  
i t  th e  Communists had agreed  to  subm it c o n tro l of t h e i r  armed 
fo rc e s  to  th e  N a tio n a l g o v e r n m e n t ,H u r l e y 's  argum ents how­
ev er d id  n o t change th e  G e n e ra liss im o 's  op in ion  of th e  new 
p ro p o sa ls .
When th e  Communists approved th e  document, th e  G eneral­
issim o  ba lked . R ather than  implementing i t  he sa . ' th a t  he 
would in c o rp o ra te  th e  su g g estio n s in to  f iv e  new p o in ts  he was 
about to  o f f e r .  When th e  G eneralissim o subm itted  th e  new Kuo­
m intang o f f e r ,  he had e s s e n t ia l ly  d e le te d  a l l  re fe re n c e s  to  a 
c o a l i t io n  governm ent. Hurley knew th a t  th i s  would be unaccep t­
a b le  to  th e  Communists, When Hurley o b jec te d , th e  
G enera lissim o  began h is  u su a l long d ia t r ib e  a g a in s t  th e  Commu--
n i s t s ,  and s a id  th a t  th e  Kuomintang was th e  only t r u ly




I t  was c le a r  th a t  th e  n e g o tia t io n s  were f a s t  b reak ing  
down. Chou was schedu led  to  leav e  Yenan to  c o n su lt w ith  Mao 
on February 16, Two days b e fo re  Chou's d e p a r tu re  Wang Shih- 
ch ieh  h e ld  a p re s s  co n fe ren ce  in  which he s a id  th a t  th e
Communists had r e je c te d  a l l  p ro p o sa ls  p re se n te d  by th e  Kuo-
90m in ta n g o ^  The nex t day Chou E n - la i  answered Dr, Wang's 
s ta te m e n t by charg ing  him w ith  in s in c e r i ty  and u n fa irn e s s .
Chou s a id  th a t  when Wang l i s t e d  th e  concessions by th e  Kuo­
m intang he had f a i l e d  to  ex p la in  th e  p r e r e q u is i te s  a tta c h e d  
to  them which made them e i th e r  im p ra c tic a l o r m ean ing less.
Chou s a id  t h a t  th e  Kuomintang opposed e s ta b l is h in g  a dem ocrat­
i c  c o a l i t io n  government and a b s o lu te ly  re fu s e d  to  do away w ith  
th e  o n e -p a rty  d ic ta to r s h ip .  Chou again  subm itted  th e  fo u r 
p o in ts  of December which he sa id  th e  N a t io n a l is t  government 
should  meet to  show t h e i r  s in c e r i ty  in  th e  n e g o tia t io n s .  W ith 
th e s e  p a r t in g  w ords, he re tu rn e d  to  Yenan to  co n fe r w ith  th e  
C e n tra l Committee of th e  Communist p a r ty  on February 16.^1
Outwardly, H urley rem ained o p t im is t ic ,  bu t in  p r iv a te  
he was u n d ers tan d ab ly  d isa p p o in te d . C h iang 's  i n a b i l i t y  to  
u n i te  th e  coun try  would c o n sid erab ly  weaken C h in a 's  p o s i t io n  
in  th e  forthcom ing San F ran c isco  U nited N ations con fe rence . 
This p o in t  was u n d e rlin e d  when, on February 18, Chou E n - la i
^^Copy of P re ss  Statem ent by Wang S h ih -ch ieh , February 
14, 1945; Hurley P ap e rs .
2lcopy of P re ss  S tatem ent by Chou E n - la i ,  February 15, 
1945; H urley P apers .
^^Report by H urley to  S t e t t i n iu s ,  "KMT-Communist Nego­
t i a t i o n s , "  P a r t  IV, F ebruary  18, 1945; H urley P apers .
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se n t a l e t t e r  ask in g  f o r  C hinese Communist re p re s e n ta t io n  on 
th e  C hinese d e le g a tio n  to  th e  U n ited  N ations m eeting schedu led  
f o r  A p ril 25. Chou argued th a t  th e  Kuomintang could  n o t r e p r e ­
se n t th e  broad masses of th e  p eop le  and suggested  t h a t  th e  
N a t io n a l i s t s  make up o n e - th ird  o f th e  d e le g a tio n  w h ile  th e  r e ­
m aining tw o - th ird s  be composed o f Communists and in d ep en d en ts . 
Chou asked H urley to  tra n s m it  h is  re q u e s t  fo r  r e p re s e n ta t io n  
on th e  d e le g a tio n  to  P re s id e n t R o o sev e lt.
H urley q u ick ly  answered C hou's l e t t e r .  He to ld  t h e ' Com­
m unist th a t  he had no a u th o r i ty  to  make a d e c is io n  on th e  
su b je c t  of r e p re s e n ta t io n  to  th e  San F ran c isco  co n fe ren ce , bu t 
commented th a t  th e  t a lk s  th e r e  were to  be between n a tio n s  and
n o t between p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  w ith in  n a tio n s . He dropped th e
24m a tte r  th e r e  ten q so ra rily .
H u r l^  was due to  r e tu r n  to  th e  U nited  S ta te s  fo r  con­
s u l t a t i o n ,  and on February  16, 1945, th e  G enera lissim o  d isc u sse d  
w ith  H urley m a tte rs  which he w ished th e  Ambassador to  subm it 
to  o f f i c i a l s  in  W ashington. Chiang though t H u rley 's  d e p a r tu re  
p re se n te d  a good o p p o rtu n ity  to  drop th e  bom bshell which he 
had been p re p a r in g  fo r  some tim e . Chiang charged th a t  S t i lw e l l  
had been invo lved  in  a co n sp iracy  w ith  th e  Communists to  over­
throw th e  governm ent, and had th e  Communists succeeded, they  
would have made a h u m ilia tin g  and c o s t ly  t r e a ty  w ith  Japan .
The G enera lissim o  s a id  th a t  no one r e a l iz e d  th e  im p lic a tio n s
23Chou to  Hurley, February 18, 1945; Hurley Papers.
^^Hurley to  Chou, February 19, 1945; Hurley Papers.
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of th e  S t i lw e l l  m a tte r , c e r ta in ly  n o t th e  "dupes of th e  news­
paper c o rre sp o n d e n ts , th e  c re a tu re s  of S t i lw e l l ,  B a r r e t t ,  
D av ies, and S e rv ic e , and c e r ta in ly  n o t th e  American p u b l ic ."
I f  t h i s  co n sp iracy  had succeeded, Chiang s a id , U nited  S ta te s  
p o lic y  in  th e  F ar E ast would have re c e iv e d  i t s  d e a th  blow.
Buurl^' doubted C h ian g 's  s ta te m e n ts , bu t th e  G enera l­
issim o  co n tin u ed . He asked Hurley to  im press upon th e  
American peop le  th a t  China was u n ite d  and th a t  only sm all 
groups h e ld  ou t a g a in s t  u n i f ic a t io n .  He m inim ized th e  impor­
ta n c e  of th e  Communists and c a l le d  on H u r l^ ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  
view  o f th e  fo rthcom ing San F ra n c isco  co n fe ren ce , to  deny th e  
charge  t h a t  China was n o t u n ite d . He s a id  th e  m i l i ta r y  fo rc e s  
o f th e  Communists were of n u isan ce  v a lu e  only and b oasted  th a t  
when th e  war w ith  jJapan ended, th e  w e ll-eq u ip p ed  d iv is io n s  he 
p o ssessed  would e a s i ly  d e s tro y  them. Chiang s a id  t h a t  even 
R u ssia  r e a l iz e d  th e  Communists cou ld  never c o n tro l  C hina, bu t 
he fe a re d  th a t  th e  American p u b lic  had been m isguided by re p ­
r e s e n ta t iv e s  of th e  U nited  S ta te s  Army and S ta te  D epartm ent.
Chiang gave H urley a f i n a l  word on u n i f i c a t io n .  He 
s a id  h is  a t t i t u d e  tow ard th e  s u b je c t  changed from day to  day. 
Even th e  Communists d id  no t know what they  would do, he s a id .  
Chiang hoped deeply  and s in c e re ly  th a t  th e  Communists m ight 
be le d  to  suppo rt th e  governm ent, bu t he cau tio n ed  th a t  t h ^  
demanded a c o a l i t io n  government so they  m ight become a m a jo r ity  
and then  th rough  in t r ig u e  e s t a b l i s h  a Communist d ic ta to r s h ip ,^ ^
9 *5-^ Memorandum of Conversation between Hurley and Chiang,
February 16, 1945; Hurley Papers.
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W ith th e se  p a r t in g  words from th e  G enera lissim o , Hurley de­
p a r te d  from Chungking on February 19,
Hurley l e f t  behind se v e ra l problem s which would ca tch  
up w ith  him in  W ashington. His s t a f f  was n e a r ly  in  r e v o l t .
The p ro fe s s io n a ls  found i t  im possib le  to  ag ree  w ith  what they  
b e lie v e d  was H urley’ s d i s to r te d  v iew p o in t. They fe a re d  th e  
com plete  lo s s  of China u n le s s  som ething were done q u id c ly . I f  
th e  Embassy s t a f f  chafed  under H u rley 's  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  th e  same 
could  be sa id  o f H u rley 's  r e la t io n s  w ith  th e  S ta te  Departm ent. 
The Ambassador knew th a t  he was re tu rn in g  to  W ashington fo r  
a  d i r e c t  c o n fro n ta tio n  w ith  S ta te  Department o f f i c i a l s .  He 
d id  n o t know what th e  outcome of t h a t  c o n fro n ta tio n  would be, 
bu t h e  counted on h is  f r ie n d , F ra n k lin  R o o sev e lt, to  suppo rt 
h i s  p o s i t io n .
CHAPTER X 
HURLEY REAFFIRMED
During F ebruary , 1945, th e  fo re ig n  s e rv ic e  o f f i c e r s  of 
th e  American Embassy in  Chungking had w aited  fo r  a chance to  
b r in g  to  th e  S ta te  D epartm en t's a t t e n t io n  th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  they  
were having in  working under H urley . The f ig h t  w ith  D avies, 
th e  w arning to  S e rv ic e , th e  a t ta c k  on th e  s t a f f  made in  th e  
pream ble to  H u rle y 's  r e p o r t  o f January  14, a l l  in c re a se d  th e  
i r e  o f th e  p ro fe s s io n a l  d ip lom ats in  China. George A tcheson, 
as  Charge d 'a f f a i r e s ,  assumed th e  p o s i t io n  of rank ing  o f f i c e r  
in  th e  Ehbassy when H urley l e f t  f o r  W ashington. A tcheson, no 
l e s s  than  th e  o th e r s ,  found Hurley im possib le  to  work w ith  and 
w anted to  b rin g  t h i s  to  th e  a t te n t io n  of th e  S ta te  D epartm ent.
The Embassy s t a f f ,  however, was n o t m otivated  p u re ly  by 
p e rso n a l an im osity  toward Ambassador H u r l ^ .  These Far E as te rn  
e x p e rts  a ls o  o b je c te d  to  what they  considered  H u r l ^ 's  n a iv e  
and u n r e a l i s t i c  assessm ent o f what he cou ld  do to  improve th e  
s i tu a t io n  in  China. In  th e  two and a h a l f  months s in c e  Hurley 
had assumed th e  p o s t of Ambassador to  China, h is  e v a lu a tio n s  
had c o n s is te d  alm ost e n t i r e ly  o f o p t im is t ic  p re d ic tio n s  sub­
s t a n t i a t e d  w ith  very  l i t t l e  f a c t .  Atcheson and, indeed , th e  
r e s t  o f th e  s t a f f  fe a re d  th a t  th e  o v e r-o p tim is t ic  view toward
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u n i f ic a t io n  advanced by H urley would lea d  th e  U nited  S ta te s  
p o lic y  p lan n e rs  in  W ashington to  make th e  wrong d e c is io n s  r e ­
g a rd in g  A m erica 's f u tu re  co u rse  o f a c tio n  in  C hina. The s t a f f  
and A tcheson f e l t  t h a t  i f  American p o lic y  rem ained unchanged, 
th e  end o f American in f lu e n c e  in  China was a d i s t i n c t  p o s s i ­
b i l i t y , ^
K u r i l ' s  d e p a r tu re  from China gave Atcheson th e  chance 
he needed. He f e l t  t h a t  i t  was h is  du ty  to  inform  th e  S ta te  
Departm ent f u l ly  on th e  s i tu a t io n  in  China as he and h is  fe llo w  
fo re ig n  s e rv ic e  o f f i c e r s  saw i t .  N eedless to  say , t h i s  view 
c o n tra s te d  sh a rp ly  w ith  t h a t  o f Ambassador H urley . A tcheson 
and th e  Embassy s t a f f  b e lie v e d  th a t  th e  s i tu a t io n  in  China was 
w orsening r a th e r  than  im proving as H urley had h in te d  in  h i s  r e ­
p o r t s .  Such an op in ion  was n o t allow ed to  re a c h  W ashington 
w h ile  H urley was in  C hina. T h ere fo re , when Hurley d ep arted  
Atcheson c a l le d  upon th e  p o l i t i c a l  o f f ic e r s  o f th e  Embassy to  
p re p a re  a com prehensive study  o f th e  C hinese s i t u a t io n  and 
make a p o lic y  recommendation to  be forw arded to  W ashington .2
Oddly enough, John S. S e rv ic e , th e  man who a c tu a l ly  
d ra f te d  th e  m essage, was n o t a member of th e  Embassy s t a f f  in  
Chungking. At th e  tim e , he was working on G eneral Wedemeyer's 
s t a f f  as a  p o l i t i c a l  a d v is e r .  But he shared  th e  view s of 
A tcheson and th e  o th e r  o f f i c e r s  in  th e  Embassy and, hav ing  
j u s t  re tu rn e d  from th e  U nited  S ta te s ,  he was most f a m i l ia r  
w ith  views on China h e ld  in  W ashington. P a r t i a l l y  because
^L oyalty  In v e s t ig a tio n  . P a r t  I I ,  2015. ^I b id .
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S erv ice  had few er ro u t in e  d u t ie s ,  Atcheson chose him to  p re ­
p a re  th e  r e p o r t .  A f te r  composing th e  f i r s t  d r a f t ,  S e rv ic e  and 
o f f ic e r s  a t  th e  Embassy met to  rev iew  i t  and make r e v is io n s .  
They developed a t i g h t l y  k n i t ,  c a r e f u l ly  worded case  a g a in s t  
th e  p o s i t io n  p re s e n te d  in  th e  numerous c ab le s  se n t to  Washing­
to n  by H urley .^
On February  28, te n  days a f t e r  H urley l e f t  C hina, 
A tcheson sig n ed  th e  r e p o r t  and forw arded i t  to  th e  S ta te  De­
p a rtm en t. I t  began: "The s i tu a t io n  in  China appears to  be
develop ing  in  some ways th a t  a re  n o t conducive to  e f f e c t iv e  
p ro se c u tio n  of th e  war no r C h in a 's  f u tu re  peace and u n i ty ."  
From t h i s  s ta te m e n t th e  Embassy s t a f f  went on to  rev iew  th e  
f a i l u r e  o f A m erica 's  a ttem p t to  u n ify  th e  m ajor f a c t io n s  in  
China th rough  d ip lo m a tic  means. Then th e  Embassy re p re s e n ta ­
t iv e s  p re d ic te d  t h a t ,  i f  th e  U nited  S ta te s  co n tin u ed  i t s  
e x c lu s iv e  su p p o rt of Chiang K ai-sh ek , c i v i l  war would r e s u l t  
in  C hina. The s t a f f  warned th a t  impending in te r n a l  c o n f l i c t  
would n o t long be d e lay ed . Only r e s o lu te  a c t io n  by th e  U nited  
S ta te s  o f an "im m ediate n a tu re "  cou ld  e f f e c t iv e ly  f o r e s t a l l  
c i v i l  w ar.
The p o lic y  to  save China o f fe re d  by th e  Bnbassy s t a f f  
was based on id e a s  advanced by Joseph  W. S t i lw e l l  b e fo re  h is  
rem oval from C hina. The U nited S ta te s  would inform  th e  
G enera lissim o  t h a t  th e  immediate and paramount c o n s id e ra tio n  
o f m i l i ta r y  n e c e s s i ty  would be th e  b a s is  f o r  fu tu re  American
S jb id .
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p o l ic y ,  Chiang would be to ld  th a t  th e  U nited S ta te s  would arm 
any groups in  China th a t  proved them selves w i l l in g  and were in  
a  p o s i t io n  to  f ig h t  th e  Japanese , An o f f e r  would then  be made 
to  form a co o rd in a ted  m i l i ta r y  command fo r  e f f e c t iv e  p rosecu­
t io n  of th e  war.
Only by such a c t io n ,  th e  s t a f f  a rgued , cou ld  th e  Kuo­
m intang and th e  Chinese Communists be fo rced  to  co o p era te  w ith  
each  o th e r . The s t a f f  s a id  th a t  such a p o lic y  would be g r e a t ­
ly  welcomed by th e  v a s t  m a jo r ity  of th e  Chinese peop le  and 
would r a i s e  American p r e s t ig e .  With such a p o l ic y , th e  r e ­
p o r t  co n tin u ed , America cou ld  secu re  th e  co o p era tio n  of a l l  
C h in a 's  fo rc e s  in  th e  w ar, ho ld  th e  Communists to  th e  Ameri­
can s id e  r a th e r  than  throw ing them in to  th e  arms of R u ss ia , 
conv ince  th e  Kuomintang of th e  u n d e s i r a b i l i ty  of i t s  apparen t 
p la n s  fo r  c i v i l  w ar, and, f i n a l ly ,  b rin g  about a u n i f ic a t io n  
w hich, though n o t com plete , would p rov ide  th e  b a s is  f o r  a 
p e a c e fu l fu tu re  development toward f u l l  dem ocracy.^
This r e p o r t  reach ed  W ashington s h o r t ly  b e fo re  Hurley 
a r r iv e d  on March 3. The nex t day th e  S ta te  Departm ent brought 
th e  Atcheson te leg ram  to  h is  a t t e n t io n ,^  As m ight be expec t­
ed, Hurley re a c te d  v io le n t ly  to  th e  co n te n ts  of th e  m essage, 
and, b e s id e s , he was angered  by th e  manner in  which th e  p ro ­
t e s t  from Chungking was brought b e fo re  him. H urley s a id  th a t  
John C a r te r  V incen t, C hief o f th e  S ta te  D epartm en t's  D iv isio n
^Atcheson to  S t e t t i n iu s ,  February 28, 1945; H urley Pa­
p e r s .
^Hurley China Log, 1945, March 3 -4 , 1945; Hurley Papers.
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of Chinese A f f a i r s ,  " c a l le d  him on th e  c a rp e t ,"  and V incen t, 
a long  w ith  an o th e r man, a t te n ^ te d  to  p u t him on th e  d e fe n s iv e  
about h is  a c t i v i t i e s  in  China. Hurley s a id  n e i th e r  man under­
s tood  A m erica 's r o l e  th e re .  He to ld  V incent th e  p o lic y  he had
been ing)lementing as Ambassador in  China was th e  p o lic y  of th e
P re s id e n t, which had been in  e f f e c t  s in c e  th e  beg inn ing  of th e
w ar, and had th e  approval of th e  W hite House and th e  S ta te  De­
p a rtm en t.
H urley seemed unab le  to  u n d ers tan d  th e  p o s i t io n  advo­
c a te d  by h is  s t a f f  in  Chungking. These o f f ic e r s  argued th a t  
American p o lic y  th e re  should  be changed. They sa id  t h a t  t h i s  
would g iv e  th e  U nited S ta te s  th e  f l e x i b i l i t y  needed to  d e a l 
w ith  th e  u n s ta b le  s i tu a t io n  th e re  and would in su re  success in  
ach iev in g  th e  long range  g o a ls  of th e  U nited S ta te s  in  China. 
Hurley drew h is  own co n c lu sio n s reg a rd in g  th e  u n re s t  in  th e  
Chungking Embassy. He was su re  th a t  th e  p ro fe s s io n a ls  th e re  
were t ry in g  to  re v e rs e  what he b e liev e d  to  be A m erica 's h i s ­
t o r i c  China p o lic y . H urley knew a ls o  th a t  V incent and o th e rs  
in  th e  D iv is io n  o f Chinese A ffa ir s  shared  th e  v iew po in t of th e  
S ta te  Department e x p e rts  in  C hina.^
Ambassador Hurley saw only one so lu tio n  to  th e  problem . 
He must have th e  men re s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  Atcheson te leg ram  r e ­
moved from C hina. There was no doubt in  H u rley 's  mind th a t  
Atcheson and S e rv ice  were th e  r in g le a d e rs  behind th e  te leg ram . 
C onfiden t th a t  he s t i l l  enjoyed th e  support of P re s id e n t
^Statement of Hurley fo r  L if e . January 11, 1946; Hur­
le y  Papers.
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R o o sev e lt, H urley began th e  p ro cess  which would b rin g  th e  
s i tu a t io n  in  th e  Chungking Embassy under c o n tro l .
The S ta te  Departm ent im m ediately re a s s ig n e d  Atcheson a t  
H u rle y 's  r e q u e s t ,  b u t S e rv ic e 's  rep lacem ent proved more d i f f i ­
c u l t ,^  T e c h n ic a lly , S e rv ice  was a  member of Wedemeyer's s t a f f  
and as such was n o t s u b je c t  to  S ta te  Department o rd e rs . Hur­
le y  went d i r e c t l y  to  S e c re ta ry  of War Henry L, Stimson and 
demanded th a t  th e  fo re ig n  s e rv ic e  o f f ic e r s  se rv in g  w ith  Wede- 
meyer be re tu rn e d  to  h i s  c o n tro l .  S ince th e  o r ig in a l  assignm ent 
of th e s e  p o l i t i c a l  o b se rv e rs  to  th e  m i l i ta r y  s t a f f  in  China had 
been S tim so n 's  id e a , he was r e lu c ta n t  to  ccaaply w ith  K u r i l ' s  
re q u e s t .
The S e c re ta ry  o f  War asked Wedemeyer i f  he was w il l in g  
to  have th e  men re tu rn e d  to  th e  Chungking Embassy. Wedemeyer 
sensed  th a t  Stim son d id  n o t fav o r g iv in g  up th e  h ig h ly  t r a in e d  
China e x p e r ts ;  b u t, in  s p i t e  of t h i s ,  he s a id  t h a t  he had no 
o b je c tio n  to  having  them re a ss ig n e d  to  H u rle y 's  s t a f f .  Wede­
meyer p o in te d  ou t t h a t  he and H urley had a r e c ip ro c a l  
arrangem ent concern ing  th e  exchange of in fo rm a tio n  and, th e r e ­
fo r e ,  he had no need f o r  s p e c ia l  p o l i t i c a l  a d v is e r s .  No doubt 
Wedemeyer was a ls o  th in k in g  of th e  hard  f e e l in g s  which would 
r e s u l t  i f  he re fu s e d  to  g iv e  up th e  fo re ig n  s e rv ic e  o f f i c e r s .  
When Wedemeyer f a i l e d  to  exp ress a need fo r  th e  China hands, 
Stimson could  do no more than  conçly  w ith  H u rle y 's  d e s i r e s , 8
^Leahy, I  Was T here . 337,
^Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer R e p o r ts j . 342-343,
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A tcheson, in  charge of th e  Chungking Embassy, was w e ll 
inform ed on even ts ta k in g  p la c e  in  W ashington and was n o t s u r ­
p r is e d  when he was to ld  to  r e tu rn  to  th e  U nited  S ta te s ,  
S e rv ic e , younger and perhaps more i d e a l i s t i c ,  d id  n o t expect 
H urley ’ s v ic to r y .  Indeed , he h e ld  h ig h  hopes th a t  someone of 
in f lu e n c e  in  W ashington would c h a lle n g e  and d e fe a t  th e  power­
f u l  Ambassador, S e rv ice  re c e iv e d  h is  o rd e rs  to  r e tu r n  to  th e  
U nited  S ta te s  w h ile  in  Yenan, and on h is  way th rough  Chungking 
sp en t an evening  w ith  Theodore H, W hite and Annalee Jacoby , 
th e  L ife  and Time r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  in  C hina, T h ^  f a i l e d  to  
sense  th e  meaning of th e  sudden o rd e rs  and in s te a d  sp e c u la te d  
th a t  S e rv ic e 's  new assignm ent would be an advancem ent.
When S e rv ice  a r r iv e d  in  W ashington and le a rn e d  th e  t r u e  
meaning of h is  rea ss ig n m en t, he w ro te  h is  two f r i e i d s  in  Chi­
n a , He was b i t t e r l y  d isa p p o in te d  t h a t  th e  s tro n g  o p p o s itio n  
to  H urley he had expected  to  form a f t e r  th e  Atcheson te leg ram  
reach ed  th e  S ta te  Department had f a i l e d  to  m a te r ia l iz e ,^  
S e rv ice  d id  n o t u n d e rs tan d  th a t  as long as H urley h e ld  th e  
con fidence  o f th e  P re s id e n t,  i t  would be very  d i f f i c u l t  to  
c h a lle n g e  h is  a u th o r i ty .  H urley, m eanwhile, seemed s a t i s f i e d  
th a t  th e  rem oval of Atcheson and S e rv ice  from Chungking had 
r e e s ta b l is h e d  h is  c o n tro l  over Embassy a f f a i r s ,  and he tu rn ed  
h is  a t t e n t io n  to  o th e r  m a tte rs .
W ith h is  v ic to ry  over th e  S ta te  Departm ent se c u re , 
H urley once ag a in  became invo lved  w ith  th e  problem  o f u n i f ic a -
^L oyalty  I n v e s t ig a t io n , P a r t  1, 1357,
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t io n .  On March 12, w h ile  s t i l l  in  W ashington, he re c e iv e d  a 
te leg ram  from General Chou E n - la i ,  in  which Chou to ld  of a 
l e t t e r  he had se n t to  th e  Chungking government. In th a t  l e t ­
t e r ,  Chou had accused th e  G eneralissim o of c u t t in g  th e  ground 
from under th e  n e g o tia t io n s . The ta lk s  had been moving hope­
f u l ly  toward th e  fo rm ation  of a p o l i t i c a l  co n fe ren ce , he s a id ,  
when Chiang made a p u b lic  s ta tem en t on March 1, b e fo re  th e  
Commission fo r  th e  In au g u ra tio n  o f C o n s t i tu t io n a l  Government, 
ex p re ss in g  h is  o p p o s itio n  to  such a  m eeting . M oreover, in  
th e  same s ta te m e n t, Chiang had proposed to  c a l l  a  N a tio n a l 
Congress on November 12, which would exclude p a r t i e s  in  Chi­
na o th e r  than  th e  Kuomintang,
In th e  same te leg ram  th e  Communist Fore ign  M in is te r  
again  made a p le a  fo r  Communist r e p re s e n ta t io n  on th e  C hinese 
d e le g a tio n  being formed f o r  th e  San F ran c isco  co n fe ren ce . 
G eneral Chou p o in ted  out to  Hurley th a t  bo th  England and th e  
U nited  S ta te s  inc luded  d e le g a te s  from bo th  m ajor p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t i e s ,  Chou re q u e s te d  th a t  h is  l e t t e r  be brought to  th e  
a t t e n t io n  of P re s id e n t R o o s e v e l t , H u r l e y  had a lre ad y  d i s ­
cussed  th e  m a tte r  of Communist re p re s e n ta t io n  on th e  Chinese 
U nited  N ations d e le g a tio n  w ith  th e  P re s id e n t, so th e  p ro p o sa l 
came as no s u rp r is e  to  R ooseve lt,
The P re s id e n t recogn ized  th e  f a i rn e s s  of Chou's p o s i­
t io n ,  A m ajor p o r t io n  of a l e t t e r  s e n t by R oosevelt to  
Chiang K ai-shek  on March 15 d e a l t  s p e c i f i c a l ly  w ith  th e
l^Chou to Hurley, March 9, 1945; Hurley Papers,
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Communist b id  fo r  r e p re s e n ta t io n  on th e  C hinese U nited  N ations 
d e le g a tio n , R oosevelt adv ised  th e  G eneralissim o t h a t  he  could 
a n t i c ip a te  no d isad v an tag es t h a t  would a r i s e  from th e  in c lu ­
s io n  of Communist r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s .  In  f a c t ,  R oosevelt 
reaso n ed , th e re  m ight be d i s t i n c t  advan tages. The P re s id e n t 
though t th e  a d d it io n  of th e  Communists to  th e  d e le g a tio n  would 
c r e a te  a fa v o ra b le  in g re s s io n  a t  th e  conference  and, m oreover, 
such a g e s tu re  would be of r e a l  a s s is ta n c e  in  b rin g in g  about 
p o l i t i c a l  u n i ty  in  C hina, R oosevelt p o in ted  out to  Chiang 
th a t  th e  U nited  S ta te s  d e le g a tio n  and th o se  o f o th e r  n a tio n s  as 
w e ll would have r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  from a l l  m ajor p o l i t i c a l  p a r­
t i e s ,  H  This l e t t e r  b rough t qu ick  r e s u l t s ,  f o r  by A p ril 17,
12
th e  Communists had d isp a tc h ed  Tung Pi-wu to  San F ra n c isc o .
Meanwhile, H urley became invo lved  in  even b roader 
q u e s tio n s  in v o lv in g  American p o lic y  in  th e  F a r E a s t, Before 
le a v in g  Chungking he had heard  rum ors, p robab ly  from Kuomintang 
so u rc e s , th a t  a s e c r e t  agreem ent made a t  Y a lta  d r a s t i c a l l y  a f ­
fe c te d  th e  m i l i ta r y  and p o l i t i c a l  s i tu a t io n  in  A sia , When 
H urley re tu rn e d  to  W ashington, he q u estio n ed  S ta te  Department 
o f f i c i a l s  about th e  arrangem ents made by th e  P re s id e n t a t  th e  
Crimean C onference, They r e p l ie d  th a t  to  t h e i r  knowledge 
R oosevelt and S ta l in  had n o t a r r iv e d  a t  any form al u n d e rs tan d ­
in g  re g a rd in g  C hina, Determ ined to  g e t a t  th e  t r u th .  H urley 
approached h is  f i r s t  m eeting w ith  th e  P re s id e n t s in c e  h is
llR o o se v e lt to  Chiang, March 15, 1945; H urley P ap ers ,
^^Copy of a r t i c l e  in  Ta King Pao (C hungking), A p ril  17, 
1945; Hurley P ap e rs ,
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r e tu rn  from China read y  f o r  a b a t t l e .
His a t t i t u d e  changed suddenly when he no ted  th e  P r e s i ­
d e n t 's  p h y s ic a l c o n d it io n . According to  H urley , th e  P re s id e n t 
looked s ic k  and n e a r  d e a th . Much of th e  f ig h t  l e f t  Ik irley  
when he saw h is  o ld  f r i e n d  in  such poor h e a l th ,  H u r l^  cau­
t io u s ly  r a i s e d  th e  s u b je c t  of th e  Crimean ta lk s  w ith  R o o sev e lt, 
and a f t e r  some d is c u s s io n , R ooseve lt f i n a l ly  produced th e  
agreem ent concern ing  R ussian  e n try  in to  th e  Far E as te rn  w ar. 
H urley was shocked when he examined th e  document.
H urley f e l t  t h a t  th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i t y  and th e  po­
l i t i c a l  independence o f China had been su rre n d e re d . The 
p ro to c o l p rov ided  t h a t  th e  S ov ie t Union would e n te r  th e  war in  
th e  F ar E ast on th e  c o n d itio n s  th a t  th e  s ta tu s  quo in  O uter 
M ongolia would be p re se rv e d  and th e  form er r i g h t s  o f R u ss ia , 
v io la te d  by Japan in  1904, would be r e s to r e d .  S p e c if ic a l ly  
re g a rd in g  C hina, t h i s  meant th a t  th e  P o rt of D airen would be 
in te r n a t io n a l iz e d ,  R u s s ia 's  preem inent i n t e r e s t s  in  th a t  p o r t  
would be sa feg u a rd ed , and P o rt A rthu r would be le a se d  as a 
nav a l base to  th e  S o v ie t Union, In  a d d it io n ,  th e  South Man­
ch u ria n  Railway would be o p e ra ted  by a j o i n t  S o v ie t-C h in ese  
conçany and S o v ie t i n t e r e s t s  in  i t  would be p ro te c te d . The 
P re s id e n t had ag reed  to  u se  h is  in f lu e n c e  to  o b ta in  th e  con­
cu rren ce  of Chiang K ai-shek  to  th e  p ro v is io n s  of th e  agreem ent, 
R oosevelt den ied  th a t  th e se  p ro v is io n s  in  any way a f f e c te d  th e  
t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i t y  o r p o l i t i c a l  independence of China and 
to ld  a i r l e y  th a t  he was see in g  g h o s ts ,
^^China W hite P a p e r. 113-114,
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According to  H urley , th e  P re s id e n t changed h is  a t t i t u d e  
by th e  tim e of t h e i r  n ex t m eeting some days l a t e r ,  R oosevelt 
t o ld  H urley th a t  he had examined th e  document more c lo s e ly  and 
ad m itted  th a t  some f e a tu r e s  o f i t  j u s t i f i e d  H u rle y 's  f e a r .  He 
then  asked H u r l^  to  v i s i t  C h u rc h ill  and S ta l in  and se cu re  
t h e i r  su p p o rt f o r  a f r e e ,  u n i f ie d  China under Chiang K ai-sh ek , 
H urley l a t e r  in te r p r e te d  t h i s  to  mean th a t  he  was to  o b ta in  
changes in  th e  Y a lta  agreem ent which would g u a ra n tee  Chinese 
so v e re ig n ty ,^ ^  There i s  no way to  confirm  th e  e x ac t d e ta i l s  
o f th e se  m eetings. B ut, s e v e ra l  d i f f e r e n t  m eanings can be 
a tta c h e d  to  th e  d is c u s s io n s  w ith o u t s u b s ta n t ia l ly  a l t e r in g  
th e  f a c ts  as re p o r te d  by H urley,
There i s  no rea so n  why K u r i l ' s  account o f th e  even ts  
le a d in g  up to  th e  i n i t i a l  c o n fro n ta tio n  w ith  R o o sev e lt cannot 
be accep ted  a t  n e a r ly  fa c e  v a lu e . M oreover, H u r le y 's  d e s c r ip ­
t io n  o f h is  a s s a u l t  on th e  ag rean en t in  th e  f i r s t  m eetings r in g s  
t r u e  and m ight w e ll have caused R oosevelt to  re c o n s id e r  th e  
m a tte rs  covered a t  Y a lta ,  Y et, i t  seems u n l ik e ly  th a t  th e  
P re s id e n t ever concluded t h a t  th e  agreem ent was a m is ta k e . 
V ir tu a l ly  every o f f i c i a l  who knew of i t s  e x is te n c e  a t  th e  tim e 
b e lie v e d  i t  to  be th e  b e s t  p o s s ib le  arrangem ent which could  be 
ach ieved  under th e  c ircu m stan ces ,
l % acA rthu r H earÿ ig s . P a r t  4 , 2884-2885, D ra f t of 
H urley Memoirs, x i i i ,  20; B urley P ap ers ,
^^Leahy, I  Was T here . 318, MacArthur H e arin g s . P a r t  3 , 
1846, and P a r t  5, 3332, F o r r e s t a l . The F o r r e s ta i  D ia r ie s . 31, 
John L, S n e l l ,  The Meaning of Y a lta ; Big th r e e  Diplomacy and 
th e  New Balance of Power  IBaton Rouge: L o u is ian a  S ta te  Uni­
v e r s i ty  P re s s , 1^5è), 197. China W hite P a p e r. 115,
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S t i l l ,  R oosevelt m ight have f e l t  th a t  i t  would do no 
harm to  q u ie t  th e  f e a r s  of h is  v o l a t i l e  Ambassador to  C hina, 
H urley was o rdered  to  v i s i t  C h u rc h ill and S ta l in  and d isc u ss  
th e  China problem  w ith  them in  o rd er to  determ ine i f  England 
and R ussia  t r u ly  supported  American p o lic y  in  China. A se c ­
ond a sp e c t o f th e  m ission  was to  co o rd in a te  w ith  th e  R ussians 
th e  d is c lo s u re  of th e  Y a lta  s e c r e t  agreem ent to  Chiang K ai- 
shek. Charged w ith  t h i s  m iss io n , Hurley p repared  to  leav e  
th e  U nited  S ta te s  f o r  London, Moscow, and Chungking.
During H urley’ s m onth-long s ta y  in  W ashington, he con­
t in u e d  to  advance an o p t im is t ic  view of th e  China s i tu a t io n .  
The day b e fo re  he l e f t  th e  American c a p i t a l .  Hurley h e ld  a 
p re s s  conference  in  which he summed up h is  a t t i t u d e  toward 
C hina. The Ambassador commented on th e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  of u n i­
f i c a t io n  and s a id  th a t  th e  U nited  S ta te s  expected  fa v o ra b le  
r e s u l t s . H u r l e y ' s  optim ism , however, was n o t shared  by 
John C a r te r  V incent,
On A p ril 2, j u s t  b e fo re  H u rley 's  d e p a rtu re  f o r  England, 
V incent se n t th e  Ambassador a l e t t e r  in  which he gave H urley 
some adv ice  on th e  u n i f ic a t io n  problem , V incent though t th a t  
R u ssia  cou ld  g iv e  c o n s id e ra b le  he lp  in  fu r th e r in g  u n i f ic a t io n  
in  China, and urged Hurley to  re q u e s t openly such h e lp  when 
he reached  Moscow. He cau tio n ed  Hurley th a t  n e i th e r  Chiang 
n o r th e  Chinese Communists would y ie ld  w ithou t firm  and con­
s ta n t  p re s s u re . V incent reasoned  th a t  th e  S ov ie t Union was
1^Department of S ta te ,  Radio B u lle t in  No. 79, A p ril  2, 
1945; Hurley P apers .
168
in  a p o s i t io n  to  p la c e  p re s su re  on th e  C hinese Communists and 
a t  th e  same tim e th e  U nited  S ta te s  could  do th e  same w ith  th e  
Kuomintang.
Hurley l e f t  W ashington A p ril 3 on h is  n o t so s e c re t  
m iss io n . Newsweek, m agazine re p o r te d  th a t  H urley had been 
charged w ith  a s e c re t  ta s k  by F ra n k lin  R o o sev e lt, and th e  
e d i to r s  guessed  r i g h t  when they  s a id  H urley would ta k e  to  
Chungking in fo rm a tio n  from  th e  P re s id e n t on what th e  S ov ie t 
Union cou ld  be expected  to  do in  th e  P a c if ic  c o n f l i c t . T h e  
W ashington, D. C ., Times H era ld , however, b e lie v e d  K u r i l ' s  
m issio n  concerned th e  San F ran c isco  co n fe ren ce . I t s  e d i to r s  
c o n je c tu re d  wrongly th a t  H urley c a r r ie d  a p e rso n a l p le a  from 
th e  C hief E xecutive  fo r  f u l l  u n d e rs tan d in g  and com plete h a r ­
mony between th e  b ig  th r e e  in  San F ra n c isco .
W ith rumors ram pant, Hürley began h is  roundabout r e ­
tu rn  to  China. He sp en t fo u r  days in  England where he ta lk e d  
w ith  many E n g lish  o f f i c i a l s ,  in c lu d in g  Prime M in is te r  C h u rc h il l ,  
who, acco rd ing  to  H urley , re a ff irm e d  h is  suppo rt of American 
p o lic y  in  China. He l e f t  England s h o r t ly  a f t e r  m idn igh t,
A p ril  8, 1945, and a r r iv e d  th a t  a fte rn o o n  in  C a iro . While in  
C a iro , H urley met w ith  T. V. Soong, who was on h is  way to  th e  
San F ran c isco  co n fe ren ce . He a r r iv e d  in  Teheran on A p ril  12, 
where h is  journey  ended m om entarily the  n ex t day, when he
^^V incent to  H urley , A p ril  2 , 1945; Hurley P ap ers .
ISiiThe P e r is c o p e ,” Newsweek. XXV (March 26, 1945), 25.
^W ash ing ton , D. C ., Times H erald . A p ril 4 , 1945; Hur­
le y  C lipp ing  Book, 1945; H urley P ap ers .
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le a rn e d  P re s id e n t R oosevelt was dead. H urley im m ediately 
ten d e red  th e  custom ary r e s ig n a t io n  to  th e  new P re s id e n t,  At 
th e  same tim e , he o f fe re d  to  c o n tin u e  in  h is  p o s t ," *  P r e s i ­
d en t Harry S, Truman w ired  back q u ic k ly , a d v is in g  H urley to
c o n tin u e  w ith  th e  m ission  a ss ig n ed  to  him by th e  l a t e  Presi*-
22d en t R o o sev e lt. The problem s fa c in g  Truman d u rin g  th e  e a r ly  
months of h is  p res id en cy  so occup ied  him th a t  H urley had a 
f r e e  hand in  China f o r  s e v e ra l  m onths.
H urley a r r iv e d  in  Moscow and c o n fe rred  w ith  M arshal 
S ta l in  on A p ril  15, In  th e  ta lk s  w ith  th e  S o v ie t le a d e r ,  he 
to ld  of h is  n e g o tia t io n s  w ith  th e  C hinese Communists, comment­
in g  t h a t  h i s  d isc u s s io n s  w ith  F o re ign  M in is te r  M olotov in  
August of 1944 had had an im p o rtan t e f f e c t  on th e  s t ru g g le  fo r  
u n i ty  in  C hina, S ta l in  sa id  he would a s s i s t  in  every way pos­
s ib l e  to  b r in g  about th e  u n i f ic a t io n  of m i l i ta r y  fo rc e s  in  
C hina, and added th a t  he would u se  h i s  in f lu e n c e  w ith  Prime 
M in is te r  C h u rc h ill  to  secu re  th e  same o b je c tiv e , unaware th a t  
H urley had a lre a d y  spoken w ith  th e  B r i t i s h  Prime M in is te r  on 
t h i s  s u b je c t .
The c o n v e rsa tio n  then  s h i f t e d  to  Y a lta , H urley seemed 
p r i m a r i l y  concerned w ith  a r r iv in g  a t  a d a te  when he cou ld  r e -
^^H urley China Log, 1945, A p ril  3 -A p ril 13, 1945; Hur­
le y  P ap e rs ,
^ Ifiu rley  to  Harry S, Truman, A p ril  13, 1945; H urley
P apers ,
^^Truman to  H urley , A p ril 13, 1945; H urley P ap ers ,
"^Summary of Conversation between Hurley and S ta lin ,
A pril 15, 1945; Hurley Papers.
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v e a l th e  p ro v is io n s  of th e  agreem ents to  Chiang K ai-sh ek .
S ta l in  fe a re d  th a t  i f  R u s s ia 's  e n try  in to  th e  A sian war be­
came known to  Chiang b e fo re  th e  S ov ie t Union was ready  to  
a t ta c k  th e  Jap an ese , i t  m ight le a k  and prompt th e  Japanese  
army to  a t ta c k  th e  R ussians b e fo re  they  were p re p a re d . Ap­
p a re n t ly ,  th e  s u b je c t  of changing th e  term s o f th e  agreem ent 
d id  n o t a r i s e .  A f te r  some d isc u ss io n  o f th e  m i l i ta r y  s i t u a ­
t io n  in  C hina, th e  m eeting  ad jou rned .
H u rle y 's  r e p o r t  o f t h i s  c o n v e rsa tio n  aga in  b rough t him 
in to  c o n f l i c t  w ith  th e  p ro fe s s io n a l  d ip lom ats in  th e  S ta te  
D ^ a r tm e n t. W hile f t i r le y  re p o r te d  t h a t  S ta l in  had agreed  un­
q u a l i f ie d ly  to  A m erica 's  p o lic y  in  China as o u t l in e d  du ring  
th e  c o n v e rsa tio n , George F, Kennan, then  Charge d 'a f f a i r e s  in  
Moscow, took  sharp  ex cep tio n  to  H u rle y 's  c o n c lu s io n s .^ ^  Ken­
nan found H u rle y 's  te leg ram  so u n r e a l i s t i c  t h a t  he fo llow ed  
i t  w ith  a n o th e r , w arning th e  S ta te  Departm ent n o t to  be m is­
le d . Kennan s a id  S t a l i n 's  "use  of words which meant a l l  
th in g s  to  a l l  peop le  and h is  c a u tio u s  a f f a b i l i t y "  shou ld  no t 
le a d  th e  U nited S ta te s  in to  an undue r e l i a n c e  on S o v ie t a id  
o r even S o v ie t acq u iescen ce  to  th e  achievem ent of American 
lo n g -te rm  o b je c tiv e s  in  China.
Truman ag reed  w ith  K ennan 's assessm ent o f th e  s i tu a t io n  
re g a rd in g  th e  S o v ie t Union, b u t th e  new P re s id e n t u n fo r tu n a te ly
Z ^Ib id .
^ % u rle y  to  S t e t t i n i u s ,  A p ril 17, 1945; f t ir le y  P apers .
^^L oyalty  I n v e s t ig a t io n . P a r t  2, 2119-2120.
f a i l e d  to  n o te  th e  secondary im p lic a tio n  of th e  m essage.
In  e f f e c t ,  Kennan sa id  th a t  Hurley was a r a th e r  g u l l i b l e  in ­
d iv id u a l who was a d d ic te d  to  w r i t in g  exaggera ted  r e p o r ts  of 
su p cess . Perhaps i f  Truman had been more f a m il ia r  w ith  Hur­
l e y 's  background and th e  feud  w ith  th e  S ta te  D epartm ent, he 
would have r e a l iz e d  ü i r l e y 's  shortcom ings and g ra c e fu l ly  r e ­
p lac ed  him. But B ir le y  rem ained Ambassador to  China and 
a r r iv e d  in  Chungking on A p ril 22, to  occupy an o f f ic e  which 
by then  had been v aca ted  by some of th e  most im portan t of th e  
o ld  China hands. Meanwhile, in  Chungking, many of th o se  who 
su rv iv ed  th e  purge hoped fo r  a way to  g e t out of China
q u ic k ly , 28
2^Harry S. Truman, M anoirs, Vol. I :  Year of D ecisions
(Garden C ity ; Doubleday and Company, 1955),"35%
2^L oyalty  In v e s t ig a tio n  . P a r t  2 , 2361.
CHAPTER XI 
BIDING TIME
Ambassador H u rle y 's  a r r i v a l  in  Chungking on A p ril 22 
marked th e  beg inn ing  o f a new phase in  th e  Kuomintang-Comraunist 
n e g o t ia t io n s ,!  H urley sp en t th e  f i r s t  few weeks a f t e r  h is  r e ­
tu rn  t e s t in g  th e  new power which r e s u l te d  from h is  v ic to ry  
over S ta te  Department o f f i c i a l s  who had d isa g re e d  w ith  him.
He ch ided  th e  p ro fe s s io n a l  d ip lom ats f o r  n o t having reco g n ized  
th e  urgency o f u n i f ic a t io n  in  China a t  a  much e a r l i e r  d a te , 
and to ld  them of th e  d ip lo m a tic  coup he b e lie v e d  he had 
ach ieved  by se cu rin g  R ussian  and B r i t i s h  app rova l of t h i s  
U nited  S ta te s  p o lic y  in  China. H u rley 's  d e s i r e  to  ga in  firm  
c o n tro l  over b a s ic  p o l ic y  m a tte rs  le d  him to  sea rch  fo r  a spe­
c i f i c  is s u e  which would s tre n g th e n  h is  cause .
G eneral Wedemeyer possessed  two d i r e c t iv e s  which he be­
l ie v e d  a u th o riz e d  him to  s t a r t  firming th e  C hinese Communists, 
These documents had o r ig in a te d  in  th e  S ta te  Departm ent D iv i­
s io n  o f Chinese A f f a i r s ,  They were n o t r e a l l y  d i r e c t iv e s  bu t 
r a th e r  d u p lic a te s  of b r ie f in g  papers p rep a red  f o r  th e  P re s id e n t
^ H u r l^  China Log, 1945, A p ril 22, 1945; H urley P ap ers ,
^D raft m essage. Hurley to  S t e t t i n iu s ,  n , d , ; Hurley Pa­
p e rs .
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p r io r  to  th e  Y a lta  co n fe ren ce . The S ta te  and War Departm ents 
had d i s t r ib u t e d  them fo r  in fo rm a tio n a l purposes and co p ies  had
3
been in  H u rle y 's  p o sse ss io n  fo r  some tim e . Ambassador H urley 
though t th a t  th e s e  two documents should  be c h a llen g ed .
Hurley se n t  a  message to  W ashington a t ta c k in g  th e  di= 
r e c t iv e s .  He s a id  th e  U nited  S ta te s  cou ld  n o t arm th e  
Communists and s t i l l  a ch iev e  u n i f ic a t io n .  He cau tio n ed  th e  
S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  a g a in s t  p la y in g  bo th  ends a g a in s t  th e  mid­
d le  w ith  a  d iv id e d  American p o lic y , and ad v ised  t h a t  W edem^er 
would d e fe r  a c t io n  u n t i l  th e  Embassy in  Chungking re c e iv e d  in -  
s txn ic tions from th e  D epartm ent,^  When th i s  message a r r iv e d  in  
W ashington, no one th e re  doubted what answer Hurley expec ted , 
f o r  by t h i s  tim e th e  S ta te  Department had a c le a r  u n d e rs tan d ­
in g  of what H urley though t shou ld  be done in  China,
H urley fav o red  a l l - o u t  p o l i t i c a l  and m il i ta r y  suppo rt 
f o r  th e  Chiang K ai-shek  reg im e. At th e  same tim e , d e s p i te  th e  
a p p aren t c o n t r a d i t io n s , he wanted to  co n tin u e  to  work fo r  
co o p e ra tio n  between th e  Communists and th e  Kuomintang, Eventu­
a l l y ,  H urley hoped to  b rin g  th e  CcMnmunist m i l i ta r y  fo rc e s  under 
th e  c o n tro l  o f Chiang, H urley b e lie v e d  th a t  any d e v ia tio n  from 
th e s e  p o l ic i e s  would r e s u l t  n o t in  f l e x i b i l i t y  bu t in  confu­
s io n  and f a i l u r e .  As H urley c h a ra c te r iz e d  i t ,  " low ering  of
3
The two b r ie f in g  papers r e f e r r e d  to  a re :  Memorandum
fo r  th e  P re s id e n t ,  "O u tlin e  of S h o rt-ran g e  O b jec tiv es  and P o l i ­
c ie s  of th e  U nited  S ta te s  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  C h ina,"  January  12, 
1945; and Memorandum f o r  th e  P re s id e n t,  " P o l i t i c a l  and m i l i ­
ta r y  s i tu a t io n  in  China in  th e  even t th e  U .S ,S ,R , e n te r s  th e  
war in  th e  F ar E a s t,"  January  9, 1945; H urley P ap ers ,
^Draft message. Hurley to  S te t t in iu s , n , d , ; Hurley Pa­
p ers,
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American s i g h t s , ” w ith  r e s p e c t  to  American o b je c tiv e s  in  Chi­
n a , seemed to  be d e fe a tism  and could  h a rd ly  f a i l  to  ren d e r 
th e  American ta s k  in  China more d i f f i c u l t , ^
S ix  days a f t e r  th e  A m bassador's r e tu r n  to  C hina, he r e ­
s ta te d  con fidence  in  h is  a b i l i t y  to  b r in g  about u n i ty  in  China. 
At a  p re s s  co n fe ren ce , he m entioned h is  t a lk s  w ith  M arshal 
S ta l in  and Prime M in is te r  C h u rc h ill  and inform ed th e  r e p o r te r s  
t h a t  bo th  men had ag reed  w ith  A m erica 's  o v e ra l l  p o lic y  in  Chi­
n a . H urley though t t h a t  th e  news concern ing  th e  appointm ent 
by Chiang o f a Communist p a r ty  member to  th e  C hinese d e le g a ­
t io n  fo r  th e  U nited  N ations co n fe rence  a t  San F ra n c isco  was 
an encouraging  s ig n . Such developm ents, he to ld  th e  r e p o r t ­
e r s ,  gave him hope th a t  th e  u n i f ic a t io n  of a l l  a n ti- J a p a n e s e  
m i l i ta r y  fo rc e s  in  China was w ith in  th e  fo re s e e a b le  f u tu r e .^
By May 8 , H urley had re c e iv e d  an answer from th e  S ta te  
Department which he expected  would confirm  th e  p o lic y  he had 
o u tl in e d  in  h is  m essage re q u e s tin g  guidance on th e  two d i r e c ­
t iv e s  p o ssessed  by Wedemeyer. The a c t in g  S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te ,  
Joseph C. Grew, ag reed  w ith  H urley th a t  th e  U nited  S ta te s  
should  r e t a in  i t s  fundam ental o b je c t iv e s .  But he cau tio n e d  
t h a t  i t  was most im p o rtan t t h a t  com plete f l e x i b i l i t y  be main­
ta in e d  w ith  re g a rd s  to  th e  manner o f ach iev in g  them. Grew 
wanted H urley to  make i t  e n t i r e ly  c le a r  to  th e  G enera lissim o  
and h is  government t h a t  th e  U nited  S ta te s  su p p o rt was n o t a
^ Ib id .
^U nited  S ta te s  O ffice  of War In fo rm ation  B u l le t in ,
A p ril  28, 1945, 17-21; H urley P ap e rs ,
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blank  check. He sa id  th e  Chinese government must u n d ers tan d  
th a t  th e  U nited S ta te s  expected  thorough re fo rm s, a  b road­
ening of th e  bases of governm ent, and improvement in  
a d m in is tra t iv e  e f f ic ie n c y .  I t  was e s s e n t ia l  t h a t  in te r n a l  
u n i ty  be ach ieved  as soon as p o s s ib le  so th a t  th e  p ro se c u tio n  
of th e  war could  be f a c i l i t a t e d  and a sound fo u n d a tio n  could  
be l a id  f o r  firm  and f r ie n d ly  r e l a t io n s  w ith  R u ss ia .^
On May 15, a t  a m eeting of th e  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  of 
U nited  S ta te s  agencies o p e ra tin g  in  China, Hurley made a s t a t e ­
ment on American p o lic y . He l e f t  no doubt th a t  h is  p o lic y  and 
th a t  o f W ashington were n o t th e  same. Hurley s a id  th a t  i t  was 
th e  p o lic y  o f th e  U nited  S ta te s  n o t to  suppo rt m i l i t a r i l y ,  po­
l i t i c a l l y ,  o r econom ically  any regim e in  China o th e r  than  th e  
N a tio n a l government o f China w ith  i t s  c a p i ta l  te m p o ra rily  in  
Chungking. W hile H urley den ied  i t  in  p r in c ip le ,  he had in  f a c t  
extended a l l - o u t  p o l i t i c a l  and m il i ta r y  su p p o rt to  th e  Chung­
k ing  governm ent. With a ^  fa c to  b lank  check from th e  U nited 
S ta te s ,  i t  was very  u n lik e ly  th a t  Chiang would make th e  con­
cess io n s  which th e  C hinese Communists demanded as p r e r e q u is i te s  
fo r  u n i f ic a t io n ,^
Of more immediate concern in  China and elsew here  was 
th e  impending im plem entation o f th e  Y a lta  agreem ent. Everyone 
knew th a t  l i t t l e  would be accom plished in  China u n t i l  th e  So­
v i e t  Union e n te red  th e  war and made i t s  o b je c tiv e s  c le a r .  By
^Joseph C, Grew to  Hurley, May 8 , 1945; Hurley Papers.
®Hurley to S te t t in iu s ,  May 15, 1945; Hurley Papers,
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t h i s  tim e , a d e c is io n  had been made t h a t  th e  U nited  S ta te s  
would no t a ttem p t to  engage th e  m asses of th e  Japanese  Army 
in  China w ith  American ground fo rc e s .  The U nited S ta te s  
would bypass a lan d in g  on th e  m ainland o f China and in s te a d
g
invade th e  Japanese  home is la n d s .  This d e c is io n  g r e a t ly  in ­
c reased  th e  S ov ie t p o s i t io n  in  C hina, fo r  R ussian  in te rv e n tio n  
would n o t be co u n te r-b a lan c ed  by a co rrespond ing  American 
m i l i ta r y  involvem ent.
On May 22, 1945, Congressman Mike M ansfie ld  of Montana 
made a speech on th e  S ov ie t Union in  China. He tra c e d  th e  
v a rio u s  problem s which e x is te d  between R ussia  and C hina, 
p o in tin g  ou t s p e c i f i c a l ly  th e  problem s of M ongolia, c o n tro l  of 
M anchuria, and th e  C hinese Communists, Congressman M ansfie ld  
s a id  th a t  th e  q u e s tio n  of C hinese d is u n ity  was very  im portan t 
to  th e  U nited S ta te s  and p o in te d  ou t th e  dangers in h e re n t in  
R ussian  su p p o rt fo r  th e  Chinese C o m m u n is ts .C o n g re s sm a n  
M a n s f ie ld 's  a c c u ra te  a n a ly s is  of th e  p ro b ab le  r e s u l t s  o f So­
v i e t  in te rv e n tio n  in  th e  Far E ast was made w ith o u t knowledge 
of th e  Y a lta  agreem ent. Furtherm ore, i t  in d ic a te d  th a t  to  
anyone f a m il ia r  w ith  th e  s i tu a t io n  in  th e  Far E a s t, R u s s ia 's  
p ro b ab le  course  o f a c t io n  was no m ystery .
Congressman M ansfield  was n o t th e  only one concerned 
about S in o -S o v ie t r e l a t i o n s ,  fo r  P re s id e n t Truman had se n t 
Harry Hopkins to  Moscow to  again  d isc u ss  R u s s ia 's  e n try  in to
^Truman, M anoirs. I ,  236,
10,
1945, XCI, Part 4
Ü, S . ,  C ongressiona l Record. 79 th  Cong,, 1 s t  S e s s ,,o n g ress i i
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th e  F ar E aste rn  w ar. On May 28, Hopkins c ab led  Truman from 
th e  R ussian  c a p i ta l  w ith  news th a t  th e  R ussian  army would be 
deployed in  M anchuria by August 8. Hopkins d e c la re d  th a t  
S ta l in  seemed anxious to  re a c h  an agreem ent w ith  th e  Kuomin­
tang  re g a rd in g  th e  Y a lta  p ro p o sa ls . The S o v ie t P rem ier wanted 
to  see  T. V. Soong no l a t e r  than  Ju ly  1, and re q u e s te d  th a t  th e  
U nited  S ta te s  inform  Chiang K ai-shek  o f th e  Y a lta  agreem ents a t  
th e  same tim e . Once ag a in  S ta l in  s a id  he d e s ire d  u n ity  in  Chi­
na under th e  le a d e rs h ip  of Chiang K ai-shek . He exp ressed  h is  
agreem ent w ith  th e  American Open Door p o lic y  and recogn ized  
t h a t  th e  U nited S ta te s  was th e  only  power w ith  th e  re so u rc e s  
to  a id  China a f t e r  th e  w a r .^
Meanwhile, by e a r ly  June s ig n s  of impending c i v i l  war 
in  China could  be seen everyw here. Chiang was making a s tro n g  
b id  to  have h is  U nited  S ta te s -e q u ip p e d  C hinese tro o p s  in  South 
China moved n o r th  of th e  Yangtze R iv e r , and to  p ro v id e  tro o p s  
a lre a d y  th e re  w ith  American arm s. T h is , of c o u rse , would p u t 
th e  b e s t  equipped tro o p s  in  China in  a p o s i t io n  to  a t ta c k  th e  
C hinese Communist s tro n g h o ld s  in  N orth China as soon as th e  
war w ith  Japan ended,
The growing danger o f in te r n a l  c o n f l i c t  became so g re a t  
th a t  p o l i t i c a l  o f f i c e r s  in  th e  Embassy cou ld  no lo n g er ig n o re  
i t .  In  th e  f i r s t  week of June , S e c re ta ry  George R ingw alt and 
C ounselor R obert L, Smyth o f th e  Embassy, th rough  a v a r ie ty  of
^^Truman, Memoirs. I ,  264-265,
1 9"Lee Tsung-jen to  Wedemeyer, June 4 , 1945; Hurley Pa­
p ers.
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C hinese sou rces in c lu d in g  Kuomintang, l i b e r a l ,  and Communist, 
le a rn e d  of c la sh e s  between th e  Kuomintang and Communist fo rce s  
in  a re a s  vdiich were be ing  evacuated  by th e  Japanese  in  South 
C hina. In  some cases th e s e  sk irm ish es  invo lved  more than  s ix  
d iv is io n s  on each s id e ,  and in  one in s ta n c e  th e  Kuomintang was 
re p o r te d  to  have s u f fe re d  a s e r io u s  r e v e r s a l  in  which th e  Com­
m unists  c ap tu red  over fo u r hundred American r i f l e s  and machine 
guns,
Smyth and R in g w a lt 's  in fo rm an ts  charged t h a t ,  a lth o u g h  
th e  S ix th  Kuomintang Congress went on re c o rd  as su p p o rtin g  th e  
se t tle m e n t o f o u ts ta n d in g  Communist problem s th rough  p e a c e fu l 
means, th e  a t t i t u d e  of th e  r u l in g  c l iq u e  in  p r iv a te  se s s io n s  
was j u s t  th e  r e v e r s e .  On s e v e ra l  o ccasio n s th e  G enera lissim o 
was re p o r te d  to  have ad d re ssed  th e  Congress in  s e c r e t  se ss io n  
on th e  Communist q u e s tio n  and lin k e d  th e  Communists w ith  th e  
Japanese  as enemies o f th e  s t a t e  who should  be shown no mercy. 
On an o th e r o ccas io n , th e  G enera lissim o  had s a id  th a t  th e  end 
o f th e  war w ith  Japan would p re s e n t  a golden o p p o rtu n ity  fo r  
th e  N a t io n a l i s t  government to  d e a l w ith  th e  Communist " t r a i ­
to r s  ."  Snyth and R ingw alt were to ld  th a t  as long as th e  U nited 
S ta te s  p o lic y  of u n lim ite d  su p p o rt o f th e  Kuomintang co n tin u ed , 
no p o s s ib i l i t y  o f p e a c e fu l s e ttle m e n t between th e  Communists 
and th e  Kuomintang e x is te d  and bo th  p a r t i e s  would move c lo s e r  
to  c i v i l  w ar.
1 R o b e r t  L. Smyth and George R ingw alt' s r e p o r t  was n o t 
s e n t to  W ashington s e p a ra te ly ,  b u t was in c lu d ed  in  H urley to  
S t e t t i n iu s ,  June 7, 1945; H urley P ap e rs .
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C onfronted w ith  t h i s  se r io u s  ev idence , th e  two fo re ig n  
s e rv ic e  o f f ic e r s  thought i t  should be brought to  th e  a t t e n t io n  
o f th e  Ambassador and th e  S ta te  Department in  W ashington.
They w ro te  a summary o f th e se  problem s and p re se n te d  i t  to  Am­
bassador H urley. Hurley became angry when he re a d  th e  r e p o r t .  
He vehem ently denied  th a t  th e  dangers of c i v i l  war re p o r te d  by 
Snyth and R ingw alt e x is te d . He to ld  them th a t  th e  U nited 
S ta te s  p o lic y  was no t to  g ive  u n lim ite d  suppo rt to  th e  Kuomin­
tang  and th a t  rumors to  th e  c o n tra ry  were u n tru e . To H urley, 
they  were p e r s i s t in g  in  th e  o ld  "d ie -h a rd  a ttem p t"  to  b rin g  
about th e  c o lla p s e  o f th e  N a t io n a l is t  government in  C hina. 
H urley agreed  to  forw ard th e  r e p o r t  on to  W ashington bu t 
a tta c h e d  to  i t  a long r e b u t t a l  denying th e  accuracy  o f th e  
in fo rm a tio n . H u r l^  ended h is  c o u n te r -a t ta c k  on th e  fo re ig n  
s e rv ic e  o f f ic e r s  w ith  p re d ic t io n s  of h is  own success and a 
d en u n cia tio n  of what he c a l le d  "American id eo lo g iC d l c ru ­
s a d e r s ."1^
N e v e rth e le ss , rumors o f c i v i l  s t r i f e  cou ld  no t be 
s t i l l e d .  The June 7 is s u e  of th e  Communist newspaper pub­
l is h e d  in  Chungking charged th e  Kuomintang w ith  a ttem p tin g  to  
p r e c ip i t a te  c i v i l  war. The Communist paper re p o r te d  th a t  th e  
Kuomintang was using  97,000 tro o p s to  blockade Communist a re a s .  
On th e  o th e r  hand, th e  a r t i c l e  sa id  th a t  th e  Communists were 
dec ided ly  a g a in s t  c i v i l  war and, above a l l ,  s tro n g ly  a g a in s t  
th e  u se  of American Lend-Lease weapons to  f i g h t  i t .  As a
^^Hurley to  S te t t in iu s , June 7, 1945; Hurley Papers.
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r e s u l t  o f th e se  ch arg es , p u b lic  s a le  and d i s t r ib u t io n  of th is  
is s u e  was f o r b i d d e n . O n c e  a g a in , Hurley den ied  th e  au then ­
t i c i t y  of th e  Communist r e p o r t ,  b u t by then  even he adm itted  
c e r ta in  u n fav o rab le  s ig n s  in  China.
H urley was despondent over th e  r e s u l t s  o f th e  S ix th  
Kuomintang Congress h e ld  in  May, 1945. A sharp  c o n f l i c t  had 
taken p la c e  w ith in  th e  Kuomintang p a r ty ,  and th e re  was con­
s id e ra b le  outspoken c r i t i c i s m  of th e  government du ring  th e  
s e s s io n s . M oreover, th e  g e n e ra l tre n d  of th e  Congress was 
u n fav o rab le  to  l i b e r a l  e lem en ts. The re a c tio n a ry  "O rganiza­
t io n  c liq u e "  in c re a se d  i t s  power by about 10 p e r c e n t , m ostly  
a t  th e  expense o f more l i b e r a l  f a c t io n s  w ith in  th e  p a r ty .
As a r e s u l t ,  t h i s  group had d i r e c t  c o n tro l  of about 40 p e r  
cen t of th e  membership in  th e  two most im portan t com m ittees in  
th e  p a r ty ,  and in d i r e c t ly  c o n tro l le d  a m a jo r ity  o f bo th  com­
m it te e s .  An a ttem p t to  have th e  G eneralissim o made p a r ty  
le a d e r  fo r  l i f e  was blocked by Sun Fo, th e  l i b e r a l  son of Sun 
Y a t-sen . H urley d isa p p o in te d ly  inform ed th e  S ta te  Department 
of th e s e  developm ents.^^
The S ix th  Kuomintang Congress d id  no t go u n n o ticed  by 
th e  Communist le a d e rs h ip . In  a b ro ad c as t o r ig in a t in g  in  Yenan 
on June 16, th e  C hinese Communists re p e a te d  t h e i r  in te n t io n  to
^^Hurley to  S t e t t i n iu s ,  June 12, 1945; H urley P apers .
--The "O rgan iza tion  c liq u e "  i s  an o th er name fo r  th e  
"C. C. c l iq u e ,"  a r e a c t io n a ry  p o l i t i c a l  f a c t io n  w ith in  th e  
Kuomintang,
Hurley to  S te t t in iu s , June 16, 1945; Hurley Papers.
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b o y c o tt th e  P e o p le 's  P o l i t i c a l  C ouncil, which th e  Kuomintang 
had d e s ig n a ted  as a p re lu d e  to  th e  P e o p le 's  C ongress, sched­
u le d  to  be convened on November 12. Mao T se-tung  had a lre a d y  
a s s e r te d  h is  r e f u s a l  to  p a r t i c i p a te  in  such a m eeting in  
F eb ruary , The b ro ad cas t charged th a t  th e  Kuomintang re fu s e d  
to  te rm in a te  i t s  o n e -p a rty  government o r  even to  c a rry  o u t th e  
b a s ic  p re lim in a ry  arrangem ents fo r  th e  r e s to r a t io n  o f u n i ty  as 
p ro v id ed  in  th e  Communist fo u r  p o in t p ro p o sa l o f December 28. 
C harging th a t  th e  Kuomintang d e c is io n  to  c a l l  th e  P e o p le 's  Po­
l i t i c a l  C ouncil was a u n i l a t e r a l  a c t ,  th e  Communists i n s i s t e d  
t h a t  th e  Kuomintang had even d e s ig n a ted  th e  Communist d e le g a te s .  
They a tta c k e d  th e  Kuomintang' s r e f u s a l  to  g ra n t any o th e r  p a r ty  
in  China a le g a l  p o s i t io n ,  a s s e r t in g  th a t  th e  proposed Congress 
would be com plete ly  dom inated by th e  Kuomintang and would p re ­
p a re  th e  way f o r  d is u n i ty  and c i v i l  w ar.
In  s p i t e  of t h i s  ic y  b la s t  from Yenan, th e  Kuomintang 
co n tin u ed  to  go th rough  th e  m otions of a ttem p tin g  to  reopen 
n e g o tia t io n s  w ith  th e  C hinese Communists. The Kuomintang 
formed a comm ittee composed o f  independent members o f th e  
D em ocratic League and l i b e r a l s  in  th e  Kuomintang to  n e g o tia te  
w ith  th e  Communists on th e  u n i f ic a t io n  q u e s t i o n , T h e r e  was
^ ^ T ran sc rip t of B roadcast from Yenan, "Chinese Commu­
n i s t s  Not to  A ttend  Forthcom ing P e o p le 's  P o l i t i c a l  C o u n c il,"  
June 16, 1945; H urley P apers .
l^H urley  to  S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te ,  June 23, 1945; H urley 
P ap e rs . The D em ocratic League was a group of m inor p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t i e s  which had jo in e d  in  1939, w ith  th e  p r in c ip a l  o b je c t  o f 
p re s e rv in g  Kuomintang-Communist c o o p e ra tio n . I t  had p lay ed  an 
im p o rtan t but u n su c c e ss fu l r o l e  in  th e  n e g o tia t io n s  between 
th e  Communists and th e  Kuomintang p r io r  to  H u rley 's  e f f o r t s .
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l i t t l e  s in c e r i ty  in  t h i s  e f f o r t ,  however, fo r  th e  Kuomintang 
was s t i l l  u n w illin g  to  make any m eaningful compromise w ith  th e  
Communist p a r ty .
Mao T se-tung  and Chou E n - la i  r e p l ie d  to  th e  Com m ittee's 
re q u e s t  to  v i s i t  Yenan fo r  th e  purpose  o f h o ld in g  ta lk s  on 
June 18, 1945, They re p e a te d  t h e i r  u su a l charges a g a in s t  th e  
Kuomintang, but welcomed th e  C om m ittee 's re q u e s t  to  f ly  to  
Yenan and a rd e n tly  hoped th a t  th e  Kuomintang would be a b le  to  
r e a l i z e  i t s  e r r o r s .  I f  t h i s  came to  p a s s , they  s a id ,  th e  Com­
m unist p a r ty  would be very  w i l l in g  to  e n te r  in to  d i s c u s s i o n s . 20 
Although th e  Communists a ls o  sounded anxious to  re a c h  an a g re e ­
m ent, in  a l l  p r o b a b i l i ty  t h e i r  a c t io n s  were m o tiv a ted  by a 
d e s i r e  to  buy tim e w h ile  w a itin g  fo r  th e  R ussian  e n try  in to  
th e  Far E as te rn  w ar. Hurley jo y f u l ly  cab led  th e  news o f th e  
impending resum ption  o f  n e g o tia t io n s  to  th e  S ta te  Departm ent 
on June 23,21
H urley and th e  new Communist r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  in  Chung­
k in g , G eneral Wang J o - f e i ,  d isc u sse d  Kuomintang-Communist 
r e l a t i o n s  on June 29 fo r  more than  th re e  h o u rs . A f te r  Hurley 
ex p la in ed  th a t  he was th e  b e s t  f r ie n d  th e  Communists had in  
Chungking, th e  m eeting got down to  th e  problem  of f in d in g  a 
w orkable form ula fo r  u n i f i c a t io n .  Wang s ta te d  t h a t  th e  f iv e  
p o in t  p ro p o sa l of November 10, w ith  some a l t e r a t i o n s ,  would 
s t i l l  be a c c e p ta b le  to  th e  C<xomunists as a b a s is  f o r  n e g o tia -
90Mao and Chou to  Wang J o - f e i ,  June 18, 1945; H urley
Papers.
Hurley to  S te t t in iu s ,  June 23, 1945; Hurley Papers.
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t io n s ,  bu t in d ic a te d  th a t  Mao would l ik e  to  see  th e  fo u r p o in ts  
o f December 28 accep ted  b e fo re  i n i t i a t i n g  se r io u s  t a l k s .  Hur­
le y  agreed  th a t  th e  f iv e  p o in ts  were s t i l l  th e  b e s t  b a s is  on 
which to  b u ild  an agreem ent, bu t he re fu sed  to  meet th e  Commu­
n i s t  demand to  p u t p re s s u re  on th e  G eneralissim o to  acc ep t th e  
fo u r p o in ts  advanced by th e  Communists in  December as a cond i­
t io n  to  f u r th e r  n e g o tia t io n s .  This r e f u s a l  he lped  s e a l  th e  
f a t e  of th e  new t a l k s . 2%
I t  now became c le a r  th a t  an agreem ent would be in # o s s i-  
b le .  H u r l^  e a rn e s t ly  hoped fo r  a u n ite d  China bu t a t  th e  
same tim e he con tinued  to  g ive  v i r t u a l l y  f u l l  su p p o rt to  th e  
G eneralissim o and th e  Kuomintang. Under such c o n d itio n s  th e  
Kuomintang would c e r ta in ly  r e fu s e  to  g ra n t any m eaningful con­
c ess io n s  to  th e  Communists. The Communists would n o t accep t 
u n i f ic a t io n  on th e  Kuomintang te rm s, f o r  i t  would mean most c e r ­
t a in ly  th e  end of th e  Chinese Communist p a r ty .  N e ith e r  s id e  i t  
seemed was w il l in g  to  make any concessions u n t i l  t a lk s  in  Wash­
in g to n  and Moscow concern ing  th e  im plem entation o f th e  Y a lta  
agreem ent were f in a l iz e d  and t h e i r  r e s u l t s  known in  China.
E f fo r ts  to  implement th e  terms agreed  to  a t  Y a lta  con­
ce rn in g  S ov ie t en try  in to  th e  Far E aste rn  war r e a l ly  began 
when P re s id e n t Truman inform ed T. V. Soong on June 9 of th e  
assu ran ces S ta l in  had made to  Hopkins about R u s s ia 's  Far E as t­
ern  p o lic y . At th e  same m eeting , Truman d ivu lged  th e  co n te n ts  
of th e  Y a lta  s e c re t  p ro to c o l , Soong a c ted  s u rp r is e d , s ta t in g
Papers.
Hurley to Secretary of S ta te , June 29, 1945; Hurley
184
th a t  th e  two t r e a t i e s  made in  1924 by th e  S ov ie t government 
renounced s p e c ia l  c o n ce ss io n s , l e a s e s ,  and p r iv i le g e s  in  China, 
Truman ex p la in ed  to  Soong th a t  he was anxious to  see  R ussia  en­
t e r  th e  war in  th e  Far E ast e a r ly  enough to  m a te r ia l ly  sh o rte n  
th e  w ar. He a ssu red  Soong, however, th a t  he would do n o th ing  
to  harm th e  i n t e r e s t s  of C hina, A m erica 's f r ie n d  in  A sia .^S
The Chinese sta tesm an  made a cu rio u s  rem ark to  Adm iral 
Leahy about th e  p ro v is io n s  of th e  Y a lta  agreem ent. In  a  p r i ­
v a te  c o n v e rsa tio n , Soong to ld  Leahy th a t  China cou ld  n o t 
pe rm it R ussia  to  e x e rc is e  th e  degree of c o n tro l  in  M anchuria 
th a t  was p o s s ib le  under th e  Y a lta  agreem ent, Soong s a id  th a t  
China would p r e f e r  to  s e t t l e  th e  co n tro v e rsy  by m i l i ta r y  a c tio n  
when fo rc e s  became a v a i la b le .  Having in  mind th e  d e p lo ra b le  
s t a t e  of C h in a 's  a rm ies , th e  su rp r is e d  Leahy asked Soong when 
China would be in  a p o s i t io n  to  do t h a t ,  Soong r e p l ie d  th a t  
i t  cou ld  be any tim e w ith in  th e  n ex t f iv e  hundred y e a r s , ^4 
On th i s  n o te , Soong l e f t  W ashington on June 15, th e  same d a te  
th a t  Chiang was inform ed o f th e  c o n te n ts  of th e  Y a lta  p ro to c o l , 
June 9, th e  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  se n t a  message to  
H urley , a u th o r iz in g  him to  d isc u ss  th e  Y a lta  agreem ents w ith  
Chiang on June 15, The same te leg ram  in c lu d ed  th e  a ssu ran ces 
made by M arshal S ta l in  to  Harry Hopkins in  M o s c o w , T h e  
G eneralissim o seemed s u rp r is e d  on h ea rin g  of th e  agreem ent,
“ ^Truman, Memoirs. Vol. 1, 267-270,
^^Leahy, I  Was T here . 381,
^ ^ S te t t in iu s  to  H urley , June 9, 1945; H urley P ap ers ,
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A cting  deep ly  h u r t ,  he rem ained s i l e n t  f o r  a fewr.moments, and 
then  asked Ambassador H urley th rough  an in te r p r e t e r  to  re p e a t  
th e  s ta tem en t as i f  he d id  n o t u n d e rs tan d  what he had h eard . 
F in a l ly ,  Chiang expressed  h is  deep d isappo in tm en t in  th e  ac-
9fit io n s  of h is  fond f r ie n d  and a l l y .  I t  would seem th a t  th e  
G enera lissim o  was engaging in  a b i t  of a c t in g ,  f o r  i t  was un= 
l ik e ly  t h a t  he d id  no t re c e iv e  news o f th e  p ro to c o l from 
Soong, who had s p e c i f ic  knowledge o f i t  on June 9,
N e g o tia tio n s  between Soong and S ta l in ,  however, d id  n o t 
begin  u n t i l  June 30, th e  day th e  C hinese o f f i c i a l  a r r iv e d  in  
Moscow,27 Soong's main o b je c tiv e  was to  g e t th e  S ov ie t Union 
to  su p p o rt Chiang in  h is  s t ru g g le  w ith  th e  Chinese Communists, 
S ta l in  had two o b je c t iv e s ,  bo th  of which were o u tlin e d  in  th e  
Y a lta  agreem ent. F i r s t ,  he wanted to  invade M anchuria and 
s t r i p  th e  a re a  of th e  i n d u s t r i a l  complex which had been d e v e l­
oped th e re  by th e  Japanese  and sh ip  i t  to  th e  S o v ie t Union, 
Secondly , th e  S o v ie t d i c t a to r  wanted a warm w ater o u t le t  on 
th e  P a c if ic  w ith  land  access to  i t .  S ta l in  knew t h a t  he had 
th e  b e t t e r  b a rg a in in g  p o s i t io n ,  fo r  C h iang 's government would 
p robab ly  f a l l  i f  th e  S o v ie t Union supported  th e  Chinese Commu­
n i s t s ,  Soong t r i e d  to  make as few concessions as p o s s ib le  to  
S t a l i n 's  demands fo r  S o v ie t economic, p o l i t i c a l ,  and m il i ta r y  
c o n tro l  in  M anchuria, and s t i l l  g e t S ta l in  to  p ledge  S ov ie t 
a id  and su p p o rt fo r  Chiang in  h is  s t ru g g le  w ith  th e  C hinese
2^ a c A r th u r  H earin g s. P a r t  3 , 2416-2417,
27Truman, Memoirs. Vol. I ,  315,
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Communists.
In  s p i t e  o f S t a l i n 's  e x ce ss iv e  demands, Soong anx ious­
ly  p re s se d  f o r  an agreem ent w ith  th e  S o v ie t Union which would 
g u a ra n tee  R ussian  su p p o rt o f Chiang, He to ld  American r e p r e ­
s e n ta t iv e s  in  Moscow th a t  th e  Y a lta  u n d ers tan d in g  was n o t a 
handicap  to  h is  n e g o tia t io n s .  A v e re ll Harrim an, th e  American 
Ambassador in  Moscow, re p e a te d ly  urged Soong n o t to  g iv e  in  
to  S t a l i n 's  demands and a t  th e  same tim e met f r e q u e n tly  w ith  
S ta l in  and M olotov to  i n s i s t  t h a t  th e  S o v ie t p o s i t io n  was n o t 
j u s t i f i e d .  On in s t r u c t io n s  from W ashington, Harriman inform ed 
Soong th a t  th e  U nited  S ta te s  would c o n s id e r any co n cessio n s 
t h a t  went beyond th e  U nited  S ta te s  i n te r p r e ta t io n  of th e  Y a lta  
u n d e rs tan d in g  as being made because Soong b e lie v e d  t h a t  i t  
would be o f v a lu e  in  o b ta in in g  S o v ie t suppo rt in  o th e r  d i r e c ­
t io n s .
A ll China e ag e rly  aw aited  th e  outcome o f Soong's t a l k s .  
S ince l a t e  February  a l l  e f f o r t s  to  ach iev e  u n ity  in  China had 
been b locked because n e i th e r  s id e  was w i l l in g  to  make any con­
c e ss io n s  u n t i l  i t  became known what th e  R ussians would do when 
they  e n te re d  th e  F ar E aste rn  w ar. The Communists were c o n f i­
d en t t h a t  th e  S o v ie t Union would a id  them in  t h e i r  s t ru g g le  
to  overthrow  C h i a n g . C h i a n g ,  on th e  o th e r  hand, expected  
th a t  th e  co n cessio n s he was w i l l in g  to  make re g a rd in g  Man­
c h u ria  would win him R ussian  su p p o rt. H urley , f o r  h is  p a r r .
78R eport by John S tew art S e rv ic e , "C hinese Communist 
E x p ec ta tio n s  in  Regard to  S o v ie t P a r t ic ip a t io n  in  th e  F ar 
E as te rn  W ar,” n . d . ; H urley P ap e rs ,
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expected  th a t  R ussian en try  in to  th e  c o n f l i c t  would make u n i­
f i c a t io n  p o s s ib le .  The ta lk s  con tinued  in  Moscow, however, 
f o r  a month and a h a l f  b e fo re  an agreem ent would be s ig n ed .
In  th a t  tim e , s e v e ra l  even ts took p la c e  which changed th e  
whole s i tu a t io n  in  China.
CHAPTER XII 
THE WAR ENDS
W hile China w a ited  fo r  th e  S ov ie t e n try  in to  th e  Far 
E as te rn  w ar, an im portan t even t took p la c e  in  th e  New Mexico 
d e s e r t  which changed th e  balance  of power in  th e  F ar E ast and 
th e  w orld . News a r r iv e d  in  Germany Ju ly  16, on th e  eve of th e  
Potsdam co n fe ren ce , t h a t  th e  atom ic bomb was a c o lo s s a l  r e a l i ­
ty ,  and, as a r e s u l t ,  th e  d ip lo m a tic  e f f o r t s  to  b rin g  R ussia  
in to  th e  P a c if ic  war became p o in t le s s .  The R ussians m ight w e ll 
have been d is tu rb e d  to  f in d  th a t  P re s id e n t Truman had l o s t  i n ­
t e r e s t  in  knowing th e  ex ac t d a te  on which they  would come in to  
th e  w ar.^  For d e s p i te  S t a l i n 's  p u b lic  r e lu c ta n c e  to  go to  war 
in  A sia , he s tro n g ly  d e s ire d  to  invade M anchuria.
Because o f th e  atom ic bomb, S ta l in  cou ld  no lo n g er p lay  
a r e lu c ta n t  r o le .  He would have to  rea ch  an agreem ent w ith  
th e  Chinese qu ick ly  in  o rd e r to  g e t in to  th e  war and secu re  
h is  o b je c tiv e s  in  th e  F ar E ast b e fo re  th e  Japanese  c a p i tu ­
la te d .  Meanwhile, in  C hina, th e  Communists, th e  Kuomintang, 
and Ambassador Hurley w a ited , hoping th a t  S o v ie t e n try  in to  
th e  war a g a in s t  Japan would so lv e  t h e i r  problem s.
^Stimson and Bundy, On A ctive  S e rv ic e . 637.
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Continued r e p o r ts  of sk irm ish es between th e  Kuomintang 
and Communist fo rc e s  undersco red  th e  tin d e rb o x  s i tu a t io n  in  
China. In  a r e p o r t  d a te d  Ju ly  16, 1945, th e  American m il i ta ry  
a t ta c h e  to ld  o f  a m ajor d e fe a t  s u f fe re d  by Kuomintang fo rc e s .
He commented th a t  th e  f ig h t in g  between th e  Communists and th e  
Kuomintang in  S ink iang  p ro v in ce  had assumed la rg e  s c a le  p ro ­
p o r t io n s  w ith  Communist fo rc e s  s te a d i ly  in c re a s in g  t h e i r  
o p e ra tio n s  a g a in s t  th e  N a t io n a l i s t s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  s in c e  th e  c e s ­
s a t io n  o f European h o s t i l i t i e s .  I t  appeared  p ro b ab le , he s a id , 
t h a t  Gommunist-Kuomintang f ig h t in g  would in c r e a s e .2
Ambassador Hurley f i n a l ly  reco g n ized  th e  e x is te n c e  of 
th e s e  c la sh e s  in  a  c a b le  se n t to  W ashington on Ju ly  31. Hur­
l e y 's  te leg ram  d e a l t  s p e c i f i c a l ly  w ith  a f ig h t  between th e  
Communist and Kuomintang fo rc e s  n o r th  of S ian . R egular Kuo­
m intang tro o p s  w ere a ttem p tin g  to  suppress a m i l i t i a  r e b e l l io n  
when th e  le a d e rs  d e se r te d  to  th e  Communist s id e . F req u en tly  
lo c a l  tro o p  commanders would use  th e  h o s t i l i t y  between th e  
Kuomintang and th e  Communists to  m ain ta in  a r e l a t i v e ly  in d e ­
pendent p o s i t io n  w ith in  t h e i r  own a re a s .  I f  e i th e r  s id e  
th re a te n e d  t h e i r  independence, they  would im m ediately appeal 
to  th e  o th e r  f o r  su p p o rt. This was a p p a re n tly  vrtiat had hap­
pened in  t h i s  in s ta n c e , fo r  th e  r e p o r t  in d ic a te d  th a t  n e i th e r  
th e  Kuomintang no r th e  Communists had in s t ig a te d  th e  u p r is in g  
of th e  m i l i t i a  tro o p s . Hurley m inim ized th e  im portance of th e  
sk irm ish  bu t prom ised to  keep th e  departm ent n o t i f i e d  of
2
Charles C. Dusenbury to  American Embassy, July 16,
1945; Hurley Papers.
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f u r th e r  developments.-^
Probably f o r  no g r e a te r  reaso n  th an  to  keep channels 
of communication open, h a l f - h e a r te d  a ttem p ts  a t  u n i f ic a t io n  
c o n tin u ed  in  J u ly . On Ju ly  8, Dr. Wang S h ih -ch ieh  inform ed 
C ounselor R obert L. Smyth o f th e  American Embassy t h a t  th e  
Kuomintang com m ittee r e c e n t ly  d isp a tc h ed  to  Yenan had brought 
back a new Communist p la n  fo r  u n i f ic a t io n .  A c tu a lly , th e  new 
p ro p o sa l was l i t t l e  more than  th e  one advanced d u ring  th e  Feb­
ru a ry  n e g o tia t io n s  w ith  th e  a d d it io n a l  p ro v is io n  th a t  Chiang 
K ai-shek  no t ho ld  th e  P e o p le 's  Congress schedu led  fo r  November. 
Dr. Wang p o in te d  ou t t h a t  th e  Communists had o m itted  m i l i ta r y  
u n i f ic a t io n  in  t h e i r  message and charged t h a t  th e  D em ocratic 
League was in  a c t u a l i t y  "on th e  f r in g e  o f th e  Communists."
The Kuomintang le a d e r  s a id  th a t  in  r e a l i t y  th e  Communist p ro ­
p o sa l was a p lo t  to  p u t  th e  Kuomintang in  a  m in o rity  p o s i t io n  
and s e iz e  c o n tro l  of th e  governm ent.^
When H urley le a rn e d  of Wang's d is c u s s io n  w ith  Smyth, he 
must have been somewhat amused. For Dr. Wang's charge th a t  
th e  Communist p lan  was a deep l a id  p lo t  to  ga in  c o n tro l  o f th e  
N a tio n a l government seemed r id ic u lo u s ly  n a iv e . In  H u rle y 's  
op in ion  th e  Communists them selves d id  n o t ta k e  th e  p lan  s e r io u s , 
ly  and saw i t  only as a p loy  to  ga in  tim e w h ile  a w a itin g  th e  
r e s u l t s  o f th e  Soong co n fe ren ce  in  Moscow. H urley r e a l iz e d  th e
% u rle y  to  James F. Byrnes, Ju ly  31, 1945; H urley Pa­
p e r s .
^"New Communist P ro p o s a ls ,"  a r e p o r t  o f c o n v e rsa tio n  
between Dr. Wang S h ih -c h ie h  and R obert L. Smyth, Ju ly  8 , 1945; 
H urley P ap e rs .
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im portance of th e se  ta lk s  as w e ll as th e  Communists, fo r  he 
had ad v ised  R oosevelt more than  a y e a r b e fo re  th a t  th e  Commu­
n i s t  problem  in  China could  n o t be s e t t l e d  u n t i l  th e  S ov ie t 
a t t i t u d e  toward th e  Communists was c le a r  and made known to  
Chiang K ai-shek . H urley b e liev e d  th a t  i f  th e  S o v ie ts  e n te re d  
th e  Far E as te rn  w ar, and signed  a t r e a ty  of f r ie n d s h ip  w ith  
Chiang’ s government, th e  C hinese Communists would be fo rced  
to  reach  an accord  w ith  th e  G enera lissim o ,
Hurley had been working fo r  some tim e to  improve th e  
p o s s ib i l i ty  of u n i f ic a t io n .  He had adv ised  th e  N a t io n a l is t  
government th a t  i t  cou ld  a ffo rd  to  make generous p o l i t i c a l  con­
cess io n s  a f t e r  Soong reached  an agreem ent w ith  R u ss ia . With 
th e  su p p o rt of th e  S o v ie t Union, th e  Chinese Communists could  
b rin g  c i v i l  war in  C hina, but w ithou t th a t  su p p o rt. H urley 
reasoned , they  would e v e n tu a lly  have to  p a r t i c ip a te  as a  po­
l i t i c a l  p a r ty  in  th e  N a tio n a l government. The Ambassador took 
th e  view th a t  th e  Chinese Communists had g re a t ly  exaggera ted  
t h e i r  power. In h is  d isc u ss io n s  w ith  v i s i t o r s  and h is  r e p o r ts  
to  W ashington, H urley re p e a te d ly  to ld  how S ta te  Departm ent o f ­
f i c i a l s ,  Array o f f i c e r s ,  and jo u r n a l i s t s  had in  a la rg e  m easure 
accep ted  th e  Communist le a d e r s ' exaggera ted  s ta tem en ts  in  r e ­
gard  to  t h e i r  m il i ta r y  and p o l i t i c a l  s t r e n g th .
When u n i f ic a t io n  came. Hurley was su re  th a t  th e  f iv e  
p o in t agreem ent of November 10, 1944, would form th e  b a s is  fo r  
i t .  In  H u rle y 's  op in ion  and a ls o  in  M ao's, t h i s  scheme o f ­
fe re d  a rea so n a b le  b a s is  fo r  se ttle m e n t of th e  o u ts ta n d in g  
d if fe re n c e s  between th e  Communists and th e  Kuomintang, Essen-
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t i a l l y ,  i t  c a l le d  fo r  th e  fo rm ation  o f a c o a l i t io n  government 
in  which a l l  th e  p o l i t i c a l  f a c t io n s  in  China would be r e p r e ­
se n te d . As p a r t  o f th e  f iv e  p o in ts ,  th e  Communists had agreed  
to  subm it th e  c o n tro l  o f t h e i r  arm ies to  t h i s  c o a l i t io n  gov- 
ernmv^nt. H urley knew th a t  th e  f iv e  p o in ts  were n o t a l to g e th e r  
s a t i s f a c to r y  to  th e  N a t io n a l i s t  government but he was c o n f i­
den t th a t  th e  d if fe re n c e s  cou ld  be n e g o tia te d , fo r  he s t i l l  
b e lie v e d  th e  problem  was one of sem an tic s . H urley fav o red  
th e  p u b lic a t io n  of th o se  f iv e  p o in ts  and had g iven h is  p e r ­
m ission  to  Mao T se-tung  to  do so .^  By Ju ly  16, th e  Kuomintang 
had a ls o  come to  th e  co n c lu sio n  th a t  p u b lic a t io n  o f th e  f iv e  
p o in ts  would be a c c e p ta b le ,^
By m id -Ju ly , H urley was look ing  forw ard to  a ra p id  con­
c lu s io n  to  h is  d u t ie s  in  China and a h e ro 's  welcome in  th e  
S ta te s ,  He b e lie v e d  h im se lf  f u l ly  j u s t i f i e d  in  th e  a t t i t u d e s  
he had taken  reg a rd in g  th e  S ta te  Department o f f i c i a l s ,  m i l i ­
ta ry  o f f i c e r s ,  and j o u r n a l i s t s  whom he b e liev e d  had worked to  
sabo tage  h is  u n i f ic a t io n  p o lic y . In  a few weeks they  would be 
proven wrong p u b lic ly  and Hurley would a t  long l a s t  be v in d i ­
c a te d , He had found th e  c lim a te  d i f f i c u l t  in  Chungking and 
was looking  forw ard to  a long r e s t , ^  Meanwhile, re p e a te d  r u ­
mors c i r c u la te d  in  W ashington concern ing  H u rle y 's  impending
% u rle y  to  Byrnes, Ju ly  10, 1945; H urley P ap ers ,
-R eport by R obert L, Smyth, "Memorandum concern ing  Con­
v e rs a t io n  between Dr, Wang S h ih -ch ieh  and P a tr ic k  J ,  H u r l^ ,  
on Ju ly  16, 1945," Ju ly  18, 1945; H urley P ap ers ,
^Hurley to  L u c ille  M, Carter, August 8, 1945; Hurley
Papers,
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r e s ig n a t io n  as th e  war in  th e  Far E ast drew q u ick ly  to  a c l o s e . 8
The f i r s t  two weeks of A ugust, 1945, were f i l l e d  w ith  
momentous e v e n ts . The atom ic bomb was dropped on H iroshim a 
August 6 , and th re e  days l a t e r  th e  S ov ie t Union e n te re d  th e  
F ar E as te rn  w ar. Japanese  su rre n d e r  cou ld  only be a few days 
away.^ On August 11, H urley re c e iv e d  a message from th e  new 
S e c re ta ry  of S ta te ,  James F, Byrnes, a sk ing  him to  have Chiang 
K ai-shek  d e s ig n a te  an o f f i c e r  to  a c t  as h is  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  in  
th e  su rre n d e r  c e r e m o n i e s , H u r l e y  re la y e d  t h i s  message to  
th e  G enera lissim o  on August 12, and Chiang exp ressed  h is  com­
p le te  a c c o r d , O n  August 14, word a r r iv e d  in  W ashington th a t  
th e  Japanese  had accep ted  th e  su rre n d e r term s and th e  war was 
o v e r,^ ^
S u rren d er, however, was no s in g le  m a tte r  in  C hina, In 
many p a r t s  o f China th e re  was no c le a r - c u t  l in e  d iv id in g  th e  
Communist t e r r i t o r y  and t h a t  c o n tro l le d  by th e  Kuomintang,
Most o f r u r a l  N orth China was under c o n tro l  of th e  Communists,
In  S o u th east C hina, th e re  was no c le a r  c o n tro l  e x e rc is e d  by 
e i th e r  s id e  in  th e  r u r a l  a re a s .  Some of th e  g u e r r i l l a s  opera­
t in g  th e re  were Communist c o n tro l le d ,  o th e rs  were Kuomintang
^"W ashington F o re c a s t ,"  Newark, New Je rs e y , C a l l .
Ju ly  29, 1945, Hurley C lipp ing  Book, 1945; H urley P apers ,
^Edwin 0. R e isch au er, J a p ^ ;  P a s t ^ d  P re se n t (2d. ed, 
r e v , ; Tokyo; C harles E, T u t t le  Company, 1953); 287,
i^B ym es to  H urley, August 11, 1945; H urley P ap e rs ,
^^Hurley to  Byrnes, August 12, 1945; H urley P ap e rs .
Truman, Memoirs. Vol. I ,  435.
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c o n tr o l le d ,  and many were v i r t u a l l y  independent and were l i t t l e  
more than  b a n d its .  Both in  th e  N orth  and th e  S o u th e as t, th e  
Japanese  c o n tro l le d  th e  c i t i e s  and communication l in e s .
Both th e  Kuomintang and th e  Communist p a r ty  made every 
e f f o r t  to  c a p tu re  Japanese  fo rc e s ,  f o r ,  in  a d d it io n  to  th e  
c i t i e s  and communication l in e s ,  they  wanted to  secu re  th e  arms 
and ammunition belong ing  to  th e  Japanese  and th e  Nanking pup­
p e t  fo rc e s .  Under th e  d a te  of August 10, 1945, G eneral Chu 
Teh, th e  Commanding G eneral o f th e  Communist fo rc e s ,  is su e d  a 
p ro c lam atio n  c a l l in g  fo r  Japanese  su rre n d e r  to  h is  tro o p s .
The o rd e r  openly d e f ie d  th e  N a tio n a l government of China and 
c o n f l ic te d  w ith  th e  Potsdam d e c la ra t io n  which d e s ig n a ted  th a t  
su rre n d e r  was to  be made to  th e  N a t io n a l i s t s ,  The Japanese 
su rre n d e r  had come b e fo re  th e  announcement o f th e  S in o -S o v ie t 
t r e a ty  which H urley hoped would convince th e  Communists th a t  
c i v i l  war was im p o ss ib le . Now, Chu T eh 's  p roc lam ation  made i t  
n ecessa ry  fo r  H urley to  g ive  up h is  w a itin g  game and e n te r  d i ­
r e c t ly  in to  th e  s t r u g g le  going on in  China,
On August 12, 1945, H urley inform ed S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  
Byrnes o f Chu T eh 's  p ro c lam a tio n . The Ambassador ad v ised  
Byrnes t h a t  he was aware th a t  th e  U nited  S ta te s  p o lic y  in  
China opposed any a s s i s ta n c e  to  th e  N a tio n a l government in  a 
f r a t r i c i d a l  w ar, b u t ,  he co n tin u ed , th e  q u e s tio n  had re so lv e d  
i t s e l f  as to  w hether th e  U nited  S ta te s  government and th e  
U nited N ations would ta k e  any a c t io n  toward p rev e n tin g  c i v i l  
war in  China, H urley argued th a t  i f  th e  Communists were a l ­
lowed to  accep t th e  su rre n d e r  of th e  Japanese  and acq u ired
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Japanese  arm s, c i v i l  war in  China could  n o t be avoided . He
recommended to  Byrnes th a t  th e  Japanese  should be p e n a liz e d
fo r  any a ttem p t to  arm fo rc e s  opposed to  th e  C hinese govern- 
13ment.
Meanwhile, Wedemeyer and H urley , w ith o u t s p e c i f i c  au­
th o r iz a t io n ,  adopted a cou rse  of a c tio n  which invo lved  th e  
U nited  S ta te s  deeply  in  th e  c i v i l  s t r i f e  in  C h i n a . W e d e m e y e r  
endeavored to  stym ie th e  C hinese Communists, whom he b e lie v e d  
to  be se rv a n ts  of th e  K rem lin, by a id in g  th e  N a tio n a l gov­
ernment in  i t s  e f f o r t s  to  e s ta b l is h  so v e re ig n ty  over N orth 
C h i n a . H e  d id  th i s  by in te r p r e t in g  what he term ed vague and 
c o n tra d ic to ry  in s t ru c t io n s  from W ashington in  th e  b ro ad e s t 
f a s h i o n . 16 The t a c t i c s  which Wedemeyer adopted and of which 
H urley approved c o n tr ib u te d  to  th e  dow nfall of th e  Chiang 
government in  a l l  of China.
Wedemeyer gave Chiang K ai-shek  a l l  th e  a id  a t  h is  d i s ­
p o sa l to  p rev en t th e  Jap an ese -h e ld  c i t i e s  and t r a n s p o r ta t io n  
l in e s  in  N orth China from f a l l i n g  in to  Communist hands. Three 
C hinese d iv is io n s  were a i r l i f t e d  in to  M anchuria and over 
50,000 American M arines were landed in  N orth China to  ho ld  
T ie n ts in ,  P e ip in g , and coal mines and r a i l r o a d s  in  th e  a d jo in ­
ing  a re a s  u n t i l  C h iang 's  tro o p s cou ld  a r r iv e .  At th e  same 
tim e , Chiang reco g n ized  many of th e  Nanking puppet le a d e rs  and
l-^Kurley to  Byrnes, August 12, 1945; H urley P apers .
1^Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer R e p o r ts i , 348.
l^ i b id . .  345, 347. ^^I b id . .  348.
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a u th o riz e d  then  to  occupy a re a s  and accep t th e  Japanese  sur= 
re n d e r  in  h is  n a m e . A I L  th e se  a c tio n s  were c a r r ie d  ou t 
o s te n s ib ly  to  a id  in  th e  su rre n d e r  o f th e  Jap an ese , bu t th e re  
was l i t t l e  doubt t h a t  t h e i r  r e a l  purpose was to  f o i l  th e  Chi­
n ese  Communists.
H u rley 's  and Wedemeyer's a c t i v i t i e s  in  China went un­
n o tic e d  in  W ashington, where a l l  though ts had tu rn ed  from th e  
war to  d e m o b iliz a tio n . P u b lic  op in ion  in  America demanded th a t  
tro o p s be dem obilized  as q u ick ly  as p o s s ib le ,  and W ashington 
fo llow ed  th i s  p o lic y  d u ring  th e  rem ainder o f 1945.18 But th e  
two American s e n io r  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  in  C hina, Wedemeyer and 
H urley , con tinued  on a p a th  which cou ld  w e ll in v o lv e  th e  U nited 
S ta te s  in  an in te r n a l  c o n f l i c t  on th e  China m ain land. Why 
Wedemeyer fo llow ed  t h i s  cou rse  was no p u z z le . He was m o ti­
v a ted  by a f e a r  o f an in te r n a t io n a l  Communist co n sp iracy  which 
would r e s u l t  in  th e  s e iz u re  of C hina. On th e  o th e r  hand, th i s  
rea so n in g  cou ld  n o t have been shared  by H urley , The Ambassa­
dor had long argued  th a t  th e  o b je c tiv e s  o f th e  S o v ie t Union 
and th e  U nited  S ta te s  in  China were i d e n t i c a l .  He b e lie v e d  
th a t  when th e  S in o -S o v ie t f r ie n d sh ip  p a c t was signed  i t  would 
dem onstra te  th e  c o rre c tn e s s  of h i s  c o n te n tio n . Why then  d id  
H urley support Wedemeyer' s a c tio n s?
The answer la y  in  H u rley 's  mind. Ambassador H urley was 
a man of a c t io n . Once given a m iss io n , he would n o t swerve
l^China White Paper. 312,
Papers.
Byrnes to George M. Stanton, August 20, 1945; Hurley
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from i t  u n t i l  he  ach ieved  su c c e ss . H urley had trem endous 
f a i t h  in  h is  a b i l i t y  to  succeed , and he f e l t  any a ttem p t to  
change h is  g o a ls  r e f l e c t e d  on t h i s  a b i l i t y .  Thus, when th e  
fo re ig n  s e rv ic e  o f f i c e r s ,  m il i ta r y  men, and even th e  jo u rn a l ­
i s t s  in  China s a id  th a t  u n ity  in  China under Chiang K ai-shek  
was im p o ss ib le , H urley re a c te d  v io le n t ly .  He had f ix e d  h is  
mind on a u n i te d  C hina. He b e liev e d  t h a t  anyone v^o branded 
u n i f ic a t io n  im p o ssib le  was in  f a c t  say ing  t h a t  H urley would 
be u n ab le  to  accom plish  h i s  m issio n .
H urley adopted  every means a t  h i s  d is p o s a l  to  ach ieve  
h is  o b je c t iv e .  One th in g  \d iich  seemed n e ce ssa ry  was to  p re ­
v e n t th e  C hinese Communists from s tre n g th e n in g  t h e i r  p o s i t io n  
by c a p tu r in g  Japanese  arms so th a t  they  cou ld  wage c i v i l  war 
w ith o u t S o v ie t a id .  He knew th a t  th e  S in o -S o v ie t f r ie n d s h ip  
t r e a ty  would be announced in  a  few days. T his i s  why H urley 
went a long  w ith  Wedemeyer when he wanted to  throw th e  f u l l  
w eigh t o f th e  U nited  S ta te s  Army behind Chiang K ai-shek .
H urley b e lie v e d  th a t  th e  ends j u s t i f i e d  th e  means. By 
s tre n g th e n in g  th e  N a t io n a l i s t s ,  he b e lie v e d  th a t  th e  C hinese 
Communists would be de layed  long enough to  a llow  th e  comple­
t io n  o f th e  n e g o tia t io n s  going on in  Moscow. Once th e  t r e a ty  
was announced, th e  C hinese Communists, he b e lie v e d , would lo s e  
hope and jo in  w ith  th e  N a tio n a l governm ent. Thus, Hurley 
a c te d  o u t o f a  co n fid en ce  in  h is  own a b i l i t y  to  ach ieve  th e  
American goal o f  a u n ite d  China under Chiang K ai-shek .
In  Yenan, however, th e  Communist le a d e rs  were su rp r is e d  
by Japanese  c a p i tu la t io n  and unprepared  f o r  th e  la rg e  s c a le
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American su p p o rt g iven  to  th e  Kuomintang. They had thought 
th a t  th e  Japanese  would make a s tro n g  l a s t  s ta n d  in  Meuichuria 
and N orth  China even i f  th e  Japanese  home is la n d s  were invaded. 
In  s p i t e  o f th e  R ussian  in v as io n  o f M anchuria, they  thought 
th e  war would c o n tin u e  fo r  some m onths. The Communists had 
been in  th e  p ro ce ss  o f g r e a t ly  expanding t h e i r  r e g u la r  army, 
but t h i s  expansion would n o t rea ch  i t s  peak u n t i l  l a t e  in  th e  
y e a r . The Communists had n o t expected  th e  f i n a l  Japanese 
c o u n te r -o ffe n s iv e  to  come u n t i l  th e  end of 1945, o r even l a t e  
in  th e  sp r in g  o f 1946.19
At f i r s t  Mao doubted J a p a n 's  s in c e r i ty  in  th e  su rre n d e r . 
The m i l i ta r y  s i tu a t io n  was u n c le a r . The Communists had f a i l e d  
to  tak e  any of th e  b ig  c i t i e s ,  b u t they  were c le a r in g  th e  
Japanese  puppets out o f sm a lle r  communities and had c u t most 
of th e  main ra ilw a y  l in e s  in  N orth  China. A pparen tly  th e  
R ussians were s ta y in g  n o rth  of th e  G reat W all, a lthough  they 
had l in k e d  up w ith  th e  Communist E igh th  Route Army in  a number 
of p la c e s . B efore th e  a r r i v a l  of American tro o p s . T iensin  was 
about to  f a l l  to  th e  Communists, and th e  Shantung p en in su la  
was s o l id ly  in  th e  hands of th e  Red E igh th  Route Army, The 
Communist fo rc e s  were a c t iv e ly  p u rsu in g  th e  advantage they 
h e ld  in  N orth China, and t h i s  cou rse  gave every prom ise of
l^M ichael Landray to  S ir  Horace Seymour w ith  E nclosu re , 
August 24, 1945; H urley P ap ers . Landray was a B r i t i s h  obser­
v e r s ta t io n e d  in  Yenan. His long r e p o r t  to  S ir  Horace 
Seymour, th e  B r i t i s h  Ambassador, was s e n t ou t through American 
channels because they  were th e  only ones which e x is te d  in  and 
ou t of Yenan. I t  i s  p a r t i c u l a r ly  v a lu a b le  because i t  g iv es  a 
v e rs io n  o f even ts  in  Yenan from a p o in t  o f view which was d i s ­
t i n c t l y  d i f f e r e n t  from th a t  o f th e  Americans s ta t io n e d  th e re .
20 1)9c i v i l  waTo
In  Yenan th e  danger of c i v i l  war seemed ex trem ely  s e r ­
io u s , The Red le a d e rs  knew t h a t  Chiang K ai-shek  was making 
every e f f o r t  to  improve h is  m il i ta r y  p o s i t io n  a g a in s t  th e  Com­
m unists by se iz in g  th e  main c i t i e s  and communication l in e s  
p re v io u s ly  h e ld  by th e  Japanese  in  Communist dom inated a re a s  
o f  C e n tra l and N orth C hina. The Communist le a d e rs  were q u i te  
determ ined to  r e s i s t  Kuomintang p e n e tra t io n  in to  th e  main a re a s  
o f China which they  c o n tro l le d ,  and extended th i s  to  in c lu d e  
Americans a c tin g  on b e h a lf  o f th e  Kuomintang. On th e  o th e r  
hand, they  appeared w i l l in g  to  a llow  Communist g u e r r i l l a  en­
c la v es  in  th e  Yangtze R iver v a lle y  and South China to  f a l l  to  
Kuomintang c o n tro l ,
The Communists were c o n fid e n t t h a t  Chiang K ai-shek  
could  no t d e fe a t them in  c i v i l  w ar. Mao T se-tung  had th e  sup­
p o r t  of a w e ll o rgan ized  p o p u la tio n  over a la rg e  a re a , a f a c t  
which had been v e r i f i e d  by many o b se rv e rs . I t  seemed c e r ta in  
th a t  th e  r u r a l  p o p u la tio n  would co n tin u e  to  su p p o rt th e  Commu­
n i s t s  a g a in s t  th e  Kuomintang. A lthough some of th e  la n d lo rd  
c la s s  m ight p o s s ib ly  sw itch  t h e i r  suppo rt from th e  Communists 
to  th e  Kuomintang, th e  only  r e s u l t  was expected to  be a r e tu rn  
by th e  Communists to  a land  d i s t r ib u t io n  program . The Jap a­
n ese  had a ttem p ted  s in c e  1939 to  c le a r  th e  Communist fo rce s  
from th e  r u r a l  a re a s  in  China and th e re  was no reason  to  sup-
22pose th a t  th e  Kuomintang would be any more s u c c e s s fu l.  
ZOlbid. Zlibid. ^^Ibid.
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M ichael Landray, a B r i t i s h  observer s ta t io n e d  in  Yenan, 
p re d ic te d  th a t  w ithou t hope in  th e  r u r a l  a re a s ,  th e  Kuomintang 
would have to  devote  i t s e l f  to  c o n tro l l in g  th e  c i t i e s .  Even 
i f  C h iang 's  fo rc e s  w ere a b le  to  c a p tu re  a l l  th e  m ajor c i t i e s  
and ra ilw a y s , he rea so n ed , t h e i r  p o s i t io n  would a t  b e s t be 
som ething l ik e  th a t  o f th e  e a r l i e r  c i v i l  w ar, which took  p la c e  
from 1927 to  1937, N e v e r th e le s s , many of th e  advantages th e  
Kuomintang enjoyed d u rin g  th a t  te n  y e a r  p e rio d  would be l o s t .  
The B r i t i s h  d ip lom at s a id  t h a t  th e  Communist r e g u la r  army was 
n e a r ly  as la rg e  as t h a t  o f th e  Kuomintang, and i t s  base  a reas  
were much la r g e r  than  in  th e  e a r l i e r  p e rio d . Even though th e  
Kuomintang fo rc e s  had f a r  b e t t e r  equipm ent, t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  im­
provement was n o t so g re a t  as th a t  of th e  Communist a rm ies,
According to  L andray, Communist long ran g e  success 
h inged on th e  p e a sa n ts . As long as th e  Communists h e ld  th e  
h o s t i l e  c o u n try s id e , th e  war cou ld  go on in d e f in i t e ly  and 
could  e a s i ly  sp read  over most of China, The obvious Commu­
n i s t  s t r a te g y  would be to  o rg an ize  and ex tend  p e a sa n t r e v o l t s  
in  Kuomintang a re a s .  I f  th e  Kuomintang could  o f f e r  th e  pea­
sa n ts  as much as th e  Communists, Landray s a id ,  th e  s i tu a t io n  
would change d r a s t i c a l l y ;  bu t th i s  appeared u n lik e ly  based on 
th e  p a s t  perform ances of th e  Kuomintang and Chiang K ai-shek ,
I t  was c le a r  to  th e  Communists, th e  B r i t i s h e r  observed , 
th a t  th e  Kuomintang was t o t a l l y  dependent on U nited  S ta te s  
su p p o rt. Most of th e  im p o rtan t c i t i e s  in  N orth China were
Z^ Ibid, 24%bid,
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hundreds o f m ile s  from th e  n e a re s t  r e g u la r  Kuomintang tro o p s . 
W ithout th e  American Army A ir F o rce , th e  Kuomintang fo rc e s  
cou ld  n o t re a c h  th e s e  c i t i e s .  W ith a la rg e  p o r tio n  of th e  
c o u n try s id e  a rra y e d  a g a in s t  i t ,  th e  Kuomintang would f in d  i t  
d i f f i c u l t  to  m a in ta in  i t s e l f  w ith o u t economic a id  from abroad . 
M oreover, th e  Kuomintang le a d e rs h ip  l a id  g re a t  s t r e s s  on th e  
im portance o f b e t t e r  equipment re c e iv e d  from th e  U nited
S t a t e s ,25
To L andray, th e  Communists appeared  c o n fid e n t of being 
a b le  to  d e fe a t  Chiang K ai-shek  w ith  o r w ith o u t American sup­
p o r t ,  and t h i s  f a c to r  made th e  l ik e l ih o o d  of avo id ing  c i v i l  
war rem ote. The Communist le a d e rs  b e lie v e d  subm ission to  th e  
Kuomintang government would be s u ic id a l  f o r  them and would in ­
vo lve  th e  s a c r i f i c e  of e v ery th in g  they  fough t f o r ,  Mao, Chou, 
and th e  o th e r  C hinese Communist le a d e rs  d id  n o t b e lie v e  any 
of C h ian g 's  prom ises about democracy or re fo rm s, and co n sid ­
ered  them as m erely propaganda fo r  fo re ig n  consum ption. They 
b e lie v e d  th a t  Chiang would only come to  term s w ith  th e  Chinese 
Communists i f  i t  was made c le a r  to  him th a t  he would n o t have 
fo re ig n  su p p o rt in  a c i v i l  war.
The a c t i v i t i e s  of th e  U nited  S ta te s  m i l i ta r y  fo rc e s  
fo llo w in g  th e  su rre n d e r  of Japan made i t  c le a r  to  th e  Commu­
n i s t  le a d e rs  th a t  a t  l e a s t  H urley and Wedemeyer had decided  
on f u l l  m i l i ta r y  and p o l i t i c a l  su p p o rt o f th e  Kuomintang in  
c i v i l  w ar. The Communists had sensed  a fundam ental change in
25lbid, 26xbid.
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American p o lic y  a f t e r  th e  r e c a l l  of S t i lw e l l ,  H urley had com­
m it te d  th e  U nited  S ta te s  to  u n c o n d itio n a l p o l i t i c a l  support 
f o r  Chiang and Wedemeyer's m i l i ta r y  a id  to  Kuomintang tro o p s 
p u t him a ls o  s o l id ly  in  th e  Chiang camp. M oreover, Landray 
s a id  t h a t  th e  Communist le a d e rs  viewed th e  a r r e s t  of John 
S e rv ic e , in  co n n ec tio n  w ith  th e  Amera s la  case  in  th e  U nited 
S ta te s  as an obvious a ttem p t to  s t i f l e  c r i t i c i s m  of H urley,
and i n te n s i f i e d  th e  su sp ic io n  w ith  which th e  Communist le a d e rs
27reg a rd ed  H urley and Wedemeyer,
W hile doubt, in d e c is io n , and s u rp r is e  were th e  o rd er of 
th e  day in  Yenan, more s t a r t l i n g  developm ents were ta k in g  
p la c e  in  Chungking, On August 16, 1945, H urley se n t a message 
to  th e  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  in fo rm ing  him th a t  th e  G eneralissim o 
had re c e iv e d  a c a b le  from Dr. Soong in  Moscow s t a t i n g  th a t  th e  
S in o -S o v ie t t r e a ty  p robab ly  would be signed  by th e  S o v ie t o f­
f i c i a l s  on August 14, bu t as y e t  H urley was u n su re  o f i t s  
p ro v is io n s .  The G enera lissim o  seemed q u ite  s a t i s f i e d  w ith  
th e  agreem ent which had been worked o u t, and he thanked Hurley 
fo r  h i s  a id  in  la y in g  th e  groundwork fo r  th e  rapprochem ent 
w ith  th e  S o v ie t Union. When Chiang to ld  Hurley th a t  th e  ne­
g o t ia t io n s  were com pleted and in  a few days th e  t r e a ty  would 
be a  r e a l i t y ,  th e  Ambassador ad v ised  Chiang to  send an i n v i t a ­
t io n  to  Mao T se-tung  to  v i s i t  w ith  th e  G enera lissim o  in  
Chungking. As a r e s u l t  of th e  t r e a ty ,  Chiang would be f r e e  to  
show th e  r e a l i s t i c  and generous le a d e rs h ip  o f which he was
27jbid.
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cap ab le , Chiang se n t th e  message and Hurley expected  th a t  i f  
Mao accep ted  th e  in v i t a t i o n ,  th e  danger of armed c o n f l i c t  be­
tween th e  Communist p a r ty  o f China and th e  N a tio n a l government
28would be reduced  to  a p o l i t i c a l  c o n tro v e rsy .
28Hurley to  Byrnes, August 16, 1945; H urley P apers ,
CHAPTER X III 
THE END IN CHINA
In th e  S in o -S o v ie t t r e a ty  announced in  th e  fo u r th  week 
of August, China reco g n ized  th e  independence of O uter Mongo­
l i a ,  made D airen an in te r n a t io n a l  p o r t  under R ussian c o n tro l ,  
le a se d  P o rt A rthu r to  th e  S ov ie t Union to  be used  as a nava l 
base  fo r  a p e rio d  o f t h i r t y  y e a rs , and agreed  to  p la c e  th e  
Chinese E aste rn  Railway and th e  South Manchurian Railway under 
a j o in t  S ino -S ov ie t a d m in is tra t io n . In  exchange fo r  th e s e  con­
c e s s io n s , th e  S ov ie t Union recogn ized  th e  Chungking government 
as th e  c e n tr a l  government of China, and prom ised th a t  a l l  Rus­
s ia n  economic and m il i ta r y  support would go to  th a t  governm ent.^
At th e  com pletion of th e  n e g o tia t io n s ,  Soong to ld  H a rr i-  
man th a t  he was p lea se d  w ith  th e  r e s u l t s  and expressed  h is
g r a t i tu d e  fo r  th e  a c t iv e  su p p o rt th e  U nited S ta te s  had given
2
him in  th e  n e g o tia t io n s .  A lthough Soong was p le a se d  w ith  th e  
term s, he was n o t su re  t h a t  th e  t r e a ty  would be w e ll re c e iv e d  
in  China. Indeed, R ussia  had made some d i s t i n c t iv e  g a in s  a t  
th e  expense of China. To s h i f t  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  th e  t r e a ty
^China W hite P ap er. 585-596.
^MacArthur H earin g s. P a r t  5, 3339-3340.
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from h im se lf , Soong go t Chiang to  ap p o in t Wang S h ih -ch ieh  as 
Fore ign  M in is te r  and he signed  th e  a c tu a l  t r e a ty  f o r  C hina,^  
The agreem ent was consummated in  Moscow on August 14 and was 
r a t i f i e d  in  Chungking by th e  G enera lissim o  on August 24.4  
News of th e  t r e a ty  must have reached  Mao T se-tung  
s h o r t ly  a f t e r  i t  was agreed  to  in  Moscow, f o r ,  on August 21, 
H urley  re c e iv e d  th e  news he had been aw aitin g  fo r  a lm ost e le ­
ven m onths, A w ire  from Yenan n o t i f i e d  G eneral Wedemeyer th a t  
Mao T se-tung  d e s ire d  a g u a ran tee  o f s a fe  conduct in  th e  event 
he  accep ted  th e  G e n e ra lis s im o 's  i n v i t a t io n  to  c o n fe r  in  Chung­
k in g , The C hinese government had a lre a d y  g uaran teed  sa fe  
conduct and p ro te c t io n  to  Mao i f  he  came to  Chungking, bu t in  
s p i t e  o f t h i s ,  Mao d e s ire d  a s im ila r  g u a ran tee  from th e  Ameri­
cans, To re a s s u re  Mao, H urley v o lu n te e re d  to  f ly  to  Yenan and 
r i d e  th e  same p lan e  back to  Chungking w ith  th e  Chairman and 
h is  a id e . H urley viewed M ao's impending accep tance  of C h iang 's  
i n v i t a t i o n  w ith  g re a t  e x p e c ta tio n s .
Ambassador Hurley f e l t  th a t  i f  Mao accep ted  th e  in v i ­
t a t i o n  o f fe re d  by Chiang K ai-shek , a se ttle m e n t cou ld  be 
ach iev ed . The in e x o ra b le  lo g ic  o f even ts  which H urley sa id  
would b rin g  Mao to  th e  con fe rence  ta b le  seemed to  be w orking. 
The c o n c lu sio n  of a fav o ra b le  S in o -S o v ie t f r ie n d sh ip  p a c t .  
Hurley b e lie v e d , would lea v e  Mao w ith o u t hope of success in  
any p ro sp e c tiv e  c i v i l  w ar. The American Ambassador p re d ic te d
% urley to  Byrnes (d r a f t ) ,  n ,d , ; Hurley Papers,
^Hurley to  Byrnes, August 24, 1945; Hurley Papers,
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t h a t ,  n o tw ith s ta n d in g  Mao's many fu lm in a tio n s , he would come 
to  Chungking and th e  r e s u l t s  would be a p e a c e fu l, s tro n g , 
u n i te d ,  dem ocratic  government in  C hina.^  C e r ta in ly , i f  Mao 
d id  acc ep t C h ian g 's  i n v i t a t i o n ,  i t  would be a momentous m ile ­
s to n e  in  th e  n e g o t ia t io n s .
Two days l a t e r  Hurley re c e iv e d  more encouraging news 
from Yenan, On August 23, 1945, he was adv ised  th a t  Chou En- 
l a i  would jou rney  to  Chungking to  co n fe r w ith  th e  G eneralissim o 
in  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f u n i ty .^  The n ex t day th e  answer everyone 
expec ted  la y  b e fo re  H urley , Mao sa id  t h a t  fo r  th e  sake o f a 
u n i te d  China and peace in  th e  F ar E a s t, he was w il l in g  to  v i s i t  
Chungking and d is c u s s  th e  s t a t e  o f th e  n a tio n  w ith  G e n e ra lis ­
simo Chiang K a i-sh ek . He added th a t  he would f i r s t  send Chou 
E n - la i  f o r  c o n s u l ta t io n .  As i f  to  rem ind H urley o f h is  com­
m itm ent, Mao w ro te  th e  Ambassador th a t  he looked forw ard to  
m eeting  him aga in  in  Yenan b e fo re  they  undertook  th e  t r i p  to  
Chungking to g e th e r ,?
M ao's d e c is io n  to  go to  Chungking was p robably  m oti­
v a te d  by d is c lo s u re  o f th e  S in o -S o v ie t t r e a ty .  The pro-C hiang 
a t t i t u d e  assumed by th e  S o v ie t Union in  th a t  t r e a ty  unm istak­
ab ly  weakened th e  Communist p o s i t io n  and, a t  th e  same tim e, 
s tre n g th e n ed  th e  Kuomintang, W hile f u l l  s c a le  c i v i l  war loomed 
om inously n e a r , th e  S o v ie t U nion 's u n p red ic te d  a c tio n s  may have
“'H urley to  B yrnes, August 21, 1945; Ik irley  P apers,
^Ivan Yeaton to  Wedemeyer, August 23, 1945; Hurley Pa­
pers,
?Mao to  Wedemeyer, August 24, 1945; Hurley Papers,
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convinced Mao th a t  he should  t r y  to  avoid a c i v i l  c o n f l i c t .
I f  th e  S o v ie t Union d id  indeed  in te n d  to  suppo rt Chiang as i t  
had vowed to  do in  th e  t r e a ty ,  v ic to ry  in  c i v i l  war would be 
much more d i f f i c u l t .  Mao, however, was n o t y e t  w i l l in g  to  
su rre n d e r  com pletely  to  th e  demands of th e  Kuomintang.
Hurley re c e iv e d  a message from th e  American O bserver 
Group in  Yenan which c le a r ly  undersco red  th e  Communists' de­
te rm in a tio n  to  r e s i s t  th e  N a t io n a l i s t s ,  The l e t t e r  adv ised  
H urley on how to  a r r iv e  in  th e  Communist c a p i ta l  and to ld  him 
what th e  Communists w ere l ik e ly  to  accep t in  th e  way of a s e t ­
tlem en t. I t  adv ised  him to  show firm ness and f a i rn e s s  and 
fo rg e t  a l l  p a s t  m isu n d ers tan d in g s . The l e t t e r  cau tio n ed  him 
n o t to  expect th e  C hinese Communists to  make m ajor concessions 
o r to  abandon t h e i r  form er demands,
The C hinese Communists, i t  was re p o r te d , f e l t  th a t  th e  
eyes of th e  w orld were on China. The G eneralissim o had knocked 
a t  t h e i r  door and i t  was t h e i r  du ty  to  t r y  to  save th e  peace. 
T heir s h o r t  ran g e  aims were a t r u e  c o a l i t io n  government which 
would a llow  th e  Communists f r e e  com petition  fo r  u l t im a te  power 
w ith  th e  Kuomintang, But, a t  th e  same tim e , they  seemed 
w i l l in g  to  accep t some s o r t  o f p lan  to  d iv id e  China in to  j u r i s ­
d ic t io n a l  p a r t s .  H urley was ad v ised  no t to  expect any g re a t  
success in  th e  forthcom ing ta lk s  u n le s s  th e  G enera lissim o  con­
ceded to  some b a s ic  Yenan demands. The Communists f e l t  th a t  
i f  n e g o tia t io n s  f a i l e d ,  in te r n a t io n a l  fo rc e s  would in  tim e be 
brought to  bear on th e  C hinese q u e s tio n , and th i s  p re s su re
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would work to  t h e i r  a d v an tag e ,8
With t h i s  l e t t e r  in  hand, H urley boarded th e  p lan e  fo r  
Yenan on August 27. He to ld  r e p o r te r s  assem bled a t  th e  a i r ­
p o r t  t h a t  he was going to  Yenan w ith  th e  f u l l  approval of th e  
G enera lissim o  and a t  th e  in v i ta t io n  of Mao T se-tung , H urley 
s a id  he would accompany Mao T se-tung  and h is  partj^ to  Chung­
k in g  where th e  Communist le a d e r  would e n te r  in to  d i r e c t  
n e g o tia t io n s  w ith  th e  G enera lissim o  and o f f i c i a l s  of th e  Na­
t io n a l  governm ent. He sa id  th a t  he was p lea se d  to  r e tu rn  to  
Yenan fo r  he had worked c o n tin u a lly  f o r  more than  a y e a r  to  
h e lp  avo id  an open s p l i t  between th e  N a tio n a l government and 
th e  Communists. In a co n tro v e rsy  where th e re  had been so many 
c o n f l ic t in g  e lem en ts, H urley sa id  th a t  i t  was a source  of g r a t ­
i f i c a t i o n  to  be a b le  to  m ain ta in  th e  r e s p e c t  and con fidence  of
Q
th e  le a d e rs  of bo th  p a r t i e s .
Hurley a r r iv e d  in  Yenan about fo u r t h i r t y  in  th e  a f t e r ­
noon, He was g re e te d  a t  th e  a i r f i e l d  by Communist p a r ty  
le a d e rs  and members of th e  American M il i ta ry  O bserver Group, 
Follow ing a d in n e r and a n ig h t 's  r e s t .  H urley , w ith  Mao and 
Chou E n - la i ,  l e f t  f o r  Chungking about noon th e  n ex t day,^*^
When they  a r r iv e d  Chairman Mao made a s ta tem en t in  which he 
s a id  China was about to  e n te r  in to  a s ta g e  of p e a c e fu l reco n -
^Robert L, Johnson to  H urley w ith  E nclosu re , August 27, 
1945; H urley P apers ,
Q
Statem ent is su e d  by Hurley p r io r  to  d e p a r tu re  fo r  
Yenan, August 27, 1945; H urley P apers .
l*^Hurley China Log, 1945, August 27, 28, 1945; Hurley
Papers,
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s t r u c t I o n .  At such a c r i t i c a l  p o in t  in  C h in a 's  h i s to r y ,  he 
added, th e  g u a ran tee  o f peace , th e  r e a l iz a t io n  of democracy, 
and th e  c o n s o lid a tio n  of in te r n a l  u n ity  were o f u tm ost u rgen ­
cy, He s a id  th e  p o l i t i c a l  and m il i ta ry  problem s e x is t in g  in  
th e  coun try  should  be r a t io n a l ly  s e t t l e d  on a b a s is  o f peace, 
democracy, and u n ity  in  o rd e r to  b u ild  an in dependen t, f r e e ,  
s tro n g , and p rosperous new China. He expressed  h is  hope th a t  
a l l  a n ti- J a p a n e se  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  and p a t r i o t s  o f China 
would u n i te  in  th e  s t ru g g le  to  c re a te  a new C h in a .H
The c o rd ia l  atm osphere o f K ao 's a r r i v a l  ended two days 
l a t e r  when a con fe rence  was h e ld  a t  H u rle y 's  re s id e n c e  between 
Mao T se -tu n g , Chou E n - la i ,  H u r l^  and G eneral Wedemeyer, The 
m eeting was c a l le d  to  d isc u ss  th e  sh o o tin g  o f an American o f f i ­
c e r  by some tro o p s  who were a lle g e d  to  be Communists. The 
American C ap ta in , John B irch , pa rachu ted  in to  Communist t e r r i ­
to ry  to  secu re  in fo rm atio n  about th e  J a p a n e s e , A n  argument 
between B irch  and th e  commander o f th e  lo c a l  Communist tro o p s 
r e s u l te d  in  B irc h 's  d e a th . The Communist le a d e rs  den ied  knowl­
edge of th e  in c id e n t  and asked Wedemeyer why he had s e n t B irch 
in to  Communist t e r r i t o r y .  Wedemeyer r e p l ie d  th a t  he would send 
Americans anywhere in  China to  accom plish h is  m iss io n .
U n fo rtu n a te ly , W edem^er chose to  t a l k  to  th e  Chairman 
o f th e  C hinese Communist p a r ty  as he would t a l k  to  a d e lin q u en t 
P r iv a te  in  th e  ran k s . J u s t i f i e d  o r n o t, t h i s  was n o t th e  d ip -
^^S tatem ent is su e d  by Mao T se-tung on a r r i v a l  in  
Chungking from Yenan, August 28, 1945; H urley P ap e rs .
1^C aptain  John B irch  was th e  in d iv id u a l a f t e r  whom th e  
John B irch  S o c ie ty  was named.
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lo m atic  way to  ad d ress  a man who m ight e v a c tu a lly  become th e  
r u l e r  of China. Mao d id  no t show any d isp le a su re  w ith  Wede­
m eyer's  a t t i t u d e ,  bu t th e  d isc u ss io n  must c e r ta in ly  have 
im pressed  him u n fav o rab ly .
M oreover, Wedemeyer was a t  th e  same tim e making p lan s  
w ith  th e  G enera lissim o  f o r  th e  c o n tin u a tio n  o f America’ s com­
m itm ent in  C hina. Both en v is io n ed  th e  r e te n t io n  of an American 
m i l i ta r y  m ission  in  China fo r  a p e rio d  of f iv e  y e a rs . I t s  p u r­
pose  would be to  a s s i s t  and a d v ise  th e  Chinese government in  
th e  c re a t io n  o f modern a i r ,  ground, and naval fo rc e s . Both 
H urley and th e  G enera lissim o  d e s ire d  and expected  Wedemeyer 
to  be app o in ted  head o f th e  m i s s i o n . T h r o u g h  a c tio n s  of 
t h i s  k in d  H urley and Wedemeyer were moving th e  U nited  S ta te s  
toward a p o s i t iv e  m ilita iry  commitment which would u n d e rw rite  
th e  f a l t e r i n g  and re a c t io n a ry  regim e of Chiang K ai-shek .
Mao was n o t s u rp r is e d  t h a t  H urley and Wedemeyer were 
backing Chiang and he con tinued  to  n e g o tia te .  The d isc u ss io n s  
between Chiang K ai-shek  and Mao T se-tung  began September 2, 
1945. In  th e  f i r s t  m eeting , Chiang p re se n te d  f iv e  p o in ts  
which com prised h is  p lan  fo r  u n i f ic a t io n .  He o ffe re d  to  form 
th e  e x is t in g  Communist m i l i ta r y  fo rc e s  in to  tw elve d iv is io n s  
w ith in  a  p roposed new n a tio n a l  army. These d iv is io n s  would be 
commanded by Communists bu t would be under th e  c o n tro l of th e
1 ^^■'Minutes of M eeting Held a t  Ambassador H u rley 's  Home, 
No. 2 C haling  V il la g e , 7:45 p .m ., August 30, 1945, September 1, 
1945; H urley P ap e rs .
I'^Hurley to  Byrnes for Truman, September 2 , 1945; Kkir-
le y  Papers.
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N atio n a l governm ent= Where th e  Communist tro o p s  would be s t a ­
tio n e d  a f t e r  th e  re o rg a n iz a tio n  was to  be dec ided  a f t e r  th e  
Communist p a r ty  had subm itted  i t s  recom m endations. Regarding 
th e  a re a s  o f China under Communist c o n tro l ,  Chiang took a hard  
l in e .  He sa id  th a t  th e  Communist p a r ty  demands reg a rd in g  con­
tin u e d  c o n tro l  o f th e s e  a re a s  were im possib le  to  c a rry  o u t, bu t 
added th a t  th e re  m ight be a p o s s ib i l i ty  of some Communist mag­
i s t r a t e s  rem aining  in  t h e i r  p o s ts  a f t e r  an exam ination of 
t h e i r  a d m in is tra t iv e  rec o rd s  by th e  c e n tr a l  government.
On p o l i t i c a l  q u e s tio n s , th e  G eneralissim o y ie ld e d  very 
l i t t l e .  He found no need to  re o rg a n iz e  th e  government b e fo re  
c a l l in g  th e  P e o p le 's  Congress in  November, A lthough he 
o f fe re d  to  c o n s id e r  th e  d e s ire s  of th e  Communist p a r ty  to  p a r ­
t i c i p a t e  in  th e  government b e fo re  th e  P e o p le 's  C ongress, he 
reg a rd ed  th e  1937 e le c t io n s  fo r  members of th a t  body, h e ld  
under Kuomintang dom ination , v a l id .  He d id , however, ag ree  to  
c o n s id e r  some re a so n a b le  in c re a s e  in  th e  number of d e le g a te s  
which were to  r e p re s e n t  th e  Communist p a r t y , I n  th e  second 
m eeting , on September 3, Chou E n - la i  and Wang J o - f e i  p re s e n t­
ed th e  Communist o f f e r  f o r  s e t t le m e n t. They co n sid ered  th a t  
th e  most e s s e n t ia l  im m ediate problem was to  s ta v e  o ff  th e  
pending c i v i l  w ar. To accom plish  t h i s  end th e  Communists o f ­
fe re d  to  make s e v e ra l  concessions bu t demanded th a t  th e  
Kuomintang approach more r e a l i s t i c a l l y  th e  m i l i ta r y  and p o l i t i c
Important P oin ts of the Conversation between P re s i­
dent Chiang K ai-shek and Mr, Mao Tse-tung, on September 2,
1945; Hurley Papers,
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c a l s i tu a t io n  in  C hina, They wanted th e  Kuomintang to  reco g ­
n iz e  th e  Communist governments and arm ies in  N orth  China in  
what they  c a l le d  th e  " l ib e r a te d  a re a s ."  They demanded th a t  
th e  Communists be a ss ig n ed  a zone in  which they  were au tho ­
r iz e d  to  p a r t i c ip a te  in  th e  su rre n d e r  o f th e  Japanese ,
F in a l ly ,  they  asked fo r  a c e s s a tio n  of a l l  armed c la sh e s  and 
an agreem ent th a t  th e  armed fo rc e s  of both s id e s  rem ain in  th e  
p o s i t io n s  which they  then  occup ied .
The Communists a ls o  re p e a te d  t h e i r  demands fo r  an i n t e r - 
p a r ty  c o n s u lta t io n  co n fe ren ce , composed of r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  of 
v a rio u s  p a r t i e s  and c e r ta in  n o n -p a r tis a n  le a d e rs .  T his was 
e s s e n t ia l ly  th e  same p lan  which had been advanced in  February  
and which had been r e je c te d  by Chiang K ai-shek  a t  t h a t  tim e.
The purpose o f th e  con fe rence  would be to  d isc u ss  a  v a r ie ty  
o f p re s s in g  p o l i t i c a l  m a tte r s . Now, however, th e  Reds in ­
c luded  th e  o u t l in e  of what they  co n sid ered  to  be th e  minimum 
term s th e  Communist p a r ty  would a c c e p t. They asked f o r  com­
p l e t e  c o n tro l  of f iv e  s p e c if ie d  n o rth e rn  p rov inces and p a r t i a l  
c o n tro l  o f s ix  o th e r s .  M oreover, th e  v ic e  mayors o f P e ip in g , 
T ie n ts in , Ching Tao, and Shanghai were to  be nom inated by th e  
Communist p a r ty .
On th e  m a tte r  o f m i l i ta r y  u n i f ic a t io n ,  th e  Communists 
aga in  o f fe re d  s p e c i f ic  te rm s. They demanded th a t  th e  e x is t in g  
Communist m i l i ta r y  fo rc e s  be formed in to  fo r ty = e ig h t d iv is io n s  
w ith in  th e  N a tio n a l array and s ig n i f ic a n t ly  re q u e s te d  th e  e s ­
tab lish m en t o f a P e ip in g  p ro v is io n a l  headqu.arters and a 
P e ip in g  p o l i t i c a l  c o u n c il to  be c o n tro l le d  by th e  Communists,
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Through th e se  two o rg a n iz a tio n s  th e  Communist le a d e rs  would 
e x e rc is e  command over th e  Communist d iv is io n s .  In  a d d itio n  
to  th e  r e g u la r  army, th e  Reds wanted to  re o rg a n iz e  th e  p a r ­
t i s a n s  in  l ib e r a te d  a re a s  in to  a s e l f  defense  corps to  be 
dom inated by th e  Communists, F in a l ly ,  they  c a l le d  fo r  a l l  
Communist tro o p s to  be s ta t io n e d  n o rth  o f th e  Yangtze r i v e r .  
The Communists advanced th re e  p ro p o sa ls  which were to  p ro ­
mote i n te r - p a r ty  c o o p e ra tio n . These th r e e  p o in ts  were 
e s s e n t ia l l y  a condensa tion  of th e  fo u r p o in ts  which th e  
Communists had demanded th e  Kuomintang i n i t i a t e  as a show of 
s in c e r i ty  in  December of 1944, They in c lu d ed  th e  r e le a s e  o f 
p o l i t i c a l  p r is o n e r s ,  th e  sa feg u a rd in g  of a l l  freedom s, and 
th e  a b o l i t io n  o f un reaso n ab le  r e s t r i c t i v e  law s,
The Kuomintang re a c te d  to  th e  Communist p ro p o sa ls  as 
m ight have been ex p ec ted . I t  r e je c te d  th e  Communist dranands 
fo r  re c o g n itio n  o f t h e i r  c o n tro l  in  th e  " l ib e r a te d  a re a s ,"
I t  o f fe re d  to  g iv e  th e  Communists an u n sp e c if ie d  r o le  in  th e  
s u r re n d e r , bu t only a f t e r  th e  Reds had su b m itted  to  Kuomintang 
a u th o r i ty ,  C h iang 's  p a r ty  ag reed  th a t  armed c la sh e s  should  
cease  bu t re fu s e d  to  h a l t  th e  expansion o f Kuomintang troops 
in to  Communist c o n tro l le d  a re a s . A lthough Chiang agreed  th a t  
a p o l i t i c a l  con fe rence  m ight p o ss ib ly  be o rg an ized , he p re ­
f e r r e d  to  keep i t s  fu n c tio n  as vague as p o s s ib le  and re fu se d  
to  postpone th e  convening o f th e  P e o p le 's  Congress in  Novem­
b e r, The Kuomintang tu rn ed  down a l l  m eaningful s e c tio n s  of
Im portan t P o in ts  P re sen ted  by Mr, Chou E n - la i  and Mr, 
Wang J o - f e i  on September 2 a t  5:00 p .m ., n , d , ;  H urley P apers ,
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th e  Communist m i l i ta r y  u n i f ic a t io n  program.
Once aga in  an o ld  f a m il ia r  p a t te r n  emerged. Both s id e s  
made in c o n se q u e n tia l concessions and re fu se d  to  su rre n d e r any 
o f t h e i r  power o r so v e re ig n ty . U n til  they  y ie ld e d  som ething 
much more s u b s ta n t iv e , th e  p ro sp e c t of u n i f ic a t io n  rem ained 
h o p e le s s . The Communists’ apparen t w illin g n e s s  to  accep t a 
t e r r i t o r i a l  d iv is io n  o f China a lone  th e  Yangtze r i v e r  a t  l e a s t  
as a  tem porary m easure emerged as th e  only new development in  
Y enan 's th in k in g  s in c e  th e  l a s t  s e r ie s  of con ferences in  Feb­
ru a ry , On th e  o th e r  hand, C h iang 's r e a c t io n  to  th e se  p ro p o sa ls  
made i t  c le a r  th a t  he would n o t s e t t l e  fo r  le s s  than  a l l  of 
China w ith o u t extrem e p re s su re  being  p laced  on him by th e  
U n ited  S ta te s ,  The G enera lissim o f e l t  th a t  w ith  American and 
S o v ie t su p p o r t, he cou ld  d e fe a t  th e  Communists in  th e  N orth,
The Communists, fo r  t h e i r  p a r t ,  were w il l in g  to  accep t h a l f  of 
China because they  were m om entarily unsure  of t h e i r  p o s i t io n .  
F u rtherm ore , they  may have b e liev e d  th a t  some tim e in  th e  fu ­
tu r e  they  would be a b le  to  underm ine a Chiang regim e in  the  
South anyway. A lthough Hurley took an a c t iv e  i n t e r e s t  in  th e  
t a l k s ,  he chose to  rem ain a lo o f  from th e  day to  day d is c u s s io n s .
H u rle y 's  d isappo in tm en t re g a rd in g  th e  new n e g o tia t io n s  
caused  him to  th in k  again  of r e s ig n a t io n .  He was in  poor h e a lth  
and l i f e  in  China was h a rd . The w eather, th e  food, and th e
c lim a te  a l l  c o n tr ib u te d  to  h is  poor p h y s ic a l c o n d itio n . In a
Government re p ly  to  th e  Im portan t P o in ts  P re sen ted  by
Mr, Chou E n - la i  and Mr, Wang J o - f e i  on September 3, 1945,
n , d , ;  H urley P ap ers ,
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l e t t e r  to  Mrs. D. F. Lawrence, Hurley vowed to  leav e  China 
soon and q u i t  p u b lic  o f f ic e  because he had "grown t i r e d  o f th e  
whole b u s i n e s s . I n  th e  U nited S ta te s ,  rumors con tinued  to  
c i r c u la t e  about H u rle y 's  impending re s ig n a t io n .  P re s id e n t 
Truman den ied  th a t  H urley would re s ig n  bu t th e  New York Times 
re p o r te d  t h a t  i f  th e  r i f t  between th e  Kuomintang and th e  Chi­
n ese  Communists c o n tin u ed , H u r l^  f e l t  th e re  was no more to  be 
done and he would lea v e  h is  p o s t in  Chungking.
The Ambassador, however, cou ld  no t le a v e  China w ith o u t 
some token of d ip lo m a tic  v ic to ry .  He began sea rch in g  once 
aga in  fo r  a scapegoat bo tak e  th e  blame fo r  h is  f a i l u r e  in  
C hina, On September 11, 1945, H urley se n t a message to  th e  
S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te  which l a id  th e  groundwork fo r  h is  impend­
in g  r e s ig n a t io n .  He argued th a t  s in c e  th e  war had ended. 
American o b je c tiv e s  th e  Far E ast had changed. Hurley be­
l ie v e d  th a t  th e  U nited S ta te s  was no lo n g er uphold ing  th e  
p r in c ip le s  o f th e  A t la n t ic  C h a rte r . More s p e c i f i c a l ly ,  he 
was concerned th a t  America was ig n o rin g  th e  a n t i - im p e r ia l i s t i c  
p ro v is io n s  of t h a t  document in c lu d in g  s e lf -d e te rm in a t io n . 
C e rta in  in d ic a t io n s  had le d  H urley to  b e lie v e  th a t  th e  U nited 
S ta te s  was su p p o rtin g  th e  im p e r ia l i s t  powers. G reat B r i ta in ,  
F rance , and th e  N e th e rlan d s , in  t h e i r  a ttem p t to  re g a in  t h e i r  
p re-w ar em pires. As p ro o f of t h i s ,  he c i te d  th e  v o te  of th e
l°H urley  to  Mrs. D. F. Lawrence, September 14, 1945; 
H urley P ap e rs . MacArthur H earings. P w t  3 , 2309.
^^Washington S t a r . September 16, 1945; New York H erald  
T ribune . September l6 ,  1945; New York Times. September 16, 
1945; H urley C lip p in g  Book, 1945; H u r l^  P apers .
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American d e le g a tio n  a t  th e  San F ran c isco  conference  on the  
q u e s tio n  o f  c o lo n ia l  independence in  ^ i c h  th e  Americans s id ed  
w ith  G reat B r i ta in  and France a g a in s t  China and R u ss ia .
The Ambassador p o in te d  ou t how th e  o b je c tiv e s  o f th e  
im p e r ia l i s t s  d i f f e r e d  from th o se  of what he b e lie v e d  should  be 
American p o lic y  in  A sia . The im p e r ia l i s t  n a tio n s  favored  th e  
s u s ta in in g  o f Japan as th e  dominant re g u la to ry  fo rc e  in  A sia 
and a t  th e  same tim e supported  a p o lic y  in ten d ed  to  keep China 
d iv id e d . This was d i r e c t l y  opposed to  what P re s id e n t Roose­
v e l t  had o u tl in e d  to  him as lo n g -ran g e  American p o lic y  in  th e  
F ar E a s t. Under th e se  c ircu m stan ces . Hurley re q u e s te d  an op­
p o r tu n ity  to  r e tu rn  to  th e  U nited  S ta te s  w ith  G eneral Wedemeyer
on September 19 so t h a t  he could  d isc u ss  American A s ia t ic
20p o lic y  w ith  th e  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  and th e  P re s id e n t.
F iv e  days l a t e r ,  on September 16, 1945, H urley found 
an o th e r reaso n  why he should  r e s ig n .  He had le a rn e d  th a t  
George A tcheson and John S e rv ice  had been a ss ig n e d  as p o l i t i ­
c a l  a d v is e rs  to  G eneral Douglas M acArthur, th e  Supreme A llie d  
Commander in  th e  P a c i f i c .  In p r o t e s t ,  he d r a f te d  a v i t r i o l i c  
th re e  and a h a l f  page c a b le  in ten d ed  fo r  th e  P re s id e n t and th e  
S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te .  The te leg ram  was never se n t bu t i t  in d i ­
ca ted  th e  A m bassador's p a s s io n a te  s t a t e  o f mind on t h i s  
q u e s tio n .
He charged both  Atcheson and S erv ice  w ith  opposing 
American p o lic y  in  China and d e l ib e r a te ly  su p p o rtin g  th e  im-
^^Hurley to  Byrnes, September 11, 1945; Hurley Papers.
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p e r i a l i s t i c  n a tio n s  in  t h e i r  o b je c tiv e s  o f a d iv id ed  China, 
Both men, he c o n tin u ed , supported  th e  C hinese Communist p a r ty  
whose purpose i t  was to  overthrow  th e  N a tio n a l government o f 
th e  R epublic  o f C hina, to  remove Chiang K ai-shek  as war le a d e r  
o f C hina, and b rin g  about c i v i l  w ar. H urley s a id  h is  m ission  
in  China had been accom plished over th e  v i r u le n t  and a b le  op­
p o s i t io n  o f A tcheson and S e rv ice , They had always su ppo rted  
a p o lic y  which would d iv id e  and weaken China.
H u rle y 's  a t t a c k  then  tu rn ed  to  th e  S ta te  D epartm en t's  
D iv is io n  o f C hinese A f f a i r s ,  He argued th a t  t h i s  group had 
long been a ttem p tin g  to  su b v e rt h i s  g o a ls  in  C hina. Members 
o f th e  ad v iso ry  s t a f f  which Atcheson le d ,  he s a id ,  favo red  
im p e ria lism  and opposed democracy. Even a f t e r  he had secu red  
th e  su p p o rt o f C h u rc h ill  and S ta l in  fo r  American p o lic y  in  
C hina, th e  D iv is io n  o f C hinese A f fa ir s  o f th e  S ta te  Departm ent 
and th e  men who once occupied  th e  U nited  S ta te s  Embassy in  
China co n tin u ed  to  r e p o r t  every  f a l s e  and fe e b le  rum or, to  
m agnify every p e rso n a l and p o l i t i c a l  c la s h  in  China in to  term s 
o f c i v i l  war.
According to  H urley , Atcheson and S e rv ic e 's  a p p o in t­
ments would c e r ta in ly  d is ru p t  th e  u n i f ic a t io n  conferences 
between th e  N a tio n a l government and th e  Communists. He sa id  
they  would again  a ttem p t to  b reak  up th e  ta lk s  j u s t  as they  
had done in  th e  f a l l  o f 1944 du ring  s im ila r  n e g o tia t io n s .  F i ­
n a l l y ,  Hurley re q u e s te d  th a t  n e i th e r  Atcheson n o r S e rv ice  be 
g iven  any j u r i s d ic t io n  over American p o lic y  in  China u n t i l  he 
had been given an o p p o rtu n ity  to  p re s e n t  th e  m a tte rs  in  person
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to  th e  P re s id e n t and th e  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te .   ^ Hurley had
found h i s  scap eg o a ts .
M eanwhile, back in  th e  U nited S ta te s  th e  growing muddle 
in  China a t t r a c t e d  th e  a t t e n t io n  of th e  p r e s s .  A lexander H. 
U hl, in  th e  New York Times on September 5 , 1945, commented on 
A tc h e so n 's  appointm ent by say in g , "Atcheson i s  on th e  co n ser­
v a t iv e  s id e ,  bu t once had a row w ith  Ambassador P a t H urley , 
a s  d id  most o f th e  China S ta te  Department p eo p le , so he c a n 't  
be to o  b ad ."^^  G unther S te in  in  th e  C h r is t ia n  S cience M onitor 
on Septem ber 22, branded Américan p o lic y  as i l l - d e f i n e d  s in c e  
th e  p a ss in g  o f  R ooseve lt and f e l t  th a t  i t s  aims were s t i l l  n o t 
q u i te  c le a r .  Mark Gayne, idiom H u r l^  l a t e r  la b e le d  a Commu­
n i s t ,  n o ted  th e  s h i f t  in  th e  S ta te  Department which saw th e  
l i b e r a l  China crowd, le d  ty  John C a rte r  V in cen t, moving in to  
p o s i t io n s  o f a u th o r i ty  p re v io u s ly  occupied by th e  more co n ser­
v a t iv e  o ld  Japan hands. The now more pow erful l i b e r a l s  in  
th e  S ta te  Departm ent were s tro n g ly  opposed to  H urley and Hur­
le y  was e q u a lly  opposed to  them, Gayne r e p o r t e d . I n  
a d d i t io n ,  rumors co n tin u ed  to  c i r c u la te  concern ing  H u rle y 's  
im pending re s ig n a t io n  and h is  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  w ith  p e rso n n e l
^ l& ir le y  to  Truman and Byrnes (u n se n t) , Sep tanber 16, 
1945; H urley P ap ers .
^^New York Times, September 5, 1945, H urley C lipp ing  
Book, 1945; H urley l^apers.
^ -C h r is t ia n  Science  M onitor. September 27, 1945, Hur­
ley  C lip p in g  Book, 1945; H urley P apers .
Z^chicago Sun. September 23, 1945, Hurley C lipping
Book, 1945; H urley'Tapers.
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in  th e  Embassy and th e  S ta te  D epartm ent’ s D iv is io n  o f C hinese 
A f f a ir s ,
A lthough Hurley had a l l  th e  reaso n s  he needed to  r e s ig n  
he  was determ ined to  make one f i n a l  t r y  a t  b rin g in g  to g e th e r  
th e  Communists and th e  Kuomintang, On September 18, he met 
w ith  G eneral Chou E n - la i ,  Chou p re se n te d  H urley w ith  a  d r a f t  
communique to  be is su e d  as a d e c la ra t io n  by th e  two p a r t i e s .
The s ta tem en t c o n ta in e d  s ix  m ajor p o in ts ,  each w ith  se v e ra l
26s u b d iv is io n s . H urley s e t  about to  s im p lify  t h i s  document 
and by th e  n ex t m orning, th e  day o f h i s  d e p a r tu re  from Chung­
k in g , he  had a s in g le  n in e  p o in t  d e c la ra t io n  which he hoped 
could  be ag reed  upon.
H u rle y 's  d e c la ra t io n  c a l le d  fo r  Communist-Kuomintang 
c o lla b o ra t io n  to  p rev e n t c i v i l  s t r i f e ,  e s ta b l i s h  democracy, 
and prom ote r e c o n s tru c t io n  and p ro s p e r i ty  under th e  le a d e rs h ip  
of Chiang K ai-shek , Both p a r t i e s  ehould  ag ree  to  p a r t i c ip a te  
in  a p o l i t i c a l  c o u n c il w ith  p ro p o r tio n a l  r e p re s e n ta t io n  fo r  
a l l  p o l i t i c a l  f a c t io n s .  Both p a r t i e s  should  ag ree  to  uphold 
th e  p r in c ip le s  o f Sun Y at-sen  and prom ote th e  e s tab lish m en t 
o f a b i l l  of r i g h t s .  H u rle y 's  document a ls o  c a l le d  fo r  p ro se ­
c u tio n  and punishm ent o f a l l  t r a i t o r s  and war c r im in a ls , and 
th e  r e le a s e  o f p o l i t i c a l  p r is o n e rs .  The e ig h th  p o in t  of th e  
d e c la ra t io n  recommended th e  amalgamation o f th e  Communist army
^ % ash in g to n  P o s t . Sept«nber 19, 1945, H urley C lipp ing  
Book, 1945; H urley P ap e rs ,
2&Draft D e c la ra tio n  g iven to  Ambassador Hurley by Chou 
E n - la i  on September 18, 1945, September 18, 1945; H urley Pa­
p e rs ,
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w ith  t h a t  of th e  N a t io n a l i s t s  on an u n s p e c if ie d  r a t i o .  F in a l ­
l y ,  th e  Communiât p a r ty ,  i t  was hoped, would ag ree  t h a t  th e  
Kuomintang would rem ain in  c o n tro l  o f th e  government u n t i l  th e
t r a n s i t i o n  from th e  p e rio d  o f o n e -p a rty  tu te la g e  to  a demo-
27c r a t i c  government had been c o n ^ le te d .
Although th e  d e c la ra t io n  p re d ic te d  a  s p i r i t  o f coopera­
t io n  would blossom  in  C hina, Mao T se-tung  seemed le s s  s u re . 
Chairman Mao knew th a t  H urley p lanned  to  lea v e  C h u n k in g  on 
September 19, and q u estio n ed  th e  wisdom o f rem ain ing  in  th e  
Kuomintang c a p i ta l  w ith o u t H u rle y 's  p r o te c t io n .  H urley w ro te  
a  l e t t e r  to  calm  M ao's f e a r s  and s a id  th a t  i f  th e  Chairman 
d e s i re d  t r a n s p o r ta t io n  back to  Yenan he would a rra n g e  i t ;  
however, he to ld  Mao th a t  he had d isc u sse d  th e  m a tte r  w ith  
Chiang K ai-shek  and Chiang had p e rs o n a lly  g u aran teed  Mao's 
s a f e ty .  At th e  tim e o f th e  d isc u ss io n  th e  G enera lissim o  had 
ex p ressed  h is  hope th a t  Mao would rem ain in  Chungking u n t i l  
th e  ta lk s  ended. H urley a ls o  b e liev e d  t h a t  i t  would be h e lp ­
f u l  i f  Mao were to  rem ain in  Chungking long enough to  work ou t 
a s a t i s f a c to r y  understand ing .^®
Hurley was ready  to  le a v e  Chungking b u t n o t b e fo re  h is  
te n u re  in  China was m arred by one f i n a l  in c id e n t .  The very  
day he d e p a rted , th e  U nited  S ta te s  In fo rm ation  Agency is su e d  
a b u l l e t in  in  Chungking which re p o r te d  th a t  H urley would r e -
^^H u rley 's  p ro p o sa l fo r  D e c la ra tio n  Issu ed  by th e  Con­
fe re n c e  of th e  R e p re se n ta tiv e s  o f th e  N a tio n a l Government and 
th e  C hinese Communist P a r ty  a t  Chungking, S ^ tem b e r 19, 1945; 
H urley P ap ers .
^^Hurley to  Mao, September 19, 1945; H urley P apers .
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sign  when he re tu rn e d  to  th e  U nited S ta te s .  I t  a ls o  a llu d e d
to  h is  v a rio u s  c o n f l i c t s  w ith  th e  D iv is io n  o f C hinese A f fa ir s
00
of th e  S ta te  D epartm ent. This news r e le a s e  was a l l  H urley 
needed to  confirm  h is  b e lie v  th a t  h is  e f f o r t s  were being  p u r­
p o se ly  sabotaged  in  China.
Ctoce again  H urley went to  W ashington fo r  a showdown.
From H u rle y 's  p o in t  of view , A m erica 's lo f ty  aims in  China 
were being  su b v e rted , and in  t h e i r  p la c e  America was now sup­
p o r t in g  a p r o - B r i t i s h  im p e r ia l i s t  p o lic y  in  th e  F ar E a s t. As 
i f  t h i s  was n o t enough, I & t r l ^ 's  o ld  a d v e rs a r ie s ,  A tcheson, 
S e rv ic e , and members of th e  S ta te  D epartm en t's  C hinese A f fa ir s  
D iv is io n , were once ag a in  arrayed, a g a in s t  him. F in a l ly ,  r u ­
mors in  th e  U nited  S ta te s  and now in  China th a t  H urley would 
s te p  down as  Ambassador, made i t  seem th a t  Truman would welcome 
h is  a c tu a l  r e s ig n a t io n .  H urley had f e l t  he had done as much 
as he cou ld  w ith  th e  proposed agreem ent which he d ra f te d  and 
gave to  Chou b e fo re  he boarded th e  p lan e  ta k in g  him to  th e  
U nited  S ta te s .  He was t i r e d  o f th e  job  in  China and was ready 
to  r e tu rn  to  p r iv a te  l i f e .
^^Everett F. Drumright to  Hurley w ith Enclosure, Sep­
tember 27, 1945; Hurley Papers.
CHAPTER XIV 
THE FINAL BOW
On September 19, 1945, th e  d a te  o f H u r l ^ 's  d e p a rtu re  
from Chungking, th re e  m ajor New York newspapers re p o r te d  th a t  
th e  c e n t r a l  government and th e  Communists were d r a f t in g  an 
agreem ent to  f o r e s t a l l  th e  c i v i l  war and th a t  H urley would 
b r in g  i t  to  P re s id e n t Truman vdien he re tu rn e d  home to  o f f e r  
h i s  r e s ig n a t io n .  They added th a t  H urley had he lp ed  d r a f t  th e  
p a c t  which was d e sc rib e d  as "an agreem ent to  a g re e ."  The 
a r t i c l e s  p ra is e d  H urley , s t a t in g  th a t  i f  an agreem ent were 
rea ch e d , i t  would be regarded  by H urley as a v in d ic a t io n  o f 
th e  way he had implemented A m erica 's lo n g -s tan d in g  p o lic y  o f 
su p p o rtin g  Chiang K a i-sh e k 's  govem m eat.^
The Ambassador a r r iv e d  in  th e  American c a p i ta l  on Sep­
tem ber 26 , and a lm ost im m ediately became invo lved  in  a  long 
round of c o n fe ren c es ,^  He d id  n o t see  th e  S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te ,  
however, u n t i l  O ctober 9, In th e  in te r im , s e v e ra l  m a tte rs  oc­
cup ied  h i s  a t t m t i o n .  One o f H u rley 's  f i r s t  im portan t
-New York H erald  ÿ rib u n e . September 19, 1945; New York 
T ^ e s . September 19, l945 ; New York D aily  News. September 19, 
15557 H urley C lip p in g  Book, 1945; H urley P apers ,




m eetings was w ith  S e c re ta ry  o f Navy James F o r r e s ta l  on Septem­
b er 28, A ccording to  F o r r e s ta l ,  H urley re p e a te d  th e  id ea  th a t  
th e  C hinese Communists were n o t Communists a t  a l l .  He sa id  
R u ss ia  d e s ire d  to  see  a s tro n g  government in  China and reco g ­
n iz e d  t h a t  Chiang K ai-shek  would be most n e a r ly  a b le  to  p ro v id e  
such a governm ent, ib irley  b e lie v e d  th e  R ussians d id  n o t d e s ir e  
e i t h e r  re v o lu t io n  o r anarchy in  China because t h e i r  own prob­
lems in  A sia  were f a r  too  complex and d i f f i c u l t  to  d e s i r e  such 
a  c o n d itio n . During th e  m eeting H urley touched on th e  p ro fe s ­
s io n a l  s t a f f  o f th e  S ta te  D epartm ait and th e  American 
c o rre sp o n d en ts  in  C hina, bo th  o f whom he s a id  had been a d e f i ­
n i t e  h in d ran ce  to  him. B esides, they  were com m unistically  
in c l in e d .
In th e  f i r s t  weéks a f t e r  H u r l ^ 's  r e tu rn  from China, 
a l l  th e  news coming from Chungking was good. On O ctober 2, a  
c a b le  a r r iv e d  from th e  C hinese c a p i ta l  which in d ic a te d  cos^ro - 
m ises were be ing  made by bo th  s id e s .  The Communists had agreed  
to  form t h e i r  m i l i ta r y  fo rc e s  in to  tw enty d iv is io n s  in  th e  p ro ­
posed  new N a tio n a l army. These d iv is io n s  were to  be commanded 
by Communists. This was indeed  s ig n i f i c a n t ,  f o r  they  had 
o r ig in a l ly  demanded more than  f o r ty  d iv is io n s  w h ile  th e  Kuo­
m intang re fu s e d  to  c o n s id e r more than  tw elve . A m il i ta r y  
commission w ith  Kuomintang and Communist r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s ,  i t  
was s a id ,  would o rg an ize  th e  Communist fo rc e s  in to  th e se  twen­
ty  d iv is io n s .  Both s id e s  had ag reed  to  th e  fo rm ation  of a 
p o l i t i c a l  c o u n c il of th i r ty - s e v e n  members composed of n in e
^ F o r r e s ta l ,  The F o r r e s ta l  D ia r ie s .  98-99.
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Kuomintang members, n in e  Communist members, n in e  members from 
o th e r  p a r t i e s ,  and n in e  h ig h ly  re s p e c te d  independen ts from non- 
p o l i t i c a l  backgrounds, w ith  Chiang K ai-shek  as th e  chairm an.
The c o u n c il would c o n s id e r , among o th e r  th in g s , th e  p o s s i b i l i ­
ty  o f d e lay in g  th e  convening on November 12, o f th e  P e o p le 's  
C ongress, a m ajor bone of c o n te n tio n  between th e  Kuomintang 
and th e  Communists. There was, however, a t  l e a s t  one m ajor 
so u rce  o f d isag reem en t. The Communists demanded an a b so lu te  
v e to  over a l l  p ro p o sa ls  adopted  by th e  c o u n c il .^
Hurley co n tin u ed  to  enjoy a  r e l a t i v e l y  good p re s s  in  
th e  U nited  S ta te s  d u rin g  e a r ly  O ctober. His name f re q u e n tly  
appeared  in  s o c ie ty  columns because o f th e  in ç o r ta n t  p o s i t io n  
occupied  in  W ashington s o c ie ty  by M rs. H urley . More la u d a to ry , 
however, was an a r t i c l e  vdiich appeared  in  th e  New York World 
Telegram  on O ctober 12, th e  day b e fo re  H urley was to  meet w ith  
P re s id e n t Truman. I t  was w r i t te n  by P a rk er LaMoore, who had 
w r i t te n  a p o l i t i c a l  b iography o f H urley in  1932, and who had 
gone to  Qhina in  1945 to  a c t  as one o f H u rlq y 's  s p e c ia l  p re s s  
a id e s .  LaM oore's a r t i c l e  made i t  appear th a t  H urley had s in ­
g le -h an d ed ly  u n ite d  China in  th e  fa c e  o f a C om m unist-inspired 
S ta te  Department p lo t  to  su b v e rt h i s  a c t i v i t i e s . ^  T his was 
an incongruous charge in  l i g h t  o f H u r le y 's  b e l i e f  th a t  th e  
C hinese Communists were n o t r e a l ly  Communists and th a t  th e  
R ussians were su p p o rtin g  American p o lic y  in  C hina.
S h e l te r  R obertson to  Byrnes, O ctober 2, 1945; H u r l^
P ap ers .
%ew York World Telegram. October 12, 1945, Hurley
Clipping Book, 194^; H u r l^  Papers.
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(kl O ctober 13, H urley met w ith  P r é s id a i t  Truman» In 
t h a t  m ee ting , H urley o f fe re d  to  s te p  down as Ambassador to  
C hina. He to ld  th e  P re s id e n t th a t  he was t i r e d  and th a t  h i s  
h e a l th  would n o t p e rm it him to  r e tu r n  to  th e  F ar E as t; bu t 
much to  H u rle y 's  s u r p r i s e ,  th e  P re s id e n t re fu s e d  to  acc ep t h is  
r e s ig n a t io n .  In s te a d , Truman adv ised  H urley to  have a check­
up a t  W alter Reed H o s p ita l ,  tak e  a few weeks r e s t  in  New 
M exico, a f t e r  which they  would d isc u ss  th e  m a tte r  a g a in ,^  
H urley was g r e a t ly  s u rp r is e d  by th e  P r e s id e n t 's  r e q u e s t .  He 
had f u l ly  expected  to  walk ou t o f th e  W hite House f r e e  o f th e  
r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  which he had accep ted  more th an  a y e a r  b e fo re  
when R oosevelt p ick ed  him to  go to  China,
The n ex t day, O ctober 14, S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te  Byrnes 
announced th a t  H urley would r e tu rn  to  C hina,^  When th e  S ecre­
ta r y  o f S ta te  announced H u rle y 's  d e c is io n  to  r e tu r n  to  C hina, 
H u rle y 's  p o p u la r i ty  co u ld  h a rd ly  have been h ig h e r . The Commu­
n i s t s  and th e  Kuomintang had announced agreem ent on H u rle y 's  
September 19 proposed  d e c la r a t io n ,  and th e  American p re s s  
h a i l e d  H u rle y 's  r o l e  in  making agreem ent p o s s ib le .  He a ls o  
was re c e iv in g  most o f th e  c r e d i t  fo r  th e  S in o -S o v ie t t r e a ty .  
Indeed , H u rle y 's  p a r t  in  rea ch in g  vrtiat were b e lie v e d  to  be 
m ile s to n e s  on th e  ro ad  to  peace in  th e  Far E ast were c h a rac -
^W edem ^er, Wedemeyer R eports I , 358-359, MacArthur 
H e arin g s . P a r t  4 . 2936,
^New York Herald T r ib y e . October 14, 1945, Hurley
C lipping Book, 1945; Hurley Papers,
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t e r l z e d  as f i r s t  r a t e  p iec es  of su c c e ss fu l d ip lom acy.°
Encouraging r e p o r ts  from Chungking con tinued  to  pour 
in .  The Kuomintang government and th e  Communists e3q>ressed 
optim ism  concern ing  th e  outcome of n e g o tia t io n s  p u b lic ly  and 
p r iv a te ly .  Both Chiang and th e  Communists a c te d  e n th u s ia s t ic  
abou t H u rley 's  r e tu rn  to  China, and, am azingly enough, ©v@a 
th e  Embassy seaned to  be looking  forw ard to  h is  a ir r iv a l in  th e  
C hinese c a p i t a l .  In  f a c t ,  alm ost everyone bu t H u rle y 's  a rch ­
enem ies and H urley h im se lf  appeared  anxious fo r  th e  Ambassador
g
to  r e tu r n  to  China. H urley was s a t i s f i e d  w itti what he  had 
seemed to  accom plish , bu t he h e a r t i l y  d is l ik e d  going back to  
C hina. He met w ith  Truman b r i e f ly  on October 19, and l e f t  fo r  
New Mexico on October 22, to  r e s t  and th in k  about F ar E aste rn  
prob lem s.
Hurley had only begun to  s e t t l e  down and soak up th e  
New Mexico sun vdien he lea rn ed  of even ts in  China '«diich g re a t­
ly  concerned him. The d is tu rb in g  news was th a t  c la sh e s  had 
occu rred  between th e  Communist and N a t io n a l is t  t ro o p s . But 
H urley w ro te  E v e re tt  F . Drum right, th e  new C hief o f th e  D iv i­
s io n  o f C hinese A f fa ir s  in  W ashington, th a t  he was s t i l l  
convinced c i v i l  war could  be avoided . Hurley cau tio n ed ,
®Mekeesport, P a . , News. O ctober 13, 1945; H«iry R. 
L ieberm an, "Chiang T alks o i  His Hopes f o r  C hina," New York 
Tim es. October 14, 1945; B altim ore Sun. October 13, 1945; 
H urley C lipp ing  Book, 1945; H u r l^  P apers .
R o b e r ts  on to  Byrnes, October 15, 1945; Hurley P apers .
l^Hurley O ffice  Diary, 1945, October 22, 1945; H url^
Papers.
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however, th a t  to  avoid  such a c o n f l i c t ,  th e  government o f th e  
R epublic  o f  China would have to  a c t  in  a d e c is iv e , r e a l i s t i c ,  
and generous fa sh io n ,
The r e p o r ts  o f  c i v i l  war were soon o f f i c i a l l y  confirm ed. 
On November 1, 1945, H urley re c e iv e d  fo u r documents from Drum- 
r i g h t  which d e sc rib e d  th e  r a p id ly  d e te r io r a t in g  s i tu a t io n  in  
C h i n a , T h e  f i r s t  paper re p o r te d  a  p re s s  conference  h e ld  by 
G eneral Wedemeyer in  W ashington, October 22, in  îrtiich he o u t­
l in e d  th e  scope o f American a c t i v i t i e s  in  China s in c e  th e  
su r re n d e r . The U nited  S ta te s  commitment loomed u n u su a lly  
la rg e  in  l i g h t  o f th e  American d e s i r e  to  rem ain n e u tr a l  in  
th e  in te r n a l  c o n f l i c t  which was soon to  en g u lf C h i n a , T h e  
second document was a news r e le a s e  from th e  C hinese M in is te r  
o f In fo rm ation  on O ctober 27, which re p o r te d  r a th e r  o p tim is­
t i c a l l y  on th e  n e g o tia t io n s  between th e  Kuomintang and th e  
Communists then  in  p ro g re s s ,
But t h i s  o f fe re d  l i t t l e  encouragement in  l i g h t  of f u r ­
th e r  in fo rm a tio n , A s e c r e t  te leg ram  d a ted  O ctober 31, from 
th e  American Embassy in  Chungking re p o r te d  th a t  th e  s ta tem en t 
o f O ctober 27 d id  n o t re p re s e n t  th e  t r u e  S i tu a t io n  in  China 
and had been made f o r  consumption abroad . This document
^^Hurley to  D rum right, October 28, 1945; H urley P apers ,
l^D m m right to  H urley , November 1, 1945; H urley P apers ,
1^S tatem ent by L ie u te n a n t G eneral A lb e rt C. Wedemeyer, 
Ccmusanding G enera l. China T hea ter of O p era tio n s, a t  News Con­
fe re n c e , October 22, 1945, W ashington, D, C ,, October 22,
1945; Hurley P ap ers ,
^R obertson to  Byrnes, October 29, 1945; Hurley Papers,
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claim ed th a t  a Communist l ia s o n  man, Wang P ing -nan , had c a l le d  
a t  th e  American Embassy and charged  th a t  th e  c e n t r a l  govern­
ment was co o p e ra tin g  w ith  th e  Japanese  p u p p e ts . He in tim a te d  
th a t  elem ents o f th e  Red E igh th  Route Army had lin k e d  up w ith  
R ussian  fo rc e s  in  M anchuria, The Communists, t h i s  r e p o r t  s a id , 
b e lie v e d  th a t  th e re  m ight be a c o n tin u a tio n  o f th e  conversa­
t io n s ,  b u t they  had no hope th a t  an y th ing  c o n s tru c t iv e  m ight 
be accom plished from them,
Another e q u a lly  fo rebod ing  te leg ram  came from Chungking 
on t h a t  same d a te ,  O ctober 31, 1945, The second message d e a l t  
w ith  th e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f th e  R ussians in  M anchuria and th e  b reak ­
down o f n e g o tia t io n s  w ith  th e  Communists vdiich cozrresponded to  
th e  in c re a se d  m il i ta r y  c o n f l i c t .  The te leg ram  was based  on 
in fo rm a tio n  p ro v id ed  by Dr, Wang S h ih -c h ie h , th e  new M in is te r  
o f F o re ign  A f fa ir s  f o r  th e  N a tio n a l governm ent. Dr, Wang 
charged  th a t  th e  R ussians had re fu s e d  to  co o p era te  w ith  th e  
N a t io n a l i s t  governm ent. R a ther than  h o ld in g  towns and c i t i e s  
u n t i l  th e  N a t io n a l i s t s  cou ld  occupy them, they  in s te a d  had 
w ithdrawn and th e  v acan t a re a s  w ere f a l l i n g  to  th e  Communists, 
The F ore ign  M in is te r  saw a d i r e c t  r e la t io n s h ip  between th e  
Communist t ru c u le n c e  in  Chungking and th e  a t t i t u d e  shown by 
th e  R u ss ian s , S ince  September 24, he s a id ,  th e  Communists 
had been c u t t in g  r a i l  l in e s  over which Kuomintang tro o p s  hoped 
to  t r a v e l  northw ard  and re p e a te d ly  a tta c k e d  tro o p s  o f th e
^^P araphrase  o f s e c r e t  te leg ram  d a ted  O ctober 31, 1945, 
from American Embassy in  Chungking ( r e  Kuomintang-Communist 
N e g o tia tio n s )  ; h u rle y  P ap ers ,
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Kuomintang government w ith o u t p r o v o c a t i o n , T h e  p a r t i a l  
v ic to ry  th a t  H urley th o u g h t he  had won on th e  q u e s tio n  o f u n i­
f i c a t i o n  in  China was becoming le s s  s ig n i f ic a n t  every day.
The n a tio n  puzz led  over H u rle y 's  c u rio u s  i n a c t i v i t y .  
W ith th e  s i tu a t io n  in  China becoming c r i t i c a l ,  why was H urley 
s t i l l  v a c a tio n in g  in  S an ta  Fe? On November 3 , th e  A sso c ia ted  
P re ss  q u e rie d  Hurley about h is  r e tu r n  to  C hina, The w ire  s e r ­
v ic e  was p a r t i c u l a r ly  in te r e s te d  in  th e  e x ac t d a te  o f H u r le y 's  
p lanned  d e p a r tu re , c a l l in g  to  th e  A m bassador's a t t e n t io n  th e  
c r i t i c a l  s i tu a t io n  vdiich e x is te d  in  C h i n a , H u r l e y  answered 
th a t  he  had n o t y e t  decided  w hether o r n o t he would go back 
to  Chungking, Furtherm ore , he  would n o t make a f i n a l  d e c is io n  
u n t i l  a f t e r  he  had made a  t r i p  to  W a s h i n g t o n , T h e  n e x t day, 
November 4 , a  co lum n ist in  th e  New York Jo u rn a l American r e ­
p o r te d  th a t  H urley would d e f in i t e ly  n o t r e tu r n  to  C hina, b u t 
r a th e r  would run  fo r  th e  U nited  S ta te s  S enate  in  New Mexico,
Some tim e a f t e r  November 10, H urley re a d  a r e p o r t  which 
f i n a l l y  in d ic a te d  th a t  u n i f ic a t io n  was im p o ss ib le . On th a t  
d a te  a  s e c r e t  message l e f t  Chungking vdiich c o n ta in e d  an ac ­
count o f th e  f iv e  p o in t  Kuomintang p ro p o sa l and a fo u r p o in t
^^P araphrase  o f top  s e c r e t  te leg ram  d a ted  O ctober 31, 
1945, from Chungking ( r e  R ussia  in  M anchuria); H urley P ap e rs ,
^^Tank C hief of New York Bureau (A sso c ia ted  P re ss )  to  
H u r l ^ ,  November 3, 1945; H urley P ap e rs ,
^%ew York Times, November 3, 1945, H urley C lip p in g  
Book, 1945; H urley P ap e rs ,
^^"Cholly K nickerbocker O bserves," New York Jo u rn a l 
A m erican. November 4 , 1945, H urley C lipp ing  Book, 1% 3;
H urley P a p e rs ,
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c o u n te r 'p ro p o s a l  made by th e  Communists. Both s id e s  had 
acconq>anied t h e i r  terms w ith  th e  u su a l charges and c o u n te r­
charges which had ru in ed  p rev io u s t a l k s . D e m a n d s  and 
a c c u sa tio n s  o f th e  same type  had emerged w ith  th e  breakdown 
o f n e g o tia t io n s  in  November, 1944, and February , 1945.
With u n i f ic a t io n  seem ingly ou t of th e  q u e s tio n . Hur­
l e y 's  r e tu r n  to  China became even more u n l ik e ly . G eneral 
H urley had gone to  Santa Fe r e lu c ta n t  to  comply w ith  P re s id e n t 
Trum an's re q u e s t  th a t  he  co n tin u e  as Ambassador to  C hina. He 
f e l t ,  however, t h a t  he could  n o t r e fu s e  th e  d i r e c t  re q u e s t  of 
an American P re s id e n t.  B esides, du ring  h is  f i r s t  te n  days in  
San ta  F e - , th in g s  seemed to  be improving in  C hina. The ag ree ­
ment in  Chungking between th e  Communists and th e  Kuomintang 
which o f fe re d  hope o f u l t im a te  u n i f ic a t io n ,  what he  b e lie v e d  
to  be th e  reduced  dangers of c i v i l  w ar, and th e  V .l .P . t r e a t ­
ment he  was re c e iv in g  from S ta te  Department o f f i c i a l s  made him 
f e e l  th a t  perhaps he should  r e t a in  h is  A m bassadorial p o s t .
But suddenly  co n d itio n s  changed. Near th e  end o f Octo­
b e r c i v i l  war in  China broke in to  th e  open and c r i t i c i s m  of 
H urley in  th e  U nited  S ta te s  became s t r o n g . A n  e d i t o r i a l  in  
th e  New York H eràld  T ribune on November 2 , 1945, s a id  H urley 
had com m itted th e  U nited  S ta te s  to  a l l - o u t  suppo rt of th e
O A
P arap h rase  o f S e c re t Telegram se n t to  S ta te  D epart­
m ent, November 10, 1945, by Embassy a t  Chungking; H urley 
P ap e rs .
"Remarks o f H onorable A lb e rt J .  Engle, November 5, 
1945," U. S . .  C ongressional Record. 79th  Cong.. 1 s t  S e s s . . 
1945, Vol. x c i; -p S F t 13; Â4754.—
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Kuomintang reg im e, d e s p i te  A m erica 's r e fu s a l  in  many a re a s  of 
th e  w orld to  i n t e r f e r e  p o l i t i c a l l y  in  in te r n a l  d is p u te s ,  l e t  
a lo n e  w ith  m i l i ta r y  power. The e d i t o r i a l  charged th a t  by such 
a c t io n s ,  th e  U nited  S ta te s  made i t s e l f  a  v i r t u a l  a l l y  of th e  
Kuomintang in  th e  c i v i l  war w ith  th e  Chinese Communists. The 
most ou trageous a sp e c t o f th e  s i t u a t io n ,  th e  e d i to r  s a id , 
was t h a t  th e  S ta te  Departm ent o f f i c i a l s  knew very  l i t t l e  of 
what was going on in  C hina, p r im a r ily  because o f H u r le y 's  r e ­
fu s a l  to  forw ard to  W ashington any r e p o r ts  by su b o rd in a te s  
which co n ta in ed  c r i t i c i s m  o f th e  K u o m i n t a n g . M a n y  newspa­
p e rs  jo in e d  in  th e  c h o ru s . One charged t h a t  H urley had been 
mesmerized s in c e  h i s  s ta y  in  China by th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  Chung­
k ing  government was th e  on ly  government in  China to  trtiich th e  
U nited  S ta te s  had extended le g a l  re c o g n itio n .^ ^  I t  was common­
ly  accep ted  th a t  H u r le y 's  r e tu rn  to  China would be constarued 
as a v ic to ry  fo r  Chiang K a i-sh ek , and i f  H urley were removed, 
th e  Communists' hopes would l ik e ly  r i s e  s h a r p l y . T h i s  c r i t ­
ic ism  convinced H urley t h a t  h i s  only  cou rse  was to  r e s ig n  as 
Ambassador. He would n o t go q u ie t ly ,  however. He would use  
h is  r e s ig n a t io n  to  b u ild  up h is  own image and la y  th e  blame 
on o th e rs  fo r  th e  d e fe a t  o f u n i f ic a t io n  and peace in  China.
H urley re tu rn e d  to  W ashington November 15, and spen t
^^New York Heràkd T ribune . October 30, 1945, H urley 
C lipp ing  Book, 1945; k u r le y  P ap ers .
23B u ffa lo , New York, Evening News. November 3, 1945, 
H urley C lipp ing  Book, 1945; r i u r l ^  P apers .
^^Jay G. Hayden, D etro it News. November 7 , 1945, Hur­
le y  C lipping Book, 1945; Hurley Papers.
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much o f th e  n ex t week p re p a rin g  h is  r e s ig n a t io n .  He began 
d r a f t in g  i t  on Tuesday, November 20, spending most o f th e  day 
e d i t in g  and r e w r i t in g  th e  document t h a t  he p lanned  to  subm it 
to  S e c re ta ry  Byrnes, P a r t  of H u r le y 's  week was occupied  w ith  
T hanksgiving f e s t i v i t i e s  so he was fo rce d  to  work over th e  
weekend. Much o f th e  tim e H urley g o t h e lp  from Lacey Reynolds 
and P a rk er LaMoore, th e  two men \dio had a c te d  as h i s  p re s s  o f­
f i c e r s  in  Chungking aud \dio had bem  p o l i t i c a l  f r ie n d s  fo r  
many y e a rs . He com pleted th e  r e s ig n a t io n  and s ig n ed  i t  on 
Sunday, November 25,
W hile H urley was w r i t in g  h i s  r e s ig n a t io n ,  China occupied  
th e  c e n te r  s ta g e  in  d is c u s s io n s  a t  th e  W hite H o u s e , O n  No­
vember 20, th e  heads o f  th e  S ta te ,  War, and Naval Departm ents 
met to  d is c u s s  th e  q u e s tio n  of A m erica 's  f u tu re  p o l ic y  in  Chi­
na and M anchuria, f o r  Wedemeyer, \dio had r e c e n t ly  r e tu rn e d  to  
Chungking, had asked  f o r  in s t r u c t io n s  re g a rd in g  th e  c r i t i c a l  
s i tu a t io n  th e r e ,  A m eeting  o f th e s e  departm ent heads r e s u l te d  
in  a c a b le  a sk ing  G eneral Wedemeyer w hether th e  Kuomintang 
tro o p s  had th e  c a p a b i l i ty  o f d isarm ing  th e  Japanese  in  Manchu­
r i a  and r e tu rn in g  them to  Japan , The c a b le  s w t  to  Wedemeyer 
made i t  c le a r  th a t  th e  S ta te  Departm ent w anted to  h e lp  th e  
N a t io n a l is t s  g e t th e  Japanese  ou t o f C hina, b u t d id  n o t w ish 
to  suppo rt th e  Chiang government d i r e c t l y  a g a in s t  th e  Commu­
n i s t s .^ ^
^ % u rle y  O ffic e  D iary , 1945, November l5-November 25, 
1945; H urley P ap ers ,
^^F orre s t a i .  The F o r r e s ta l  D ia r ie s . 108-109,
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Wedemeyer' s answer on Nov«aber 23 c l a r i f i e d  th e  i s s u e ,  
b u t l e f t  i t  unso lved . The G eneral was r e lu c ta n t  to  make any 
p o s i t iv e  recom m endations. He en^hasized  th a t  i t  would be im­
p o s s ib le  to  su p p o rt Chiang and a t  th e  same tim e s ta y  c le a r  o f 
th e  G en era liss im o ' s war w ith  th e  C hinese Communists. The 
G e n e ra l 's  recom mendations were couched in  e i t h e r - o r  te rm s. 
America cou ld  w ithdraw  a l l  th e  tro o p s  a t  once from China o r  
cou ld  announce i t s  in te n t io n  to  co n tin u e  su p p o rtin g  th e  Chiang
regim e w ith  m i l i ta r y  and economic a id .  Wedemeyer though t th e
27q u e s tio n  should  be decided  by th e  S ta te  Departm ent.
(ki November 26, th e  War and Naval D epartm ents, a c t in g  
on Wedemeyer's telegram^ tu rn ed  th e  q u e s tio n  back to  th e  S ta te  
D epartm ent. In  a  memorandum, F o r r e s ta l  and S e c re ta ry  o f War 
R obert P . P a tte rso n  reco g n ized  th e  im p o s s ib i l i ty  o f upho ld ing  
Chiang a g a in s t  th e  Japanese  w ith o u t su p p o rtin g  him a ls o  a g a in s t  
th e  C hinese Communists. But th ey  f irm ly  e le c te d  to  a cc ep t th e  
r i s k s  in v o lv ed  in  g iv in g  a l l - o u t  su p p o rt to  Chiang.
P a tte r s o n  b e lie v e d  th a t  r e p o r t s  o f Communist m i l i ta r y  
s t r e n g th  were g r e a t ly  ex ag g era ted , and though t t h a t  Chiang o f ­
fe re d  th e  b e s t  chances o f se c u rin g  a u n if ie d  China th a t  would 
be f r ie n d ly  to  th e  U nited  S ta te s .  This b e l i e f  cou ld  w e ll have 
been based on F o r r e s t a l 's  c o n v e rsa tio n s  w ith  H urley on Septem­
ber 28, 1945.^® They recommended r e ta in in g  more th an  50,000 
American M arines in  N orth China and proposed to  len d  every
^^I b id . . 110-111. Wedemeyer to  War D epartm ent, Novem­
ber 20, l945, Appendix IV, Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer R e p o r tsj
^^F o rre s t a i ,  The F o r r e s ta l  D ia r ie s . 98-99.
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a id  to  Chiang in  g e tt in g  th e  Japanese r e p a t r ia te d ,  ^
This was th e  s t a t e  of th e  China ta n g le  on Monday, No­
vember 26, vrtien G eneral H u r l^  k ep t a n in e  f i f t e e n  appointm ent 
a t  th e  S ta te  Departm ent w ith  S e c re ta ry  Byrnes. At th a t  m eets 
in g  he to ld  th e  S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te  th e  rea so n s  behind h is  
d e c is io n  to  r e s ig n .  He f e l t  he was n o t g e t t in g  th e  suppo rt 
t h a t  he  deserved  from th e  A d m in is tra tio n . He had seen  a r t i c l e s  
in  th e  D a ily  Worker \Aiich in d ic a te d  to  him th a t  h is  s e c re t  r e ­
p o r ts  to  th e  S ta te  Department were being made a v a i la b le  to  
th e  Communists. He s a id  th a t  he had heard  through Dr. Wang 
S h ih -ch ieh  t h a t  Byrnes h im se lf  had s a id  t h a t ,  s in c e  th e  war 
was o v e r, th e  A d m in is tra tio n  was going to  g iv e  H u rle y 's  p o s t 
to  a d ese rv in g  Democrat. He re p o r te d  a  d isc u ss io n  he had w ith  
th e  C hinese r e p re s e n ta t iv e  to  th e  U nited N a tio n s , who warned 
him th a t  i f  he  re tu rn e d  to  China th e  A d m in is tra tio n  would f in d  
some p r e te x t  fo r  p u b lic  d isc h a rg e . Furtherm ore, S e rv ice  and 
A tcheson were s t i l l  in  th e  p o s i t io n s  they  had occupied when 
H urley l e f t  f o r  Santa Fe. Byrnes to ld  H urley t h a t  he  had th e  
f u l l  su p p o rt o f th e  S ta te  Department and th e  P re s id e n t, and 
t h a t  he would check in to  H u rley 's  charges ^ i l e  th e  Ambassador
re c o n s id e re d  h i s  d e c is io n . H urley l e f t  h is  re s ig n a t io n  but
30agreed  to  d isc u ss  th e  m a tte r  again  l a t e r  in  th e  day.
In  th e  a fte rn o o n  m eeting , Byrnes made every e f f o r t  to
29ib id . . 111-112.
^^ ^MacArthur H e y in a s . P a r t  4 , 2936-2937. Ikraf t  o f Hur­
le y  Memoirs, x iv , 23-24; W ashington, D. C ., Times H era ld . 
November 28, 1945: W ashington S ta r . November 28, 1945; H urley 
C lip p in g  Book, 1945; H u r l^  P apers .
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conv ince  H u r l^  th a t  he should  co n tin u e  on as Ambassador, 
S ev era l reaso n s m ight have prompted B y rn es 's  d e s i r e  to  g e t Hur­
le y  back to  C hina, H urley had only  r e c e n t ly  prom ised th a t  i t  
would be q u i te  easy  to  b rin g  th e  Communists and th e  N a tio n a l­
i s t s  to g e th e r  in  peace  and harmony, and p re s s u re  from th e  
Congress fo r  r a p id  d e m o b iliz a tio n  made a heavy U nited  S ta te s  
m i l i ta r y  commitment in  China i s ^ o s s ib le .  The e a s i e s t  s o lu t io n  
would be to  send H urley  back to  China to  so lv e  th e  problem  
th rough  diplom acy. With p e rsu a s iv e  argum ents, Byrnes con­
v in ce d  H urley th a t  he  would have th e  f u l l  su p p o rt o f th e  
A d m in is tra tio n , and f i n a l ly  H urley agreed  to  f ly  to  China a f ­
t e r  he add ressed  th e  N a tio n a l P re ss  Club on November 2.8,31 
Byrnes inform ed th e  P re s id e n t th a t  H urley would r e tu r n  and a 
p la n e  was re a d ie d  to  ta k e  him back to  C h i n a , T h e  n e x t day, 
however, th e  S e c re ta ry  o f S t a t e 's  p lan s  met d i s a s t e r .
On th e  morning o f November 27, H urley awoke, f u l ly  ex­
p e c tin g  th a t  he would r e tu r n  to  China th e  n e x t day. He d id  
n o t want to  go back to  China, and he had f u l ly  in ten d ed  to  
r e s ig n  when he l e f t  th e  C hinese c a p i t a l .  But he found i t  
d i f f i c u l t  to  say no to  th e  re q u e s ts  o f P re s id e n t Truman and 
S e c re ta ry  Byrnes, He ta lk e d  to  S e c re ta ry  F o r r e s ta l  on th e  
te lep h o n e  th a t  morning and perhaps th e  two men d isc u sse d  th e  
w orsening s i tu a t io n  in  C hina, fo r  F o r r e s ta l  had j u s t  com pleted
31W ashington, D, C ., Times H era ld . November 28, 1945; 
W ashington S ta r . Novanber É8, 1945; H urley C lip p in g  Book,
1945; H u r le ÿ T â p e rs ,
^^MacArthur H earin g s. P a r t  4 , 2937,
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d r a f t in g  a menorandum to  th e  S ta te  Department which p re se n te d  
th e  Navy and War D epartm ents' views on th e  s u b je c t .  H urley 
a r r iv e d  in  h i s  o f f i c e  about ten  f o r ty - f iv e  and c o n fe rre d  w ith  
Byrnes ag a in  by te lep h o n e , d is c u s s in g  h is  imminent f l i g h t  to  
th e  Far E a s t, k t  t h a t  tim e , H urley  s t i l l  a p p a re n tly  expected  
to  be back in  China b e fo re  th e  week was o u t.
A fte r  speaking  w ith  th e  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te ,  H urley 
tu rn ed  h is  a t t e n t io n  to  th e  C ong ressiona l Record. H e  must 
have been c a s u a lly  thumbing th rough  th e  accum ulated verbage 
which occurs in  Congress every day vdien he ran  a c ro ss  a speech 
made by Congressman Hugh Delacy o f W ashington on November 26. 
In  th e  speech , Delacy charged th a t  American m i l i ta r y  su p p lie s  
in  China were being  used  to  su p p re ss  th e  a s p i r a t io n s  o f m il­
l io n s  fo r  a new democracy ^ i c h  th ey  had begun to  b u i ld  f o r  
them se lves. The Congressman blamed H urley fo r  th e  r e s ig n a t io n  
o f C larence  L. Gauss, th e  form er Ambassador, and s a id  K u r i l ' s  
s te p  by s te p  r e v e r s a l  o f th e  R oosevelt-G auss p o l ic ie s  in  China 
made c i v i l  war u n av o id ab le . F in a l ly ,  he  charged t t ia t  H urley 
and Wedemeyer had committed th e  U n ited  S ta te s  to  armed i n t e r ­
v e n tio n  in  C hina.
H urley saw in  th e  speech \d ia t he b e lie v e d  to  be a d d i­
t io n a l  co n firm a tio n  th a t  h is  r e p o r ts  to  th e  S ta te  Departm ent 
T*ere being leaked  to  c r i t i c s .  L a te r ,  vdien Delacy was ques-
^^H urley O ffice  D ia ry , 1945, November 27, 1945; H urley 
P ap e rs . W ashington S t a r . November 28, 1945, H urley C lip p in g  
Book, 1945; H urley P ap e rs .
S . .  C ong ressiona l R ecord. 79th  Cong., 1 s t  S e s s . , 
1945, XCI, P a r t  8 , 10993:1^995:---------
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t io n e d  about th e  sou rce  o f h i s  in fo rm a tio n , th e  Congressman 
s a id  he had based h i s  charges on cab les  se n t from China by 
co rresp o n d en ts  o f th e  A sso c ia ted  P re s s , th e  U nited  P re s s , and
th e  New York Times, and t h a t  he had no access  to  any o f Hur-
35l e y 's  r e p o r t s .  In f a c t ,  th e  in fo rm atio n  in  D e lac y 's  speech 
cou ld  e a s i ly  have been d e riv ed  from such so u rc e s . But H urley 
d id  n o t want to  go back to  China and now he seemed to  have a 
good excuse to  r e s ig n .  I t  appeared t h a t  th e  su p p o rt Byrnes 
had prom ised him would n o t be fo rthcom ing . H urley c a l le d  
v a rio u s  p re s s  h e a d q u a rte rs  a t  about noon and s a id  th a t  he  would 
r e le a s e  a s ta tem en t a t  tw elve t h i r t y .  In  h a l f  an h o u r, r e p o r t ­
e r s  assem bled a t  H u r le y 's  o f f i c e  and he d i s t r ib u te d  a p re s s  
r e le a s e  which had been p rep a red  in  advance fo r  h i s  expec ted  
r e s ig n a t io n  o f November 26.^6
The r e s ig n a t io n  and th e  accompanying p re s s  r e l e a s e  were 
d ram atic  s ta te m e n ts  o f  H u rle y 's  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  w ith  th e  co u rse  
o f  even ts in  China and th e  U nited S ta te s .  They re p re se n te d  a  
confused  jum ble o f  charges a g a in s t  S ta te  Departm ent p e rso n n e l, 
in te r s p e r s e d  w ith  p a t r i o t i c  f l u f f  and padding . He charged 
th a t  th e  U nited  S ta te s  su p p lie s  and p r e s t ig e  were being  used  
to  underm ine democracy and b o ls te r  im p e ria lism  and communism. 
H urley s a id  th a t  th e  American p o lic y  in  China d id  n o t have 
th e  su p p o rt o f th e  c a re e r  men in  th e  S ta te  Departm ent who con­
s i s t e n t l y  s id e d  w ith  th e  C hinese Communist p a r ty  and th e
^^ahM ngton S tar . November 28, 1945, Hurley C lipping
Book, 1945; Hurley Papers.
36Ib id .
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i n ^ e r i a l l s t  b loc  of n a tio n s  in  an e f f o r t  to  keep China d iv id e d . 
D esp ite  th e se  handicaps^ H urley claim ed th a t  he  had made 
p ro g re ss  toward u n i f ic a t io n  and succeeded in  p rev e n tin g  c i v i l  
war between th e  r i v a l  f a c t io n s .  When he re q u e s te d  th a t  th e  men 
su b v e rtin g  h is  p o lic y  be removed, they  were re tu rn e d  to  Wash­
in g to n  and p lac ed  in  p o s i t io n s  he co n sid ered  they  had
su p e rv iso ry  a u th o r i ty  over him. He s a id  th a t  th e  U nited  S ta te s
was in  danger o f being  sucked in to  an im p e r ia l i s t  power b loc
37which was form ing a g a in s t  Communist im p eria lism .
Much o f W ashington was taken  by s u r p r i s e .  S e c re ta ry  
Byrnes le a rn e d  o f H u rle y 's  p e tu la n t  r e s ig n a t io n  as he  was 
abou t to  le a v e  th e  S ta te  Department fo r  a  c a b in e t luncheon w ith  
P re s id e n t T r u m a n . T h e  d ram atic  even t was th e  s in g le  to p ic  of 
d is c u s s io n  a t  th e  c a b in e t luncheon th a t  a f te rn o o n . S e c re ta ry  
o f A g r ic u ltu re  C lin to n  Anderson suggested  th a t  George C. 
M arsh a ll be app o in ted  to  th e  vacan t p o s t .  The s e le c t io n  of 
M arsha ll would se rv e  two fu n c tio n s . F i r s t ,  th e  ex -C hief of 
S ta f f  was c e r ta in ly  one of th e  most capab le  men in  government 
s e rv ic e .  I f  anyone could  p o ss ib ly  b rin g  o rd e r ou t o f  th e  chaos 
in  C hina, i t  would be George C. M arsh a ll. Secondly, th e  qu ick  
appoin tm ent o f M arsha ll would s t e a l  much of th e  thunder from 
H u rle y 's  s e n s a t io n a l  ch a rg es ,
37H urley to  Truman, November 26, 1945; H urley P ress 
R e lease , November 26, 1945; H urley P apers .
^®Washington S t a r . November 28, 1945, H urley C lipp ing  
Book, 1945; H urley P ap ers .
^^I b id . F o r r e s ta l ,  The F o r r e s ta l  D ia r ie s . 113.
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But H u r l ^  was n o t e a s i ly  s t i l l e d ,  and th e  n e x t day he 
le v e le d  an o th e r b la s t  a t  o f f i c i a l  W ashington. I f  an y th in g , 
H urley ’s ad d ress  to  th e  N a tio n a l P re ss  Club, November 28, 1945, 
f u r th e r  confused th e  i s s u e .  He s a id  t h a t  th e  men o f th e  d ip lo ­
m atic  s e rv ic e  in  China e i th e r  d id  n o t know American p o lic y  or 
they  d e l ib e r a te ly  opposed i t .  Furtherm ore, he re p e a te d  th a t  
a l l  of th e  d ip lom ats whom he had removed from China were p o s ted  
to  W ashington where they  were p lac ed  in  "su p e rv iso ry "  c ap a c i­
t i e s  over him. In  s p i t e  o f t h e i r  o p p o s itio n , H urley c la im ed, 
he had succeeded in  i n i t i a t i n g  d isc u ss io n s  between th e  Commu­
n i s t  p a r ty  and th e  N a tio n a l governm ent, he had brought Mao 
T se-tung  and Chiang K ai-shek  to g e th e r , and, f i n a l ly ,  he had 
p rev en ted  a c i v i l  war among th e  p o l i t i c a l  f a c t io n s  in  China. 
A lthough he had secu red  approval of American p o lic y  from 
C h u rc h ill  and S ta l in ,  th e  i in ^ e r ia l i s t  c i v i l  se rv a n ts  o f B r i ta in  
in  A sia had su b v erted  C h u rc h il l’ s aims J u s t  as American c a re e r  
s e rv ic e  o f f ic e r s  had blocked H urley ’ s e ffo r ts .^ ®
As could  be expec ted , th e  immediate r e a c t io n s  to  Kur­
i l ’ s speech v a r ie d . At f i r s t  bo th  R epublicans and Democrats 
in  Congress sh ied  away from commenting on H urley ’ s s ta te m e n t, 
a s c r ib in g  t h e i r  c a u tio n  to  a c e r ta in  confusion  they  saw in  
th e  document. A rth u r Krock observed in  th e  New York Times 
th a t  H urley was known as an im pu lsive  man and, however u n ju s t  
th e  op in ion  was, he was n o t h ig h ly  r a te d  fo r  sound judgment
40 "E xcerp ts From an Address by P a tr ic k  H urley b e fo re  
th e  N a tio n a l P re ss  Club a t  W ashington, November 28, 1945," 
November 28, 1945; H urley P apers ,
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o r long d e l ib e r a t io n  b e fo re  reach in g  c o n c lu s io n s ,^ ^  The New 
York P o s t s a id  th a t  H urley had been a b a r r i e r  to  th e  foirmation 
of any genuine American p o l ic y ,  branded h is  r e s ig n a t io n  con­
fu sed  and in c o n s is te n t ,  and added th a t  i t  i l lu m in a te d  th e  
rea so n s  f o r  h is  f a i l u r e .  The P o s t con tinued  t h a t  H u rle y 's  
s ta te m e n t made sense  only  i f  i t  was an open b id  f o r  th e  le a d e r ­
sh ip  o f th e  v a r ie d  a n ti-R u ss ia n  and N a t io n a l i s t i c  elem ents in  
th e  c o u n try . T his a n ti-H u r le y  e d i t o r i a l  went on to  say th a t  
i t  was d o u b tfu l t h a t  H urley ever unders tood  o r  ca red  v\xat p o l i ­
c ie s  were being  s e t  in  W a s h i n g t o n . O n  th e  o th e r  hand, some 
new spapers viewed H u rle y 's  s ta tem en t as a  courageous p r o te s t  
a g a in s t  bung ling  in  China vAiich m ight s tan d  o u t as th e  s in g le  
most im p o rtan t p a t r i o t i c  s e rv ic e  of th e  postw ar e ra .^ ^
Almost every newspaper comm entator, how ever, demanded 
th e  in v e s t ig a t io n  o f K u r i l ' s  ch a rg es . In  no p la c e  was t h i s  
c ry  lo u d e r than  in  th e  h a l l s  o f C ongress. Mmnbers o f Congress 
were a s  confused as everyone e ls e  about American China p o lic y . 
They w anted to  know vixy th e  U nited  S ta te s  had s o ld ie r s  in  China 
when th e  war w ith  Japan was over. They wanted to  know w hether 
th e  R ussians were w ithdraw ing acco rd in g  to  t h e i r  t r e a ty  a r ­
rangem ents. They wanted to  know why th e  U nited  S ta te s  was 
co n tin u in g  to  su p p o rt th e  N a t io n a l i s t  governm ent. T h ^  wanted
A rthu r Krock, New York Times. November 28, 1945,
H urley C lip p in g  Book, 1945; H urley j^âpœ's,
4^New York P o s t . November 28, 1945, H urley C lipp ing  
Book, 1945; H urley P a p e rs .
^%ewark. New Jersey , Star-Ledger. Novanber 28, 1945,
Hurley C lipping Book, 1945; H u rl^  Papers.
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to  know what s ta k e  th e  average  American had in  th e  C hinese 
c i v i l  w ar. They w anted to  know th e  U n ited  S ta te s  was 
u s in g  fo rc e  to  meddle in  th e  in te r n a l  a f f a i r s  o f a n o th e r  n a ­
t io n .  They w anted to  know who th e  men were th a t  H urley had 
charged  w ith  su b v e rtin g  American p o l ic y . F in a l ly ,  they  wanted 
to  g iv e  th e  S ta te  Departm ent a  chance to  answer H u rle y 's
c h a rg e s .44
A d m in is tra tio n  le a d e r s ,  however, d e s ire d  to  avo id  a 
f u l l  s c a le  in v e s t ig a t io n  o f H u r l ^ 's  ch a rg es . At w o rs t, th e  
H urley re s ig n a t io n  was a can o f  worms. Once th e  in v e s t ig a ­
t io n  began, an y th in g  m ight be uncovered . At b e s t .  H u r le y 's  
ch arg es would be d i s c r e d i te d .  But th e  in v e s t ig a t io n s  cou ld  
p ro v id e  an is s u e  fo r  th e  coming 1946 e le c t io n s .  T rying to  
su p p ress  th e  demands f o r  in v e s t ig a t io n .  S en a to r Tom C onnally , 
Chairman of th e  pow erfu l Senate  Fore ign  R e la tio n s  Committee, 
r id ic u le d  G eneral H u r le y 's  fu lm in a tio n s . C onnally  s a id  he was 
t ry in g  to  combat in  th e  Senate  what he c a l le d  th e  mania f o r  
s p e c ia l  in v e s t ig a t io n  c o m m i t t e e s . H u r l e y  opposed th e  id e a  
of any s e c re t  h e a rin g s  b u t ag reed  to  appear a t  any p u b lic  h e a r ­
in g  t h a t  was a ffo rd e d  him by th e  C ongress,4^ C onnally  a lo n e  
cou ld  n o t s t i f l e  demands f o r  in v e s t ig a t io n  and h e a r in g s  were
S .,  C ong ressiona l R ecord. 79th  Cong., 1 s t  S e s s . , 
1945, V ol. XCI, P a r t  14, House R e so lu tio n  443; P a r t  9, 11236; 
P a r t  8 , 11122.
4^Paul W. Ward, The B altim ore  Sun. November 29, 1945, 
H urley C lipp ing  Book, 1945; H urley P apers .
^ ^ F e lix  B e la ir ,  J r . ,  New York Times. December 1, 1945, 
H urley  C lipp ing  Book, 1945; H urley P ap e rs .
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schedu led  by th e  Senate Foreign  R e la tio n s  Committee to  a i r  
H u rle y 's  ch arg es .
When th e  h e a rin g s  opened on December 5, H urley was th e  
f i r s t  w itn e s s . As he p rep a red  to  d e l iv e r  h i s  tes tim o n y , te n ­
s io n  ro s e . Then, b r ig h t  l ig h t s  shone and cameras \d iir re d  as 
th e  in u re s s iv e  so ld ie r -d ip lo m a t boomed ou t h i s  in d ic tm en t 
a g a in s t  th e  S ta te  Departm ent. H u r l^  was th e  very  model of 
a d is t in g u is h e d  sta tesm an  w ith  s i lv e r -g re y  h a i r  and d re sse d  
im peccib ly  in  a t a i lo r e d  s u i t .  He spoke out s tro n g ly  w ith  th e  
v o ic e  o f a t r a in e d  o r a to r ,  t in g e d  w ith  a d i a l e c t  ^ i c h  found 
i t s  ro o ts  in  th e  re d  c la y  h i l l s  o f Oklahoma. But as H uicl^  
ram bled on i t  became c le a r  th a t  behind th i s  m ag n ificen t facade 
was a  s in g le  man \Aio had met d e fe a t ,  a  sim ple man who was un­
a b le  to  b ea r th e  burden o f th a t  d e fe a t  h im se lf  o r to  conceive 
t h a t  c o n d itio n s  in  China m ight have been o u ts id e  American con­
t r o l .  In s te a d , he  la sh ed  ou t in  every d i r e c t io n ,  blam ing th e  
Communists fo r  t h i s ,  th e  E ng lish  fo r  t h a t ,  th e  c a re e r  d ip lo ­
m ats f o r  som etning e ls e .  Everyone had f a i l e d  but H urley and 
t h e i r  f a i l u r e s ,  n o t h i s ,  ended w ith  th e  d e fe a t  of th e  American 
aim o f u n i f ic a t io n  in  China. The more H urley spoke, th e  more 
ia ^ la u s ib le  h is  charges became.
F in a l ly ,  H urley f in is h e d  and th e  S ta te  Department p re ­
se n ted  i t s  c ase . In c o n tr a s t  to  H u rley 's  bom bastic, confused 
tes tim o n y , th e  S ta te  Department o f f i c i a l s  p re se n te d  a c o ld ly  
lo g ic a l  s ta tem en t o f th e  China p o lic y  Byrnes had o u tl in e d  in  
a l e t t e r  to  Congressman Jack  Z. Anderson o f C a li fo rn ia  on
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Novanber 30, In  th a t  l e t t e r  th e  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  s a id
t h a t  th e  U nited  S ta te s  favo red  th e  e s tab lish m en t of a s tro n g , 
u n i te d ,  dem ocratic  China v ^ ic h  would c o n tr ib u te  to  peace and 
s t a b i l i t y  in  th e  Far E a s t. A lthough th e  U nited S ta te s  though t 
i t  e s s e n t ia l  t h a t  China so lv e  i t s  in te r n a l  problem s th a t  ta s k  
would have to  be c a r r ie d  ou t la rg e ly  through China’ s own e f ­
f o r t s .  S e c re ta ry  Byrnes en^hasized  t h a t  th e  U nited  S ta te s  
m i l i ta r y  commitment in  China was fo r  th e  so le  purpose o f  a id ­
in g  China a c c o n ^ lish  th e  su rre n d e r o f Japanese fo rc e s .
By December 8 , i t  had become obvious t h a t  th e  only  
p eo p le  in  th e  S ta te  Departm ent ^ o  knew '(diat American p o lic y  
was were th e  c a re e r  men, among them George Atcheson and John 
S e rv ic e . I t  was ap p aren t th a t  they  had been p re s s in g  s te a d i ly  
f o r  j u s t  th e  ty p e  o f p o lic y  which Byrnes id e n t i f i e d  in  h i s
testim ony  and in  h i s  l e t t e r  to  Congressman Anderson as t h a t
aar 
49
48o f th e  U nited  S ta te s .  By December 9 , i t  was c le a th a t  B ir-
le y  d id  n o t have th e  f a c ts  to  back up h is  ch arg es .
On December 11, th e  S a in t Louis Post-D ispatC h commented 
t h a t  " th e  H urley show i s  about to  c lo s e  a f t e r  a b r i e f  run  
which has been d is t in g u is h e d  fo r  i t s  very  bad s c r i p t ,  c o n s is t ­
in g  c h ie f ly  of l o f ty  speeches in te r s p e r s e d  w ith  w ild  c r ie s  of 
w o lf ."  The P o s t-D isp a tch  added th a t  th e  H u r l^  drama m ight
^^U. S . ,  C ongressiona l Record. 79th  Cong., 1 s t  S e s s . , 
1945, XCI, P a r t  l3 ,  A526^-A5270.
^%ew York P o s t . December 8 , 1945, H urley C lipp ing  
Book, 1945; H urley P ap e rs .
^^Jack T a it , New York Herald Tribune. December 10,
1945, Hurley C lipping Book, 1945; Èurley Papers,
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have been m ild ly  amusing were i t  n o t fo r  th e  deeper im p lica ­
t io n s .  I t  was incongruous, th e  newspaper co n tin u ed , th a t  an 
American Ambassador charged  w ith  in ^ o r ta n t  and d e l ic a te  m is­
s io n s  had shown h im se lf  g iven  to  a r b i t r a r y  d e c is io n s , 
in d ic tm e n t w ith o u t p ro o f o f t r i a l  o f a s s o c ia te s ,  and a des­
p o t ic  manner dangerously  o u t o f key w ith  A m erica 's  devo tion  
to  a dem ocratic  way o f  l i f e , ^ ^
On December 12, th e  W ashington, D. C«, News announced 
th e  S enate  Foreign  R e la tio n s  Committee p lanned  a q u ie t ,  slow 
d e a th  f o r  H u rle y 's  c h a r g e s . N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  th e  co n tro v e rsy  
which H u rle y 's  r e s ig n a t io n  had caused would l i v e  on fo r  sev ­
e r a l  more y e a rs .  Indeed , H u rle y 's  name and th e  charges he 
had made in  h is  r e s ig n a t io n  w ere to  be re v iv e d  vdienever Com­
m unists in  government or th e  Communist v ic to ry  in  China were 
d isc u sse d , and H urley liim se lf  was f re q u e n tly  c a l le d  upon to  
t e s t i f y  b e fo re  C ong ressiona l com m ittees on th e s e  m a tte rs .
A lthough H u rle y 's  a c t iv e  r o l e  in  China ended w ith  h is  
r e s ig n a t io n ,  th e  problem s which th e  U nited  S ta te s  faced  th e re  
rem ained to  be so lv e d . B efore th e  end of December, George C. 
M a rsh a ll, th e  new American Ambassador to  C hina, was on h is  
way to  th e  F ar E a s t. The trem endous s t a tu r e  and a b i l i t y  of 
M arsha ll were brought to  b e a r on th e  p ro b i ans th e re  b u t, un­
l ik e  H urley , he  q u ick ly  r e a l i z e d  th a t  th e re  was l i t t l e  which
^^S a in t Louis P o s t-D isp a tc h . December 11, 1945, H urley 
C lipp ing  Book, 1945; H urley P ap ers .
^^W ashington, D. C ., News, December 12, 1945, H urley 
C lip p in g  Book, 1945; H urley  P ap e rs .
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could  be done to  save th e  s i t u a t io n .  He saw th a t  no rea so n ­
a b le  amount o f American m i l i ta r y  a id  could  save th e  Ghiang 
government because  Ghiang and h i s  army had l o s t  th e  su p p o rt 
o f th e  peop le  o f  G hina,^^
^^MacArthur H earin g s . P a r t  1 , 662,
CHAPTER XV 
THE VOICE IN THE WILDERNESS
The H u r l^  s to ry  d id  n o t end w ith  th e  C onnally  h e a r­
in g s in  December, 1945, H urley thought th a t  h is  s e n s a t io n a l  
r e s ig n a t io n  would b rin g  him th e  su p p o rt and g r a t i tu d e  o f th e  
American p eo p le . In s te a d  h is  d e p a rtu re  from o f f ic e  and th e  
h e a rin g s  ^ i c h  fo llow ed d id  j u s t  th e  o p p o s ite . The charges 
which he made a g a in s t th e  p ro fe s s io n a l  s t a f f  of th e  S ta te  De­
partm en t in  h is  r e s ig n a t io n  were d is c re d i te d  in  th e  Connally 
h e a r in g s .1 The ex-A m bassador's testim ony n o t on ly  f a i l e d  to  
s u b s ta n t ia te  th e  a c c u sa tio n  th a t  pro-Communists were su b v e rt­
in g  American fo re ig n  p o l ic y , b u t, m oreover, h is  confused 
s ta tem en ts  and backward lo g ic  e:q>osed him to  be a bum bling, 
am ateur d iplom at who should  never have been a ss ig n e d  to  such 
a  c r i t i c a l  p o s t in  th e  f i r s t  p la c e .^
A fte r  th e  c lo se  o f th e  h e a r in g s , H u r l^  re tu rn e d  to  New 
Mexico where he had e s ta b l is h e d  a home s h o r t ly  b e fo re  th e  war. 
He ran  fo r  th e  U nited S ta te s  Senate in  1946, seek ing  a forum
H larqu is W. C h ild s , "The S ta te  o f th e  N a tio n ,"  New York 
P o s t . Decamber 6 , 1945, H u r l^  C lipp ing  Book, 1945; H urley Pa­
p e r s .
^"Our Choice in  C hina,"  New R epub lic . CXIII (Decem­
b er 10, 1945).
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in  which he could  a l e r t  th e  n a tio n  to  th e  dangers he though t 
were b efo re  i t . 3 H urley ran  a g a in s t  th e  Dem ocratic incum bent, 
Senato r Dennis Chavez, b u t devoted most of h i s  tim e in  th e  
campaign to  r e s t a t i n g  th e  charges he had made a t  th e  tim e o f 
h is  r e s ig n a t io n .  These is s u e s  were of l i t t l e  i n t e r e s t  to  th e  
v o te rs  of New Mexico, and Chavez was re tu rn e d  to  th e  U nited 
S ta te s  Senate in  s p i t e  of thie g e n e ra l R epublican tre n d  in  th e  
1946 e le c t io n s .^  H urley ran  fo r  S enato r again  in  1948 a g a in s t  
C lin to n  P. Anderson, th e  form er S e c re ta ry  o f A g r ic u ltu re , and 
th i s  tim e was d e fe a te d  by an even g re a te r  m arg in .^
H u rle y 's  p r o te s t s  th a t  American fo re ig n  p o lic y  had been 
su b v erted  by th e  pro-Communists in  th e  S ta te  Departm ent and 
h is  h in ts  th a t  American i n te r e s t s  had been n e g le c te d  a t  Y a lta  
won him th e  e a r  o f s e v e ra l  d i s s id e n t  groups in  th e  U nited  
S ta te s .  The China lobby adopted H urley as a  h e ro  because of 
h is  suppo rt o f Chiang K ai-shek . S u p e r -p a tr io ts ,  who b e liev e d  
American power was so g re a t  th a t  i t  cou ld  change h is to r y  any­
where in  th e  w orld w ith  a  mere s ta tem en t of p o l ic y , were qu ick  
to  f in d  a champion in  H urley . The p ro fe s s io n a l  Communist- 
f ig h te r s  d e lig h te d  in  h i s  in to q > e ra te  s ta tem en ts  about 
Communist subversion  in  th e  S ta te  D epartm ent. In  much th e  
same fa sh io n , th e  R oosevelt h a te r s  accep ted  H u rle y 's  charges 
about th e  Y a lta  co n fe rence  a t  fac e  v a lu e .^  H u rle y 's  s to r i e s
%altsr M. Harrison, Me and My Big Mouth (Oklahoma 
City: Britton Printing Conçany, 312-314.
^ o h b e c k , P a t r ic k  J .  H urley . 453. ^ I b id . . 454.
^For Example se e  H u rle y 's  postw ar correspondence w ith
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o f Communist i n f i l t r a t i o n ,  of p l o t s ,  and o f s e c r e t  agreem ents 
appealed  s tro n g ly  to  a l l  th e se  groups f o r  th e  common denomi­
n a to r  among them was a c o n s p i r a to r ia l  mind.
U nited  by th e  theme o f co n sp iracy  vdiich ran  through 
H u rle y 's  ch a rg es , th e  f a c t io n s  which had u n ite d  around H urley 
encouraged him to  make s ta tem en ts  even le s s  co n sid ered  than 
th e s e  in  h is  r e s ig n a t io n .^  Minor ev en ts  d u rin g  h is  te n u re  in  
China took  on new meanings as they  became p a r t s  of a  g re a t  
co n sp iracy  \d iich  only  H urley and h is  fo llo w ers  were a b le  to  
fathom . A f i r e  in  th e  American Embassy in  Chungking became 
p a r t  of a  Communist p l o t  to  d e s tro y  p ro o f of Communist subver­
s io n  in  th e  Embassy f i l e s . & When H u rle y 's  C a d il la c  lim o sin e  
broke down, i t  was ag a in  a t t r ib u t e d  to  sab o tag e , r a th e r  than
Q
to  an in e p t C hinese m echanic. As H urley  developed th e  con­
s p i r a t o r i a l  theme, he p a in te d  h is  r o le  in  th e  s tru g g le  a g a in s t  
th e  co n sp iracy  he had in v w te d  in  term s la r g e r  than  l i f e .  
S t i l l ,  he  w a ited  f o r  th e  o p p o rtu n ity  to  p lea d  h is  case  once 
ag a in  b e fo re  th e  n a tio n .
While H urley was in  New Mexico lo s in g  e le c t io n s  and
F u lto n  Lewis, J r . ,  A lfre d  L. K ohlberg, George Van Horn Mosely, 
Henry Regnery, George S o k o ls l^ , W alter Judd and H erbert 
Hoover.
^For Example se e  H urley to  Henry R. Luce, August 23, 
1949; H urley to  Orlando Ward, January  11, 1952; and H urley 
P re ss  R e lease , June 2 , 1950; H u r l^  P ap e rs .
Q
H urley P re ss  R e le a se , June 2 , 1950; H urley P ap ers .
^D raft of H urley  Memoirs, x i i ,  8; H urley P ap e rs .
^^This i s  a c o n tin u in g  theme th roughou t D ra f t of Hur­
ley  Memoirs; H urley P ap e rs .
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making i r r e s p o n s ib le  s ta te m e n ts  re g a rd in g  h i s  Am bassadorship 
in  C hina, th e  l a s t i n g  peace  f o r  ^ i c h  World War I I  had been 
fough t was b reak in g  down. Even b e fo re  th e  war was o v e r, th e  
S o v ie t Union began to  d is p la y  a new h o s t i l e  a t t i t u d e  toward 
th e  U nited  S t a t e s . ^  By th e  summer of 1949, th e  U nited  S ta te s  
and th e  S o v ie t Union w ere locked  in  & w orld power s t r u g g le .
The c o n f l i c t  w ith  th e  S o v ie t Union was c a l le d  th e  Cold War, 
and America had developed new weapons to  f i g h t  in  i t . ^ ^  The 
g re a t  c ru sad es of World War I  and World War I I  had f a i l e d  to  
win a l a s t i n g  peace and th e re fo re  war was r e j e c te d  as a  means 
of so lv in g  th e  id e o lo g ic a l  c o n f l i c t  w ith  th e  S o v ie t Union. 
In s te a d , th e  I ta ite d  S ta te s  had adopted  th e  p o lic y  o f  c o n ta in ­
ment developed by George F. Kennan, th e  C h ief o f th e  P o lic y  
P lann ing  S ta f f  o f th e  S ta te  D e p a r t m e n t . C o n t a i n m e n t  seemed 
to  work w e ll ,  f o r  a lth o u g h  th e  American p eo p le  were n o t win­
n in g  th e  Cold War, they  a t  l e a s t  were n o t l o s i n g .
Halfway th rough  1949 ev en ts  suddenly began to  tak e  
p la c e  vdiich made i t  look  as though th e  containm ent p o lic y  had 
f a i l e d  and th e  Communists were w inning th e  s t r u g g le  f o r  w orld 
suprem acy. Qa. August 5 , 1949, th e  S ta te  D epartm ait is su e d  
th e  W hite Paper which o f f i c i a l l y  announced t h a t  China had
lllru m a n , Memoirs. I ,  85.
l^ E r ic  F. Goldman, The C ru c ia l Decade and A f te r ;  Amer­
ic a .  1945-1960 (New York; A lfre d  A. knopf, 1^60), 62-9Ù.
^^The most co n c ise  s ta tem en t o f th e  conta inm ent p o lic y  
i s  in  George F. Kennan, "The Sources of S o v ie t C onduct," For- 
e ign  A f f a i r s . XXV ( J u ly ,  1947 ;, 566-582. -----
1^Goldman, The C ru c ia l Decade and A f te r ,  96-97.
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f a l l e n  to  the  Communist a r m i e s . O n  September 23, 1949, th e  
W hite House re le a s e d  th e  news th a t  th e  S o v ie t Union had ex­
ploded an atom ic bomb. F in a l ly ,  in  December and January , 
i t  was charged th a t  A lger H iss , a  S ta te  D epartm w t o f f i c i a l ,  
had been a member o f th e  Communist p a r ty  and had passed  c la s ­
s i f i e d  S ta te  Departm ent documents to  W hitaker Chambers, a 
con fessed  C o m m u n i s t . S o m e  le a d e rs  o f th e  R epublican p a r ty  
such as S enato r R obert T a ft of Ohio expressed  concern over 
th e se  ev en ts  and began to  g iv e  some o f th e  more r a d ic a l  e le ­
ments w ith in  th e  p a r ty  a chance to  exp ress t h e i r  v iew s.
On February 9 , 1950, an obscure W isconsin S en a to r, 
Joseph R. McCarthy, d e liv e re d  a speech b e fo re  th e  Women's Re­
p u b lic an  Club in  W heeling, West V irg in ia , on th e  su b je c t  of
Communism in  th e  S ta te  D epartm ent. McCarthy made w ild , un­
s u b s ta n t ia te d  charges t h a t  205 Communists h e ld  p o s i t io n s  in  
th e  S ta te  Departm ent, bu t a  p o p u la tio n  f r ig h te n e d  by th e  un­
expected  advances made by th e  Communists around th e  w orld were
19ready  to  b e lie v e  M cCarthy's r e v e la t io n s .  When th e  Korean 
War broke ou t in  June o f 1950, many peop le  assumed th a t  h e re
was p ro o f of th e  W isconsin S e n a to r 's  t a l e s  of subversion  in
20h ig h  p la c e s . As M cCarthy's power ro s e , so d id  th e  power of
l% ew York Times. August 6 , 1949, 2. 
l% ew York Times. September 24, 1949, 1.
’ ^Goldman, The C ru c ia l Decade and A f te r . 101-111. 
IGlb id . . 126-127.
^%ew York Times. February 12, 1950, 5 .
^^Goldman, The C ru c ia l Decade and A f te r . 212.
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th e  d is s id e n t  elem ents which had surrounded H urley in  th e  
y e a rs  a f t e r  th e  w ar.
H u r l^  was brought to  W ashington to  r e s t a t e  th e  accusa­
t io n s  he had made in  1946.21 The d is s id e n ts  d id  n o t h e s i t a t e  
to  u se  H urley , fo r  n o t only  d id  h is  charges o f f e r  som ething 
fo r  each one o f th e  d is c o n tm te d , he was a f ig u re  o f g re a t
s t a tu r e ,  i f  n o t in  f a c t ,  in  appearance. But in  th e  e a r ly
1 9 5 0 's .  H u rle y 's  testim ony  made even le s s  sense  than  i t  had in  
1946, N e v e rth e le ss , encouraged by th e  a t t e n t io n  he was r e ­
c e iv in g  in  W ashington and around th e  n a tio n , he decided  again  
to  run fo r  th e  S e n a to r ia l  s e a t  in  New Mexico in  1952 d e s p i te  
attenq>ts by p a r ty  le a d e rs  in  t h a t  s t a t e  to  b lock  h is  nomina- 
t io n .  H u r l^  l o s t  th e  e le c t io n  and in  th e  n ex t few y e a rs
th e  d is s id e n ts  who had won him new h e a rin g s  were d is c r e d i te d  
by th e  a n t ic s  of S enato r McCarthy. The le a d e rs  o f th e  Repub­
l ic a n  p a r ty  vdio had f o r  a b r i e f  moment co u rted  th e se  g roups, 
ru shed  to  d is a s s o c ia te  them selves and Hurley found h im se lf  
once aga in  d isc a rd e d  and surrounded only by a band o f peop le  
who were i f  any th ing  more a lone  than  he .
An e v a lu a tio n  of H urley !s r o le  in  China i s  d i f f i c u l t  
because he fu n c tio n ed  n o t as an independent man, b u t r a th e r  
as a r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  of P re s id e n t R oosevelt. In many ways, 
H urley was th e  p e r f e c t  in stru m en t fo r  e x ta id in g  p r e s id e n t ia l
2l See testim ony  o f H urley in  MacArthur* H earin g s. P a r t  
4 , 2827-2859.
22lb id .
^^Lohbeck, P a tr ic k  J .  H urley . 460-461.
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power in to  th e  f a r  c o rn e rs  o f th e  w orld . Through ex p erien ce  
th e  P re s id e n t had le a rn e d  th a t  H u r l ^ ,  once g iven in s t r u c t io n s ,  
would n o t vary  from them. M oreover, H u r l^  cou ld  be counted 
on n o t to  a llow  h is  own id ea s  to  ta k e  p recedence over th o se  
o f th e  P re s id e n t,
When th e  P re s id e n t  se n t  H urley to  China and l a t e r  made 
him Ambassador, he  knew f u l l  w e ll th e  k in d  o f man he had s e ­
le c te d ,  H urley had worked c lo s e ly  w ith  th e  P re s id e n t s in c e  
1941, M oreover, he  had been a  well-known W ashington f ig u re  
s in c e  1929, R ooseve lt r e a l iz e d  t h a t  H u r l ^  had no s p e c ia l  
d ip lo m a tic  t r a in in g .  F u rtherm ore , H u rle y 's  p a s t  h i s to r y  had 
dem onstra ted  him to  be a  poor team w orker and a  flam boyant 
W ashington dandy. More im p o rtan t, however, R oosevelt was su re  
H urley would fo llo w  P r e s id e n t ia l  p o l ic y  w ith o u t q u e s tio n . Be­
cause  o f th e s e  f a c to r s .  H urley enjoyed th e  f u l l  sv ^ p o rt o f 
F ra n k lin  R o o sev e lt,
The in s t r u c t io n s  H urley had re c e iv e d  from R oosevelt in  
l a t e  A pgast, 1944, governed H u rle y 's  a c tio n s  in  C h i n a . W h a t  
e r ro r s  H urley made th e re  w ere to  a c o n s id e ra b le  degree  r e f l e c ­
t io n s  o f m isconcep tions h e ld  by R oosevelt and th e  coun try  as 
a w hole. S p e c i f i c a l ly ,  H urley  f e l l  too  much under th e  i n f lu ­
ence of Chiang K a i-sh ek , The same could  be s a id  of F ra n k lin  
R o o sev e lt, who was committed to  a  p o lic y  of firm  su p p o rt f o r  
Chiang K ai-shek , M oreover, H urley was confused on th e  n a tu re  
o f th e  C hinese Communists and tended  to  m i n i m i z e  t h e i r  ia ^ o r -
^^Draft of Hurley Memoirs, x i ,  8; Hurley Papers.
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ta n c e . The same was t r u e  o f F ra n k lin  R o o sev e lt. H urley  was 
o v e rc o n fid en t of h is  a b i l i t y  to  succeed in  p e rso n a l diplom acy. 
Once a g a in , th e  same was t r u e  o f F ra n k lin  R o o sev e lt. F in a l ly ,  
because  H urley and R oosevelt tended  to  p la c e  m i l i ta r y  o b jec ­
t iv e s  b e fo re  p o l i t i c a l  ones, they  f re q u e n tly  r e j e c te d  th e  
counsel o f p ro fe s s io n a l  d ip lom ats in  th e  S ta te  D epartm ent.
Time has proven th e  S ta te  Departm ent e x p e rts  r i g h t  in  
t h e i r  a p p ra is a l  o f th e  China s i tu a t io n .  They p re d ic te d  th a t  
China would f a l l  under th e  c o n tro l  o f Mao T se -tu n g . This d id  
happen, and America was l e f t  backing Chiang K a i-sh ek , a  power­
le s s  o ld  man en trenched  in  an is la n d  re d o u b t. They p re d ic te d  
th a t  th e  C hinese Communists would be d riv en  in to  th e  hands of 
th e  R u ss ian s. T h is , to o , happened and th e  C hinese Communists 
had to  f ig h t  th e  Korean war in  o rd e r  to  f r e e  them selves from 
th e  S o v ie t yoke. They p re d ic te d  t h a t  American su p p o rt fo r  
Chiang would le a v e  th e  U nited  S ta te s  w ith o u t i n f lu e ic e  in  a 
Communist dom inated C hina. This i s  th e  s i t u a t io n  in  w hich th e  
U nited  S ta te s  found i t s e l f  a f t e r  1949.
R o o se v e lt 's  f a i l u r e  to  r e s p e c t  o r  u t i l i z e  th e  inform a­
t io n  su p p lied  him by th e  S ta te  D ^ a rtm e n t m ust be c o n sid e red  
th e  prim ary  cause o f H u rle y 's  f a i l u r e  in  C hina. Had R oosevelt 
been more d isp o sed  to  a cc ep t th e  a id  o f h is  S ta te  Departm ent 
a d v is e r s ,  th e  in s t r u c t io n s  he gave to  H urley m ight have been 
f a r  d i f f e r e n t .  U n fo rtu n a te ly , r e l a t io n s  between th e  C hief
^^Donald F. Drummond, "C o rd e ll H u ll (1933-1944),"  ^  
U n certa in  T ra d itio n ;  American S e c re ta r ie s  o f S ta te  in  th e  
tw e n tie th  C en tu ry , ed. Norman A. G raebner (New York; McGraw- 
H i l l  Book Company, 1961), 201-203.
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E xecu tive  and th e  S ta te  Departm ent d u ring  th e  war y e a rs  were 
u n s a t is f a c to ry .
A lthough R ooseve lt h e ld  th e  v en erab le  C o rd e ll H ull in  
h ig h  esteem , he found him d i f f i c u l t  to  work w ith . R oosevelt 
g ra d u a lly  came to  b e lie v e  th a t  th e  S ta te  Department m achine­
ry  was o u td a ted  and u n su ite d  to  th e  requ irem en ts o f w artim e 
d i p l o m a c y . I n d e e d ,  h i s  appointm ent of Edward R. S te t t in iu s  
to  th e  p o s t o f S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  upon C o rd e ll H u l l 's  r e s ig n a ­
t io n  was fo r  th e  exp ress purpose of re o rg a n iz in g  th e  S ta te  
Department so th a t  i t  m ight become a more e f f i c i e n t  in s tru m en t 
f o r  P r e s id e n t ia l  u se .^ ^  R o o se v e lt 's  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  w ith  th e  
S ta te  Department was n o t unique to  him. In  f a c t ,  many modem 
American P re s id e n ts  have been e q u a lly  d is tu rb e d  by id ia t ap­
p eared  to  be in e f f ic ie n c y  in  th e  S ta te  D e p a r t m e n t . P e r h a p s  
too  fre q u e n tly  th e  S ta te  D ^ a rtm en t must g ive  unwanted answers 
to  P r e s id e n t ia l  q u e r ie s . These unpopular answers have caused 
th e  P re s id e n ts  to  tu rn  to  s p e c ia l  envoys l ik e  H urley ^ o  u s u a l­
ly  p rov ided  more p le a s in g  answ ers.
W a l t e r  Johnson, "Edward R, S t e t t i n iu s ,  J r .  (1944- 
1945),"  G raebner, U n certa in  T ra d i t io n . 210. J u l iu s  P r a t t ,  
C o rd e ll H u ll . Vol. !k!ltl o f % e  American S e c re ta r ie s  o f S ta te  
and t h e i r  û inlom acy. ed. R okert H. F e r r e l l  (lîew York; ôooper 
Square P u b lish e rs , 1964), 532-533, 543-544.
^^W alter Johnson, "Edward R. S t e t t i n iu s ,  J r .  (1944- 
1945),"  G raebner, U n certa in  T ra d i t io n . 2 l0 . Joseph C. Grew, 
T urbu len t ^ a :  A D iplom atic  Record o t F o rty  Y ears. 1904- 
1^45. ed. W alter Jonnson. (2 v o l s . : Boston; Houghton k i f f l i n  
Company, 1952), I I ,  1383-1385.
^®Arthur M. S c h le s in g e r, J r . , A Thousand Days; John F. 
Kennedy in  th e  W hite House (B oston: Houghton M if f l in  Compa­
ny , 1965), 409-412.
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I t  was perhaps too  much to  expect R oosevelt and th e  
American peop le  to  w ithdraw  t h e i r  f u l l  su p p o rt from Chiang 
K ai-shek  as th e  S ta te  Department China e x p e rts  advocated . 
America had u n d e rw ritte n  th e  Chiang regim e in  o rd e r  to  
m a in ta in  th e  Open Door in  China in  th e  fa c e  o f Japanese  
a g re s s io n . S ince then  Chiang had become th e  symbol o f China 
in  th e  minds of most Am ericans. R oosevelt and th e  American 
p eo p le  would have found i t  v ery  d i f f i c u l t  to  w ithdraw  su p p o rt 
from Chiang and n o t b e lie v e  t h ^  had d e se r te d  China,
I t  i s  n o t th e  purpose  of t h i s  work to  p r e d ic t  what 
would have happened in  China had H urley n o t been s e n t  th e re  
o r  had R oosevelt had him re p la c e d  when th e  fo re ig n  s e rv ic e  
o f f i c e r s  in  th e  Embassy p ro te s te d  a g a in s t  h i s  am ateu rish  
methods and in a c c u ra te  r e p o r t in g .  C e r ta in ly  by th e  tim e Hur­
le y  a r r iv e d  in  C hina, l i t t l e  could  have been done to  p rev en t 
a Communist takeover th e r e .  P erhaps, however, i f  th e  course  
advocated  by th e  S ta te  Departm ent o f f i c i a l s  had been fo llow ed , 
th e  U nited S ta te s  would be faced  today w ith  a le s s  h o s t i l e  
Communist China, th e  Korean War m ight w e ll have been avoided, 
and a le s s  dogm atic M arx ist government m ight have come in to  
c o n tro l  in  China.
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